

· in memory of ·

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1910 ~ 1964

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1916 ~ 1976

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1941 ~ 1980

The Busmen: a Labour Process Perspective

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PREFACE

This study had its initial stages funded by a post-graduate award from the Social Science Research Council, and I thank that body for its support.

The Department of Sociology, University of Edinburgh, extended its facilities to me in a generous manner. Professor Tom Burns was my supervisor at the beginning of the research. Both have due thanks.

Despite the interest of members of staff, notably Frank Bechhofer, my research ran into successive difficulties, until the burden of its production was taken over by Michael Anderson. I am very happy to have the opportunity of recording both an academic and personal debt to him for volunteering to take over what was generally viewed as a hopeless task. What has eventually been produced has been so largely through his interest, patience, encouragement, support, and provision of a forum for discussion from which the ideas in this thesis emerged.

I also owe a personal debt to Irene Young, who was instrumental in my producing this work.

Dr Sean Damer's comments on the labour process aspects were sufficiently helpful to absolve him of his hasty vow to buy me a crate of champagne if I ever finished.

I wish to record also my appreciation of the patience and good-humoured interest of those crews I formally interviewed. My dependence on the insights of them, and of the crews I worked with over the years runs through much of the thesis.

The manuscript was heroically twice typed by Annie Davies, for which much thanks.

Finally, I declare that this thesis has been composed by myself and the work is my own.

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses one particular capitalist labour process, that involved in the production of bus services. Although it concentrates for the most part on the conflicts, contradictions, paradoxes and struggles at the point of production, it also seeks to locate such struggles for control by the work force within the general features of the capitalist labour process, and the industry itself within the wider political and economic context.

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INTRODUCTION

Like much academic work, the first draft of this thesis was written backwards: from examination of a mass of disparate empirical observations a conceptualisation of the processes involved was developed. Fortunately it is more permissible to admit this in sociology than in some other subjects.

The conceptualisation that eventually emerged arose from my review of the data I had. The ethnographic material, while fairly coherent, still lacked an overall location: certainly it related to busmen; certainly it was a valid expression of how busmen felt about their jobs and more importantly an analysis of why they felt as they did. But edging more to the central concerns of the thesis, the analysis of why busmen think and react as they do, led to the realisation that some more major sociological issues were involved. Analysis of the work tasks and work situation in order to find out why busmen respond as they do, led to consideration of wider issues than are common in industrial sociology. My analysis led me to the realisation that the task of producing a bus-service, the concomitant "technology", "work-tasks" and "occupational ideologies" were all dialectically related in the "labour-process" in a fundamentally capitalist bus-industry. In essence, even though all but one of the companies I compared were publicly owned, it was the particular constellation of capitalist ideology, assumptions about labour, and forms of control and forms of exploitation that structured the daily working life of busmen.

The adoption of this realisation not only enlarged the theoretical issues that had to be considered, but changed the scope and interpretation of the empirical material. For the analyses of work situations were no longer self-contained, but related not just to the overall form of the organisation, and say its methods of control, but to the much wider scene of the particular form of organisation found in capitalist societies.

It is against this background that I would place the central idea of this thesis - that of control and reactions to control. This idea structures two main themes - Firstly the control of busmen by their organisations: Secondly the struggle for control over their work tasks that busmen have.

These two themes are connected: busmen are put in the situation of seeking control over their work tasks because of the constraints put on them by the structure and processes of the organisation in defining the labour processes involved in producing a bus service.

Overall, the thesis refers to a dialectical analysis of the work situation of busmen. On the one hand there are the constraints and controls that the management of the organisation seek to enforce on their work force. The forms of control arise, not from any technological imperative, I argue, but from the capitalist structure of the industry. And this structure exists firstly historically, through the development of the industry, and secondly, persists because the bus industry is embedded in

a capitalist economy.

On the other hand, there is the reaction of the workers to these sets of constraints - their own attempts to bring under their control the instruments of material production: I argue that this is a constructive-creative response to the management domination of the labour process and emphasise that workers are not just passive victims of work structures.

The structure of the thesis seeks to establish (in Chapter One) the capitalist form and ideology of the publicly owned bus industry, and then after some methodological considerations, analyse how the ideology of capitalism constrains the work situation and how the work force responds to the situation. The last chapter returns to a more formal consideration of the labour process, and addresses some current contentions. It should be evident that my consideration of the "occupational attitudes and behaviour of bus crews" seeks to relate the work tasks to a wider framework: to establish the relationship between internal organisation structures, processes and ideologies with the society in which they exist.

A quick overview of the issues taken up in this History and Structure section is necessary. I intend to briefly outline those general features of capitalism which should be traceable in the bus industry if it is to be shown to conform to this general progression, with the corollary that the work-force will be in the same structural position as other workers in organisations with

a capitalist economy. This is of importance, not only as a means of explaining how the busmen's work tasks are structured, and how they react to these tasks (the main substance of my thesis), but also because these workers are service workers (and analyses of this type generally deal with industrial production workers) and the industry is publicly owned and most other studies have dealt with privately owned industries. Naturally it follows that if one idea in my thesis is correct - that it is the ideology of capitalism that structures the position of these service workers in a nationalised industry - then it follows that the dominance of capitalism in the production of goods and services is much more than has been argued in industrial sociology, and even this argument itself has had but a late emergence in this area.

My first task is to establish that bus companies do not differ from other productive enterprises in any significant way. At a very simple level it might suffice to say that bus companies were established for profit and that present public ownership has not, as a matter of historical fact, changed how they go about producing bus services. But this would beg the question of what constitutes the capitalist-defined labour process, and how far bus companies conform to it. So I will be looking at features of the capitalist labour process - division of labour, accommodation, degradation of work, discipline, increasing control of labour, costs, and revenue,

agglomeration, valorisation, deskilling and so on and at the same time looking at how bus companies became embedded in part of the capitalist economic structure. I will establish this latter point as one of importance because the actual capitalist structure clashes with the "public utility" image that the managers of the organisation hold: this is perhaps a rather surprising thing to seek to establish since I think it true to say that the general image of bus companies is not one of typical capitalism. But it is the contradictions between the intent of public road passenger transportation organisation, with its "service" orientation, and the capitalist organisation structural processes whereby it seeks to accomplish its intent, that explains much of the busman's work situation and his reaction to it. It will become apparent in reviewing the history and structure of the bus industry that clear class divisions have their place: that bus companies were in fact typical capitalist industries and went through the typical progression of advanced capitalism, accompanied by the typical capitalist labour processes.

If bus companies have indeed gone through this typical process then certain features should be apparent in that history. As the editors of C.S.E. (1976) put it:

In the labour process, nature is transformed to fulfill human needs. But this transformation must be carried out under certain social relations which can be seen in the productive process itself, and which define not only the conditions of work and the distribution of the product, but the overall configuration of classes and the division of labour between different activities.

Capitalism is characterised by the separation of workers from the means of production. Initially this may simply mean that the capitalist, as owner of the means of production, appropriates the commodities produced by wage-labourers, as in the craft-based stage of production Marx called manufacture, where capital is dependent upon the mutual co-operation of workers. But capital must overthrow the handicraft bases of production - not simply because it imposes technical limits to the accumulation of capital, but because it enables the independent craft worker to resist the discipline of capital. Thus in the full development of the capitalist mode of production capital strives to establish its direct control over the labour process. This becomes a crucial terrain of class struggle, the accumulation of capital depends on capital's ability to assert its control over the division of labour within production.

The analysis of how the bus industry went through these processes, must necessarily be on a large scale, with material used from the few available sources. This will stand in contrast to more detailed analysis of the present working situation of a particular number of busmen, the subject of my empirical research. The connection between the two should be apparent, however.

Nichols (1980) has argued persuasively that an examination of the labour process is a vital part of the theorisation of industrial sociology. This argument is one I will take up in the Conclusion, but for the moment I wish to introduce some concepts relevant to the theory of labour process, in order to contextualise theoretically the examination of concrete labour processes, which forms the bulk of the thesis; and to introduce some concepts that I will be using to analyse the bus industry as a capitalist entity. If this theorisation is correct, then it should be possible to demonstrate that the bus industry

despite its public ownership and declared "service" ethos has been formed and behaves like any other capitalist organisation; i.e. an organisation formed for the pursuit of profit. This I do in examining the history of the industry.

Thus, in this thesis I hope to bring together two important ideas of Marx, the forces of production, and the labour process. The first is examined in Chapter One, the second is illustrated for the bus industry in subsequent chapters.

Two articles are used in discussing the concepts involved, Brighton Labour Process Group (B.L.P.G.) (1977) and Elger (1979).

Elger neatly summarises the intent of this discussion and its relation with both the history of the industry and my analysis of the particular labour processes involved:

. . . it is necessary to advance . . . towards a historically located theorisation . . . (which) would explicitly locate the forms of transformation of the labour process in relation to phases of valorisation and accumulation, and trace that articulation with class relations beyond production

(Elger 1979:88)

Despite Elger's criticism of B.L.P.G. for a "truncated mode of formal analysis" - that they do not deal with concrete historical processes, as I will do, they conveniently outline some basic points.

Firstly they point to the ultimate material basis of politics in the capitalist mode of production as being the dual dominance of capital over labour: in the form of

ownership of the means of production on the one hand, and the form of real control over the process of production on the other. Importantly, in terms of class struggle, they note that this domination is never completely established, for the changes involved in the processes of capital accumulation, necessitate re-establishment of dominance in new conditions. It is important to note that this provides an opportunity for the working class to react strongly to domination, in view of the influence of Braverman (1974) on writings on the labour process. It is of course Braverman's failure to address class struggle which Elger (1979) criticises. This struggle as Elger points out, has also to be related to wider political struggles outwith any particular production process, so that the worker is not simply treated as an object of capital, but is, as I shall argue, creatively involved in conflict and control, as indeed might be expected given the attention that capitalists devote to controlling their work-forces.

B.L.P.G. quote the basic premise, "Capitalist production is both a labour process, 'human action with a view to the production of use values' (Marx, Capital, I, p. 79) and a process of self-expanding value, of valorisation". (B.L.P.G. 1977: 4). Valorisation, they explain is specific to capitalism, and refers to the process whereby capitalism, as a social system is able to create surplus value. The production of surplus value (expropriated by the capitalist) takes place within two sets of capitalist

relations of production - economic relations, such as "free labour", wages, exchange values, etc., developed before the capitalist period, and specific production relations, being the various aspects of the control of the labour process by capital, whose aim is the production of surplus value through direction of labour power, i.e. exploitation of labour. As B.L.P.G. point out this control of the labour process is vital in that valorisation is not the necessary objective of work to the proletariat. But this control is not solely over the technical components, but involves control also of the "social combinations of labour":

It can only be specified as a particular form of social organisation of labour, a form which is a specific form of coercion and the realisation on an adequate basis of the objective of valorisation. (B.L.P.G. 1977: 6)

Thus capital is a social relationship, and the control of labour power is a social relationship, and a "despotic" one at that. Thus the point of production becomes the focus of a political struggle for control of the only commodity the working class owns, its own labour-power. But obviously what happens at the point of production cannot be cut off from the general processes of control of the working class in the capitalist state at large.

However, B.P.P.G. shy clear of this point (cf. the disclaimer on p. 4) but then closely discuss Formal and Real Subordination of Labour. The distinction is of course an important one, but can be dealt with here more lightly since it relates to the development of capital as a whole, while my period, I would argue (and certainly the

substantive material) lies wholly within the period of real subordination of labour. It would be possible to argue that the period 1830-50 in the Omnibus industry was formal subordination, since crews typically hired a bus by the day, but this is a relatively minor point for the purposes of this thesis. However, insofar as formal subordination of labour implies retention of control beyond the normal rigours of capitalism as in, say, a machine-paced industry, and as I shall argue even present day busmen retain a wide area of control, the distinction should be borne in mind, especially since formal subordination is still a form of coercion, particularly in the areas of intensity, duration and continuity of work, while it may involve greatly increased scale in production (which Marx said was the real basis on which the specifically capitalist mode of production develops, (Ibid: 7). The drive for greater valorisation through "efficiency" leads to increases in scale, intensity, etc., in short, a position where, "the seller is only in a relation of economic dependence on the buyer because the latter own the conditions of labour: it is no longer a fixed political and social relation which subjects labour to capital" (ibid: 9). However, the grounds for development into real subordination exist in that while there may be no innovation in the mode of production itself, there develops (a) "an economic relation of domination and subordination; because the capitalist is henceforth the consumer of labour power he

is therefore the supervisor and organiser of it, he controls because he owns the means of production:

(b) greatly increased continuity and intensity of labour
. . . " To anticipate slightly, this characterises very closely the early phase in the bus industry from small scale entrepreneurs to large monopolistic organisations within a space of twenty-five years or so.

It is the advent of large-scale industry that precipitates the Real subordination of labour to capital. In this phase a contradiction emerges between private appropriation and socialised labour:

As the forces of production of society develop . . . they are socialised and become directly social (collective) as a result of co-operation, the division of labour, within the workshop, the use of machinery and in general the transformations which the production process undergoes as a result of the conscious application of the natural sciences, of mechanics, of chemistry etc., applied with definite technological objectives, and as a result of everything that is involved in labour conducted on a large scale

(Marx, *ibid*: 10)

Nichols (1980 27ff) summarises the features of real subordination of labour as involving continuous revolution of production as an indispensable tendency since the capitalist enterprise becomes locked in an inter-enterprise capitalist competitive system, necessitating the extension of capital through innovation and increased productivity of labour (i.e. relative surplus value becomes the dominant mode of exploitation). However, I feel Nichols over emphasises the plant aspects of the forces of production

insofar as the forces of production may be demanding of as high a discipline as any found in a factory, without the labour process being machine paced. The organisation of production, quite apart from the pace of machines, may be equally anarchic and despotic, as I later hope to show in my analysis. This in no way implies that workers in such a labour process are any less fragmented, degraded, or alienated (cf. *ibid*: 28).

A point B.L.P.G. make forcefully is that the technical and social upheavals of innovation involves a class struggle at the point of production. This has occasioned the doing away with skills at some times, but has also strengthened certain sectors of the work force, (as exemplified by the change from horse-drawn to electric trams). Yet overall, the point of relevance for this theme is the imposition of discipline on a collective work force. (The emphasis on factories tends to obscure that capital worked in this way in non-machine production, as I shall show). Many of the conflicts in present day bus work stem from this contradiction between regulation and unforeseen contingencies at the point of production.

Since busmen are not, on the face of it, employed in the same sort of machine-paced work as semi-skilled factory work - are not immediately coerced by the instruments of production of machinofacture, it is important to look at valorisation and capitalist management.

The main point is that the division of labour is organised by capital for the purposes of valorisation. And capital can only do this through a system of power relations designed to increase valorisation through discipline and enforcement of its exploitation of labour through a system of norms and penalties, the chief being replaceability of labour. I will examine the formation of such power relations in the bus industry in Chapter One, and subsequent chapters will, in part, demonstrate that present day operation in bus work. In passing, it is worth noting that this organisation of power relations is explicit in capitalism, and not as Braverman (1974) suggests, a result of scientific management applications.

As B.L.P.G. point out (ibid: 13) this system of power relations seeks to develop to the maximum, intensity of performance of tasks, maximum predictability, continuity of production and cheap and easily replaceable labour. All of these will be seen to emerge in the formation of the bus industry. It is also worth noting their point (ibid: 14) that material forms of production can be taken over for non-capitalist objectives. I will argue that many of the contradictions of present day bus work remain through public control because they stem from the transfer of the forces of production and concrete labour processes of capitalist organisation directly to forms of municipal and national ownership unchanged, and as these organisations act in a capitalist-dominated economy, their original social aims have become degraded to the level of any other form of

capitalist relations of production.

Three "basic structural features" of the capitalist labour process - (i) the separation of mental and manual labour, (ii) hierarchical control and (iii) fragmentation/deskilling of labour appear to pose some difficulties in applying fully a labour process analysis to bus work. For though (i) and (ii) are clearly evident, (iii) is problematic in that bus work has not become less skilled since its inception and a large amount of control is still held by bus workers. However, as B.L.P.G. point out (ibid: 24) there are a number of important processes which do not fall under the full force of the law of value. In the body of the thesis I examine some of this complexity.

However, a little comment on the three basic structural features is apposite.

B.L.P.G. (ibid: 17ff) see the division of intellectual and manual labour as the securing of control of the organisation by separating the application of knowledge, say in the designing of the system of operations from those who carry out the tasks in a controlled and routinised way.

Hierarchy is of course a way of dealing with the antagonisms inherent in a capitalist labour process, through acquiring of information about individual workers, so as to be able to initiate appropriate sanctions. That is, hierarchy is the expression of the power of management to control.

Fragmentation/deskilling is the feature posing most problems for this thesis. The importance of Braverman's

(1974) work can hardly be overlooked.

But as Elger (1979) has commented, deskilling is not a necessary part of the degradation of labour. I shall show in the body of the thesis that conditions of exploitation exist most pertinently for busmen, yet it is difficult to argue that their task has been deskilled, except in the rather particular sense that at various stages multi-skill entrepreneurship has given way to employment on task performance by hired labour.

Nonetheless Braverman identifies a situation which will be seen to aptly describe part of the work situation of busmen.

Workers who are controlled only by general orders and discipline are not adequately controlled, because they retain their grip on the actual processes of labour . . . (and) they will thwart efforts to realise to the full the potential in their labour power. To change this situation control over the labour process must pass into the hands of management, not only in a formal sense but by the control and dictation of each step of the process, including its mode of performance.

(Braverman 1974: 100)

In short, busmen have escaped some of the aspects of the capitalist labour process, but not others and this is what my thesis is all about; the possibilities for resistance occurring in a particular capitalist labour process.

My final point in this brief discussion of some features of the capitalist labour process, is that I agree with Elger (1979: 67) in his criticising of B.L.P.G. for adopting a level of abstraction which precludes location of changes in the labour process with specific phases of

accumulation, and changes in the relations of capital beyond production: My own analysis of the bus industry seeks to include these elements, though obviously it must be much more limited in depth and scope than Elger envisages, especially since my main intent is to examine the conflicts and contradictions in one particular labour process in one particular industry.

CHAPTER ONE: History and Structure

This first chapter has three aims.

Firstly, to locate changes in the concrete labour processes of bus work by tracing the changes in forms of capital accumulation and degrees of exploitation of labour, with references (though somewhat cursory) to the changes in political and social domination in the period.

Secondly, to explore the ideology of management, to see in what ways domination of the labour force is sustained, and how managers attempt to deal with the contradictions inherent in the industry.

Thirdly to explore some global contradictions inherent in the industry and how they affect internal and external relations, how they are coped with, or not, by management and crews.

Section One: History

In overview, the industry moves from a period of small entrepreneurs exploiting a new technology, (and quickly creating a system of ruinous competition), to the setting up of large-scale companies, funded by massive injections of capital and employing mass labour-power, to a period of monopoly, falling profit and intensification of the labour process, changed by technical innovation, with high competition and improvements in the material conditions of work against a background of a general climate of "socialisation", followed by a collapse into another period of entrepreneurial competition, then a period of consolidation by large masses of capital accompanied by an improvement

in the material conditions of work, followed by a further period of monopoly, and eventually, falling profit, accompanied by intensification of the labour process.

There is an apparent problem of disjuncture in levels of analysis which I wish to clear up first. An account of the global characteristics of an entire industry even simply at the national level, never mind the possible international comparisons is bound to stand in contrast to the following chapters which examine in detail specific labour processes (even if I do draw on material gained all over Scotland). However, it is necessary to the purposes of the whole thesis to make explicit that the two levels are connected: that the labour process at the point of production is connected with the structure of exploitation in the whole industry, and that struggles for control at the point of production are ultimately related to whole social structures of domination. This historical section endeavours to show the continuity of this struggle from the earliest beginnings of the industry to the present day.

So although my empirical material is set in Scotland in the late 1960s and early 1970s, my discussion, which uses much material from London, will, I think, be seen to be clearly relevant. A further important point is that the industry did not exist to any significant extent in Scotland till c. 1880, while it was established as a full-scale capitalist operation in London from c. 1840. A last point must be that in an area with a paucity of published and relevant material, use must be made of what exists.

In this respect I am fortunate in being able to use the excellent History of London Transport by Barker and Robbins (1974).

Although Blaise Pascal is usually credited with the idea of a public vehicle plying for hire between designated points, the origins of British bus services are clearly in the introduction of omnibuses to London by George Shillibeer in 1829. Prophetically, he was driven out of business by competition and the pécadilloes of his conductors and ended life as an undertaker.

Shillibeer's original reasoning was that by reducing the price and enlarging the numbers carried over existing conveyances, a success could be made. He was right, but unfortunately this innovation was so easy to emulate that intense competition drove Shillibeer from six vehicles to bankruptcy within a year.

Buses served the needs of an expanding middle class, whose means did not rise to a hackney, so a profitable market existed if means could be found to limit the mutually ruinous competition. The conventional capitalist answer, which reappears again in the history of the bus industry, was to form coalitions to monopolise routes and restrict competition. However, the process of capital accumulation was not all that easy, and Shillibeer, who had headed this combine, failed, and was put in the Fleet for debt.

Much of the success or failure of the owner of this time depended on the ability of the "cad" or conductor in

cajoling hesitant passengers to join, and overcrowding the bus, which illegal eventuality was difficult to detect. This, and the loitering, followed by speeding to make up time, led to fines on the crews. Thus, from the beginning bus crews have been involved in a labour process requiring a wide range of manipulative skills, which have rendered them liable to civil penalties, in the production of surplus value for their employer.

In 1839 control of what was viewed as chaotic conditions were imposed. Drivers and conductors had to be licensed, and could be fined for various road offences, while Parliament legislated degrees of control over proprietors, covering routes, fares etc. This legislation appears from Barker and Robbins' (1974: 36) account to have been a result of a pressure group acting on Parliament. It might be expected that this would result in a period of formation of large companies, but this was not the case. Out of c. 825 vehicles, the biggest grouping was 46. Generally proprietors were job masters, engaged in general work, while the expenses of a bus were high, requiring a stud of twelve horses to keep it on the road for fourteen hours a day, at a cost of 15s a week each for feed (ibid: 36). The cost effectively limited the market. Barker and Robbins make no comment on living standards for the crews, but they might have been easier than they were later, since the day was only fourteen hours long, with probably quite long breaks from actually being on the road. It is also likely

that controls over receipts were freer - i.e. the crews could make more.

This period of relative stability continued till the International Exhibition of 1851. The exhaustion of capacity to meet this traffic need led subsequently to intense competition, with great numbers of failures. As a result,

Each omnibus was being run more intensively than before, and profit margins (and it can be assumed, wages) were cut to a minimum,
(ibid: 63)

while mergers of interests were made.

At this stage a merger of two forces typical of this industry - finance and what has been seen as the administration of a public utility - occurred.

Edwin Chadwick, the social reformer had an interest in the Paris system of controlling fares and routes and frequencies through the granting of a monopoly franchise, being convinced of the "disutilities of competition in public services", and encouraged talks of mergers in 1854. At this point, a group of French businessmen began a bid for control of the London bus services, which eventually led to the formation of the London General Omnibus Company (L.G.O.C.) in 1855.

The venture had the hallmarks of mid-Victorian financial entrepreneurship or "effrontery" as Barker and Robbins put it (ibid: 76ff). The capital funding was shaky, and members of the trade were bought over in return for inflated prices for assets and future well paid

managerial posts.

One member's view was that the take over was a job on the part of five or six members of their own trade to help themselves at the general expense. (ibid: 76)

Further tricks ensued: purchases of 600 vehicles were fraudulently announced, threats were made to the opposition and bribes to vacillators, staff were attracted from railway companies, obscure share dealings resulted in £100,000 (one sixth of the paid up capital) going to the original small group of financiers, and at the end, the opposition was crushed, and one giant company, the largest bus company in the world, controlled threequarters of London's public transport service.

This company (still two-thirds French-owned) was radically different from the previous forms through which transport was provided: this was full-scale capitalism, and the new features, of hierarchy of control specialists and supervisors, aimed at control, were implemented.

Accountants were employed, attention was directed at cutting costs, vets were employed and conditions improved generally for the horses, to prolong their working life (with) large-scale processing of feed and centralised building and repair works

while for the men

. . . and employing inspectors to check on conductors whose takings fell below the average. (ibid: 83-84)

Although it suffered financially in part from the remaining competition, the company was able to gain a virtual monopoly through agreements. However, this virtual

monopoly did not solve its problems.

Firstly the entrepreneurs had taken as much as £150,000 out of the company and into their private pockets right at the start, besides giving "more than generous" compensation for those who sold out, and servicing an "unexplained" debt of £100,000, and having £5,000 worth of shares "disappear".

Secondly, high profits had had to be guaranteed to attract sufficient capital and to pay a high enough dividend to forestall suspicions of financial impropriety.

Despite cutting costs, the new company failed to meet expectations, and control passed into British hands, though the bulk of the shares were still held in France.

This period of stability lasted almost to the end of the century, with a continuance of low profits, exacerbated by growing competition from railways and tramways: later returns were somewhat better, due to a relative fall in the value of its capital, the abolition of mileage duty, and a fall in the price of horsefeed, though these conditions also encouraged some competition.

The essence of these problems for capital was a reduction in costs and a more intensive use of labour. The evidence that more intensive use was made of labour, is rather secondary, but fairly clear. Mention has already been made of stricter control of revenue, though this would be limited in scope, because the extra money encouraged conductors to drum up trade, and there was still sufficient

freedom for Barker and Robbins to argue (ibid: 275) that crews were in business for themselves, virtually hiring by the day. This is a nonsensical interpretation, I feel, for the organisation was clearly able to sack crews for not producing enough, and was able to impose a sixteen hour day, with much more intensive working - making the work less "porous", while legislation, initiated largely by, and in the interests of, proprietors, further sought to control the crews.

Wages, Barker and Robbins calculate (ibid: 279) would total 35s to 40s per week. But the sixteen hour day started at 7.30 a.m. and terminus breaks were usually of fifteen minutes, after a three hour trip, and probably only that long for the horses' sakes. This represented a greater intensification of the labour process compared with the shorter and more porous working day of the 1830s. As a driver remarked to Mayhew,

Every horse in our stables has one day's rest in four, but it's no rest for the driver. (ibid: 280)

They worked a seven day week, and in appalling conditions, exposed to all weathers, the conductor perched on a small step at the back, fined for bad timekeeping and walking considerable distances to and from that sixteen hour day.

The recessions and general unemployment of this period provided little opportunity for reaction to these conditions. Trade Unions for general workers had still to emerge, and the huge reserve army of labour provided ten applicants for each job, with only "relief" (i.e. casual) work available at

first. Although the work was not greatly affected by recession, it was still very insecure, with little continual employment, and dismissal for the slightest offence or complaint,

. . . upwards of three-quarters of the (L.G.O.C.) conductors left within the year.

Obviously this is an almost classic case of monopoly capital driving its labour power as hard as possible to meet the demands of its financial funding, and exploiting a mass of unemployed to do so, an exemplar of formal subsumption of labour.

Perhaps this period of exploitation may be thought too remote to be of relevance. Should that be so, a personal note may shorten the perspective. I was driving a bus c. 1970. My grandfather drove a tram c. 1920. So I am discussing the conditions of my quasi-hereditary occupation at the time my grandfather was born, a mere three generations. I shall of course be providing an implicit comparison with this period in my discussion of the labour process in the 1970s.

The labour force responded to this oppression through intense class struggle culminating in 1889 when the tramway workers formed a Union which resulted in an amelioration of conditions, including the abolition of the system of excessive fines.

So when the L.G.O.C., in 1891, sought further control of revenue by implementing a ticket system, they found themselves with a fight on their hands. Although the

company had tried to forestall action by offering higher wages, the loss to the crews (the driver and horse-keeper had a share in what the conductor made) obviously was not enough, and they went on strike. The difficulty was that the owners had never openly acknowledged what Charles Booth called "peculation", and thus the crews were unable to strike on the grounds of what was in reality a cut in wages. Instead, they had to base their struggle on a claim for shorter hours. In this they were successful, for management soon conceded a twelve hour day, and a modest increase in wages. Barker and Robbins have evidence (ibid 287) that some of the "ringleaders" were not re-employed, and that hours began gradually to creep up to that old level.

Thus the strike could not be called a success in economic terms, but it established some means of collective action, and did make a break with a life that had been wholly work, a matter of great long-term importance.

For the company there were of course costs in paying for more hours and equipment, but also a great increase in the extraction of profit: receipts in 1892 were £805,000 compared with £696,000 in 1890.

Because of later combination of interests, it is appropriate to remark the parallel funding of tramways in the period 1860-1890. One of the points of interest of tramways was that the use of rails (besides affording increased capacity and speed) necessarily involved the local authorities, who were responsible for the upkeep of

the roadway. This involvement happened at a time when "municipalisation" was a potent driving force throughout the land, water and gas and hygiene and other public utilities had been taken over, and the idea was rife that public transport was a similar utility. Thus the tramway companies secured rights to tramways which were often very advantageous to the municipalities, which resulted in the tramways being transferred to local ownership some few decades later. In the short term however, the difficulty of making profit under these conditions seems to have led to extreme exploitation of the crews (as the example of Glasgow, below, shows).

The existence of impoverished tramways, also allowed later massive international capital investment on electrification, an investment that would have been much more difficult had only bus interests been involved.

A brief look at tramway history is instructive, since it presages later developments in public ownership. It also shows that capital, even massive capital on an international scale, had to struggle against a popular social policy which sought to control entrepreneurial exploitation of a public necessity.

The compulsion of capital to innovate in order to maintain or improve its position is clearly shown in late nineteenth century tramways. Horse tramways were largely stagnant: it was apparent that some form of mechanisation was imminent. This had two results: horse services deteriorated because of reluctance to buy new stock,

especially when their leases were due to lapse soon, and municipalities became greatly concerned with achieving social benefits through the transport system.

In Europe generally, local authorities had evolved means to take over and control public utilities, and tramways were often viewed as such. Local authorities saw both the benefits of dispersal of the working class from squalid crowded central areas and the inherently monopolistic nature of tramways. Of course it would be wrong to suggest that every sizeable town was anti-capitalistic, but as McKay (1976 90ff) makes clear, strong measures were taken to control the working of the capitalist firms who offered to operate the lines (which the city usually leased to the company), so that dividends were usually of the order of 5 per cent, (higher profits came generally from the supply of equipment, particularly with electrification), while cut-price "workmen's" tickets were often imposed, along with control of routes and better conditions for tram workers. Thus tramways in particular have to be seen against a Europe-wide improvement in work and living conditions. As McKay puts it (ibid: 113):

Most significantly European (his contrast is with the USA) cities won specific improvements directed towards ameliorating specific social problems, which weighed heavily on the growing urban civilization. And the search for these specific improvements was clearly a manifestation of one of the powerful organizing concepts of nineteenth century Europe . . . the ideal of amelioration of harmful social conditions through intelligent compassionate public policy and governmental action. . . .

Not to mention, I might add, increasingly powerful and organised labour movements, with their sights on something more than just amelioration. But the benefits were real.

Barker and Robbins (1974) include an extract:

The social effect of the new L.C.C. tram in South London has been described most persuasively by Charles Masterman, a shrewd Liberal commentator on social conditions in Edwardian England who went to live in Camberwell in 1900. At that time, he writes:

'Our sole communication with London . . . was a few erratic horse omnibuses and the lines of slow-moving two-horse trams, which diverged fan-like to the bases of the various bridges. Here at evening, a tired indignant crowd fought silently for entrance into each successive conveyance; the young and old were squeezed out and occasionally trampled under. The crowded tram jogged off quietly into the night. By the dim light of two odorous oil lamps we contemplated dismally the dismal countenance of our neighbours. Half an hour afterwards, or perhaps three-quarters, we were deposited amongst the crowded warrens which we called home.'

By contrast, a few years later

We have fast lines of electric trams, brilliantly lighted, in which reading is a pleasure, hurrying us down from over the bridges at half the time expended under the old conditions. Each workman to-day in the district has had half an hour added to his life - half an hour actually saved from the transit and half an hour given back to him in the transit. . . Family after family are evacuating the blocks and crowded tenements for little four-roomed cottages, with little gardens, at Hither Green or Tooting. The unaccustomed sign TO LET can be seen in almost every street. Owners of block dwellings find themselves drawn - to their indignation - to undertake work of renovations, cleanliness and general improvement before they can obtain satisfactory tenants. The two greatest boons which have come to our people are the gas stove and the fast electric tram.

However, not all cities were willing to content themselves with specifying lines, fares, frequencies and

(often) profit level.

Glasgow provided a model for take over of tramways by the municipality. It is important to understand that Glasgow, besides having some of the worst conditions in the country, also was a pioneer in civic concern for the working classes. It is besides the point to question whether this was merely enlightened self interest or not, for the measures taken were broadly for the benefit of the people and had their firm support. (c.f. Glasgow, 1914, : 2). Municipalisation dates from 1855 with water, 1869 gas, 1891 electricity and 1894 the horse-trams.

But even when the horse-tram company was putting forward plans in 1870, the Corporation made sure that the necessary Parliamentary Bill was advantageous to the city, commenting . . .

. . . as to the proposal to use the streets belonging to the Corporation without paying any price therefor, to the Corporation as proprietors of the solum, second as to the power of the Corporation to control and regulate the traffic on the proposed tramways and the means of enforcing such regulation as may be necessary; third as to the power of removal of these tramways should they be found to be a nuisance, fourth as to the fares to be charged, which in the case of a monopoly, such as is proposed, should be stringently operated.

The committee are of the opinion that Tramways, if found desirable should be laid down by the City Authorities and maintained by them and worked under their control.

(Excerpt from minute of meeting of Parliamentary Bills committee at Glasgow, 2nd February, 1870 in (Glasgow 1922)

Thus, although popular pressure in the 1891 election

encouraged the municipalisation of the tram, the intent had been clearly stated two decades earlier. However, in 1870, the Corporation decided to allow a private company to operate, specifying half-fares

. . . for the Working Classes . . . between five and seven in the morning . . . and between five and seven in the evening.

It is clear from the Lord Provost's speech (ibid pp 28-30) that the benefit to the public was at the forefront of public expression, the horse tram being seen as a way of greatly reducing the fatigues of journeys to work of the worker.

McKay (1976) points to three basic arguments behind municipalisation generally. First was the very poor standard of service operated, with a desire for extension of lines and better rolling stock. Second was the city engineers' desires to have control of the streets' maintenance, and third was an openly expressed argument that gains from the operation of a public necessity should not flow into private shareholders' pockets. Advocates argued that the city could make more profit through better administration and lower interest rates, while the idea of a contribution to city rates appealed to business leaders. But also important was a quite explicit aim of paying the workers more than the norm for unskilled labour, set by the general labour market, arguing that municipal tramways could become enlightened pacemakers, exerting real upward pressure on unskilled wage rates that would go far beyond

their own workers. (ibid: 173). (Hunter (1964: 229) gives the example of Hull at this time, where workers worked seven days a week totalling 90 hours for 20s to 25s, with fines amounting to about 10 per cent of their wage.)

The struggle to gain control of the trams in Glasgow was a hard one, with the owners apparently using every trick to prevent being bought over, and even after they lost that battle, they continued with horse buses, attempting to swamp the Corporation trams. The Corporation was helped by massive popular support, since it was felt that "poor working conditions made it difficult to get a good class of man on the trams" (McKay: 175), with the potential take over featuring in the elections of 1890 and 1891. The Corporation was hugely successful: the first $\frac{1}{2}$ d fare in Britain was introduced and traffic jumped by 60 per cent in the second year of municipal ownership. Hours of labour by tram workers were lowered to ten hours a day and wages per hour increased by 15 per cent, free uniform being provided.

. . . the supply of suitable men seeking employment far exceeded demand. Strikes and threats of strikes were not a problem . . . advocates of municipalization . . . could point to improved social relations and better conditions for the working class, in addition to cheaper transport for the riding public. (ibid: 176)

Although on electrification in 1896 Glasgow initially bought American capital equipment, it quickly sought to protect itself from excessive deprecations of capital by building its own power station and engineering works.

I have discussed the example of Glasgow in depth not simply because it provides one of the groups of bus workers I discuss later, but because it shows several important features of capitalism and the struggle against it.

Firstly, the decision to municipalise, although couched sometimes in economic terms, was a political and ideological one, aimed explicitly at benefitting the mass of the people and the workers who operated the system. The Lord Provost of Glasgow, writing in 1914, places civic concern and the amelioration of the city firmly in the support of the working classes for municipalisation. This extent, (water, gas, electricity and transport), he writes, has by others been called "rank socialism". However, he introduces the contradiction of municipalisation as a means of class struggle, thinking a better term to be "municipal trading" or "civic co-operation".

To my mind the only limit should be the point at which the community ceases to find an adequate supply of disinterested representatives able and willing to carry on public enterprises for the common benefit.

(Municipal Glasgow, 1914: 2)

(He advocates the municipalisation of milk supplies as the next step followed by public hospitals and housing.)

Despite the contradictions, municipalisation did result in a material improvement for the working class.

Secondly, the electrification programme throughout Europe, as McKay (op. cit) illustrates, confirms that advantage was taken of technological innovation for the

workforce to enhance its position. Partly through earlier strike action, but much more through scarcity of the new skills, and encouraged by socially concerned schemes like Glasgow's, and partly by the exigencies of the new technology, hours generally were cut to 54 to 60 and in the period 1900 to 1910 wages rose by 30 per cent.

However, though tramway workers were able dramatically to improve their position vis a vis other groups of semi-skilled workers, McKay has calculated that the real increase in wages was only 10 per cent, and that the real gain was the reduction in hours (McKay 1976: 230-1).

Further on the side of resumed pressure to control the work force, there was a third factor - a lasting contradiction. By 1910, the Municipal Tramways Association identified the success of Glasgow's tramways to (placing)

the entire management in the hands of one man, John Young, who occupies the position of general manager, and who really runs the Tramway Department as if it were a private company, and is independent . . . from the meddling of committees the division of authority, and the petty annoyances which thus arise, particularly from political aspirants.

(Rogers 1910: 94)

In short, though conditions and wages had improved, tight control over working practice was maintained. This idea of running a public service along "the best" "rational" private company lines was a powerful one, and I shall show its continuing relevance for management today, as well as its effects on the labour process present day crews are involved in.

Fourthly, the surplus revenue, while often used "for the common good" was also used to lower tax demands, which,

of course, helped capital most.

For the purposes of this thesis, the tramways example shows that material change in the forces of production did occur, largely as a result of working class pressure in conventional political ways, that general benefits both for the working class and the particular work force did ensue, but that the process of municipalisation contained its own self-limitations, and that in particular, the labour process remained largely untouched - indeed it is probable that the "rationality" of what was seen as "better and more efficient" municipal administration radically increased the extent of control.

Having given the example of Glasgow in detail, I propose to note only the main features of the taking into public ownership by London County Council of a large proportion of London's trams.

Barker and Robbins (op. cit) make clear that the political fight was intense, a fight which the Progressives won in 1898, but only because a syndicate of owners wished to sell out. The Council was eventually able to secure the Tramways on advantageous terms. It is worth noting that because of very high capital investment and controlled profits, few tramways were a success for their owners, Liverpool had had to take over the operation of its tramways as early as 1880 (Klapper: 1974: 87). The Progressives' objectives of creating better housing conditions by a policy of cheap fares, (allowing suburban housing development) and better conditions for the work

force, were greatly helped by the advent of electric power. However, this was quite definitely a piece of capitalist technology, and a number of powerful firms were involved in its exploitation. The application of electric power to both tramways and underground railways involved international capital on a great scale, with attendant financial chicanery of a type even to raise questions in Parliament. (Yerkes, who organised, with great profit to himself, the financing of the District Line had been chased out of Chicago by a lynch mob because of fraudulently "milking" the electric railway there, and openly specialised in "buy old junk, fix it up a little and unload it on other fellows". One of his co-financiers was Speers, and the company he formed also acquired London United Tramways, which allowed him to exploit land speculation on the basis of extension of lines. Also involved, though with less reported vice, were British Thomson-Houston (a subsidiary of General Electric of the U.S.A., and the British firm of Siemens, both of which had the American House of Morgan as main financial backer. (cf. Barker and Robbins, op. cit.: 61-85))

Most of these firms were interested in the lucrative business of supplying capital equipment, but one, British Electric Traction, a company criticised even at the time for its right wing connections, and attempts to control municipal routes, acted specifically as an operating company, and quickly extended from electric traction into motor bus operation, using its tramway rights for later substantial

bus operations

The transition to motor buses provides an interesting example of capitalist technological innovation with a concomitant betterment in the conditions for the work force. (Though it is doubtful if the conditions at the point of production improved: rain, hail and sleet are much more painful flung at the open cab (open till 1930) of a motor bus travelling at 25 m.p.h. than a horse bus travelling at 9 m.p.h.)

The connection with electrification is close: many of the first experiments and indeed successful vehicles were petro-electrical. But certainly in London, it was a matter of either the existing monopolies or large capital-intensive firms like B.E.T., seeking to improve exploitation through the more intensive use that motor buses were seen to have the potential to provide. Potential is the key word, for early experiments were disastrous. Only large firms could stand the expense - the collective that formed the London General Omnibus Company had been losing £250,000 a year among them on motor buses. Expenses of development were high (the companies often sought to build their own), breakdowns were very frequent, and the crucial factor - carrying capacity - was too low to cover costs. However, there was a compulsion to innovate. Even with a virtual monopoly, horse-bus operation was marginal: operating fixed costs were low: slight change in economic circumstances (price of feed, the weather) could affect profits severely: the motor bus was seen as a means of reducing

the unpredictablility of returns.

While dividends in horse buses were shrinking after 1900, by 1905 investors could be found interested in the motor bus (Barker and Robbins, op. cit.: 126), and competition escalated. Given the shaky technological foundation, there were fears of a "smash" and, typically, a number of companies combined to protect shareholders' interests, leading eventually to the formation of The Combine, run by Hopfield, a formation supported, curiously, by Sydney Webb, who looked for eventual control by L.C.C.

Again the efforts of capital were being threatened by moves towards public ownership: the response of the companies was to promulgate the idea that they were devoted to the idea of "public service".

Barker and Robbins note (op. cit.: 313) that conditions for labour eased in the period 1900-1914. Conductors even on the L.C.C. owned trams might not be allowed to sit, or even lean against the back of the tram, but hours were cut progressively to $8\frac{3}{4}$. On the motor buses shift work reduced the day to 8 or 9 hours, but often with a considerable spread-over. Claims for superannuation were dismissed (and not brought in till compulsorily introduced in 1970) but crews could join a union. It is likely that pay improved considerably given the new skills demanded and the comparability with tram-work. The ground work appears to have been laid for later considerable advances to a high degree of collectivisation (the T.W.U. was of considerable weight in the T.U.C. of 1919 when it also gained a 48 hour

week), and high wages and fringe benefits which lasted till the 1940s - even though the Union claimed that high wages were paid to stave off investigation of high profits.

However, conditions varied considerably, and not all companies, or indeed municipalities were concerned about labour conditions.

In St. Helens,

The tale of callous exploitation of labour power is given in the anonymous conductor's account of working on the trams in St Helens in the 1920s, recounted in Charles Forman. (1979: 96-99)

Two features are noticeable in the account. The first is the use of a trained reserve pool of labour - the spare. Men in this position were not yet offered a permanent post, but had to turn up at 4 a.m. to take the place of anyone who failed to turn up, indeed before 4 a.m. so as to be first in the queue. Of course, employment was not guaranteed, while the employee whose place was filled either had no pay for that day, or had to wait on an afternoon turn, which of course meant a late finish with another early start the next day. The respondent reports that this uncertainty over hours meant he often had only three or four hours sleep.

Even in regular appointments, the shift system was used to suit the convenience of management, with late turns being followed by early starts, coupled with long hours.

The discipline system was severe, with three reports for a missed fare leading to dismissal, although this accumulating sins was done with the knowledge of the

conductor. Lesser disciplinary measures were involved for other crimes such as failing to punch to within an eighth inch the correct fare stage - this on a crowded, swaying tram, with the tickets wet from exposure.

Management dealt with this breaking of its technical requirements by a severe tongue-lashing, though the crime is minor, and other ways can be used to check overriding.

A point of relevance to the theme of this thesis is that St Helens trams were municipalised,

but the running of them was left entirely in the hands of the management of the former private company. The brutal usage of men, the harsh discipline enforced for trivial offences, the exploitation of their physical capacities had its justification in the queue of men at the gates, hoping for a start on the spare list.

Who needs the relative sophistication of Scientific Management in such conditions?

Three features characterise the nature of the labour process in the bus industry between the Wars: despite an initial setback, the major firms established the still prevailing pattern of monopoly control, secondly, moves towards the "socialisation" of the industry, and thirdly, an intensification of labour which was accompanied by a climb by the work force to the top of the semi-skilled wage force. (Routh: 1965: 92-94)

After the First World War "established" operators were severely threatened by a type of competition the industry had not seen for many years. The war had released both a great number of technically improved vehicles and trained men, with a small capital, onto the market. Many

immediately began running bus services. Particularly in country areas these typically one-man enterprises grew considerable, but the competition was probably fiercest in London, where the existing "established" companies fought a vicious war against the "Pirates". This was more due to impulsion towards control of the territory that the major companies had divided among themselves than for strict commercial reasons, since the Pirates typically operated at peak periods and thus kept costs down for "regular" operators. A dirty struggle ensued, with "flooding" of routes and drivers encouraged to literally run others off the road, but although the major companies had some success with these tactics, it was not until the passing of the 1930 Road Traffic Act, and particularly its licensing clauses, that they won their present control.

The R.T.A. was the result of a strange mixture of pressures. Firstly there was the straight commercial desire for control by the major companies, now (since 1924) bolstered by nine million pounds of the railway companies' money, with their claim to best serve the nation's transport needs.

Secondly, there was pressure from a lobby which had long sought to bring transport under national control, including nationalisation if necessary, and which put forward arguments about the "socialisation" of transport, with obvious connections with the municipal socialism movement, and supported by moves to take London's transport

into public ownership. This diverse body of opinion was in general supported by the third factor, Ernest Bevin's desire to see a monolithic union structure dealing with single owners, which could only come about if Pirates were driven from the streets.

The Act was precipitated by an industrial dispute that was used by the head of the London Combine, Ashfield, and Bevin, in combination to bring the Combines into control of the L.C.C. In this they were successful. But it should be noted that Bevin's ideas of union structure were resisted strongly by the London Busmen, some of whom formed the "Rank and File" movement, since they had no liking for Bevin's autocratic and monolithic policies. In a short time licences country wide had been granted - almost invariably to "established and respected" companies, which meant in effect those with railway backing, and the "area" monopolies were secure.

However, if the end result of the licensing procedure was to set up a system of control which prevented competition, but at the same time, through Traffic Commissions, regulated fares, the period was one of intense debate for the Labour movement.

I have mentioned that Bevin's ideas of union action met with a great deal of opposition from the men particularly in the Rank and File movement, but the whole divisive issue of public and worker control can be seen in Herbert Morrison's "Socialisation and Transport" of 1933. Morrison was Minister of Transport in the Labour Government of 1929-31 and was

responsible for the London Passenger Transport Bill and (presumably) the 1930 R.T.A. His book vividly illustrates the contradictions in policy facing workers in a capitalist dominated industry. Overall Morrison elucidates the thinking behind Public Control, the various forms of ownership possible, and the possible nature of worker involvement in the industry. His conclusion is that control of an organisation through accountability to Parliament is "socialization of transport". He misses the irony of this by pointing out that it was a Conservative government that "socialized" water, telephones, and broadcasting. Nonetheless, it is Morrison's arguments that have prevailed, and my thesis traces the consequences for the work force today.

The pre-nationalisation form of public ownership was to pay existing shareholders 5 to 6 per cent, but to take away their participation in the organisation (and Morrison notes, (op. cit: 56) that the rate of profit in the 1920s was 25 to 65 per cent, which fits the entrepreneurial phase well), but it is clear that "capitalist rationality" is to continue to be the organising principle, while the work force are to have only formal, and necessarily antagonistic participation in the organisation (note that this went back on ideas put forward in 1919 for the public control of railways, which proposed the inclusion of employee representatives on the Boards (Barker and Robbins 1974: 227)).

Morrison dismisses the arguments for free competition by showing (p. 59 ff) that it fails to achieve adequate

capital expenditure, good wages and conditions for the work force, adequate services everywhere, rock-bottom fares, safer and more comfortable rolling stock and reliable and speedy services.

He discusses these in detail, but I wish to look particularly at the section called "Good wages and conditions for the work-people employed".

Free competition brings everybody down to the test of who can survive longest. It inevitably tends to reduce average receipts for vehicle; and directly that happens there is a terrific urge by the employer to take it out on the men.

He argues that the fierce competition of the 1920s resulted in very low hours and poor conditions for the work forces of small companies, while it was very difficult for Trade Unions to set and maintain standards in negotiation alongside many competitive owner-drivers.

His arguments for "socialization" are (p. 100 ff)

1. Things generally are tending to larger units and this is a justification in itself.
2. As a means of overcoming conflict - e.g. the biased road, or the biased rail, mind.
3. Pragmatic (low level co-ordination) - conceived of "as sound public business. . . and not political dogma".

In Chapter Eight: The Management of Socialised Industries, he puts forward the idea that neither local nor national government should be involved, but that such organisation should be run on meritocratic lines (obviously setting up the "professional" ethos I shall examine shortly).

However, he does point to the dangers of local government incompetent interferences, and to the parsimony as regards wage levels should the undertaking be managed by a Minister answerable to the Treasury, while political control might affect Trade Union negotiating positions.

This concept of organisation is developed in Chapter Nine, where he asserts,

We are seeking a combination of public ownership, public accountability and business management for public ends . . . it must be no mere capitalist business, the be all and end all of which is profits and dividends, even though it will, quite properly, be expected to pay its way.

However, he sees no contradiction in these aims, though doubts can be discerned in the concern he has to show why Labour should not be on the Board (Chapter Eleven).

. . . I desire that working class opinion should not be excluded from the Board,

- but they should be appointed on the grounds of capacity and loyalty. He explicitly rejects the claim of the Transport Workers Union to a statutory place on the Board, arguing that it would be a sectional interest. He reviews various arguments for worker representation of socialised industries Boards, but finally comes down to the argument that the Labour Party Executive had rejected the idea in 1932.

However, he does give the other side of the issue (and I hope that my quoting in full will not pre-empt my own thesis).

He quotes one Mr Clay, who argued that although the conflict of interest might exist, it would be no worse for

members than the present form of negotiation, without any opportunity to fix wages, decide policy or make operative decisions,

. . . so the workers in industry are going to see that they are for industrial power.

Clay also rejects the idea that labour are

just another interest - it is in a different category . . . This is a class society, whether we like to admit it or not; and whether we say that interests will be represented or not, interests will be there. Every interest but that of the people who are actually doing the job. . . this report appears to assume the permanency of the purely commodity status of labour. That, I think is a fundamental objection. It assumes that the Board will be a kind benevolent sort of thing that will give to labour an opportunity to learn about the job. Good heavens! We can teach them more about the job than they ever knew . . . Finally the report pays no regard to what I may term the humanity of labour . . . After all, industry has a purpose, and if that purpose is going to be finally achieved, then the workers within the industry must have full citizen rights. They have not only to be efficient wealth producers, but they have to realise that in doing their job, and doing it well, they are ministering to the community as a whole, and rendering service to a great ideal.

Exactly.

However, though admitting some sympathy, Morrison rejects these views, but adds himself, in a curious self-contradictory way (p. 222) that he identified with the workman in revolt against,

wage slavery and industrial serfdom - his labour bought and discarded at the convenience of the capitalist, as a commodity, and that it is an axiom of capitalism that the workman must be kept in his place . . . and give satisfaction within the direct limitations of his allotted task, and that he should regard the high problem of industrial management, commercial policy and financial administration as subjects which are

reserved to the man at the top . . . This serf-status of labour is in many ways much more a spiritual and intellectual injury than a material one.

Exactly.

And his faith in the benevolence of the new "meritocracies" was, as I shall argue, grossly misplaced.

Thus the early 1930s saw the culmination of a long battle to "socialise" public transport, a battle which applied particularly to London, as did the efforts of London Busmen to control the industry (vide Clay's views), efforts which did have the effect of raising busmen generally to the top of the labouring league in economic terms, though the battle for control was lost (vide Morrison).

However, the 1930s also saw monopoly control over virtually the whole country, at a time when profits were high. This period saw the establishment of a form of "rationality" and ideology by the organisations and their managers which persists today, and which I examine in the next section.

In sum, monopoly capital (and remember the "socialised" companies acted no differently) secured control and was able to proceed to "rationalise" and intensify the labour process. The many disputes in London under the new "socialised" Board between 1933 and 1937 were precisely about intensification - in this case scheduling, the bus industry's equivalent to increasing the speed of an assembly line, scheduling in effect fixing the content of work. Generally, speeds went up from 9.67 m.p.h. in 1927

to 10.42 m.p.h. in 1937 (Barker and Robbins op. cit.: 325).

However, the work force responded in kind, resisting re-scheduling and putting forward their own claim (successful some years later) for a reduction in hours to seven (six days a week). Ernest Beven specifically spoke of high scheduled speeds as intensification of work, and of the increasingly onerous nature of the work:

If you are going to run this great human family by a mind that operates on the system of a slide rule, then you will never get an appreciation of the men's difficulties, and what they are complaining about.

But the centre of his case was that bus work had a damaging effect on health, giving rise to nervous and gastric disorders (the Board proposed that this be researched, an inconclusive medical report being submitted much later in 1938).

But the immediate response of the Board (and Morrison's arguments about the benevolence of the meritocrats will be recalled), was -

The court found that traffic congestion, irregular hours, and speed increases were accepted as part of busmen's work.

As a result the seven hour day was refused, not being established till after the War.

In terms of labour struggle, the War saw a weakening of the power base of the busmen by the introduction of structurally weak groups from the "fringes" of the labour market, women and blacks. That the busmen were aware of this potential weakening of their bargaining position is

shown by Manchester busmen's decision in 1940 to work with blacks rather than women (in Beetham: Transport in Turbans 1970). Those women who were employed were generally paid less - up till 1970 in Scotland.

For the moment however, the effects were in the future for the Unions secured "closed shop" agreements in the late 1940s, though even this was two-edged, since it was welcomed by management

in order to avoid industrial conflict and
restore discipline in the garages.

Union power was thus bureaucratised and taken far from local control: the fears of the syndicalist busmen of the 1930s of monolithic Union control were borne out.

However this process has to be seen against the political movements of the times. For in 1949, as a result of the acquisition of railway shares and the willingness of Tillings and S.M.T. to sell out the remainder of their interest, the majority of "Company" buses were nationalised. (B.E.T. held out till compulsorily purchased in 1968). Nationalisation of important assets is obviously connected with political struggle for control. In this case a success for labour movements. But this does not mean that it was a success in terms of the labour process involved in the bus industry. For Morrison's arguments were the ones which prevailed, so that the Thesinger Committee, set up to examine the workings of the industry in 1953, had no recommendations to make. Thus it is clear that these nationalised bus companies took over and did not

change at all the whole existing capitalist labour process. Indeed, in this case a comparison could always be made with the still privately owned B.E.T. Company buses. No discernible differences existed.

The years after nationalisation saw the bargaining position of busmen severely deteriorate. In a period of labour shortage the six day weeks, split shifts and (typically) twelve hour Saturday shifts for no extra payment began to seem unattractive. Crucially, pay slipped back comparatively. The operators could point to falling revenue and increasing costs, while the 1957 London Busmen's strike (their pay generally being a pace-setter for the industry) collapsed disastrously, and effectively discouraged strike action elsewhere. The national negotiating machinery negated any local action, while the increasing recruitment of particularly oppressed groups such as women (typically either young and in the job for a short time before marriage, or older, often sole support), blacks, brought over specially from the Caribbean, and the unskilled weakened resistance. This weak work force had its struggles further frustrated by the increasing use of the industry as a short-term stop gap by workers with greater marketable skills. The industry gradually moved into a position where effective struggle was made even more difficult by a weak labour force operating in an environment that had traditionally posed problems of organisation for struggle due to dispersal not only nationally, but even within any one garage. By the 1960s the job had fallen

very far both in money and esteem. Even the differential between conductor and driver rose from 67 per cent of the driver's wage to 89 per cent (Routh 1965: 92-4), which can imply only a derating of the driver's wage. By the time of my own working experience in Scotland, the labour process had remained virtually unchanged since the 1940s (the five day week being successfully negotiated a year after I started work as a conductor) - except that massive congestion had effectively provided an environmental intensification of work - the industry was inexorably slipping in to decline, pay could only reach the average manual labourer's wage by means of massive overtime, and staff turnover was very high (in Glasgow, over 50 per cent per annum).

But it was in Glasgow that an effective labour struggle emerged, in Scotland, at least. Dissatisfaction with the (British) national negotiating machinery's ability to produce a "decent" wage, and the resultant lack of effective negotiating machinery at the local level for other matters, led to a strike in 1964, which had withdrawal from the national negotiating machinery as a prime aim. Of course, this led to withdrawal of T.G.W.U. support, and the bizarre situation of a strike-breaking bus leaving Parkhead depot, driven by the shop steward, with ten policemen aboard, to protect him from his own members. The strike was successful in establishing local pay negotiation. The 1960s also saw a shift in T.G.W.U.



thinking in the direction of support for local control through shop stewards, and this was probably a considerable factor in the 1969 strike in the Scottish Bus Group (S.B.G.). A local dispute over manning became caught up in pay negotiations. Local groups sprung into unofficial strike action, very dissatisfied with the amount offered, and sought to bring the S.B.G. out of the negotiating machinery. The T.G.W.U. was caught in the position of trying to control the members, while at the same time having the effect of the strike as a useful negotiating argument. The end result was a "satisfactory" pay settlement and the achievement of a Monday to Friday five day week, introduced by the local groups as a late demand.

However, the five day week, which was not an original official Union demand, shows up some of the contradictions in the bus industry's labour process.

For the crews, the gain for many was free weekends. But for others, who depended on heavy overtime to make up their wages, it meant a loss, because overtime was now available only at weekends, in the main. The Union opposed the Monday to Friday week for the same reason that management eagerly accepted it. Most of the bus companies' income by this time came from contract or commuter work during the week. Putting weekends entirely on voluntary overtime allowed them to cut services on the grounds of cost and/or non-availability of staff, effectively creating redundancies.

However, the vociferous and powerful local union action at this time undoubtedly strengthened the capacity of the crews to resist some of the oppression and exploitation that management tried to introduce in their first deliberate intensification of work for many years in the early 1970s.

The background to this intensification, which took the form of a colossal move over to one-man operation (o.m.o.) was that in the 1960s most municipalities and many companies (the S.B.G. as a whole in 1969) moved into deficit. This happened first with the municipalities, who had mostly been controlled in such a way as to return a bare surplus, and often retained explicit low fare policies. However, while municipal undertakings could mostly be supported from the rates, the nationalised companies could not. Also during the 1960s a number of highly critical National Board for Prices and Incomes Reports, highly critical of the industry were produced. The end material result was State pressure to convert to one-man operation, by only offering subsidies to purchase buses suitable for one-man operation. This effectively meant rear-engined buses, which the engineers of the industry disliked because of very much higher maintenance costs; but it also meant that any organisation that wished to convert wholly to one-man operation (particularly the city operations) had to go heavily into capital debt, and lose the intensification they had been practising on the materials of production, cutting bus

service life from twenty to eight or nine years.

However, the 1968 R.T.A. did offer the possibility of the unremunerative routes of the nationalised concerns being subsidised by local rates: for the first time the bus companies were forced to take account of local political control, a collision which I discuss in the next section.

As I said, the countrywide impulsion to introduce one-man operation met a local union resistance and willingness to take action which led to a national one-man operation rate, (which did however allow for considerable local variation). The internal division of the crews, split over the prospect of a great intensification of work, loss of service to the public, redundancies among conductors on the one hand, and a great increase in wages for individuals on the other, no doubt contributed to the eventual compromise settlement of $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent extra for one-man operation. This put one-man operation drivers much further up the wage scales, while reducing labour costs as a proportion of total costs from 70 per cent to around 54 per cent (Hovell, 1975: 40). That one-man operation was an extreme intensification of work is evidenced by the chaotic traffic conditions which resulted from its large-scale introduction. It is of course the disruption to services and traffic, rather than consideration for the drivers that has led to the almost universal adoption of no-change automatic fare collection by the end of the 1970s.

Overall this intensification of the labour process has been successful, with conductors now a fast-disappearing occupation.

But the struggle continues. As I write the Transport Minister, Norman Fowler is threatening to limit the subsidy to bus companies who make "unrealistic" wage settlements, while his Transport Act, effective in October 1980 will open again many areas of bus operation to entrepreneurial competition (Guardian 12.8.80).

By and large I have been discussing the changing nature of the labour process in the bus industry, the social and political background, and the struggles of successive generations of busmen to resist the impulsion of capital accumulation. I turn now to consideration of the ideology of control held by those who wield power in the industry - the managers.

Section Two: Management Ideology

Managers are the agents of the power of organisations to direct labour. I have shown in the previous section that the labour process in the bus industry retained its capitalist form, is equally a part of capital in general, even under public ownership. Further, there are explicit State injunctions for nationalised bus companies to make a profit, enshrined in the 1968 R.T.A., and to be reinforced by the 1980 Transport Act.

This section deals with a central paradox of the

agents of exploitation viz, that while enmeshed in an overall capitalist "rationality", bus managers have been singularly inept in terms of maintenance of extraction of surplus value, and I explore the growth of the "service" ideology which makes them so. However, I shall argue, and indeed the substance of the thesis is illustration, that what value has been extracted has been through a further exploitation of the labour process: that the crews by more intense effort have borne the burden of maintenance of what is still the major means of transport in Britain.

In examining the growth and effects of the prevailing managerial ideology, I gloss the criticisms made by Hibbs (1975), though similar criticisms are also made by Hovell et al (1975). "Gloss" is a singularly appropriate term here, since Hibbs's work is behind the attack made by "free enterprise" groups on monopoly control by this publicly owned industry, to be given effect by the 1980 Transport Act.

In tracing the history of the various companies, Hibbs shows that there were three main traditions operating among the managers, (a) the municipal, which was basically an engineering ethos with notions of "public service", (b) the "professional", often with an electrical engineering or accounting background (I make no claims for the sociological status of the word "professional". It is used here because it is how managers refer to themselves), (c) the independent, which was more specifically market

oriented. These three traditions have played a vital part in attitudes and operations of present day bus companies.

The "professionals" emerged in the 1930s, after the R.T.A. had established monopoly control, but had also limited the degree of exploitation of the market. Companies could now expand only through buying out smaller companies, rather than running them out of business through competition. Protection, rather than expansion, of capital came to predominate. The need was now for managers to control assets and organisation rather than entrepreneurs to drum up business through identification of market demand and competitors' weaknesses. At the same time the major firms, in their (largely successful) battle for the new licences, had tried to legitimise their applications by arguing that they were best able to provide the "service" which public interest demanded.

The contradiction we are concerned with is of course that these new managers, with their engineering "rational" background, were the more easily able to legitimise their search for increasing control of their capitalist organisations by the very lack of the usual capitalist imperative to seek out new markets. "Service" as an idea has been used inconsistently both to legitimise existing labour processes (in "the public interest") and to avoid finding out what the public interest is, either by techniques of market research as Hovell et al (1975) advocate, or by integrated planning with local authorities, as Bendixson

(1974) urges. The industry as a whole has been unable to decide whether it is a public utility or a trading activity. This contradiction has led to an inability to solve its problems. On the one hand it has failed to plan for the public interest, while on the other, it has until lately failed to follow through capitalist policies such as deliberate efforts towards greater control and intensification of labour processes.

Both Hovell et al and Hibbs see, not the basic contradiction, but the effect, the reluctance to change in what is a further contradiction: that it is the very preponderance of operational staff "who know the business" in bus organisation that makes them so inefficient (in any sense).

Hovell (ibid. 111 ff) writes:

. . . operational staff rely on their "experience of actual conditions and intimate knowledge of the service network" . . . and such operational staff are in a dominant position organisationally to express their attitude forcibly. They command all but an insignificant proportion of the total labour and capital resources.

(The contrast is with most industrial companies where sales/marketing is in a dominant position.) Hovell's main point is that this over-riding concern with controlling what is known (routes, schedules, costs etc. even though I shall argue that in fact these are not under control: that forming the context of the labour process they are the site of a struggle for control) makes the organisation incapable of dealing with factors perceived as "external"

and "unknown", and which would require corporate strategic planning. This lack of willingness to plan which means dealing with marketing demands and/or local authorities is confirmed by my own research: S.B.G. directors regard themselves, they told me, as "experts". At the most local authorities could indicate their general aims, indicate which routes should be subsidised, but the operation should be left to the "professionals". Hovell attributes (ibid 116) this

pre-occupation with cost reduction and running a service network which from their own point of view offers the least scheduling and manning problems

to the fact that

most of the present senior operations executives were recruited in the late 1930s and 40s, a time of demand for public transport. This, combined with the effects of working in an industry protected by monopoly franchise and enjoying security of tenure, tends to make them somewhat resistant to change.

No doubt it does, but it is inadequate to locate the practice of a whole industry in personalities: I have tried to locate present inadequacies in deeper contradictions and concrete historical processes.

The "service" contradiction could of course be (historically) maintained by both the fact of State ownership after 1949 and the lack of pressure because of inherent profitability. Despite drastic decline in public use from the mid 1950s onwards return on capital reached a high of 17.8 per cent in 1959 and 13.2 per cent as late as 1968 (Pryke: 1972).

But it is the basic contradictions of the industry that have made it unable to cope with its rapidly increasing problems. And of course, I argue that it is the contradictions in the forces and relations of production in the industry that create the contradictions that the crews encounter in the labour process.

I now turn to how these internal contradictions have exacerbated the problems facing the industry. These problems in turn further add to the contradictions in the labour process, as far as it affects the crews. For example, proper traffic control would ease the problems stemming from congestion, but this would make discipline easier to enforce: radio control can be used against violence, but also to monitor the crew's performance: increasing scheduled speed may provide a better service through increased capital use, but it greatly intensifies effort; one-man operation may increase wages and cut costs simultaneously, but it also intensifies labour and creates redundancies; automatic-gearred buses save maintenance and driver strain, but further weaken the "skill" claims of the drivers.

As might be expected there is a divergence in interests of the managers of the industry, the crews, and the consumers.

There is, Hibbs argues, a hierarchy of esteem among managers which puts operation of stage services at the top, followed by express coach services, extended tours, day

excursion, private hire and works and schools contracts. This order is of course in just about inverse order of profitability (and is also inverse to the bus crews' order of esteem). It is also different from the consumers' order in that a day trip to the seaside may rank higher than stage services provision. It is also of significance that the stage services, ranked first by the professionals is the one most subject to stringent state control, and has also something like a negative correlation with profitability. The link may well be made here between professionalism maintaining basic services, and also serving to maintain the status, security and income of those aspiring to it. Experimentation may be profitable, but it is certainly risky, even for securely entrenched "professional" managers.

Maintaining the theme of professionalism, it is worth while looking at the formal requirements of the industry, and the way management interprets these.

The nationalised bus industry does have a formal requirement laid down by the Treasury, to clear its costs, "Taking one year with another". This it has done quite well since nationalisation, even though the requirement was formulated as late as 1968. The curious feature is that although turning in a profit for the years from 1948 to 1970 (when the S.B.G. first reported a loss), the prevailing management idea has not been running a profitable business, but of providing a service (cf. Thompson and Hunter, 1973,

and Gwilliam 1964). This idea is usually not elaborated, being taken to be self evident, but it shares with other management ideas such as charging policies and cross-subsidisation, the quality of being fallacious.

The notion seems to see public transport as being analogous to the water supply, and may inherit something from the monopolistic nature of the railways. It is a fallacy, because unlike street lighting and public health services, bus services compete in a market in which there exist viable alternatives, while its own costs (unlike say water) per unit are rather high.

The fact that it is fallacious is not the chief concern. The chief concern is that the industry is seen to be somehow not in a situation of competition, and thus ingores the true competitive forces that it does in fact encounter, i.e. alternative means of satisfying transport demands. The concomitant attitude of such an approach is of course rather a "take it or leave it" attitude. Only by the 1970s is it being realised that transport managers cannot be left to run the industry on such assumptions.

The change can be seen in the involvement of the industry with general planning - or rather its lack of involvement. The issue was highlighted by reports like that of Buchanan (Traffic in Towns 1966) which put more emphasis on provision of transport with sophisticated analysis of land use, infrastructure and traffic generation. Hibbs is not alone (cf. my own private communication with

regard to the S.B.G. lack of understanding of planning requirements) in seeing a lack of co-ordination between planners and transport managers: indeed he sees a real professional conflict here, with the busmen seeing planners only as yet another external constraint. For transport managers, the situation has been exacerbated by the new Regions with interests in general transport planning. Busmen regard the involvement of local councils with both horror and entrenched resistance and are reluctant to admit claims that payment of local subsidies implies representation on policy and control: i.e. the idea of service collapses when it meets genuine public interests and demands.

There is a very limited demand for transport for its own sake - especially public transport. It is a means of maximising unrelated wants, a derived demand. And while the demand of the individual is specific to his own assessment of the marginal utility of such satisfaction, the ability of public transport to meet his demand, and to relate it to the wider demands of society, is dependent on the extent to which these demands coincide to form flow patterns at common periods.

At the present time such generated bus traffic flows are not only in competition with private vehicle flows in terms of who uses what vehicle, but are also subject to delays caused by such flows and other non-route-related flows (i.e. much urban congestion derives from car-flow

routes cutting across bus routes). The conflict is the old one of individual choice as against the optimal solution for society. It must be a trenchant criticism of present day management that they have not seriously attempted a solution to this fundamental problem, which has been added to the old continuing situation which Hibbs (p. 87) notes as

Public Transport . . . is at best a somewhat hostile and fraught environment, and at worst a positive disincentive to the driver to overcome spatial and temporal constraints.

1

The next section looks at the contention that even the internal "professional" concerns of bus management have been inadequately dealt with, particularly with regard to service - failings show up the falsity of this legitimacy notion, which allows control of the labour process without social accountability.

The basic argument is that the failings of previous fallacious or inadequate policies were hidden by general profitability: the failure of these policies has been made visible when margins came under pressure: and the industry has failed to respond not only to past inadequacies, but to the new changed circumstances.

Again, such themes are looked at in order to elucidate the crews' labour process, and to introduce some of the problems they have to contend with.

The grounds for the problems becoming pressing is the growth in alternative transport: bus passenger mileage

dropped from 50 to 34 thousand million between 1952 and 1972. It is not simply a matter of reduced mileage due to the car's greater flexibility, utility, convenience and lower perceived (and possibly actual) cost, but that in the competition for limited road space, the bus is proportionally more held up by congestion than the car. Thus bus service quality falls off: the drop in passenger revenue resulting is compensated for by rising fares, leading to less usage, leading to rising fares, and so on.

Linked with the basic problem of costs is the more tangible one that bus companies at the time of the research did not have an accurate idea of the costs. They do not even make use of the data they do have, but the main failing is using the historical figure of average costs, when costs are in fact, anything but average. It also means, for example, that Eastern Scottish had to admit in 1970 that they made no attempt to cost individual services - and this when they were trying to withdraw rural services "because their costs exceed average costs, therefore they are unprofitable."

Average costs as a measure is of course useless because of the existence of such disparities as peak services which have very high revenue but very much higher costs because of the uni-directional nature of the traffic flows and need for machines not used at other times (e.g. Birmingham Corporation has about 1,300 buses: only 167 are used at the mid-day period. These points are discussed

in Thompson and Hunter 1973: 291).

The point to note is that bus companies use this useless measure - average cost - because it is the only one they have: little attempt has been made to estimate real costs.

Features missing in the bus industry associated with undertakings of its size and management "tail" are corporate planning and the overcoming of stifled initiative by, say, management by objectives.

An example was given to me by the Western Shop Steward, who had great difficulty convincing management that running express services from London to Glasgow on the motorways was now possible (this is now one of the more profitable ventures of the S.B.G.).

Hibbs argues that bus companies can avoid attention to the complexity of demand in their industry. Management can avoid sophisticated catering for different quality/price demands because of the monopolistic licensing system.

This lack of sophistication in treating demand has its counterpart in charging policy. Fares are not adapted to meet differing types of demand, or to meet different types of competition. Neither is account taken of the two main elements affecting elasticity of demand for public transport - the existence of substitutes and the cost of the time involved. Even quality is not varied as an element in the bus's competitive situation.

Even cross-subsidisation is a fallacy. Cross-

subsidisation is a social benefit transfer system that is basically a political decision, and it is a decision that the bus industry has willingly undertaken for years (although it would be difficult to get them to see that it was a political decision). The disadvantage is that there is no guarantee that the subsidy transfer will be from the pockets of those better able to pay the higher average fares. Indeed probably it will be the other way round, since the densely-packed but poorest areas are the most remunerative and the cheapest to provide. The policy can no longer have its original justification but the alternative of a variable charging policy related to the market demand for travel has not yet emerged.

Quite apart from any sociological significance it must be a matter of concern that such large companies (the S.B.G. had a turnover of £40 million in 1972) operate on assumptions no longer valid (I am not suggesting that they are alone in this).

A further contradiction is that there is an overall lack of direction with regard to objectives in the bus industry, exacerbated perhaps by the split between Municipalities, P.T.A.s, Territorial Companies and Private Operators, with the looming of involvement by local government, and de-licensing of some areas.

Hibbs (1975) argues that the prevailing Treasury policy is, "do as well as you can", contrasting with the P.T.A.s' (Passenger Transport Authorities) maxim, "do not show a deficit". Thus there is a conflict between the

distinct ethics of service and (nominally) competition. The conclusion drawn is that "unremunerative" depends on the goals of the operator. This is obviously of importance in applying for subsidies for "unremunerative" routes. Paradoxically it is the smaller operator who is best able to "cost" a route to see if it is worthwhile due to intimate local knowledge, whereas the larger companies have not yet developed accurate means of costing. The situation has arisen then, where application for subsidies for rural routes of similar types have varied greatly, with consequent wide variations in the level of support. And of course some operators have submitted costs greater than actual because of using average-cost-per-vehicle-mile as their basis. All the above is based on what is "remunerative" for the operator, not what is adequate for the consumer, clearly showing the fallacy of "service". Hibbs's final comment on this is

To attract a subsidy may be an easier way to raise revenue than many others, while management is more at home in an administrative framework than it is in the market"

(1975: 165)

Clearly contradictions exist between profit and service to the community.

To understand the prevailing policies of management, I trace the consequences for the operation of bus services, and thence lead on to the consequences for the crews.

Overall, the argument must be that the "professional" attitudes developed and institutionalised in the period of expansion are inadequate for solving problems brought about

by changes in the field of operations of the industry, especially in this present period of reduced demand. The industry has made little positive response to its decline, (and incidentally, its move from being a middle-class to a working-class mode of transport).

Hibbs (1975: 178) argues that the main response to the decline has been further standardisation of the product, taking the industry even further from its market, with transport management concerned with technological excellence irrespective of its relevance to effective demand. As an example of this last he says, "Timetables (are) produced as if aesthetic satisfaction were the principal aim".

The reason adduced is the policy vacuum in which bus operators have acted for forty years.

Given this situation the aims of policy within the industry have been confused. The municipal sector has been characterized by a desire to provide a high standard of service, but has not been notable for its analysis of the market it has sought to serve . . . it is fair to conclude that the industry as a whole is managed with an eye to its constraints rather than its opportunities, with a considerable degree of in-house paternalism in its attitude to its customers."

(ibid: 183)

As noted before, there is little collaboration with planners, and an almost pathological unwillingness to share policy decisions with local government representatives (a view strongly emphasised to me by S.B.G. directors).

Hibbs sees as unresolved the fundamental policy conflict of whether bus services are to be a trading activity or a public service. Particularly in the municipal

sector management tends to be service oriented, but the technology tradition is strong and tends to run counter to the introduction of a market based approach to the operation of public service or the interests of the crews. This form of constraint is also found in the nationalised sector, but the confusion is more subtle, since the territorial companies subsidise their profit-making enterprises with a "public service" ideology, and also, broadly for territorial expansionism reasons, took over many unremunerative routes, which emphasised in turn the "public service" rationalisation through the "necessary" cross-subsidisation.

As Hibbs puts it (ibid: 188),

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that this is an outcome of the statutory protection that the industry has enjoyed for so many years.

The "professional" approach has meant an ignoring of the high profit earners of low esteem, i.e. the private hire or coach tour businesses. This is symptomatic of a rather schizophrenic set of assumptions for managers who are nominally committed to profit maximisation, but who seem to regard the impact of market forces with suspicion.

Thus the options available for bus transport are infrequently discussed (cf. the lack of this in the journals "Bus and Coach", and "Buses"), with the assertion, "Transport is a service" being used as an avenue of escape. The danger is of course that the policy options will be decided upon from outside the industry.

Hibbs's pithy assessment is, "It is as if buses still ran on invisible tramlines".

In sum, the service ethos, developed to legitimate and protect the professional managers' interests, has been used to obscure the essential capitalist relations of the industry. This service ethos has contradicted the capitalist relations of production, and led, on the one hand, to "inefficiency" in capitalist terms (i.e. not extracting all possible surplus value) with actual lack of service to the community and, on the other hand, to an unintentional intensification of labour for the crews through failure to control an increasingly imposing environment. The present situation sees a definite swing from the ideas of public service to one of explicit injunctions to make a profit, this making intensification of the labour process even easier. Once more "service to the public" is to be couched in explicit capitalist terms of "accountability", "rationality" and extraction of surplus value. And this can only come from increasing the exploitation of labour power.

Section Three: Contradictions and Consequences

In this section I briefly comment on some of the contradictions that arise in the industry, and indicate in global terms the consequences for the crews. However, this section is no more than an introduction to the later chapters, which explore the situation more fully.

In the coming chapters I demonstrate that though the busman is subject to control in terms of the "normal" authority structure of capitalist enterprises much of his task is outwith the control of management; certainly driving and conducting are not activities that lend themselves to the type of control which results from the minute division of labour that constitutes "scientific management", and this constitutes a major contradiction in the labour process.

Considered in isolation, driving as a task is generally a highly valued activity, and in my own experience driving a bus gives a feeling of power and mastery over machinery which is definitely positive: similarly conducting allows a degree of involvement in ordinary social relations which is of a generally valued type.

But these tasks are not performed in isolation. They are performed in ways constrained by the form and aims of the organisation. The potentially valued work of the crews is transformed by the forces of production into the constraints of route operation, the whole aimed at maximising revenue and minimising cost, including labour costs.

The effect of a capitalist structure is to change the basic valued nature of the task activity to a de-valued activity carried out under surveillance of an organisation supported by the duress of the workings of the labour market. As Braverman puts it:

. . . it is not the productive strength of machinery that weakens the human race, but the manner in which it is employed in capitalist social relations. . . . The machine, the mere product of human labour and ingenuity, designed and constructed by humans, and alterable at will, is viewed as an independent participant in human social arrangements. . . . This is the reification of a social relation, it is nothing but a fetishism . . . machinery embraces a host of possibilities, many of which are systematically thwarted rather than developed by capital.

(Braverman 1974: 229-30)

Yet the very freedom from direct supervision that exists in the carrying out of the task means that the task is presented as a series of problems to be overcome: the significant thing, which will be demonstrated later, is that the crews are able to establish and maintain control over the task to an extent. But this control is constantly threatened by the organisational structure of supervision, while the work as a whole is placed within the organisation's policies, rather than the needs of the consumer, with which the crews are in daily contact.

The capitalist structure itself generates problems such as long hours, broken-shift work, a pay structure that has institutionalised low basic pay and high overtime working - as much as 30 per cent of earnings being from overtime earnings to achieve the national average manual workers' wage², inadequate machinery with the physical and mental strain that results from operating it, lack of protection of crews from the violence which they meet, and which is itself often a result of the crews' endeavours to enforce the revenue-collecting activity³, unwillingness to

change (or acknowledge) arduous route timings, harsh disciplinary proceedings, and a failure to involve crews in what might be argued to be an enterprise devoted to perceived social needs for cheap efficient mass transportation.

This last point is perhaps an interesting side-light on Fox's (1974) ideas: as will become apparent, bus crews have a loosely prescribed job compared with many other groups of manual workers, but their place in the organisation is blatantly one of "low trust".

Moving on to the effects of the inefficiency of bus managements, a glance at, say, the comparative criteria given in Chapter 10 of the P.E.P. 1965 "Report on Attitudes in British Management" easily categorises the majority of British bus managements as "Sleepers", rather than "Thrusters". The inadequacies of these managements has been noted not only by such commentators as Hibbs (1975) and Thomson and Hunter (1973: 315) but also by various government reports in the 1960s⁴, and increasingly in the early 1970s by some sections of management - significantly emanating not from "traditional" management, but newer entrants with different experiences.⁵

The main emphasis is on maintaining and increasing services by the introduction of marketing, improving internal efficiency by better costing, greater co-operation with other bodies in the provision of services, and reduction in costs and labour difficulties by the introduction

of one-man operation. More sophisticated observers such as Hibbs (1975) and Thomson and Hunter (1973) see the necessity for placing bus transport within some total system of "social accounting" (cf. Thomson and Hunter 1973: 295-6).

However, the state of inadequate management, ". . . (which) has led to an accelerating loss of control over actual operation and above all industrial relations", (N.B.P.I. Report No. 50 1967: Chapter 2) is not the chief concern: detailing the consequences for the crews of such management is.

Perhaps the greatest possible consequence lies in the threatening of the existence of the jobs themselves. Redundancies can easily be seen to be the result of management's reluctance to market bus services in such a way as to limit the decline, or to emphasize sufficiently their importance to the local communities.⁶

Paradoxically, it has been the very inefficiency of the industry that has till recently mitigated the effects of the decline in usage:

. . . A labour force of 282,000 in 1958
had fallen to only 263,000 ten years later,
in spite of a drop of one third in passenger
journeys, (Thomson and Hunter 1973: 302)

Unfortunately most redundancies have taken place in rural areas where recruitment has not been a problem, and not in urban areas, where shortages continue.

The cutting of services which has been carried out
- and many of the first routes to be cut could probably have

been shown to be viable if the true costs had been available - with other economies, has reduced the utility of the bus transport system to the consumer. But many of the crews still perceive meeting "social needs" as an important part of their job, which is frustrated by overall cutting of standards of service. Many of the "false economies" such as reducing services, running old buses liable to breakdowns, forcing drivers to drive too fast and increasing their sense of frustration by having "mettlesome" headways, have indirect consequences for the crews in that they have to deal directly with the reactions, usually vociferous and often abusive, of an outraged public⁷.

I think it fair to posit, though of course the argument is speculative, that the "sleeper" attitude of management has led to an unwillingness to deal with the problems of the industry in general, and that this has led in turn to an unwillingness to deal with the more specific problems that the crews encounter as a consequence. Lack of involvement with "shop floor" conditions is not confined to the bus industry of course, but the industry is probably exceptional in having new sets of problems appear which have been left largely to the work force to solve. The most noticeable of these problems is the lack of adjustment of timings, or co-operation with local authorities to overcome the great increase in congestion. Management has preferred to leave the crews to overcome the problems - how is explained in the chapter "Interaction". In another area, it has taken very great pressure to force companies to take measures to protect crews

from violence. There is little concern with facilities for passengers, or with designing vehicles with the passengers' interests in mind, rather than the engineers': it is the crews who have to deal with the problems of the elderly, and mothers with children and shopping struggling up three high steps into a coach. Until the Leyland National in 1973, the designing of the drivers' working conditions in terms of ergonomic principles was just not considered, resulting in a myriad of little frustrations and major physical efforts, while no provision was made for creating a stable working platform for the conductor.

The effects of the failure of bus managements to tackle the underlying problems, and the effects these have on the crews, is perhaps best evidenced by the unwillingness of crews to stay in the job. Again it is the rural areas where problems are lesser than have the more stable work force, while the efforts of urban working take place in a more open labour market, more open to alternatives.

Even the industry's efforts to deal with recruitment problems have backfired in that recruitment of immigrant labour has lowered the perceived status of the job.

The industry also seems unaware of the potential attractiveness it could offer in the labour market. Busmen, despite some current conceptions, have done relatively better than other manual workers since 1948⁸, though low wages are consistently proffered as a reason for labour problems. Of course, these wages are only achieved by high overtime working, which itself is costly to the industry.

Management also quite rightly points out that shift working is a perceived disadvantage of the job, but seems unaware that shift-working related to compensatory payments is often viewed favourably, and that 25 per cent of Britain's male manual workers do shift-work (N.B.P.I. Report No. 161 (Supplement) Paper I), and the general conclusion is that it is not such a great handicap for an industry's recruitment, especially given the degree of self-selection of the work force involved (ibid).

(This is not to deny the deleterious effects, physical and social, detailed by such as Wilkinson 1971).

What management seems unwilling to calculate is the cost-benefit balance between getting rid of the mainly loathed split-shifts in return for a more stable work force. In this they ought to have the advantage that shift working in the bus industry is related to obvious social needs that the crews can easily appreciate, rather than the solely economic criteria of better utilisation of capital that is the reason in many other sectors; the split-shift, organised to cover peak operations, is of course related to the economic use of the greatest cost - labour.

The material of this last section has dealt with the problems of the industry very much in "management consultancy" terms. Even at this level there are evident contradictions in policy, and evident "problems". However, I wish to conclude by stating what I believe is the underlying structure of these surface problems.

The first notion is that management has been inefficient even in its own terms: Hibbs, Hovell, Bendixson the N.B.P.I. etc. make clear that management has failed to solve problems posed by a changed environment. This has what might be termed unintentional consequences for the crews, unintended intensification through congestion, weakening of union power through change in labour and pay.

The second notion explicitly seeks to de-mystify the capitalist structure, to show that deliberate and increasing control of the workers by management is an inherent tendency of capitalist-structured organisations. (It might be possible to argue that the 1950s and 1960s saw a hiatus in this process between the battle over pace of work in the 1930s and the intensification through one-man operation in the 1970s.)

However, this lust for control exists in a contradiction. For while the organisation controls the workers, it is the workers who control the task. This is of course a contradiction found in most labour processes. But as I shall show, in the bus industry much of the labour process is performed in unsupervised conditions, and the labour process is a quite exceptionally wide and varied one, confounded further by its evident social utility (in contrast to, say, the manufacture of a particular item of use only as a component of the products of one firm). This lack of supervision increases the potential for control over the task by the crews, but brings them at the same time

into conflict with the bureaucratised rules formulated to try to control them. Thus a further element of irrationality is introduced by the organisation's seeking to control the workforce by a system of rules which are difficult to enforce, and exist to discipline the workforce, rather than to solve the difficulties of providing a bus service, as is their ostensible aim.

Thus the continuing struggle of the crews, who seek to subvert and re-create management's aims are helped by the lack of supervision on the one hand, but contradicted in part on the other by failure on the part of management to ease their task, and by some forms of the struggle for control being against the interests of the public and/or other crews.

Trying to draw together this somewhat wide-ranging chapter, I have sought to locate the labour processes of bus work in concrete historical processes of domination and class struggle. I can conceive of no other way to do this than to trace the processes of capital accumulation in the industry, and the various stages of class reaction by successive generations of bus workers.

However, I have also tried to show that the labour processes in the industry will be affected by the particular forms of domination inherent in management. Accordingly, I have sought to show that the structure of domination is itself caught in its capitalist structure and processes

contradicting its public ownership, and that its managers' conceptions of "service" and "professionalism", evolved to legitimate one particular stage of capitalist control, have been superceded by a further evolution in capitalist imperatives, and that this ineptness adds further to the exploitation of the crews.

Given this context, the substance of the thesis analyses the labour processes - the structures of domination and the struggles for control - in detail. In the context of the relevant literature, these efforts by the crews to control, subvert and re-create are important, since some of the literature (e.g. Braverman 1974) assumes that workers are passive in their resistance to capitalist domination.

But first I introduce the methodology involved, and briefly review, in conventional industrial sociology form, the "respondents' attitudes". Attention is also drawn here to Appendix I , which outlines the concerns which originally guided the research, but which have been superceded by a re-conceptualisation of the material.

Notes: Chapter One

¹ A good example of just how fraught it can be is given by Bus and Coach 1968, p. 53 ff, where S. MacDonald describes not a late night bus on a Saturday in Glasgow, which might well be thought of as fraught, but the facilities for passengers at one of the main S.B.G. bus stations, which unlike the late night bus is very much under the immediate control of management. The accompanying picture shows passengers picking their way across a rubble-strewn parking lot, while MacDonald remarks on the lack of stances and facilities: the long distance buses leave from a street half a mile from the booking office, without refreshments, toilets or even a bus stop. In the same source there is a letter on p. 115 where a letter of complaint relates how Western S.M.T. replied to an inquirer that they had better things to do than make sure that their buses' destination screens were unambiguously shown.

² This relationship has been related to high absenteeism and difficulties in recruitment as well as high costs in overtime payments, which were characteristic of many parts of the industry in the 1960s and early 1970s - N.B.P.I. Report No. 161 (Supplement) p. 64.

³ This is the main explanation advanced to explain violent incidents on public transport. See my own comments in "The Public" and J.S. Rose, 1976.

⁴ There were nine Reports in three years, N.B.P.I. Reports Nos. 50 and 63 are of particular relevance.

⁵ The 1973 conference on "Local Government Reorganisation and Public Transport" at the Polytechnic of Newcastle upon Tyne produced some hard-hitting analyses of bus management malaise. See in particular B.M.M. Barrett's plea for a marketing approach to fill the companies' policy vacuum, D.M. Holding's criticism of route costing systems - pointing out that it was only when bus companies applied for local government subsidies that the faults of their costing systems became apparent - a thesis supported in a paper by A.D. Mennear. All these papers are unpublished, but copies were obtained from the Polytechnic.

Comment has also appeared in "Buses" from time to time, e.g. Buses No. 249, 1975: 460.

The operators have little hope of gaining any great profit and there seems rather to be in some cases too much resignation to a deficit with a consequent feeling that not much can be done about it and no great effort would therefore be justified.

⁶ There is evidence that "good" management can halt a decline in usage: Bendixson 1974: chapter 5 offers the examples of Reading and Stevenage.

⁷ That the public is at last prepared to take complaints to source is evidenced by the following extract from

Buses No. 278, which also shows just what inefficiencies are commented on for the major group under analysis here.

Dundee's débacle proved to be but a minor foretaste of what lay in store for the Scottish Bus Group when it applied to the commissioners on February 22 and 23 for an increase averaging 15 per cent. Again, most of the rises seemed fairly harmless, but a proposal to raise the 6p minimum rate by 50 per cent to 9p stuck hard in the gullets of many. Strathclyde Region, mindful no doubt that it had instructed Greater Glasgow P.T.E. to raise its 10p, 18p and 26p fares to 10p, 20p and 28p, noted the S.B.G. proposals some months ago and implied consent. Lothian's attitude was a much different one. Spurred on by vivid memories of the summer of 1977 when Eastern Scottish bus services were decimated by vehicle shortages and frequent breakdowns, it fired such ammunition at the bus group, through the traffic commissioners, that no decision could be taken at the end of the allotted period for the hearing.

S.B.G. executive director Mr Arthur Newman was at the receiving end of the first day's barrage and came off pretty badly as far as the daily press was concerned. His admissions included that 15.4 per cent of the E.S. bus fleet was over 15 years old, that 42 per cent of vehicles of that vintage within S.B.G. were owned by E.S., and that S.B.G. could not standardise its bus fleet when other undertakings were moving away from individual vehicle types for variations in traffic. The coup de grace for Lothian was when its solicitor prised from Mr Newman the claim that older buses were more dependable than new ones. That brought the house down, by all accounts. An engineer revealed to the hearing that he had logged no fewer than 40 breakdowns on his daily journeys by service 52/53 (Edinburgh-Balerno), while one woman claimed to have lost a city job through the irregularity of the bus service. Another told of buses needing to accelerate to build up power for hill climbing. It was agreed by the traffic commissioners that detailed answers should be given to these points, and the hearing was deferred until March 28. There was no guarantee that the increase

would be granted even then, nor was there any cast iron likelihood that the increase would go through in its entirety. Mr Newman indicated that S.B.G. might seek another increase later in the year to compensate for the delay in the passage of this application.

As if all that was not enough, matters took a decidedly embarrassing turn for Eastern Scottish a week later when the first five of its 10 Volvo Ailsa double-deckers entered traffic on none other than services 52 and 53. It had been planned for some time that six would work that run, the other four working Musselburgh's Edinburgh-Port Seton duty, but the timing played straight into the hands of the refugees from the inquiry. One woman was convinced that "all the screaming" (hardly a fortunate choice of words in view of Ailsa sound effects!) about the bad bus situation had resulted in the Ailsas "being pulled out of the hat from somewhere". Others were equally certain that the arrival of the buses was more than a happy coincidence.

(page 228)

8 Using 1948 as a base year, national average weekly earnings for men had moved to 220.9 by 1965 while municipal bus workers showed 233.8, and the company sector 226.7 (Devons, Crossley and Maunder 1968).

CHAPTER TWO: Methods

The research procedures used in this study were interviews of some of the holders of positions I thought might prove useful, such as Shop Stewards and Traffic Managers, Participant Observation and Survey Data Collection. Denzin, (1970) I discovered after having completed the research, recommends such a wide-ranging approach under the designation of Triangulation: however I used it because it seemed obvious to use all available means. A systematic justification for such a method will be found in Denzin. I am more intent here on simply giving an account of what I did.

The interviews posed the first problem. After interviewing two Traffic Managers, one Personnel Manager, and one Shop Steward I realised that although I was gaining valuable information on how they saw their job, I was gaining little 'real' perceptions of the crews, who were my main interest. Accordingly, this type of interview was dropped in favour of other pursuits.

As will be clear from the substantive parts of this study, the main methodology used was participant observation of the kind that Denzin calls the "complete participant", thus making unavoidable the "commitment to adopt the perspective of those studied by sharing in their day to day experiences" (ibid p 185).

However I should make clear that the participant observation did not simply consist of "being a busman". I extended this aspect to include review of relevant sources - the journal "Buses" the review of the history and present situation of the bus industry, comparative wage rates, and

managed to track down the five autobiographical accounts mentioned in the bibliography. I also accumulated a large newspaper file on public criticism of bus services, accidents, letters of the public to the press on the subject, replies of ordinary bus crews to such invective, and contributions to the Trade press such as 'Motor Transport'.

* * * * *

But I must confess that any insight into the 'condition' of the Scottish Busman is mainly a result of introspection on my experiences and observations as a participant in the job.

Denzin writes (ibid: 187), "A central assumption of participant observation is that the investigator shares as intimately as possible in the life and activities of those he is studying". I think I can fairly claim to be a complete participant on these grounds. The length of involvement, if I include time spent before formally commencing this research (Davis on "The Fare", 1966 also used his material retrospectively) was a total of fifteen months as a conductor, and eighteen months as a driver. This time was spread out over a number of years, since all but one period of three months I was employed in summer vacations. Of the seven groups my research encompasses, I worked various periods at Kilmarnock, Milngavie, Maryhill and Possil depots of Glasgow Corporation, Tollcross garage

of Edinburgh Corporation and New Street depot of Eastern Scottish. My experiences in these locales were of course one of the reasons for choosing them. The differences I observed among them were also the inspiration for the study. With this wide experience, a comparative approach was of course a virtual necessity. This is a method used in other studies for the same purposes of validation through comparison, e.g. "Boys in White", Becker et al 1961.

Being a busman in this way, as might be expected, did immerse me in the whole structure of "sentiments, activities, expressions and symbols" of the job. Indeed it has, I am sure, changed facets of my general personality and view of the world. It involved me in developing for instance both a "professional driver" attitude to other road users, an impressive vocabulary of swear words and foul-mouthed imprecations, an adoption of the value of winning the odd hours-paid-but-not-worked from the Company, learning to savour the camaraderie of the after-work pint, the whole gossip world of a bus garage, in learning to accept graciously the offers of conductresses who were impressed by my not talking lecherously, - in short being involved experientially in the whole symbolic and expressive world of the busman, of which I have managed to convey only a faint reflection in this study.

In classic complete participant style my role as sociologist was completely concealed. Indeed, apart from my experience in Edinburgh Corporation and Eastern Scottish, I was completely concealed in that I had no research project in view! In fact, this has formed a valuable check both

on my own observation and on my acceptance by other crews. For of course, it might be argued that I was identified as a "student" and might be treated differently. In dealing with this possibility I think it fair to say that any student who showed he accepted the values, speech, expressions etc. of the regular crews, and who was also efficient, very quickly became accepted. It is worth remembering that the bus industry includes a large number of transient workers, so the crews who remain for some time are well used to 'new starts'. A further check on my own presentation of self was provided by my employment with Edinburgh Corporation, which does not employ students as temporary labour. In my three months there, there was nothing in my interactions with the other crews that led me to believe that I was identified as a student or in my eighteen months with Eastern Scottish during the writing of this thesis; indeed when I occasionally informed other crews that I was at University they generally evinced some surprise. In addition there is the admittedly rather more questionable factor that I myself felt myself to be a bus driver. The identity, as far as I was concerned, was complete. The problems that this caused are discussed below. Certainly as regards the idea of my being identified as "a sociologist studying bus crews", there was not the slightest hint. In the achievement of the appearance of a regular I was helped by my Licence numbers which showed considerable antiquity by the time of the last piece of participant observation. (The Licences are numbered serially, so that the number is an accurate guide to

when the holder entered bus work. I was older and more experienced than many of the regulars.)

The concealment of the observer usually raises the difficulty of the concealment of the recording of observations. This was quite easily resolved by carrying a small notebook in which I recorded observations. This occasioned no comment, since bus drivers are quite often to be seen writing, and it was simple enough to place the notebook in a Time Card. I wrote up the notes at the end of each day in diary form. I have to confess, however, that I did not find such observations terribly useful, since I did not have a systematic framework to which observations could refer. I also suffered greatly from fatigue, since I found a 12 hour day with some eight hours actually at the wheel rather tiring. This consideration undoubtedly influenced my ability to even consciously perceive a possible observation. Bus driving is an involving job which requires a certain degree of concentration. While quite suitable for introspective meditation on diverse subjects, it does not lend itself to sustained application of logical analysis of the abstract generalities of sociology.

Denzin (ibid p 190) raises the problem of the ethics of the complete participant's role. I cannot say that the ethics of the situation troubled me greatly. I was being paid to do an arduous job, and felt free to write what I thought about it. When "official" permission was sought to carry out the survey, I did of course admit to my having been a conductor for some years. As far as the crews are

concerned, the names of those involved in any incidents in this text have been changed, and I doubt if they themselves would even remember the incidents, since I use them as illustration of general processes, rather than significant events in themselves.

As might be expected, this kind of observational process lent itself to what Denzin (ibid p 198) designates as analytic induction, as a way of making sense of my experiences, working up relevant concepts to order and explain the structures and processes involved. It was through such a system of thinking that I was led to my main thesis - that workers react to their situation, perceive and respond; subvert and recreate the technology in which they are involved.

It is of course an extension of this method to include survey and sampling techniques to establish the generality of the propositions evolved. The survey results are accordingly included where apposite, though I emphasise that the main burden is not derived from analysis of the survey form or the content of the results, at least in the first instance.

This raises the problem of validity of my participant observation. I do not think the method's general validity needs justification here. The problem of generality is in part solved by my comparing seven different groups of workers, and explicitly looking for differences among them to further the explanatory process, but in an important sense I can only offer the particular synthesis of detailed observations as the best test of validity.

However, participant observation as a sole method of research does have its limitations. For instance it was not possible to be an observer in all my research locales: in four of them my observations are based solely on memory used retrospectively and introspectively. Indeed formal observation with the whole paraphernalia of field notes etc. was only for six months in New Street.

There is also the peculiar limitation in bus work that while doing it, it is only possible to observe one person apart from oneself. This is not quite as much a limitation as it might appear, because some observations can be made of how the crews, isolated as they are, yet communicate by waves and signs to each other. But the main point is that bus crews spend only about 70 per cent of their time actually engaged in the task. The rest of the time they congregate in bus station canteens, on stances, and at terminuses. There they talk, and included in the talk is a great deal of discussion about bus work. As explained later, bus crews are often criticised, or have to take evasive action to avoid being killed or killing, and have to deal with other problems. Talking over incidents helped establish common perceptions of and reaction to outsiders. Thus, by being involved in such talk, I was able to share vicariously in other's experiences, and how they presented and represented them, and note their correspondence with my own observations and experiences.

I also used ordinary bus travel to confirm that others perceived situations the way I did. For instance I once came down from Balerno with a friend, to whom I predicted

successfully what speed the driver would travel at where, how fast he would brake, how he would rev his engine at stops with many passengers, and later in the journey who he would stop for and which lane of traffic he would choose, and when he would cut across.

A last limitation is that participant observation does not extend to relevant others in the situation, e.g. supervisors, managers and even the great British public, apart from perceptions at crew level. However I feel this is a limitation in the scope and extent of the research and not its nature.

There is one last point about the use of participant observation, and that is the danger of identity of the researcher with his subjects - "going native". I certainly identified completely with the role I was supposed to be investigating. I was, a bus driver. I found it impossible to remain detached when I had narrowly missed being killed because my driving sense made me brake on a corner just in time to avoid an artic's trailer cutting across where I would otherwise have been. I was involved absolutely with five A.M. starts, twelve hour days, working in the 80°F of a cab in summer, very involved in keeping out of trouble after ten p.m. on a Friday night - and very involved in counting my wages: I felt I had earned the money.

But this identity, which still persists - I think of myself more as a bus driver than a sociologist - was, I think, one of the main reasons for the difficulties I had in constructing this thesis. For just as a psychiatrist who

identifies with his patient cannot help him, so this sociologist had great difficulty in analysing, rather than expressing the situation of bus crews. It was only by a fairly traumatic personal process that I was able to return to academic writing. For instance one of the effects of this identity was to introduce a mental stricture on completing my survey at New Street, where I did most of my work. One hundred and ten interviews I had done: the last nineteen had to be put off for six months because I could not face imposing my sociology on my work mates. I offer no explanation, sociological or psychological, I offer it only as a direct result of my being involved in the situation I was studying. I also had a feeling of revulsion at applying sociology in general to what was a very personal area. Again I offer no "real" reason for this: again it has taken time to resolve the internal issues - to what extent I am not really competent to judge.

With such a personal comment made, it would be as well to turn to the Survey used.

The most obvious use of Survey methods in this context is of course to provide validation for observations made through the means of participant observation. As already observed, only some of the research locales were directly observed by myself. A questionnaire schedule is also a convenient means of formalising and systematising, and extending a consistent body of questions about relevant areas to the subjects. The interview can touch on areas that may be relevant but do not normally come up systematically in informal contact in the

work place. It is in a sense a way of forcing responses, and this was always kept in mind. For example, questions 50 to 53 are statements that are sometimes exchanged among bus men, but do not occur with any great regularity. However, they can be argued to "tap" important underlying orientations.

The second reason for the use of Survey methods relates to the original Thesis design. While observation can be used to analyse the Technology elements quite easily (e.g. confirmation of the correspondence between scheduled and actual timings of buses can be accomplished very simply by standing (unobtrusively!) by the side of the road with a timetable handy), orientations are not something which can readily be observed. To explore expected differences among my population, some form of systematic attitude survey seemed necessary. And it is relevant to add that another reason was an emphasis current at the time and place of my original research on the "hard", "number-crunching" type of sociological research. Being weak-minded I fell in fairly unthinkingly with the recommendations of this school of thought, even though looking at tables of figures causes me acute distress. However, in the event some interesting comparisons do emerge from this survey: they are referred to from time to time in appropriate places. The interview schedule, and the computer print out of variables and values are included in the appendices. The schedule can be seen to extend itself from attitudinal and self-reporting areas into such areas as age, length of

service, previous work history etc.

Being derived from such common sources as Moser (1967) and Oppenheim (1966) and referring to such sources as the appendices of *Le monde des employes de bureau* (Crozier 1965) and *The Affluent Worker* (Goldthorpe et al 1968), it bears not only a passing resemblance to the schedules used by these authors but also to later works such as the questionnaires used by Wedderburn and Crompton 1972 and Beynon and Blackburn 1972. This would seem to be a good example of the replication so often asked for. It can be seen to lend itself to such by now probably traditional, areas as "The Worker and the Job", "The Worker and the Union" etc. (Why my thesis does not take this form is referred to elsewhere.) A pilot survey was run, which proving the necessity of but slight modifications, constituted the main questionnaire. The analysis of the survey that was eventually pursued took the conventional form of analysing the variables based on the questions. There is quite a deliberate heavy reliance on open-ended questions, e.g., "If you could, what one thing about the job would you most like to change?" The responses to such questions obviously posed more problems in specifying the variables underlying the multifarious responses, and as is usual, no doubt violence was done to the data by category collapsing. My reluctance to collapse categories did of course have the effect of making statistical analysis rather difficult, especially where the seven groups were broken down by job, age and sex. This splintering of the data was one cogent reason for treating the Survey with caution. What

variables and values eventually emerged can be examined in the appendix. (The data analysis was performed by mounting the data on punch cards, subsequently transferred to magnetic tape using the program 'Statistical Package for the Social Sciences, NIE, BENT and HULL, 1970). If I had pursued survey analysis, I would undoubtedly have been able to show that perceptions of the organisation varied by previous job experience, length of service, sex and so on. I did not do this because of problems of validity of statistical association, because it would have extended even further this thesis, and finally because the main point has been made forcibly by Blackburn and Beynon (1972).

The consent of Scottish Bus Group directors, and the General Managers of the two City Corporations was obtained, along with the explicit consent of the local Shop Stewards concerned.

Interviews were carried out entirely by myself, so the interview bias is at least constant.

The interviews lasted at least twenty minutes and extended normally to about thirty to forty minutes. It was specifically designed to be completed in twenty minutes because the normal meal break is about forty minutes.

The two municipal organisations were helpful in that the Chief Depot Clerk called in "Spare" crews to be interviewed. I was careful to emphasise that "Day Off" crews were best, since I did not want bias from over sampling new entrants normally on the spare sheets. ("Day Off" workers go on the Spare Sheet when working that day - as is normal.)

I was introduced as, "being interested in finding out what you think of the job", which occasioned some mirth. A quiet section of the canteen was set aside for the interview. Serious co-operation and interest was normally evinced by the respondent.

In the S.B.G. and the A.A. locales, I was left to approach crews myself, again in the canteen and in their breaks. This made initial contact rather more of a strain for me, but my approach overall seems to have been successful, since the response rate in all groups was 100 per cent.

The end result was 129 interview schedules filled out (I wrote down the answers, I should mention, showing choice cards where appropriate), giving either eighteen or nineteen cases in each group, based on as near a random sample as I could obtain.

The sample was split almost equally between drivers and conductors or conductresses, so some deliberate sampling is present.

The status of the Survey on statistical grounds is not very high. It was designed as exploratory, and as indicative of tendencies rather than statistical certainties.

The sample, even for each locale, is small, compared with the then 30,000 busmen in Scotland it is very small indeed. The possibility of a self-administered questionnaire was dismissed on the grounds of impracticality and cost. A "pilot" survey, showing tendencies of the type used seemed the only practicable one given the resources of one person in the time span and scale of research envisaged.

A general word about the application of the Survey method to my material is apposite. The main proposition of my thesis is that attitudes and behaviour in the work place do not depend solely on either the "technology" or "prior orientations" involved, but are worked out in response to the complex of factors involved in organisation and task. The implication of this is, of course, that answers to my interview questions are biased by experience within the organisation in unpredictable ways.

For example, question 2 "What sort of situation were you in, that made you take up the job in the first place?" may elicit an answer on the lines of "intrinsic interest", which reflects the respondent's present assessment, rather than his prior approach to the job. This reflexive characteristic was a further reason for taking an analytical approach to busmen which was not based primarily on survey analysis.

Research Locales

As well as experience in some of the groups eventually chosen, another reason for selection of groups was the possibility of identifying different orientations related to the different situation of the workers in their different communities. This kind of enterprise, as well as being somewhat too large to be conveniently fitted in with other subjects within the confines of a small research program, does of course raise the spectre of ecological fallacy. Even with this danger in mind, however, there does appear to be,

from the survey data, some correspondence between orientations and the type of community, even in the broad sense in which they are outlined below. For instance, there is some evidence that Fife crews do hold more "solidaristic" attitudes, as might be hoped for in choosing a small mining community, while Glasgow crews, exposed to more work experiences and opportunities, and living in outlying, low amenity post-war housing estates, do appear to have more "instrumental" orientations to work. This might be an interesting area to follow up more fully, since it should be possible to construct some consistency about the "same" technology being used in each case and use it to explore different perceptions of work according to different "community" factors, though of course the rest of this thesis devotes some attention to showing that even within this "one" technology, very great differences in perception of the task and organisation exist.

With this in mind, I think it still reasonable to give the research locales as originally described, because it was in these locales that I identified discrepancies in both orientations and task performance - the starting point of the thesis.

Kilmarnock is an old burgh in Ayrshire which developed some major heavy industries, by the 60s mostly in a state of some decline. I was aware of an employment consciousness no doubt connected with this. Trade Union consciousness associated with old redundancy-producing industries seemed likely. The housing is mainly council schemes. I expected

to find a traditional male-oriented society of the type associated with heavy industry and the adjacent mining areas which the local bus company served. Probably related to other employment opportunities, there was an emphasis on long association with the bus company, with something of the pioneer spirit of early days remaining. (It is not unusual for the S.B.G. Companies to have employees with over forty years' service, as the "Retirements" column of the Staff Magazine confirms.) It was expected that workers would have strong kinship ties in the area. The work load was comparatively light, with many rural routes, but some heavy load services up the Darvel valley, and on local town services.

Milngavie is some seven miles from Glasgow city centre. It is a dormitory town of some 12,000 inhabitants. However most of the services operated by the Company were not the comparatively lightly-loaded Milngavie-Glasgow services, but a set of services to the large (30,000) housing estate of some notoriety, Drumchapel, rather nearer Glasgow. Crews were drawn not only from Milngavie but from Drumchapel and the older slum housing area of Maryhill, both within the City of Glasgow. I suspected (and found) a number of ex-Glasgow Corporation Transport crews. Although Glasgow has a high unemployment rate, it also seems to have plentiful job opportunities, and this was in fact reflected in the work history of my survey respondents. I suspected trade union consciousness to be "instrumentalist", though given the high degree of apparent camaraderie, it might well have solidaristic overtones. The crews seemed to be much younger

than other depots, and this may have been one reason for the frequent horseplay observed (both on and off the buses). At the time I was working there, overtime was very plentiful, so that it was possible (and was done) to do a "double shift", i.e. work two shifts (16 hours). Organisationally the garage is cut off in that none of its routes cross or overlap with routes from other garages. All services run from outlying housing areas to the city centre, and do not uplift and set down wholly within the city limits.

About the City of Glasgow I need say very little here. The massive deprivation that exists on so many grounds needs no emphasis. With the lowest car-ownership per head of population of any city in Britain, the burden of moving the population about falls largely on the bus crews.

The personnel of the depot surveyed here come also from Drumchapel and the 'high amenity' council estate of Knightswood. I expected to find high instrumentality in terms of orientation to work, given the job opportunities available elsewhere, with the attraction for corporation transport working being security coupled with opportunities for high wages with overtime. Certainly such an instrumental attitude could be expected given the evident strain and pressure of driving in the city. Organisationally, routes are operated by two garages, so that adjacent buses on a route are normally from garages at opposite sides of the sides of the city. I knew there was a very high antipathy to the public, a perceived notion of potential violence. But the busmen did feel well treated by the impartial

bureaucracy of the Corporation, and acknowledgement was made of better conditions of service as well as higher pay compared to S.B.G. bus opportunities in adjacent areas. There was, accordingly, I suspected, a degree of self-selection operating. I had observed a greater degree of isolation among the crews, with much less eating together, talk, and fun being evident - prima facie evidence for "alienation" or "anomie" for those inclined to that sort of interpretation.

Edinburgh Corporation struck me as being remarkable for the high proportion of middle-aged crews, and the very few conductresses. It has fewer garages than Glasgow, so that routes tend to be operated by a single garage. Work loads tended to be lighter, both in terms of number of passengers, and time to get from here to there. I was not able subsequently to analyse the very strong impression I had that the organisation was run primarily with a regard for the crews' welfare. From informal discussions with shop-stewards, there seemed to be a high degree of consensus between management and union. Conditions in general I thought better than Glasgow. Organisationally, it was better run, with higher pay, more predictable timings, an easier "human" attitude to control, fewer breakdowns, etc.

The Fife depots of Kelty and Lochgelly were chosen because of their rural mining-community characteristics. The area is one with high unemployment. I suspected that even if not all that many ex-miners were employed, there would still be orientations to work of a solidaristic kind. The

continuing resistance of Fife crews to one-man operation to avoid redundancies seemed a good example of this. The "traditionalist" outlook extends to employing conductresses rather than conductors, and segregating males and females except when actually working - a practice endorsed by most of the crews.

The A.A. company was chosen as a comparison with the near-by and route-contingent Kilmarnock depot. The intention was to uncover any variables associated with small size, organisation and private ownership. The crews are drawn from three coastal towns in Ayrshire, which have a mixture of tourism and light and heavy industry. The area as a whole is quite affluent.

The Edinburgh depot of Eastern Scottish offered an interesting example of city crews working predominantly rural or rural-urban services. This depot also offered the most scope in type of task, since it was a large garage supplying both heavily loaded suburban-city services, but also inter-urban (e.g. Edinburgh-London) and extensive Tours services. I observed no readily identifiable orientation to work, since a "pure" instrumentalist would join the City service, while there yet did not appear to be any noticeable "solidaristic" element. In terms of "community" the crews were drawn from all over the city. The depot included long-service workers, and those taken on only for the summer.

These research locales were of course chosen primarily to fit into the comparative scheme detailed in the "Thesis A" section (see Appendix).

Before leaving the locales, and addressing the next topic of "Who are the Busmen?" a general methodological note has to be made.

With seven groups involved in a comparative framework, which is not based on survey analysis, as was intended, but mainly on analysis of the actors' perceptions, I felt it would be very confusing, as well as tedious to make comparisons by variables and groups throughout. Accordingly, I have based my account of "the busman's perceptions" mainly on the New Street Depot of Eastern Scottish, making reference to significant differences where appropriate.

Not only does this aid clarity of argument, but New Street is where I worked as a driver for some eighteen months and pertinent examples come more readily to mind from that experience.

CHAPTER THREE: Survey Population Characteristics

I include in the next section information of descriptive nature, in the context of which later sections may be placed. Considered here are the work history of busmen, their reasons for choosing bus employment, the wages prevailing, and, leading up to subsequent considerations, what they like about the job, and how they perceive it being estimated generally.

Choosing bus employment

The analysis of question 2 - "What sort of situation were you in, that made you take up this job in the first place?" - shows that for 26 per cent of the general sample, "Money" was the most important consideration. Probing showed that this did not simply refer to the average wage, but on the one hand to "steady money", a guaranteed wage for every week, and on the other, the opportunity for greatly increased earnings through overtime.

Of all the groups, Glasgow showed the largest proportion (44 per cent) quoting money. This instrumentalist answer may well be related to the vagaries of employment and lower job opportunities of the greater proportion of "previously unskilled" crews in Corporation Transport. More probably, it may well be that the crews perceived more positively that only money would get them to do such a lousy job, (as it was expressed to me on occasion). This latter point is endorsed by the turnover figures discussed later, while a degree of self-selection would seem to be involved in that the crews of neighbouring Milngavie quoted money as the reason for joining in only 16 per cent of cases, with an

indication of joining that Company for the intrinsic qualities of the tasks offered.

The other two significant categories mentioned in the general sample are "Redundant" at 26 per cent, and "Previous job disadvantages", and "Intrinsic attraction - ("I've always really fancied working on the buses" - "I just wanted to drive") - both at 15 per cent.

This sort of consideration obviously relates to perceptions of the market situation (cf March and Simon 1967 and Blackburn and Mann 1979), which goes beyond the bounds of the subject here). The instrumentalist attitude of Glasgow crews is re-inforced by the positive nature of their choice - only one man gave "Unemployed" as a reason compared to 28 per cent in Milngavie and Fife depots.

That the process of assessing the market position is rather more complex than March and Simon (1967) imply is apparent in answers to question 3 - "Have you ever left this job and then come back?" "Yes" percentages were:

Glasgow	44
Milngavie	72
A.A.	42
Eastern	36
Edinburgh	50
Kilmarnock	22
Fife	21

This would seem to be indicative of use of the buses as an alternative but "second choice" type of employment, which is itself a token of the chronic shortages of staff

in bus companies generally. Where other opportunities are noticeably lower, as in Kilmarnock and central Fife, the proportion of re-join is much lower. It should be remarked that the extraordinary figure of 72 per cent for Milngavie is 42 per cent attributable to crews who transferred from Corporation Transport to Midland because of Midland's relative attractiveness.

Most of the reasons for returning to the buses were related to attraction of the buses, and redundancies in the other employment. The marketable skills of the crews who left were entirely in relatively skilled (mainly driving) or semi-skilled areas.

The table shows the results for question 6. The top line in each cell indicates the main job level while the bottom line indicates whether an occupational level has ever been held. The classification is based on that used in The Affluent Worker.

MAIN JOB ~ TOP LINE : EVER HELD ~ BOTTOM LINE
FIGURES ARE PERCENTAGES :(DOUBLE COUNTING)

	LOWER PROFESSIONAL	SMALL EMPLOYERS	SUPERVISORY	SELF-EMPLOYED	SKILLED	RELATIVELY SKILLED	SEMI- SKILLED	UNSKILLED
E.C.T.	5.6	5.6	5.6 5.6	5.6	22.2 33.3	22.2 33.3	21.6 50.0	22.2 38.9
PIPE	5.3 5.3		21.1 26.3	5.3	5.3 10.5	31.6 42.1	21.1 52.6	5.3 15.8
G.C.T.		5.6	11.1 11.1		5.6 11.1	11.1 22.2	11.1 22.2	33.3 44.4
MILNGAVIE			22.2 22.2			33.3 38.9	22.2 50.0	16.7 27.8
A.A.		5.3 5.3	5.3 15.8		5.3 15.8	31.6 52.6	26.3 36.8	15.8 21.8
NEW STREET			10.5 15.8	5.3	26.3 31.6	26.3 57.9	15.8 42.1	26.3
KILMARNOCK			5.6	5.6 5.6	5.6 11.1	11.9 33.3	38.9 50.0	22.2 22.2
OVERALL	0.8 1.6	0.8 2.3	10.9 14.7	0.8 3.1	10.1 17.1	24.0 40.3	23.3 43.4	16.3 27.0

Comment on Table

Given a larger sample, more might be made of the intra-group variations. But the main points can be briefly made. Given the general low esteem in which the job is held (q.v. difficulty of recruitment), it is perhaps surprising that more of the respondents had not been in the 'Unskilled' categories (27 per cent had) especially since most of the women come into this category. The only exception is Glasgow, which not only has 44 per cent, but also a far smaller span of job held, (though it also had a higher proportion who had been regular servicemen - other than war or national service). The implication is that Glasgow crews have lower marketable skills, which may go some way to explaining their "last card in the pack" dominant assessment of the job. This has further implications in that Glasgow bus work would seem to be perceived as worse work by those who might consider bus work: those with better market skills went into bus work outside Glasgow.

For instance, Milngavie is notable for a wide range of jobs, coming closest to Blackburn's (1973) image of "urban proletariat", and also the highest level of "jobs held".

But in general, the sample falls into the relatively skilled and semi-skilled categories, which accords with the occupational classification of bus work.

The "downward mobility" of those who had 'skilled' previous occupations can be easily explained by the lack of security in for example building trades, or low wages, as for example, in shop trades.

As regards the part of the economy in which these skills had been sold, the general sample results for "ever been in 'X' industry?" show 33 per cent Driving, 38 per cent for Armed Services, 59 per cent for Service Industries, 39 per cent for Manufacturing Industries, 11 per cent for Primary Industries, while 25 per cent of the sample had been unemployed at some time.

The chief exceptions to this general pattern are that Milngavie again reported low Armed Services (17 per cent) and high (89 per cent) Service Industries; while Fife reported 32 per cent for Primary Industry.

In general, the employment history data do tend to support the initial choice of areas and groups. Examination of the locations of all these jobs shows very little geographical mobility, with only 12 per cent showing any significant (over 50 miles) change of residence (excluding armed forces service of course).

In the context of perceptions of this market - which vary from, "This is a great job" to "Its the last card in the pack" a note on wages is apposite. The place of money in busmen's perceptions is referred to in other places, but deserves a clear comment here.

In 1971 Average weekly earnings for male manual workers were £30, and the average hours worked 44, (all figures from British Labour Statistics Yearbook 1971).

For Road Passenger Transport manual workers, average weekly earnings were almost exactly the general average at £30.71 per week (Table 10). But given the lower hourly

earnings of bus workers at 63.10 pence per hour as opposed to 71.95 pence per hour, these earnings were achieved by working an average of 48 hours as opposed to 44 hours.

The noticeable contrast is for conductresses. Even their basic wage for 40 hours of £18-19 was considerably above the general average of £15 per week for all women manual workers (Table 11).

But the chief attraction for many of the crews is the potential for overtime earnings.

An analysis of Edinburgh Corporation's wage statistics for 1971 shows that their average wage for drivers was £33; with overtime, some drivers on O.M.O. were earning about £46 per week, on a yearly average. The upper earnings for conductresses were £31, and for conductors, £39.50. Various bonuses were used to boost wages from £17.00 to a lower limit of £22.

To examine the relation between basic wage, actual wage and overtime working, I looked at a few cases in detail.

To earn near the average for drivers - £33.99 required in one case 40 hours basic shift, plus 3 "details" (overtime rush-hour services of about 2 hours duration, paid 3 hours), plus rest day working of 8 hours, making a total of 72 hours 30 minutes (resulting in a wage of which half is overtime working), with 54 actual hours worked.

To earn close to the national average male manual worker wage, one worker worked a 40 hour shift and his rest day (7 hours 52 minutes) to give £31.60.

Thus just to earn the national average wage required

either rest-day working, or three "details", which equally disrupt non-work time, for they rarely follow on from a shift - if the shift is from 6.00 a.m. to 2.00 p.m. the "detail" will probably be somewhere in the period 4.30 - 7.30 p.m.¹

But it is evident that bus working does allow crews to "choose" what earnings to achieve, according to their own wishes or needs. That they do this is evident from the range of earnings in E.C.T. which for drivers was from £22 to £46 per week on an annual average basis. I also worked out that curiously enough, the average for all crews in E.C.T. was £31.81, almost exactly the male manual worker average!

As a last point to illustrate the potential for overtime, I have on a few occasions actually managed to clock up the "ton" - 100 "pay hours".

The actual basic wages of the groups were £19.25 for "country" busmen, £23.01 for E.C.T., and £20.15 for G.C.T. crews. With this close similarity in wage rates the market situation of bus crews would seem to be based on overtime throughout the year (country services cut back in winter, while city services maintain constant overtime levels), other conditions, and the "perceived reasonableness" of the task. Just how accurately these are perceived is problematic.

As an introduction to how the crews perceive their job it is interesting to note the turnover rates.

From this data it would appear that being a busman in Glasgow Corporation Transport is viewed less than wholly enthusiastically.

Glasgow Corporation Transport (from the Report of the

General Manager 1971) had a 52 per cent turnover of staff per annum. Of these 52 per cent, one third were dismissed. The implication of a 52 per cent turnover of staff is of course, that many of the staff have less than one year's service and accordingly, experience. This is borne out by the "Years of Service" chart on p 39 (The 'Report' is a most marvellously comprehensive document.) which shows 70 per cent of the Traffic Staff had under five years' service, 82 per cent under ten, and 89 per cent under fifteen. (I calculated that of all resignations and dismissals 0.88 per cent were due to "normal" retiral). These figures also include the Inspectors, Timekeepers and Underground Train crews and are thus under-reported for "Green Staff" (as the crews are known, by the colour of their uniform). 'The Buses' is not an old man's job in Glasgow!

Unfortunately, out of the £40 million turnover of the S.B.G., no allocation is made for data compilation of a similar nature. The accountability of the Municipalities is evident from their very detailed reports.

However the general manager of Fife did very kindly compile for me some data, from which can be extracted that in Kelty and Lochgelly crews, 50 per cent had under five years' service, and 75 per cent under fifteen years' service. There was also a much larger proportion of long-service workers, with eleven per cent having between twenty and thirty years' service. (And two stalwarts with between forty-five and fifty years').

Turnover rates were only roughly available, and for

1973 only, but were about 25 per cent. Edinburgh Corporation Transport's turnover rate I calculated to be 30 per cent in 1971, though in later contact with Edinburgh Corporation Transport in 1975 I was informed that with the implementation of O.M.O. "the associated 25 per cent increase in wages had cut turnover very considerably".

However, at this stage it is as well to remember the operation of differential labour market situations in the different localities.

Before the main analysis, however, some tendencies can be derived from the Survey results of how the crews perceived their job.

Occupational considerations are continued also in questions 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11, which are included here partly as background data for later analysis, and partly to aim at giving some general perception of their job by busmen.

In asking about generally valued aspects of work the reflexivity of such a question (respondents will tend to draw on their present situation in answering) has to be borne in mind.

Yet the general sample showed a very general assessment with 38 per cent putting 'Security' first, and 19 per cent 'Good Wage'. Other categories were spread over the whole range.

The second "job affect" reversed the position, so that 'Security' took second place at 14.7 per cent to 'Good Wage' at 29.5 per cent. But interestingly (bearing in mind the reflexivity point made above), "Interest and variety" had

gone up to 13.2 per cent, and "Opportunity to use your own judgement" had gone up to 10.1 per cent.

The most interesting feature of all is the results for question 8 "As far as these two things are concerned, how would you rate this job?"

	Very Good	All Right	Pretty Poor	Very Bad
%	44	36	10	4.7

There was very little inter-group variation from these assessments, so that it seems fair to say that Busmen seem to get their instrumental orientations fairly well satisfied in their occupation.

This orientation towards Security and Wages is pointed up by the much greater spread of answers to question 9 - "How about things on the bad side of work: which of these is important to you?" Indeed the spread was so wide that no significant differences among the groups was distinguishable.

The 'times mentioned' for this question were Long hours 34, Boring job 48, Can't use own judgement 21, Too much supervision 24, No future 35, job itself unpleasant 35, and Insecurity 43.

This question really only gains significance by contrast with question 10 - "What do you like about being a driver/conductor?", and by complementarity with question 11 - "And what do you dislike most?" These questions were framed so as to avoid the pitfalls of "Are you satisfied with your job," type of questions, whose inadequacy has frequently been commented on (cf. Stewart and Blackburn 1973: 73).

The very diversity of answers to these deliberately open questions indicates the diverse nature of "being a bus-man". The main responses were on the topics of - Travelling, Exercise of professional skill, Best job available, Good organisation to work for, Limited supervision, Active job, Good/Regular money, Socially involving, Just a job, Shift work, Touring work, Socially responsible, Respectable, Driving itself, Variety, Unspecific (positive affect), and Nothing.

The main categories, with the percentage of respondents who mentioned them, were Variety 45.7 per cent; Socially involving 43.4 per cent; Limited supervision 31.8 per cent, Driving itself, 21.7 per cent; and Travelling 19.4 per cent.

(In explanation, "Socially involving" is taken to cover statements "I really like meeting people", "Oh ye meet all sorts in this job" and so on. The other categories are self-explanatory.

(For reasons that will become apparent below, it is of significance that Glasgow's rate is about one third of the average for this factor of "socially involving".)

The conclusion is that working on the buses includes a diversity of elements in terms of the content of the job, with a very positive valuation of significant features of the task. (Analysis of Variable 052 - "main trend of likes", indicates that the Activity itself was the most highly valued aspect. But note from previous questions, the high valuation also of 'extra-organisational benefits' such as security and good wages.

(It might be as well to note here that the response to this question was immediate and positive in the majority of cases.) I thought I might well add some comment based on my own experience on the main valued job characteristics mentioned by crews, to give some little substance to the content of the task which has been established as the main source of valued factors.

Variety for me has included having to be content with the low level variety of constantly shifting faces, social types, and the passing street and country scenes. But it has also included driving flat out through Edinburgh with a police motor-cycle escort in a double decker packed with the Queen's bodyguard company of the Scots Guards in full dress. On this occasion, on arrival at Holyrood House, after a most exciting, not to say hair-raising ride, one of the other drivers said "You know as I went round a corner, I looked at you in my mirror, and just said to myself, I hope to hell my bus isn't canted over at that angle!"

Socially involving for me included knowing regular passengers, the knowledge of providing an essential link in urban and rural environments, the opportunity to talk over "life" with workmates, and in general being involved in other people's lives and interests.

Limited supervision I have difficulty in commenting on personally, since I have no experience of closely supervised work: suffice it to say that the crews do appreciate "not having somebody breathing down your neck all the time". Indeed the only time this happens - literally too - is when undergoing driver training. This is a most frustrating period in which to begin with virtually every move is judged

wrong, and greeted with a running commentary on the lines of "Jesus Christ driver its a fucking bus, stay out from the kerb! Don't mind what the back of the bus is doing, the back of the bus will look after itself! Hell's teeth look in the mirror when you're going round a corner, remember there's thirty feet behind you!" All of which seems chiefly to be a straight forward example of "hazing" with the latent function of acting as an initiation into the symbolic universe of the qualified bus driver. It also reinforces the idea that access to this socially valued activity is only through the organisation.

Driving itself is of course a generally valued activity in itself, and it's very pleasant to be driving out in the country with the dawn mist lifting off the fields, and the chorus of birds making itself heard above the engine. Even city driving can be pleasurable, while there is always present the "machismo" effect of being master of twelve litres of power, with the authority to make your way over lesser vehicles. It is not all pleasure of course, not only in terms of actual work done and skill employed, but in other aspects, which move into the area of horror at one extreme, though again here there is experience - and an experience shared among all bus drivers because it could happen to them. Even in my comparatively short experience of eighteen months as a driver in one garage, I know personally of two drivers who had had people killed by their bus - one of them twice. In the first case a car came round a bend on the wrong side of the road into his bus: in the second a woman just stepped off the pavement in front of him. There is still a conductor in New Street who was a driver until a motor-

cyclist went round a bend at over 100 miles per hour and through the radiator grille of his bus.

Driving a bus is not something that can be undertaken lightly.

Travelling is again a generally valued activity and the country buses especially provide opportunities for going to the most un-thought of places - Auchtermuchty, Ecclefechan and Auchenshuggle are all served by the bus companies mentioned here.

Turning to question 11 - "And what do you dislike most?" a first point to be made is that again this is a free-response question, and thus a very great range of dislikes was obtained. Somewhat different results would be obtained - and probably a more accurate picture would emerge, if the respondents had been asked to rank a list of factors. However this is one of the faults of the virtuous "exploratory survey".

Variable 074 shows that the main dislikes (32 per cent of those mentioned) were in the area of social relations affected by the job, but this area includes both interaction with society in the form of serving the public, and in the effect of shift-work and general tiredness on the individual's own activities. The second main area (22 per cent of mentions) was to do, not with the task, but with the organisation of the task.

The factors identified were physically tiring, mentally tiring, driving conditions, public, organisational inadequacies, shifts, unsettled employment conditions, effect on non-work life, supervision, unsolidaristic work force, work

mates, wages, union, condition of buses, life chances, stigma attached to the job, management, introduction of OMO, boredom, and nothing. "Other" factors had a mention rate of 14 per cent of all mentions.

It is an interesting comment on the way at least some people's expectations were met that 11 per cent mentioned "nothing" disliked.

The greatest number of mentions (24 per cent) was for the effect on non-work life. This is hardly surprising given the shift work, split shifts and also the long hours worked by many crews. Indeed it was the amount of time involved in working that dominated over when the work was done. The really significant mentioning of this factor (50 per cent of respondents in the subfile) was in Fife, which accords with the community type. In the S.B.G. as a whole it tends to be the rurally situated garages that resent their inability to participate fully in their community (private communication from S.B.G. director).

The factor taking second place with 21 per cent of mentions was the Public. Why this is so is explicated in the appropriate section later, but the basic paradox can be mentioned here. The public is both the source of "satisfaction" (cf question 10, and stress on "social involvements") and of "dissatisfaction". Being such a diffuse area it compels a wide range of responses from the crews and it is this that makes the job involving ("boredom" has a mention rate of only 4.7 per cent, while the "interest and variety rates of mention will be recalled). Some of the discussion of the Public will focus on Glasgow and certainly the Glasgow

crews perceive the Public in antagonistic terms - 38 per cent of them mentioned the item, the highest rate of all groups.

The mention rate of other factors are less salient generally, but there are some significant group emphases, whose significance will be explicated in later sections.

First, it is surprising to find that Edinburgh had a very much higher rate of endorsement of task factors - Physically and Mentally Tiring were mentioned by 44 per cent of them, and 33 per cent also mentioned Driving Conditions. The job was mentioned as tiring by only one other response - in Eastern. Driving conditions do have a general mention rate of 14.7 per cent. Lacking any other explanation, it occurred to me that this particular result may simply reflect the form of the question: if organisational and other expectations are being met - and there is general evidence that this is the case in Edinburgh - then attention will focus on what is a fairly arduous task.

A second area of interest was that Eastern had a significant (50 per cent of the sample) mention of management and organisation inadequacies, only Glasgow coming close at 33 per cent.

A last point is that Glasgow also had an exceptional mention rate for "unsolidaristic work force" and "work mates". In short, they feel aggrieved by the action of some of the people they have to work with. This is an important point, but the explanation will have to wait till the section on Interaction.

In sum , there are few dislikes of the task itself, but a whole range of factors connected with the organisation of the performance of that task. The explanation of this seems a suitable enterprise!

Consideration of how the crews perceive the 'satisfactions' and 'dissatisfactions' of the job leads to consideration of how they value the job in more "social" terms, how they see its status and esteem (the usage of these terms follows Littlejohn 1963).

Immediately, a striking contrast emerges from comparing questions 26 and 27.

To question 26, "Do you think your job a good one to have?" 33 per cent of the general sample judged it to be Very Good, and 44 per cent, Good. Inclusion of Neutral would boost the proportion of favourable answers to 93 per cent. It seems safe to say that the balance is tipped markedly towards the "Likes" end of assessment, with a quite marked match between expectation and substance.

In considering the responses to question 27 - "What do people in general think of it?", it seems as though the referents change. Few mentioned labour market position, and of these, most pointed out that people would not consider taking the job because of shift work or having to work with the public.

The most striking feature is that the total of assessments of a derogatory nature is 55 per cent, with only 5.4 per cent of the sample unambiguously saying that they thought people in general thought it a good job.

However, there were few who answered in very derogatory terms, such as

"Trash, lowest of the low"

or were willing to place the job as a last resort, most making some mildly derogatory statement like

"Bus crews are invisible - taken for granted" or

"Don't think much of it" or

"You're a public servant, and that makes you a second class citizen".

But there was some further elaboration (9.3 per cent) with social areas

"They've got a bad reputation because of the scrubbers" - mainly connected with supposed sexual licence.

However 14.7 per cent (the second largest single group) saw themselves as having a low reputation because of the inadequacies of the organizations.

"The sins of the system fall on the crews' heads"

Question 54 tried to uncover the crews' perception of occupational ranking. When asked to rank their own occupation as well, the majority put it in the middle - with bank clerk and factory worker. But a substantial 15 per cent put it bottom of all.

In sum bus crews value their task and see the status of the job as being generally in line with their expectations. But they perceive it as being generally held in low regard, with the crews suffering for the managements practices discussed in Chapter Two.

The last area of crews' perceptions based on survey

data that I wish to consider is how the crews see each other. Again, the aim is to give a general first impression against which detailed analysis can be compared.

With such antipathy directed against the Public, and the reciprocal (and connected, probably) perception of themselves as being held in low esteem and accorded low status by the public, it might be thought that bus crews would be inclined to perceive each other in friendly fashion.

The answers to questions 16 and 17 indicate that this is indeed the case. Perhaps most cogently put as

"Great! - that's what keeps people in the job."

The generally positive responses have to be seen in the light of the isolation of the crews when actually working, but the comparatively long periods they can spend in conversation.

Question 17, being a restricted choice question on relation of the respondent to other crews, and also being not very discriminant in the categories employed, brings out the finding that 22.5 per cent "had a few good friends," 34 per cent were friendly with all, and 34 per cent got on well with everyone.

But question 16 - "How would you describe how people got on with each other here?" throws up a more interesting picture.

Although the predominant trend was that they got on well -

"Once you put on the uniform you're one of the boys" - with 53 per cent making some form of positive statement,

even of these positive statements 16.3 per cent was for "Very Good", 5.4 per cent for "Good", and the biggest category (28.7 per cent) was for "Good - but" qualified in some way.

A look at the other categories, and the whole range of responses that they are based on, indicates why.

Quite a sizable group (18.6 per cent) perceived an ambivalence ("two-faced" was the term most commonly used), based on friendly relations generally, but that this did not stop self-seeking after overtime, or type of work, and importantly, the task.

"They're all very well in the canteen, but they're right bad behind the wheel."

"Great in the canteen; but on the road you've no friends."

"All right, but there's back-biting because of the way the system works."

This was balanced to a certain extent by those (6.2 per cent) who saw a measure of integration because the crews were involved in the same work, but the trend is quite clear: crews have affable relations and recognise common interests; indeed one feature is the way that crews conceptualise their job as one of co-operation - of "working together", but the performance of the work can cause interaction among the crews of a diversive and negative nature.

How the lively, affable, "Solidaristic" affective ties among crews give way to antipathy and even violence on occasion is discussed in the section on Interaction.

But I feel at this juncture it would be as well to

relinquish the fascination of percentages (valuable as these are for a general picture) and get out to where the action is - on the Road!

Notes: Chapter Three

¹ Thus to gain the average manual worker's wage 54 hours work is required. Recall that the "breakthrough" to better conditions on the municipalisation of Glasgow's tramways reduced the working week to 54 hours (much less than the average then), and put tramway workers to the top of the wages league, with no overtime allowed, generally. Thus even a "good" employer such as E.C.T. has effectively intensified the labour process by cutting wages relative to fifty years ago.

CHAPTER FOUR: Route

The route is the first of the key determinants of the labour process to be considered. The route effectively acts as the means whereby the work force is disciplined in the labour process. The essential feature is that the ordering of the work has to cope with a work force which is comparatively free of immediate supervision: thus the route is primarily a means of securing control, mainly through specifying not just where to go, but vitaly what time is given for completion of the operation. Unlike many machine-based industries, time is important, not simply in the intensification of work, but has the additional feature of being used as a discipline.

First, I want to examine how management manages to mystify discipline and intensification through the use of time.

Lamden (1969: 22ff) writes,

Running time, or the number of minutes allowed for a bus to move from one terminus to another, or between intermediate points, must obviously be based on local operating conditions. No standard formula will work out, even if there is an acceptable average on which to base general calculations, simply because every route is different in character. For instance, a town or city service may start over flat territory and good roads where first there is a number of well used passenger stops in a three mile stretch of road; this may be followed by two miles of parkland, or a high income residential area which produces but little bus traffic, before reaching a housing estate located on a steep hill. Another service carrying just as much traffic may be all uphill, downhill, with narrow winding streets, and every stop normally observed. Or sometimes a bus may have difficulty emerging from a side road onto a busy main road; or a particular street may be regularly congested for a couple of hours a day despite bans on parking and restrictions on the

loading and unloading of lorries and vans. Again a service covering a well laid out main road may be in difficulty if schedules are tight, solely because car drivers do not give way to buses wanting to leave special lay-bys.

Overall, it is much better to have timings that are tight rather than loose, for not only do they put crews on their mettle, (my emphasis) thereby encouraging starts from unsupervised terminals to be made on time, but they also discourage early running at slack times.

Note that nowhere does Lamden actually consider changing running times to suit changing conditions: the implications of this for the crews will be referred to in further sections.

Nothing does the bus industry more harm than early running, especially where the next bus is more than five or ten minutes away. It is desirable, therefore, to have a timing point at all main traffic centres in towns and cities (to have one about every mile or mile and a half is sound practice) and to have strict enough discipline to ensure that these times are observed.

I have quoted this passage from Lamden at length because not only does he give a rather vague account of the variables of a route that I consider more formally below, but he also brings out the organising principle of time, as well as demonstrating some of the contradictions inherent in the organisation, the implications of which I examine below.

The first point arising from Lamden is that despite his advice about the variabilities of routes, and the consequent need for particular timings to accord with varying local conditions, bus companies do in fact adopt average timings. For example Glasgow Corporation

actually publishes its average scheduled speed as being 12.31 miles per hour, Edinburgh Corporation's is 9 miles per hour (Reports of the General Managers). The S.B.C.'s average speed would seem to be 15 miles per hour, from examination of its timetable.

Companies would thus seem to be ignoring Lamden's warning (a warning he made in the first edition of his book in 1942). In particular, changing traffic patterns in the '50s and particularly the '60s have meant radical changes in traffic flows, but only occasionally have these been reflected in changed timings for bus routes.

The implication for the labour process is that congestion has meant an intensification of work for bus crews - an intensification which does not have increasing surplus value as an end, but merely seeks to maintain the status quo. Road conditions have changed radically since the times were first established, but the bureaucracy set up to control routes has failed to adapt to new conditions. Only rarely have the crews been able to change this vital component in their task: my own working experience has only encountered one, where an increase in time was gained by threat of strike action. Thus the achieving of the organisational principle of reliable services is devolved onto the crews. I examine below the effect of this intensification of the labour process.

As may be gathered from the extract from Lamden, the route is a material and social entity which must be

traversed in a given length of time. The given time could be designated as the organisational imperative. But, in actuality, on even moderately busy routes, time becomes a pressing imperative, as well as an organisational principle.

Even in rural areas, accurate time-keeping is an explicit organisational requirement, enforced by supervision. But supervision is not the sole factor governing the running of a bus system. One consideration is that this supervision is founded on the assumption that it is to prevent buses from running early - and this assumption is supported in the main in how the crews actually operate the system. But what is to prevent the crews from running late, and thus reducing the pressure deriving from keeping up to time?

As will be shown below, there are fluctuations of both a random and an unpredictable nature which interfere with the driver's ability to complete the route within the time allowed. If he fails to do so, then he is working harder than he need, and he also disrupts the pattern of regular headway. An immediate consequence is that being late encroaches on lay-over time, which acts, from the crews' point of view, as a rest period. If only for this one reason, there are very real considerations compelling the driver to keep to time, if not actually to run early.

The driver must also keep in mind that his conductor will also suffer any consequences of being late, with a consequent threat to the working relationship.

To keep to time requires effort: to be late, however, is to lose control of the system in which the driver works. So drastic are the consequences of this losing of control that it can explain almost the whole of the bus driver's typical bad traffic manner, and his foul-mouthed imprecations aimed at apparently inoffensive little old ladies who are slow in boarding.

The consequences of loss of control with regard to time because of the effects of other constraints can be considered this way:- Buses are sent out to operate a route at precise intervals; in a city system, anything from four minutes to twenty minutes. Each bus is supposed to pick up all the passengers who have come to bus stops in that period, the frequency of the service supposedly being designed to meet potential passenger loadings.

If for any reason a bus is late, then obviously more people have had time to accumulate at any one stop. But the more people there are, the longer the loading time becomes, and the longer the loading time the later the bus gets . . . and so on in progressive fashion. If a bus gets late, it does of course not only do its own work, but also starts to do the work of the bus behind it, particularly if the route has a high frequency service. Since this is so, it continues to get progressively later, with the consequence that the bus behind starts to catch up, "bunching" occurs, and the headway principle is destroyed.

This bunching is in fact so common that it has attained the status of a national joke - "They're scared to go alone," - "Banana Bus" Routes - because they come in bunches etc, etc.

It should not be supposed that the coping methods instituted by crews are easily achieved. Crews are really in a "Double Bind" situation. Losing control of the system by not being on time imposes progressively heavier work loads, while attempting to keep up to time itself imposes loads not envisaged by management.

The operation of the other constraint factors is examined below.

The TYPE OF PASSENGER LOADING will depend on two factors - the density of population and the time of day. It is fairly certain that the bus frequency will be adjusted to meet the population density, for bus routes were conventionally established by sending out buses at increasingly frequent intervals to meet the demand.

What is more subject to fluctuation is the passenger loading pattern during the day. This factor is not a function of numbers alone, but also of type. Obviously, the more passengers there are, the longer they take to board, and thus the less time there is available for moving the bus from one terminus to the other. But contrary to expectation, commuter loading patterns may not be the greatest hindrance to the driver in that commuters tend to be younger and more mobile and can thus board and disembark quickly, and more importantly, they tend to get on at one point, fill the bus, and then disembark at another, with little or no time lost at intervening stops. In contrast what might appear to be a "quiet" run through

a sparsely populated area may be anything but, due to an elderly population taking a long time to board, and taking only short journeys.

It is not so much the number of what the crews term "skulls", but the turnover of them that is the crucial factor in loading times. There is little a crew likes better than a "swinger" at rush hours, i.e. a bus which fills at one terminus and has no stops till its dispersal area, since no time is lost at intervening stops, while the turnover is limited to one bus load, rather than the possible three or four.

In terms of constraints relating to factors within the ambit of the organisation, loading times are the source of the greatest hold-ups. Obviously the greater the turnover of passengers, the longer the time spent in loading. High turnover may mean a seventy-five seater bus changing its constituent population every half-mile or so. Whether this is so depends on the type of area the route goes through and of course the time of day. Early morning buses of workers may be heavily loaded even at 5.30, but such loads are predictable, fast-loading, while road speeds are more easily adjusted because of low traffic densities.

TRAFFIC DENSITY does of course vary during the day. Obviously even the most skilled driver's attempts to overcome the decrease in speed caused by sheer volume of other traffic on the same stretch of road is limited.

In this respect it should also be noted that many city timings are still related to the tramway timings. But of course, trams had the advantage of their own track, and right of way. The average bus speed in 1968 along Glasgow's Argyle Street was 3 m.p.h. (Glasgow City Transport Report for that year) as opposed to 9 m.p.h. in 1903.

Even within a three mile radius of Glasgow's centre (and thus a six mile stretch of route for a cross-centre route) the average car speed is nine m.p.h. in working hours (private communication from Glasgow Regional Planning Department). The resulting problems for bus drivers are obvious.

It should also be noted that passenger loading patterns and traffic patterns themselves have an interactive effect for the driver. The driver can see that if only that passenger would step onto the platform now, he will be able to pull out into the only gap in the traffic for the next minute or so. If he cannot pull out at that moment, then he will be that much later. Such considerations are constantly in the mind of the driver. Not only is he exercising motor and perceptual skills, but he is also engaged in estimating likely eventualities for that journey, while remembering past experience on the route: the matter is fundamentally a seeking for control over the unpredictable.

One last simple point needs to be made about the

elements of constraint that make up the route, and that is that even PHYSICAL FEATURES do not act constantly. Even in terms of geographical features, it will obviously take longer to go up a hill than come down it. But bus companies take no account of this, even though the effect can be quite great. For instance, the Eastern Scottish 52 route climbs almost four hundred feet within eight miles, with speeds uphill reduced to under ten m.p.h. The timings take no account of such features. Nor do the timetables take account of those other physical variables which can effect the speed of a bus - darkness, rain, wind, the state of the road, etc., which all pose additional problems of control for the driver.

I think it can fairly easily be seen that all of these elements are variables, and some of them vary in ways which are random, unpredictable and/or fluctuating, and that some or all of them may act simultaneously.

Thus the route, as a material determinant of the labour process, can be seen to be one way in which the organisation dominates the efforts of the work force in the performance of the task. This domination is clearly one of bureaucratic administration, with general and invariable standards imposed on a work situation which is in fact highly variable and subject to fluctuations. It is a very clear example of how administration is used primarily as work discipline rather than as an aid to task performance. However this domination means that the

coping with the fluctuations and variety is devolved onto the crews: and it is the crews who by physical and mental effort have to cope with the problems posed by the contradiction of using not just an average, but deliberately set tight timing to deal with fluctuating work. It is clear that ideas such as Lamden's "mettle" are merely a means to mystify the actual efforts at the point of production. And bus companies have preferred to run their operations on this vacuous mystification of a very real effort, rather than find out what particular times and frequencies are appropriate to the various conditions that actually occur.

So far can this process be taken that when G.C.T. introduced one-man operation they did not revise the running times, but allowed longer lay-over times to compensate. This meant, of course, that only the departure time of a bus was known, and the very principle of regular headways was destroyed. But even in more conventional systems, there is a necessary inconsistency in policy, since a tight timing at slack periods will result in buses running late at busy periods: on the other hand if a driver can produce the effort to keep to the timing in busy conditions, he can obviously produce it in slacker periods. In either case the ostensible aim of producing regular headways is problematic because of the contradictions in the form of control. The pattern of service is produced in spite of this form of control. The professional managers pride

themselves on their devotion to service: it is clear that the means they take to produce this service are themselves a major part in the failure of bus services to be predictable.

These inconsistencies in the form of organisation of the labour process, the failure to deal with problems such as variation in load, or congestion means that it is the crews who have to overcome random, unpredictable variations in the task: they are forced into a struggle to control the task, as well as involved in a struggle against the control of the work force by the organisation.

It follows that crews perceive and respond to their work in terms of the particular operation of the routes they work on. Subsequent sections will demonstrate, should it need to be established, that it is much harder work to move a thousand or so passengers in a city shift, than to move a few score on a rural-operating shift.

There are thus major differences in the type of work typically met with among my seven groups. But even within each group there are differences among the routes operated. For instance the 105 operated out of Milngavie depot is as busy as the busiest of Glasgow's routes, but the 13, which operates through a high income residential area, is quieter than many rural routes. Thus work load even within one depot may vary considerably. Work load does of course also vary within a route, both in terms of where the bus is and what time of day it is.

This variety of type of work, and work load, that is so much a feature of bus work, is one of the most positively endorsed features of bus work, being mentioned by 46 per cent of the survey population, in the "free response", question 16.

Because of this variety, it is impossible to clearly distinguish the groups in terms of work load. But it is possible, I think, to look at the totality of the work load over all the shifts and all the routes as it is experienced by the crews. It should be noted that in terms of the responses of the crews to their working environment, a coherent picture may take some time to build up, simply because crews may have to work through a large number of different routes and shifts (it takes three years to do all the shifts in a large Glasgow garage, while in New Street until comparatively recently, some routes were the prerogative of "senior" men, it taking seven years to get on "Leven").

Thus variety and increasing experience - "You're always learning at this job," is a typical comment - associated with the features of the operating environment, are a source of positive affect, despite the fact that the route is also the source of all the pressures and constraints on the crews.

CHAPTER FIVE: Supervision

Introduction to Supervision

In 1975 the Inspectors in the S.B.G. withdrew their labour in a strike aimed at maintaining their pay differential over the crews. The system did not collapse. Business continued much as usual - only two men were sacked in Edinburgh, having decided to park their bus rather than run it to North Berwick - even revenue continued almost as normal.

Nothing could show more clearly that the form of supervision in the industry is part of the forces of production aimed at optimising exploitation of labour power and capital investment.

However, the domination takes different forms, and I discuss supervision using two main notions. In the first chapter on Inspectors I discuss two groups whose domination of the crews is incomplete: relations are characterised by ambiguity and negotiation. In the second of these chapters I discuss supervisors whose control is very much more one of unchallenged power to direct the work of crews.

As a preliminary to this treatment, it should be noted that the first chapter discusses Road Inspectors, whose job is to check on the fulfilment of organisational requirements, and Stance Inspectors who control the workings of bus stations. The second chapter discusses Regulators and Depot Inspectors who are in charge of resource allocation in garages, Schedules, who control the general pattern of work allocation, and the District Traffic Superintendant (D.T.S.), in charge of a garage and

responsible for operations in his area. A feature of the Company sector is that the hierarchy of supervision is very shallow, the next steps above D.T.S. being Traffic Manager, and General Manager. Thus there are only four grades above crew, and promotion to Director of the S.B.G. has occurred.¹ However, it is the immediate control of the labour process that is considered in these two chapters.

Note

¹ A private communication from a lecturer in Transport Studies, with an intimate knowledge of the S.B.G. informs me that this internal recruitment does not seem to have had the advantage of raising staff morale, but rather of only staffing the vital position of Traffic Manager with elderly men with little experience of anything outside the traditional thinking.

(a) Road Inspectors

The formal tasks of road inspectors in this respect have already been described as being to do with timing and ticket checking.

It has already been stated in Chapter Four on the Route that one of the most important of the difficulties facing the driver in the performance of his work is that the time specified for the completion of a journey is based on an average speed for the whole journey and takes no account of fluctuations in speed caused by such non-average factors as hills, number of passengers, traffic congestion, potential performance of the vehicle etc. - all of which can assume a random and unpredictable nature, and act variously or together to militate against the achievement of average speed. Further, the requirements of the timetable will normally specify intermediate timing points, which are chosen for administrative convenience (e.g. crossroads, post offices, villages on longer routes), which again have little regard for fluctuation, and are not even placed at constant intervals (varying, e.g., from two minute sections to eighteen minutes within a thirty three minute journey). There is thus an inbuilt contradiction between the principle of average running speed and the non-average conditions met. Of course, if average running speed is set low enough, then it can be met; but it rarely is (cf. Lamden's advocating tight

running times to "put the crews on their mettle". The lowest of the groups was E.C.T. at 9 m.p.h. G.C.T. Scheduled 12 m.p.h. average speed, S.B.G. 15-20 m.p.h.

It is evident that a driver must adjust his speed in accordance with the delaying or enabling effect of the conditions he meets. But the requirement of meeting the intermediate timing points constrains his ability to do this. He may know that the time allotted to the next section is inadequate because of the concentration of passengers, but he is under the requirement to meet the average speed. N.B. This may involve exceeding the legal speed limit, which is also an offence for the organisation. The temptation is of course to use those sections of the route which have a more than necessary allocation of time to build up a reserve of time which can be used in sections with too small an allocation of time, (and note that this is, of course, the underlying process of the averaging calculation used by management for the whole route). But the meeting of timing points obviously interferes with any such action by the driver. It is the function of inspectors to see that drivers do not yield to temptation and fulfill the stated running times between timing points (and paradoxically thereby stopping them from achieving the average running speed laid down by management). In case the point has got lost, intermediate times are not only intended as a control for the driver, but give passengers a specific time for the arrival of the bus in order to cut out guesswork or over-waiting.

(It should also be mentioned that management may try to introduce a further constraint by making the conductor nominally responsible for timekeeping. This goes against the dominance of the driver which normally prevails in the relationship, and can be very divisive if the conductor seeks to exercise his duty.)

In sum, there is in many circumstances, but particularly on urban routes, an imperative on the driver to overcome potential delays from various sources, by running early where he can. Inspectors are there to see that he does not. There is thus a conflict built into the relationship between driver and inspector (over and above any normal conflict inherent in power relations), in that often crews must run early in order to fulfil management requirements, but the appointment of inspectors to enforce management's designated timing points makes this potentially unrewarding because of disciplinary consequences if caught, or prevents the achievement of management's timing for the whole route.

Crews do of course run early to try to enlarge a small break to one long enough for a cup of tea.

Inspectors do, of course, tend to position themselves at parts of the route where a driver is likely to be running early, though their ability to do this is influenced by the inspectors' own keenness, transport to get there, and the consideration of the best place to catch passengers overriding.

The inspector's ticket-checking duties are a constraint on the conductor. There is of course (as described in the

section on conductor's work (Chapter 8) always the check on "pochling", but the inspector will also be checking the "quality" of the conductor's work. For example, is the conductor smoking, sitting down, dressed correctly, engaged in conversation, not near the platform; has he collected all fares, or is he engaged in collecting fares at top speed if the bus is very busy, has he all the necessary equipment?

Are all tickets correct in respect of indicated direction of travel, date; do the pence made sense in terms of the stage shown? Does any passenger complain about the conductor's demeanour towards them? Is any detected over-riding due to mistake on the conductor's part? Is the way-bill filled in? (The way-bill includes sections for the number of passengers and total receipts at a number of points on the route: conductors often miss out filling in the figures if they are busy - a clear conflict of duty.

The major constraint apart from this "quality" aspect is the check on what are euphemistically called "missed fares". This is not the simple quality check it appears. (And after all in a crowded bus, with perhaps over 80 passengers, and a very high turnover, it is quite to be expected that the conductor misses the odd fare, especially in areas where the travelling public is somewhat reticent about actually offering to pay the fare), for there is a presumption that a missed fare implies intention to defraud. The action or potential action of inspectors in this area turns a comfortable and profitable negotiation between conductor and passenger into a fraught conspiracy. Even the conductor who is

not intent on milking the system is brought into this fraught condition because on some routes it is virtually impossible to persuade a section of the passengers to accept a ticket in return for a fare that is willingly paid. And of course there is always the clash of personal interests in that few conductors are inclined to charge their friends, relatives and relations of other crews, often exacerbated by the local and neighbourly nature of many bus services.

As is outlined in Chapter 8 the conductor can use the overlooking of fare-paying as a means of maintaining control over the bus, as well as on occasion, a means of supplementing his income. I would not wish to be too sociologically subtle here. Undoubtedly many conductors go out of their way to add quite considerably to their wages. It is generally agreed that lack of pochte is a drawback to becoming a driver.

The ticket-checking functions of the inspector are thus a constraint on the action, and therefore a threat to the conductor's control of the situation. N.B. Missed fares may not always involve pochling. It is dangerous to ask some passengers for fares, but the conductor will usually freely admit this to any inspector, and leave any action to the latter.

Bus companies rarely give much thought to the difficulties involved in the process of extracting money from the public - there is certainly no administration recognition of the problem. By judicious use of fare-overlooking and associated negotiation the conductor can establish or

maintain some form of control. He may not be able to collect all potential receipts, but by overlooking some, he can collect more than he might otherwise do.

Although the inspector is thus a constraint on the conductor, his influence is limited usually by lack of surprise. The system whereby drivers of buses coming in the opposite direction warn of the presence of an inspector is continued by the driver warning the conductor, coupled with the conductor keeping an eye of the road ahead and being ready to issue tickets quickly if necessary.

The only people to be surprised by an inspector usually are those who are over-riding (as well as those passengers who are put in the embarrassing position of trying to select the right ticket from a collection of twenty or so in their purse, or pick it up off the floor, or unstick it from sweaty palms, or fish for it in the depths of pockets, or unroll it, or offer it with all markings rubbed off, or extract it from the chewing gum on the back of the adjacent seat, and all the other wonderful things that people like to do with bus tickets).

The conductor is employed to prevent over-riding, and many conductors do have a great facility in remembering where each of 50 or so passengers got on and how much they paid and where they ought to get off. But again, many do not have this skill. No blame attaches to the conductor, but it is regarded as a failing. It also involves the conductor in issuing another ticket and introduces an element of friction into what was a non-conflict situation. Over-riders

are potentially abusive: at the least they will be in an embarrassing situation. It is a potential disruption of the control a conductor seeks to maintain over the bus.

In any event the conductor will probably feel constrained to offer some comment on the matter. What sort of comment will depend on his own resources, but potentially such a situation can be used by the inspector to increase his own authority.

All the activity of the inspector, whether on fare collection or overriding, is aimed explicitly at optimising revenue - operating at the margins to squeeze out surplus value at the edge of the task. If need were more catered for - say by a flat fare system, then much of the inspectors' work would be redundant. And this optimisation of revenue is done through the inspector, as an agent of the organisation, having the hierarchical power to impose his will on the actions of the crews. The power of the inspector is clearly based on hierarchy, since it involves skills which are not comparable to those being exercised by the crews. However, although the inspector derives his power from the organisation, he cannot use it unilaterally.

In the actual relations between Inspectors and crews there are elements of ambiguity and negotiation. Fundamentally this derives from the attempt to impose a rigid system of control on crews who act independently in situations of unpredictable variety.

As discussed in the chapter on the Organisation of the bus industry, most managements take what can best be described as a nineteenth century militaristic view of the control of their workforce. This does of course give a chain of command which is easy to control, with traffic managers drawing up what has to be done, D.T.S.s operating the commands, and inspectors acting as N.C.O.s to ensure fulfilment. But the intention goes beyond this and extends itself into the whole of the amorphous area "discipline", so that the "ideal" bus driver is seen as an "ideal" soldier, clean white shirt, black tie, guard's cap (unbent), polished black shoes - the whole rigid uniform - freshly shaved (at 5 o'clock in the morning!), civil to passengers - rule observing - punctilious presentation. The difficulties this can raise have been discussed by D. Beetham (1970).

This organisational ideal is of course inherited from the impulsion for control, no doubt exacerbated by the tramway ideas of "efficiency" and aided by a reserve labour market. How a bus driver looks is of course immaterial to his task performance, yet the control activities of bus companies even led to my having to shave off my beard (the sacrifices of research work!). And, as is clear, this impulsion to control conflicts with the freedom from immediate control that bus crews have.

This would seem to be a situation where the development of a "high trust" relationship between management and

crew is called for (Fox 1974. But the authoritarian restrictions and the concomitant underlying attitude obviate much of any such trust. There is a certain amount of trust involved of course, in as much as management does send off a driver with £40,000 of machinery in potentially damaging conditions with the responsibility for the lives and safety of passengers, for most of the time quite without supervision.

I observed that many of the older drivers I encountered had experienced "trust" situations even where there was an emphasis on "spit and polish" and strict observance of rules, but this was where an owner or his traffic manager was directly involved in day to day running. Much was made of the anonymity of the S.B.G. companies after they were taken over by the T.H.C., and lack of involvement by management thereafter. (CF. remarks on "professionalism" of bus management).

It is difficult to encourage a driver to overcome difficulties when he is far from the support or direction of supervisors, when he has been reprimanded for smoking when talking to a passenger - or even when he is just nominally under such a threat.

Inspectors are required very much to maintain the "smart appearance" outward signs of the "well disciplined right kind of worker" with clean well-pressed uniform, always with an (unbent) cap, clean white shirt etc. But of course inspectors are in a paradoxical situation, since

they are acting as the agents of domination of the organisation - but they are culled from the ranks of the shop floor, they are still culturally similar, still employees, accorded legitimacy solely by the organisation, more subject to strict adherence to management's control; they are literally white collar workers but with fewer privileges and worse conditions than a typist: they have quasi-official status in the public's eyes and rights to interfere with their privacy, yet no power to enforce policy themselves, they are part of British officialdom but stand in the rain and snow and wind and after all, are only looking at bus tickets which may be checked, or discarded without further thought.

But there are further contradictions, in that the control and discipline functions that inspectors are charged with are not invariably put into effect, while the degree to which they are put into effect varies from inspector to inspector.

This ambiguity and negotiation implies that the relation is not solely one of constraint, but one of interaction between crew and inspector.

The most obvious example of this is simply that inspectors do not always exercise their discipline or control functions: certainly they are not automatically applied. From the crews' point of view, however, this action (or in-action) by inspectors is unpredictable, and thus assumes a random character. Road

inspectors may be only concerned with certain rules and not others; a driver may run slightly early for years and just happen never to encounter an inspector while doing so. And conversely, a driver who has never run early may be stopped the very first time he attempts to do so. There are certain sections of the route where it is tacitly acknowledged (but tacitly and therefore always problematic) that it is necessary to run early (e.g. on approaching a section of known delays which are of course not timetabled for). But each inspector has an (unknown) starting point at which he will ignore running early, and an unknown allowance for running early. Even on other sections of the Road individual inspectors will allow an (unknown) margin of time. For example an inspector may condone a duplicate bus running early, but will insist on the time-tabled service bus sticking to time, even though the duplicate will probably only be making that journey, while the Service crew may have to continue immediately or soon after arriving at its destination.

The action taken by inspectors does seem to vary according to how they idiosyncratically interpret or assess the requirements of their job: there are no doubt checks on the level of their activities, but this still leaves a considerable margin for variety, especially given that inspectors in say country routes would rarely, as it happens, find anything wrong to report on.

Inspectors thus have a latitude in deciding whether an organisational rule has been broken, and if so, what to

do about it.

The range of inspectoral behaviour runs from a strict attention to the letter of the rules, through a fairly friendly approach to a very lax approach (e.g. of the latter is the Central Inspector who collected fares of passengers getting off a bus which the conductor had not had time to collect, pocketed half, and gave the other half to the conductor saying "There's your share" - source personal information).

Again as far as the crew are concerned, not only do they encounter an inspector randomly, but whom they encounter is further randomised, though it may happen that the word will go out that 'Jake' is working on such and such a route, and more caution will be exercised, eyes straining to the limit of vision to make out a peaked hat shadow lurking on the other side of a distant stop. Of course, it is the more militaristic type of inspector who is most given to "lurking" though the tendency to hide is not played so much since a lurking inspector was struck by a bus as he sprang from a hedge to stop it. - Many are the young conductors who have hastily gathered themselves and their scattered equipment from the back seat of a rural bus on an urgent signal from the driver that he had spotted an inspector ahead!

Once stopped, and presuming there has been no chance to warn the driver and/or conductor of his presence, and assuming that something is wrong within the ambit of the inspector's quality control function, what happens next is dependent on the type of inspector, what particular industrial misbehaviour has been committed, which depends on the

particular inspector's interpretation of his instructions, to what extent the transgression is deemed to be important, what response the crew can make, which is in turn dependent on who they are, and what personal resources they might be able to deploy to meet the threat of a "booking".

This complexity of variables perhaps indicates the ambiguity about the operation of Road Inspectors, while the latter ones indicate the sources of negotiation in the interaction.

Consider the variables involved more closely. As stated before, there are a number of rules which are habitually broken. But like the management's breaches of rules - e.g. buses with defective speedometers, gears which jump, fastened emergency exits etc. - which are overlooked by crews except when they want to work to rule, so inspectors overlook many breaches, but the overlooking is only in abeyance: it is always there to be used. For instance, there is the instruction that "1st gear must be used in moving off," (even posted up in some companies inside the cab). 2nd gear is habitually used by most drivers, however. This breach of rules is very seldom remarked upon, nor are more understandably excusable ones such as putting on the handbrake when stopped, or speeding, or drawing up at 18 inches (no more no less) at a bus stop. The ambiguity here is that the driver is bound by a myriad of rules and instructions and by-laws and laws, engendered both by the bus company, Road Traffic Acts and other civil Acts. He is in almost constant breach of them during the course of his working day,

but it would have to be a very flagrant breach, or more likely a breach that actually had unfortunate consequences, before the Company took particular note, e.g. breaking a prop-shaft through ~~exer~~ting too much strain by using second gear to take off.

Thus (pace the argument on p142 of this section) inspectors are in the situation of constituting a formal system of management constraint on the performance by crews of their job, but they have to overlook, in particular drivers' continual breach of rules, some with the force of Parliamentary legislation behind them, because they recognise that the crews' behaviour is necessary for the performance of the job. This would seem to be a situation with a degree of ambiguity.

There is a further, associated, ambiguity, in that inspectors recognise that a bus system only works because of the individual and unsupervised efforts of driver and conductor in what has to be a "high trust" situation. But no formal means exist whereby such trust can be engendered: indeed the only means for supervising crews is a militaristic framework of regulation which if strictly enforced would severely damage crews' willingness to fulfill individual effort.¹

The analogy with the 20th century as opposed to 19th century army would be the recognition in the former that battle conditions now place great reliance on the individual soldiers efforts unforced by "bullish" discipline. To effect this concentration is made on "leadership" to engender trust and initiative. There is some recognition of a similar situation

in bus companies, but, unlike the Army, there is no explicit recognition, nor, more importantly, any way of transmitting "leadership" to the individual crew. The "front line" leaders, the inspectors, have formally only a constraint function. Their only way of recognising the need to engender trust is to refrain from exercising their constraining function. But at the same time, they are enjoined to enforce whatever standards the bus company seeks to maintain (or improve upon). This latter will tend itself to be variable, dependent on the recruitment and turnover levels.

It may as well be re-iterated here that management views crews with a considerable amount of unease and distrust, and certainly lack of knowledge. (This is the impression I had in my interviews) When I broached the idea of interviewing crews, one manager laughed, indicated that he thought it very unlikely I would get any reply, given that the crews were so wild, and then bade me good luck in very much a ~~Daniel~~-going-into-the-lion's-den type of attitude. I had few difficulties interviewing crews, in fact, and through my own working experience, had always found bus crews responsible people with an intelligent interest in the world. Nonetheless, management sees itself as having a dearth of the "right sort" of worker. This notion has all the characteristics of an ideal and non-existent type. Given that most managerial staff see only those crews who commit serious offences, or similarly bring themselves to notice, the origins are not far to seek. But the ideal has real effects.

The only way in which management sees that it can

achieve the "right sort" - and note that its main criterion is that lack of disciplinary offences indicates good performance - a quite erroneous assumption - is to use its only tool, i.e. the existing regulations, and see that they are enforced. The degree of enforcement will depend on the capacity to take effective action on breaches: if there are staff shortages, and in recent years there have been severe staff shortages, then the types of action are limited. It does not see itself able to recruit "better" workers by paying more.

As regards the influence of staff levels, the point is a simple one. As mentioned, the only sanctions available to management (in the persona of D.T.S. or Chief Inspector) after a reprimand, are suspensions for one day or more. But this course of action compounds the existing difficulties in meeting schedule commitments, and can therefore not be used with freedom in conditions of staff shortages (which prevailed during the 1960s and early 70s.) The managements find themselves having to tell crews "not to do it again", when formerly they could readily use the important sanction of suspension or dismissal.

To recap briefly, the desire of management to run things strictly with regard to the rule book is handicapped by lack of direct supervision, decreased efficacy and application of sanctions and, possibly, a work force less tolerant of "strict" discipline (though this is unknowable). It is not so long ago (1967) in one of the companies I worked for that crews charged with misdemeanours were marched, cap under arm

into the presence of the D.T.S.: I myself have been barked at in a most authoritarian manner for the "crime" of wearing a "civilian" raincoat inside the depot of Glasgow Corporation.

It is worth remarking that Glasgow Corporation which has without doubt the most "problems" and the least match between any of management ideas and behaviour by crews of all the companies examined here, also has the strictest standard and the most hierarchical authoritarian and impersonal disciplinary process.

The disparity between the aims, and the framework of rules designed to achieve the aims, and the inability to effectively enforce the aims leads to ambiguity about what the standards of behaviour are. There is some realisation of the need for a "high trust" relationship which could overcome the distant supervision problem, but no means of carrying it out.

A recapitulation of the argument will be useful.

Structure: The Formal Control system is reduced on consideration to those elements which constitute effective constraints (on the behaviour and attitudes of the crews). These constraints imply rule-breaking, which is of two kinds:

- (a) performance breaking (e.g. pochling running early)
- (b) attitude breaking (e.g. incivility, badly dressed)

Rule breaking, for the crews, is

- (a) tempting (e.g. lack of direct supervision, easier task, etc)
- (b) necessary, sometimes developing further into a creative response which though immediately serving

the purposes of the crews, ultimately serves the purposes of management. This kind of rule breaking is exploitative.

The situation is, though, one of ambiguity, including exploitation as an element.

This leads to negotiation about some parts of crews' jobs, involving a creative response.

The situation can be shown to ramify.

As is argued in the section dealing with the conductor (cf Ch.8), the conductor seeks to establish a measure of control over his 8' x 25' x 12' working place. The inspector in this context constitutes an overriding control which can undermine the conductor's own control, which is, as is explained (in Chapter 8) largely dependent on a definition of the situation of the type analysed by Goffmann.

The disruption comes about because the inspector is seen, or may be seen, not as an extension of the conductor's authority, but a challenge to it. It is, after all, the inspector's job to carry out a check on the quality of the conductor's work within the scrutiny of the public and to order him (publicly) to rectify any faults therein. It is of course the public nature of the rectification which causes the conductor to "lose face" and thereby, potentially, his control. This situation, from my own observation is tacitly observed by many inspectors, who will quietly ask a conductor to rectify an oversight or mistake. Often this will be put in the form of a question about the matter - in a manner that will serve to allow the inspector to change

his demeanour if he himself has made a mistake, or if the conductor makes a satisfactory explanation. But not all inspectors are so circumspect, and it is the potential for disruption of control which prevails and establishes the expectations of the conductor. As a consequence, conductors are not only desirous of knowing whether their bus will be checked, but also by whom. Such information will be freely offered around meeting points for crews, and (sociologically) is one of the elements of interdependence among crews.

An inspector thus constitutes a potential disruption of the conductor's control, no matter who either of them are, quite apart from any sanction he may impose for breaches of company regulations or legislative demands.²

Accordingly, the demeanour of the conductor towards the inspector takes this situation into account, to forestall or at least diminish the effect of the inspector's presence. I did not observe any one particular set of responses that was universally adopted, the action of the conductor seeming to draw on his own personal resources and experience - as one might expect, given the intimate nature of this face-to-face interaction.

For example, women conductors who have been in the job for many years would seem inviolate. They tend to be super efficient and thus difficult to fault, as well as sometimes being rather formidable personalities who may even have shown a young inspector how the job was tackled when he was a "new start" conductor.

It is not surprising that face-to-face interaction between such acquaintances is tempered by memories of past collusion. Over and above this is the consideration that experienced crews are rarely caught committing sins. When caught, they do (according to the related accounts) tend to make demands on the underlying equality, making it supercede the "authority" relation.³

Another type of response to inspectors involves an assumption of equality from the start, with perhaps the conductor instituting and demanding a response from the inspector as he boards with some piece of badinage rather than an acknowledgement of superior status. This may not affect a "booking" if something is wrong, but makes it more difficult for the inspector to assume the full burden of his authority. The inherent weakness that many inspectors have is that they have been crews themselves, have broken the rules they are now trying to enforce. Appeals to basic equality in this way then hit the inspectors at a weak spot. In addition, through constant working on the same route, inspectors and crews can become more familiar and easier through interaction. For example, while running early, (a trifling few minutes) my bus was boarded by a notorious "hard" inspector who started grumbling about the time, and when I was due. His aim of booking me was, however, stopped short by my mature and very experienced conductress who simply and bluntly said to him, "Och don't be daft, Parker, there's five buses in twenty minutes at

this time of night, none of them carry anything, and anyway, we're not the service bus".

Hopefully, what has been said goes some way towards illuminating why the control and discipline functions of inspectors are not uniformly applied, quite apart from any rigid or non-rigid attitudes towards rules and discipline of individual inspectors.

(At the risk of being boring) let me remark once again that inspectors do not enforce the Rule Book. Application of sanctions varies according to who has committed a violation (cf. discussion immediately preceding) and to whether it is deemed that an offence has been committed to an extent that justifies a "booking".

As discussed in Chapter 1 bus management would appear to have failings (even just with regard to their own stated aims and legal requirements). It is not surprising that these failings materialise also at the level at which inspectors operate, and inspectors find a contradiction between the Rules and the actuality of the situation.

Management would appear to practice two kinds of contradictory behaviour serving to undermine the inspector's position, the first which matches the "Tempting" rule-breaking mentioned earlier, and the second the "Necessary" type of rule breaking.

Further to discussing the crews' position within the disciplinary framework deemed necessary by management to ensure operations (cf. pp. 144 - 145) it can be remarked

again that failure to fulfill management's requirements is tempting for crews. Failure may even occur commonly because of a simple lapse of memory. For example, it is more comfortable not to wear a tie, more convenient to be able to wear any colour of shirt, more fashionable to have one's own trousers on, rather than the uniform ones, easier to reply to insults or aggression from passengers with the same responses. Similarly it is easy to forget to change the destination screen ("everybody knows where the bus goes, and it's well known that passengers never look to see where the bus is going - if it's the right colour and pointing the right way they jump on!"), while not only is it easy to forget to change the direction of travel indicated on return tickets by turning them round, but it is patently an unnecessary complication, which adds nothing to the Company's revenue or information, etc., but expresses control.

Inspectors are of course employed to stop such failings, which might be classed as "attitude breaking" since they broadly do not materially affect the service offered to the public but do not conform to the control that the Company would like to enforce, as well as being employed to try to stop crews from succumbing to the more "serious" temptations of running past passengers, running early, driving badly, pochling, etc., i.e. performance rule breaking.

But the inspector's capacity to enforce such attitude

breaking temptations is curtailed from two sources - failure by management to fulfil its own requirements, and failure to enforce sanctions because of limited manpower.

The other source of constraint on inspectors comes from recognition of "necessary" rule breaking. Here they are caught in the contradiction of being instructed to, say, stop drivers running early, but also knowing that drivers have to run early at certain points and times of day if the system is going to work at all. Inspectors are aware that if the timings are to be achieved, drivers have to run early outwith the City Centre. If they are late, the organisation has to re-adjust at considerable cost and inconvenience. The contradiction is inherent and rarely resolved to the extent of being unambiguous. Both sides know it is necessary, but no formal or informal recognition is made of this. Drivers resent their being booked for a justifiable attempt to make the system work. Inspectors have to choose which drivers to book, and also decide whether the amount of time early is "justifiable" or not.

In the same way, inspectors have to overlook the fact that the bus is being driven in a manner not in accordance with company directives, and also that frequently it will patently be speeding. In sum, in order to make the Company's system actually work it is necessary to break the Rules which the Company has set up in order to achieve that aim. Inspectors are caught in this contradiction, just as are the crews.

A further consideration that affects the inspectors' position is that the crews they supervise very often encounter

problems which they have to sort out without recourse to the supervisory structure. This, as has already been noted, means that bus inspectors can only legitimise their position by invoking their formal position in the organisation hierarchy. But, as these last few sections have sought to establish, this invocation is unchallenged, contradicted and undermined in various ways.

(b) Stance Inspectors

Stance inspectors are primarily resource managers rather than quality controllers but they too find their power subject to challenge, ambiguity and negotiation. Simply, their job is to see that machines and men are matched to shifts and services, i.e. largely a logistic function. The material uses the Eastern situation for illustration.

The themes of this section are that Stance inspectors are faced with a set of problems, part of whose solution involves a form of negotiation between themselves and the crews, with the crews being willingly involved in the process in order to pursue their own interests. A certain ambiguity about the relations between crews and Inspectors results, but again, the organisation can be made to fulfill its obligation to the Public even though at the cost of some rule-breaking, and the creation of social processes outwith control of management, particularly

bringing earnings partially into the control of the crews.

Rules and the breaking thereof are of importance because bus organisations inherit a rigid organisation appropriate to a period of stability. Conditions have changed in the direction of stress, caused by fluctuations in resources, involving decision making at comparatively low levels, but this change has been unrecognised by management. The result is thus a creation of the supervisors and the crews pursuing their own interests, rather than a policy planned and supported by management: rule breaking, or a different form of organisation is effectively sanctioned without an analysis of the situation.

The Stance inspector's job extends into coping with fluctuations resulting from breakdowns, buses being late, and non-attendance by crews. The main area for negotiations with crews comes in the area of overtime and work allocation.

For their part, crews have much to gain from participating in the process initiated by the Inspectors, since they are thereby able to maximise their own interests, particularly with regard to overtime.

Organisationally, the Stance Inspector's busiest time is from 16.00 hours till the end of the rush hour after 18.30 to 19.00. By 16.00 almost all late shifts will have

reported, while spare buses and crews will have been sent up from the depot. From this time Stance Inspectors are effectively in control of the resources of the organisation, with the exception of the break-down crew. Unlike Control they have no fitters in immediate call, so defects have to wait for remedy. They also have vehicles going out of service with defects that have appeared during the day. This involves direct rule-breaking, in that if pressed, they will give a bus with a "written off" minor defect to another unsuspecting driver.

Their position overall involves even greater fluctuations than Control deals with, (Control does not have to shuffle crews and buses around because of late arrivals) while the involvement of the crews cannot be compelled in an authoritarian way using Company backed sanctions because the crews are there on a voluntaristic basis, working overtime, or having to be persuaded to change shifts or journey - persuaded because they can "officially" insist on doing their own scheduled duty. Perhaps also there is an element of co-operation because of the immediacy of the task - the public are visible and their demands expressive.

Certainly communication downwards is less peremptory than with Control: even polite modes of speech are used. "Would you take that bus round, son?"

Stance inspectors also are in more continual contact

with crews, and have to deal with problems in a face-to-face fashion. And many of these problems are not of the crew's making (like reporting late for duty) but are outwith the control of the organisation - such as delays caused by traffic. Stance Inspectors also have to encourage drivers to arrive in time, since many of the "turn round" times in the Bus Station are of small duration - late buses cause logistic problems. But the inspectors must be able to take some form of action if a crew are consistently late. For example, a crew due to come in at a rush hour may hold back in order that the Inspector may send out a substitute bus on what should be the next trip. The Inspector therefore has to know which crews are likely to be genuinely not able to get in on time and which ones are "coming it". In this case, the Inspector might not send out a substitute bus, if he has his suspicions, but will rather hold back past the scheduled time, leaving the crew to catch up on the deficiency in time.

Part of the greater community of interest may stem also from the open conflict between Stance and Control and Schedule. Organisationally Stance conflicts with Control over the number of buses and crews sent up (Control tends to keep buses in hand for break-down reliefs), while conflict with Schedule is even more acrimonious because of the use the Stance Inspectors have to make of crews on over-time.

But the main reason for a greater "community of interest" lies in the overtime work necessary. Without going into the organisational reasons behind this working suffice it to say that during the week some crews "work on", (or their shift "goes spare" leaving them with a rather open-ended working day), while weekend working is entirely voluntary, with often enough additional overtime because of lack of staff.

Overtime is, of course, seen to be desirable by a large section of the platform staff, especially on Saturdays, when double time operates, while it is necessary from the organisation's point of view. The Stance Inspectors are in the position of disbursing such overtime in order to fulfil the Company's obligations. This, along with their other duties, requires a great deal of shuffling of duties, Spares, and crews on overtime, the net effect of which is to cause them to treat the crews as working on a voluntaristic basis.

The Stance Inspectors are thus in the position of having to fulfil inflexible timetable requirements by using a flexible source of labour.

The process brings into play strong elements of negotiation and ambiguity, because the crews have their own ideas of what is in their own interest, and can use the voluntaristic nature of the participation to pursue that interest. Skill at interpersonal relations comes into play here: some staff are more successful than others at achieving the aims of the maximum number of hours paid for the minimum amount of actual work (this varies: many crews

would rather work than sit around being bored) on the easiest routes with the best vehicles.

Factors that crews can use to enhance their own interests can be positive or negative. Positively, by, for example, always working on when asked, and even on occasion being willing to do a particularly nasty overtime journey, drivers and conductors can endear themselves to Inspectors because they introduce an element of predictability into the Inspectors' shifting world: it is obviously valuable to the Inspector to know that he will be able to use an incoming crew. Doing an unpleasant or difficult journey for overtime will be paid off by getting a "good" bus to do it, and perhaps being able to get "good" buses for the regular shift work. For example, on one of my regular shifts, we regularly got a coach for the last journey to replace the double decker scheduled for the shift. But we had to trade this off in other areas. Other trade-offs are being selected for overtime when it is in short supply, or being "signed" for longer hours than actually worked.

Negatively, crews can respond by immediate tactics, like pointing out that the intended overtime journey will take them "over the hours" (permitted hours of working), which is a common ploy when the journey is viewed with disfavour. The driver or conductor will of course have to weight his refusal against the possibility that the Inspector will then sign him off, as opposed to giving him a shorter journey. They may however, have to put off their retaliation till later, when they may book off a bus that might

possibly be kept in service for its minor fault, this causing problems for the Inspectors, given the general shortage of buses. Because of the wide range of sanctions, both positive and negative, on both sides, there are compelling motives to engender a co-operative type of interaction.

On the Inspector's side, there are also positive and negative factors to be used. Positively, inducements like a small but nasty journey can be patently balanced against rather a long number of hours paid for (it being a peculiar feature of the bus industry in general that crews have to be employed for quite considerably longer periods than they actually work, and this is even more the case with this kind of overtime, where crews have to be kept spare for unpredictable eventualities), or a "good" vehicle may be offered, or it may be made clear that it is mutually beneficial in a diffuse sense if this journey is undertaken, both parties being aware of the general "back scratching" nature of the interaction, since the Inspector is of course aware of the potential negative actions of the staff.

Negatively, if pressed, the Inspector can make use of his official organisational authority and order work to be done, but this goes against the whole tenor of the relationship, and is in fact rarely used.

The reason for this is that the Inspectors have to encourage crews to do overtime (which they do not always wish to do - since overtime is at least an hour long (the length of the shortest return journey,) and may go up as

long as four hours - sometimes euphemised as "Dae ye fancy a wee trip to Glasgow, son?" This will take three hours - and this has repercussions for their non-work lives): not only that but many of the journeys taken up will be out of the control that crews try to maintain - i.e. will be late, or duplicated, with no opportunity to tell the service vehicle where to stop to take over, or will involve speeding to make up the scheduled time, or be notoriously busy. This needs a positive attitude that is difficult to maintain in an authoritarian structure, quite apart from the consideration that authority is undermined if those over whom the authority is exerted have their own set of sanctions.

Thus the Stance Inspectors manage to do what more senior management fails to do - instill the "right" attitude, i.e. the attitude that will get the job done. But the job is done with a "right" attitude different to that envisaged by ~~management~~ and in a way that management does not concern itself with, except in so far as it is content not to enquire how the enterprise is carried forth.

With relevance to this area, it should be noted that the Bus Station distributes work in a way that is non-accountable to the organisation. The overall amount is controlled (and is, it may be mentioned, a source of conflict between Bus Station and Schedules), but the distribution of it is not. In the absence of organisational criteria, it is perhaps not surprising that a system based on interpersonal relations and a compromise between the interests of the crews and the interests of the Inspectors has been evolved.

A contrast exists with the individually planned overtime distribution in E.C.T., where overtime is controlled by discussion between Control and Shop Stewards, and is given out on Mondays to each of the crews.

As may be gathered, the negotiation that goes on between crews and inspectors to achieve a compromise on the divergent interests is of a diffuse kind. It may be direct "Sure I'll do a Glasgow Express, if you give me that bus", but it may also be more indirect and subtle. A driver who has to take over a late bus may point this out in aggrieved terms. He knows very well that the Inspector will reply that "You'll easily make it up", but he will have made his point and can expect some favour in return for "services above and beyond the call of duty".

The negotiation is also influenced by the transitory and open nature of the interaction.

This in turn imparts a degree of ambiguity to what is a rather complex relationship (and certainly one not envisaged by a mechanistically (in T. Burns's sense) inclined organisation. (Burns and Stalker, 1961).¹²

Ambiguity exists because the Stance inspectors are not merely dispensers of overtime, but supervisors, who have to use their authority on occasion (e.g. getting crews out of the canteen onto their bus). It is difficult to be precise about an authority "performance" that encompasses direct commands, and civil, and even on occasion, downright begging, requests: inspectors have a range of "performances", and which particular one will be used is uncertain. This

connotes that the parameters of negotiation are also fluid and have to be continually re-worked. In addition consistency on both sides is difficult to maintain. Both sides may, from time to time, have to make decisions which are not of mutual benefit (e.g. an inspector may have to send a driver out on a journey that the driver does not want to undertake, because he is the only driver available, or a crew may genuinely not be able to "work on" (because of extra-work commitments). Underpinning this is the basic ambiguity that although crews and inspectors manage to compromise, the participation in "negotiation" involves basically divergent interests. Negotiation takes place not necessarily in a "friendly" fashion, but is not the less negotiation for that.

In sum, the negotiation makes it possible for the organization to work, but the negotiation is of a fluid and ambiguous nature: again this is an area of evolved interaction outwith management control to get the organization to work in spite of the Rules that exist supposedly to effect such an end.

Notes: Chapter Five

¹ Of course management itself breaks the rules by running defective buses, allowing drivers to break Commission hours of work regulation etc.

² Most studies of supervisors note elements of ambiguity in their position, but it is still important to analyse particular cases to see what makes it so.

³ Question 18 responses showed that 27 per cent of the sample mentioned seeing some favouritism exercised by inspectors.

"Some inspectors play at friends and enemies," was a typical comment, as was, "It all depends on who you are".

CHAPTER SIX: Supervision

This chapter on Supervision deals with the subject in terms of those elements of the forces of production in bus organisations which are able to act as agents of domination in a way that the crews find much more difficult to challenge. It is of course the whole organisation's structure which dominates, but these supervisors are the particular managers of the resources of the organisation, including labour power.

As the last chapter on stance inspectors showed, it is a peculiar feature of the bus industry that a high degree of management is devolved on to a very low level, with very infrequent direct intervention from higher grades. This no doubt explains some of the features of the organisation and style of supervision.

Fox (1974) makes a good point about the contradiction between an organisation's need for commitment from its work force and the low trust and discretion it actually organises. The bus crews perforce have a high level of discretion in their tasks, and indeed are trusted to go away for the day with £40,000 of machinery and the opportunity to directly handle the cash revenue. But nothing highlights the domination of the organisation more than the immediate supervision: it is stark power to direct labour.

The material in the following sections is drawn from New Street depot, since it is the one I am most familiar with, and have had the longest opportunity of observing. New Street is a large depot with a large variety of types of route, types of vehicle, and great seasonal fluctuation

in the services operated. In contrast to the two city garages, there is a possible range of vehicles which the crews might encounter (and enough will be said to make clear the subjective importance of this) - there is neither the lottery of the identical buses of a city operation or the certainty of the same bus for each individual shift as in small garages. The depot, being also the locus of the chief engineer has a larger quota of older vehicles, and consequently a higher proportion of breakdowns, and consequent to that more opportunity to observe the system/organisation under stress. It also has its associated bus station which also has to deal with defects in the organisation, with a more varied set of social processes involved.

(a) Regulator

The Regulator is a member of the Control Room Staff. The general form of the relation to crews is one of conflict. These two types of supervisors operate from and try to enforce a power base which the crews cannot challenge effectively. They both direct crews' work for reasons intimately connected with the organisation's working at all and which have little or no basis for challenge from the crews.

It needs to be plainly said that Bus Crews are at the bottom of the pile of the organisation. In terms of the organisation's expectations they have no power to deploy: they are employed as operatives only. Supervisors exist to oversee the quality of the work, and to direct

their labour. As has been discussed, in the case of Road Inspectors, there is a degree of ambiguity and negotiation about the operation of Rules - about the Power relations. I hope I have given some explanation of why this is so. But I want to emphasize that the underlying relationship is one of Power: that the Supervisors in general have Power invested in them by virtue of their place in the organisation. That this relationship is basically one-sided can be seen most clearly by considering the two categories of Regulators and Control Room Inspectors. The relation here is one of direct command, in which crews are only one element in a resource-controlling situation, and that furthermore it is one element which can be manipulated to ease pressure from other demands. The power of Stance and Road inspectors is countered by crews, the ambiguity of the role, and the existence of negotiable issues.

As stated above, the Regulator is part of the organisation's administration machinery. In common with other Supervisors in the Bus Industry he owes his authority (that is his right to direct the actions of crews) to his function rather than to any superior skill.

The literature on Industrial Relations shows that Style of supervision is an important factor in the work place. The style of all of the three Regulators at New Street is an attitude of authoritarianism - distant, peremptory, communication difficult to pursue, questions treated as importunate.

It is of course possible that all three just happened to be misanthropic. But an examination (on inductive lines) of the tasks and position yields some explanation of the crews' organisational dependence on the Regulator: the demands made on the Regulator because of his function in the organisation; and the Regulator's responses.

Firstly, the Regulator is responsible for allocating a particular vehicle to a particular shift. This involves knowledge of the conditions met with on that shift, e.g. a bus may start on one route but change to another later, with regard to normal loading, degree of work involved, restrictions such as low bridges etc., whether the shift returns the bus to the garage (thus making it available for mid-day work). The bus is then written in opposite the shift number displayed in the muster room and also on the garage location sheet, which is designed to show the particular part of the depot the bus is in. It is important to the crews to know exactly where the bus is for the garage is a large one, containing some 200 vehicles, on two floors. In the early morning diesel haze it is difficult to see the small identification numbers, while it takes time to walk round the ranks of vehicles. Now this takes place for the most part in the early morning (most afternoon shifts "take-up" at the Bus Station). Crews not unnaturally do not, for the most part, choose to turn up earlier than the start of the shift, given the very early time of day. This leaves them only the officially designated five minutes in which to check the bus on the

location sheet, find the bus, get in, start up (which can take some time if air pressure needs built up) check for defects, and set the destination screen, manoeuvre the vehicle out of its position (which can pose problems sometimes), probably have to queue to fill up at the water point, and may even have to wait to get out of the garage because some driver's conductor hasn't turned up by the time he has brought the bus round to the exit, and there is no space to get it out of the way while he procures another conductor or chivvies along his own one, who has turned up late, got into conversation or fallen asleep.

This gives the notion of the logistical problems involved in moving vehicles out on to the road to take up service.

The logistics of controlling the allocation and movement of buses is of course a management problem in resource control, which is probably quite properly delegated to the Regulator. If the organisation is well controlled no problems arise. But if there are defects, then these call for managerial intervention. I suspect that the situation I shall go on to describe is really one requiring this kind of intervention. But no such link exists in the organisation. If problems occur, there is no higher management official who is then and there brought into action. It is in fact the crews who are left to cope with problems arising from partly lack of resources, and partly poor co-ordination of resources. As an apposite example, there is

no superior to the Regulator directly involved in his work: no monitor of how he goes about his job. If the work was purely routine, this would not be remarkable, but, as I will show, the job requires adjusting conflicting demands of a type which are normally classed as managerial. The result adds to the exploitation at the point of production.

An example of the effects of lack of monitoring of the Regulator, is that a driver may find that he has been allocated a bus which is behind two others in a line. This means shifting the two in front (which takes time even just in terms of waiting for air pressure to build up in the brakes), moving across the exit line, which may well be blocked with vehicles at the water point, parking the bus in the first available space, walking back for the second bus, doing the same, and then walking back for the allocated bus. This has the subsequent effect of misplacing these two buses for the allocated drivers who will now have to search round the garage for them.

A driver in this situation will find himself now at least ten minutes late. Personally, I have had to do all this and have then found that my bus was defective. This means finding the Regulator and getting a new bus, and then starting the procedure all over again! There is no way whereby a driver can complain about this pressure. It is an outwardly trivial failure to allocate properly whose main effect is only annoyance and bad temper for the driver. He could make a protest, but in my experience would get a

very brusque answer: even a conciliatory answer would only go so far as to point out that it is easy to make up ten minutes in the morning. (So it is but that is not how it strikes the driver.) The worker's lack of control over the organisation of his work is compounded further by power used to humiliate. This is certainly one possible reason for the autocratic style of the Regulators. The Regulator can draw on his superior organisational position to defend himself from derogatory judgements of his actions by aggrieved drivers. Another reason is of course that given the wide variety of both shifts and available vehicles, it is easy to see that the Regulator may have to allocate the baulked bus because he needs the two in front for other duties. The basic organisational problem is that although the Regulator allocates the vehicles, it is the night shunters who rank them, and of course they do so without regard to the subsequent use, except to divide between single and double decks. In the contradiction of unpatterned ranking and specific need shifts, it is the crew's time and effort which is used to cover the only partial control of resources.

This is only really possible where the Regulator, because of lack of supervision is able to define his position as one of unquestioned power. Often this is accepted because of superior skill, or recognised need for the position - especially with industrial organisations. In this situation the power is resented because some of the

decisions made create difficulties for the crews for which no allowance is made.

The situation is one in which power is exploited by the agent of the organisation's dominance to overcome problems which stem from the inadequacies of the organisation. The extra effort of the crews is used because their time has been bought, and their more intense labour effort can be used as a cheaper resource than costly re-organisation to overcome the problem.

It is hardly surprising that the Regulator seeks to reinforce his image of power by acting in a way antithetical to the normal friendliness of crew interaction. He is continually interacting with crews as he walks round checking the availability of buses, his uniform is exactly the same, he is showing no particular extra skill, he can claim no higher status. Yet he is clearly an agent of the organisation, and shares the "defended backstage" of the Control group: it seems a clear example of ambiguity being reduced through exaggerated differentiation.

It has been suggested in the discussion so far that the Regulator can be seen as reducing the demands made on his capacity to handle his fluctuating resources and demands by having the crews sort out problems which from the crew's point of view should not arise (e.g. in a "well run" bus depot, e.g. E.C.T., buses are allocated in the order they are scheduled to leave the garage; no problem in locating the vehicle arises). To put the matter in

perspective, it is necessary to identify the source and nature of these fluctuations.

In anthropological terms the crews are "clients" of the Regulator - they require information in locating the vehicles, to enable them to get on with their "real" job, which will present its own problems. But the only return the crews can make is deference.

The Regulator, however, is himself a "client", in this case of the Engineering shop:

The contradiction of the organisation is such that "running" repairs are carried out mainly between 0600 and 1800 hours. Some work of this nature is carried out overnight, but this is limited because of expense. Thus many minor defects, reported when buses have come in at the end of the day, can only be dealt with from 0600, when the first shift of fitters arrive but also when the peak period for bus shifts are scheduled. Overnight, of course, the buses have been washed, fuelled and ranked by the night shunters. The problem arising is a simple one of relating the average rate of defects to the average rate of repairing such defects, and calculating the number of "spare" buses necessary to cover the deficiency. Again this is a matter of logistics.

In line with capitalist rationality, given the high capital cost of the unit of production, "spare" capacity is kept to a minimum, while labour power is used to overcome the inadequacies which result from this accounting.

However, "average" defects will fluctuate, thus creating shortages of vehicles from time to time. In New Street there is, as already stated, a high proportion of older vehicles with a proportionately higher rate of defects. To compound the problem, because of seasonal demand, the requirement for vehicles fluctuates. In winter there is spare capacity because of the large number of "tours" vehicles not operating. This spare capacity for much of the year does of course make it all more necessary to cut fine the spare capacity for summer with the result that in summer the line is cut very fine indeed. Given that from day to day, defect fluctuation can be expected to rise above the spare capacity, and it can be seen that shortage of available vehicles occurs. Even before that point however, vehicles begin to be pressed into service which are not suitable. Foreign buses (e.g. National coaches on overnight stops), Expresses from other depots, are utilised. But more importantly, buses with running defects of a non-serious nature are used, with the result that vehicles may run for a whole summer season with third gear jumping out. (Being left occasionally at distant depots by irate drivers, creating even worse logistic problems in getting them back again in exchange.) Or a bus which is overheating may be passed for service, is put on a longer route than it was intended for by the fitter and breaking down half-way, then requires replacement buses and deployment of the breakdown wagon and its fitter.

Or old buses are used for longer journeys than intended, accelerating their decrepitude, i.e. capitalist irrationality at its most obvious.

The Regulator is the person who has to bridge the gap between demands of the timetable of shifts and the fluctuation in available resources.

An example of how the Regulator can cut down the demands made on him is when a driver reports that he cannot find his vehicle. In these circumstances the Regulator will tell the driver to go round again (note that this is not when the driver reports that the bus is not in the designated rank in a garage, but when it is not in the garage at all) - a journey that will take at least five minutes. Since this is the inevitable reaction, most drivers do go round twice, which involves two floors, weaving in and out of ranks, including the engineering shop's rank, and the pits. The reason for this reaction by the Regulator is that he can reduce unnecessary journeys in re-allocation on his part if the driver has made a mistake. But there is a more subtle process at work here: by telling the driver to go round again, the Regulator is maintaining his position of authority, so that drivers would check twice (even though this will make them late) rather than ask the Regulator. It happens often enough that a bus has been re-allocated, but this fact not yet remarked, or that a bus is taken by mistake, or taken into the pits for maintenance, or has been shifted out of

position. Because of this movement, later shifts rarely have the location of the vehicle accurately described. The Regulator does not care to be asked the position of a vehicle. For example, if a vehicle has to be re-allocated he will only impart the number - the location has to be asked, (humbly) for. An example of how the Regulator is unwilling to adopt even a stance of equality, but seeks rather to differentiate himself from the crews by non-co-operation happened when I was allocated a bus from an "outside" depot which had a serial number in sequence with quite another type of bus in the home depot. Since drivers look for the type of bus, and then go closer to see whether it is the desired number of that type, I did not see the allocated bus. On reporting this, I was told to go round again, but was not told what the Regulator well knew, that this bus was not of the expected type, although its serial number implied that it was. This being the case I still was unable to locate the bus, so had it pointed out to me with sneering contempt (I kid you not!) - a blatant example of status differentiation enforced to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the situation.

As has been stated, the logistics economies of bus operations involve the use of defective vehicles (not just at New Street but also at other garages (cf. Midland Depot "raided" by Traffic Commissioners who put over 50 per cent of the vehicles off the road because of defects - source, Motor Transport, December 1971). Obviously some means of

"persuading" or "normalising" such practices is needed. Control and Regulators are part of this process, and by maintaining their authoritative attitude, can make it difficult for crews to protest - though of course drivers may turn the tables by running the vehicle into a distant depot and obtaining a replacement. It may appropriately be added here that the Union is caught up in the contradiction. The Assistant Secretary of the bus section of the T.G.W.U. has urged his members not to protest about defective vehicles because rectifying the position costs too much for cost-threatened bus companies, and ultimately thereby threatens jobs in the industry. The difficulty is compounded in New Street by crews rarely being allocated the same vehicle twice running, though they are likely to be allocated the same type of vehicle. This compares with smaller depots where crews will usually always have the same bus, and also be able to ask the (only) fitter individually to rectify small faults. This is impossible in the large impersonal organisation at New Street.

In sum, the Regulator is under pressure from many sources - crews requiring re-allocations, vehicles being taken off and brought out from the Pits, the background need to fulfil all the timetable obligations, shuffling the buses around so as to put up each shift's bus at the required time - all against a background of deficiency of vital resources - buses.

Perhaps I indulge too much in speculative induction

on a figure peripheral to the main activities of bus crews. But to crews, the Regulator is an important figure: efficiency at least is looked for - the autocratic and fundamentally insulting behaviour may be overlooked, if buses are clearly located and posted in good time. Where this is not the case, severe antipathy by the crews is formulated. This was indeed the case with one Regulator, who had the general attitude, but was also inefficient. Resentment was built up to the point that he was eventually "shopped" for drinking in uniform, a severe step in retribution, but one which, speaking personally, I thought delightful.

(b) Control

As has been said, the Regulator works as part of the Control Room Staff, though for much of his work he is out on the floor of the garage. The relations between Control and Platform Staff have to be seen against the background of the whole of the "informal" group relations at New Street. Perhaps I can best typify the relation by noting that communication between the Control Office, which is a glassed-off part of the garage floor, and crews is effected by a ticket window - but one which is always half-way closed, so that crews have to stoop, bend their heads underneath and then crick them upward to talk to the staff inside - a direct and daily humiliation.

The three main features to be noticed concern

Control's position in the organisation, and Control's function in the organisation, and Control's internal structure. All three features reveal problems, which together build up a picture which may explain the authoritarianism.

Control is the implementer of management decisions in detail: see the discussion below of function. But curiously, there is no direct supervision, Control being virtually autonomous. There seems to be a break in the normal bureaucratic organisation here, there being no problems which are directed upwards - though of course reports on these are. For the most active part of the day - 6.00 - 7.30, Control constitutes the highest part of the organisation, since office staff, including the D.T.S. do not arrive till about 9.00. As a result the main trend of decision making is downwards and sideways - downwards in directing crews, sideways in transferring problems such as break down retrieval and defects and repairs to the engineering side, liaising with the Stance Inspectors.

This lack of direct supervision does, I hazard, enable Control to maintain its authoritarian attitude more effectively. And as I argue elsewhere (in the "Union") there is at New Street an informal group which constitutes a de facto source of control power.

Though the area of the Control's relation with other resource-control nexes has to be left aside, it is still possible to identify some sources of demands made on Control personnel, some of which have repercussions for the platform

staff.

The general demand is to co-ordinate the various functions in such a way that the organisation actually works in some fashion - to see that vehicles are supplied, retrieved with matching crews - simply to see that the nuts fit the bolts. Thus much of the organisation's decision making takes place at this organisationally low level.

In terms of this resource control function they are subject to conflicting demands. Crews "sleeping in" or reporting late for duty are covered for by have "spares". But the number of "sleep-ins" fluctuates unpredictably, while the number of spares carried has to be kept as low as possible for obvious economic reasons, (as well as in some depots sheer shortage of staff). Naturally, lack of crews becomes a problem when the rate of "sleep-ins" rises (on one famous occasion at New Street, no less than 50 staff managed this one Monday morning!). The problem then becomes one of shuffling the shifts among the crews, as late reports arrive. This may involve trying to persuade staff who have arrived early to take on another shift. Control may be authoritarian, but still keeps an element of co-operation in hand for such eventualities.

In times of severe shortages of either crews or vehicles (and of course the problems are exacerbated because drivers and conductors do not sleep in in equal numbers), control has to decide which services "don't go" or go out late. This is obviously an important managerial

decision, affecting the requirements of the Company's licence, but it is one decided at just this level.

One further balancing is required when buses are sent up to the Bus Station for the afternoon rush hour - drivers have to be found to take them up, while some vehicles have to be kept in hand for breakdowns and defects for shifts still to go out. This is a source of conflict, for the Bus Station has its own fluctuation to cope with. Communication between the two sets of controllers takes place by telephone - and in often acrimonious terms.

The general attitude of control must, of course, be affected by the disciplinary sanction they exert. Sleep-ins and late reports may be employed or not, as management, in the actual form of control, sees fit. Thus if there is a shortage of staff, late reports will be employed: if there is a superfluity, the odds are that they will not. This imparts a further ambiguity in that sanctions are not enforced uniformly as regards the offence, but as regards the availability of staff, and also on the general tendency of the person to be late. For the offending busman, the action appears arbitrary, and an undue coercive exercise of power. But it goes further than just suspension for the day. The Conditions of Service are open-ended about the sanctions about late reports ". . . they may be suspended for the day or dealt with as the Management think fit." (Rule 12). Thus a late report, especially someone who does so regularly, may be suspended

for the following day. I have even myself, been present when someone was suspended for two days - actually in contravention of Rule 5d - suspension does not become operative for seven days from notification: I very much doubt whether this sanction is itself sanctioned by the D.T.S. or management. The remarkable thing is how much this drastic action is accepted by the crews.

It is widely believed by the crews - and seems likely - that there is co-operation between Control and Schedules in the matter. Schedules has a record of late reports and other sins, and can impart this information to Control, who can then pursue this rather drastic action. The general pattern of balancing staff against sanction does of course involve the D.T.S. but the practical application is pursued through the means described. Thus the sanction can work as a system of informal control. The important point is that this is perceived as a coercive disciplinary situation (trying to have crews conform to the level of sins/black spots (literally) condoned by Schedules) which is outwith the official disciplinary control supposedly only in the hands of the D.T.S. The heaviest management sanctions are thus employed in an unofficial/unsupervised way, to which the crews have no effective response, simply because it is unofficial. Not unnaturally, this causes resentment among the crews.

Being unofficial, it also lends itself to partiality in its operation. This is difficult to gauge from the

standpoint of an observer, especially an observer who has never himself been late, but it is believed to be the case by the crews. There is a belief that favouritism exists, and that "arse-licking" (to use the parlance of the people involved) is carried out by some of the crews in order to be the recipient of the partiality that involves overlooking or treating mildly lapses, and also the partiality that results in "good" shifts on "good" buses being devolved onto the fortunate, though brown-tongued recipient. This is reported to take the form of buying drinks for the Control staff, and generally pursuing a policy of deference. This again is impossible to verify, but the existence of such ideas is symptomatic of the divisions in ideas and feelings within the depot.¹

Further resentment is caused by the rather unusual internal structure of Control staff at New Street. In other Companies and depots, Control functions are carried out by solely Inspector grade personnel (for example in Glasgow they are known as Garage clerks, but are a grade above Road Inspectors). But New Street employs "depot drivers". This post is supposed to exist in order to have drivers permanently on call for activities around the garage, even, in a last resort, for driving a bus on a shift.

But the post at New Street has evolved into fulfilling virtually all the functions of inspector. This is resented by the crews, since the power evoked is informal, and not

part of the "legitimate authority" structure. As informal, it is power difficult to challenge, since the power decisions made here are believed to be supported by a wider informal but "illegitimate" group in the depot, which includes Control Inspectors and Schedules, both of whom operate very real, legitimate and drastic sanctions, but who also take unofficial action against those "whose face doesn't fit". This is easy to do given that bus crews are almost daily in infringement of some rule or other.

Whether this is the case or not, it is perceived as such by the crews. If it is true, then the informal sanctions, or threats of them can also be used to informally control efforts by the crews to make sure that Control fulfills its job. For instance, it would be unwise to refuse to take out a bus because the driver's emergency window was stapled up, if it were believed that Control would find some other means of invoking sanctions in revenge.

In this light, the informal control system could be used to cover up general management deficiencies.

Such a power structure, given the close involvement of the crews, can be expected to have repercussions and effects on the way that crews view their job as a whole - quite apart from causing them any difficulties in the more immediate sense. Lack of involvement through the prevailing disparaging attitudes and emphasis on status

differences (i.e. the problem is compounded for many of the crews, because the personnel have fairly recently been employed as drivers themselves) can be expected to affect the performance of their job by crews. The effect is mitigated, however, by the infrequent contact between the two groups. Subjectively, the crews are of the opinion that they can expect little back-up from the company if they get into any of the numerous kinds of trouble that afflict bus crews in their normal pursuance of the job. For crews, there is the explicit impression from Control that communication from crews only means trouble (and in a sense this is true: it rather neatly corresponds with that other attitude of crews "that it would be a great job if you didn't have to carry any passengers".) So there is a feeling of lack of support to correspond to the general attitudinal aspect of Control. This difficulty put in the way of identifying with the Company (the difficulty found by the resentment caused by what is seen as legitimate use of authority by Control personnel) can be expected to have its effect on exacerbating the frequently found gap between the Company's ideal of the perfect bus crews, the treatment of those crews, and the actual behaviour of crews.²

Perhaps the most surprising thing about bus crews is how many actually do conform to the management's ideal, despite the conditions in which they work, and the power structure to which they are subjected.³

(c) Schedules

Schedules, apparently on the periphery of bus work from the point of view of the crews, in fact vitally controls the content of the work, and marginally, pay. The Schedules department is the concrete locus of intensification through drawing up routes, frequencies and running times, while it also allocates who gets what work. Schedules has implemented, in New Street at least (the case under consideration) a typical tactic of capitalism, erosion of seniority to increase flexibility of labour.

Schedules formal task is that of co-ordinating time-tables with shifts and crews.

But apart from this "formal" function, Schedules plays an important part in the organisation of New Street (I have not observed such a formidable role played overtly by other schedules departments). It is very much part of the informal system of control at New Street mentioned already, and it exercises sanctions to establish and maintain that control.

There is a deeper sense of control in which Schedules could be said to have a vested interest - that of time-tabling. As can be imagined, co-ordination of times and services is an exceedingly complex task, and once they have been established, Schedules can be assumed to be most reluctant to change them (especially given the fact that bus crews rarely work the whole of the shift, precisely because of the difficulties of co-ordinating services.

"Wheeltime" of 70 per cent of paid time is about the maximum achieved, many shifts are considerably under that proportion. Thus crews find themselves in great difficulty when routes are extended because no more time is allowed because of difficulties raised for timetabling. For example, the 74s are due in at 5 to the hour, and go out again as 70s on the hour - usually with the same crew. Five minutes in fact leaves little margin for being late, though of course the rapid turn-round is "good scheduling". But the route has been extended over the years by a mile, without any increase in time - precisely to avoid disrupting the co-ordination of services: similarly the 35/27 route through Livingston has been extended by about two miles without extension of the time allowed because the turn-round time in Glasgow is only eight minutes.

This sort of procedure is of course an intensification of the labour process. But quite apart from this a resistance to revising the timings can be expected from Schedules simply in terms of the extra work involved.

But Schedules controls the conditions of work of crews in other ways too. It is perhaps indicative of Schedule's power that most of the abuse inveighed against "authority" at New Street is directed at Schedules. A further idea can be had of how the power is used can be gained from the commonly heard phrase: "Who runs this place? The D.T.S. or the Schedules Clerk?"

The source of the power lies in Schedules being a co-ordinated point for reception and analysis of all work

done (or not done) by crews, and also acting as the formulator and director of subsequent work.

As should be evident from the "sociographic bits" ~~the~~ particular task out of all the variety of possible shifts which is done is of great importance to crews. It is Schedules that controls the distribution of work.

Thus it is through the Schedules office that trends towards greater "massification" of the work force have operated: differentials have been eroded, the benefits of seniority have been whittled away: despite the efforts of the crews to control the allocation of work, this control has become less effective. Schedules is the instrument of the organisation in effecting the change. Schedules is the location of resistance to retiming routes to meet the demands, not just of extended routes, but of routes now meeting massive congestion.

A further locus of power lies in allocation of overtime, special duties such as "London duties", time off, change of partner on the shift etc. All these are important to the crews, but almost wholly within the discretion of Schedules. (Arguments over London allocations are a perpetual discord among the more senior drivers). This is an important area of management discretion, but again one which is delegated to a body whose actions are unsupervised, and against whose decision action by the crews is difficult.

But action by Schedules can be more particular in effect. Schedules, by controlling the records of work, is aware of lapses by crews - late reports, sleep-ins, not signing up for overtime on a "late Saturday" etc., and Schedules

by controlling the allocation of work, is able to enforce sanctions. And these sanctions are quite outwith any formal organizational disciplinary process. For example, by knowing the number of available spares, Schedules can inform Control how many late reports should be sent home, and how long should elapse before they are employed again. More powerfully, Schedules is instrumental in deciding who is fired at the end of the summer season, since it holds the accumulated records - but the crews feel that the matter is not decided on "straight" interpretation of the records, but on "whether your face fits". For example one conductor who was dismissed after some years' service was re-instated by Industrial Tribunal, when he was able to show that his work record was not significantly different from other crews: but his face had not "fitted". The poor chap had henceforth to be extremely punctilious in his duties.

Further examples of Schedules' power is evident in requests for time off, or change of duties. The line taken is a "hard" one, linked perhaps to the informal control system. Crews generally find it easier to ask the D.T.S. though they may find his permission being gainsaid by Schedules.

In short, schedules forms a locus of power which is exercised unsympathetically, with no recourse to any kind of appeal. There is also a fear of offending Schedules, who have the power to allocate "nice or nasty" work, coupled with Schedules holding all the records of late reports, absenteeism, accidents, shorts, and so on, and being the place that initiates recommendation for retention or firing

at the periodic clamp-downs. This type of action contrasts with the formal disciplinary proceedings, in which a clear appeals procedure exists and the help of the Union can be enlisted. Schedules is a means of control which by-passes this procedure - an important point given the ease of "transgressions" in bus work.

(d) D.T.S.

In discussing the position of the D.T.S. I am obviously moving into an area where direct observation was extremely limited, and for this reason I will aim at a rather more general level.

The D.T.S. is the locus of the formal disciplinary proceedings, although appeals are possible up to General Manager level.

But here there is (yet another!) contradiction. For the capacity of the D.T.S. to enforce the company-legitimated sanctions of suspension, or dismissal is in fact hampered by the sheer lack of sufficient numbers of crews.

The D.T.S. is thus often reduced to saying "Don't do it again", coupled with a moralistic little homily on the qualities of the ideal busman. Of course for breaches such as late reports, etc., the set of unofficial sanctions operated by Control and Schedules exists - conceivably as a counterweight to the diminished capacity for action of the D.T.S.

While at one time Companies were able to maintain a "high degree of discipline" through being able to operate

the severe sanctions of dismissal or suspension they are no longer able to do so: yet there is not yet a substitute framework for management to impart and enforce its ideas about standards, though the D.T.S. may try to do so, but only of course after an offence has been committed.

How this operates is discussed in the section on the Union.

The way I have treated Supervision differs from how crews see supervision, in that I have extended the term to include the organization of work, whereas crews tend to see only individual supervisors, and assess them in personal terms, (such as "Jake's a right hard bastard", or "You're all right with Cokey"). The organization of work tends (probably rightly) to be identified with "Management".

To deal with management I have to turn to relying heavily on Survey data, because although the crews perceive management, they do not interact directly with them (though of course they interact daily with the results of management policies), and of course this is a non-observable situation.

Thus in the following section I describe the perceptions of management of the crews as surveyed. The relations with sections on "Organization of the Industry" will be evident.

Dealing first with elements of supervision not yet discussed, it must be kept in mind that the most important point about supervision in bus work is the lack of it, compared with most work. To illustrate this, I was told by

a divisional superintendant in E.C.T. that he had just had to deal with an employee who had been reported for his first offence of running early in seventeen years of service, "and the poor fellow just didn't know what to do, or who he was to see, or what would happen". Normally, crews' only contact is to toss in their disc to control when they sign on, and after that there are normally only the infrequent checks of road inspectors. Supervision was disliked by 4 per cent, but low supervision was liked by 31.8 per cent (Questions 11 and 10).

It is with this low profile in mind that Question 13 - "How about things run by the inspectors and control staff?" should be assessed.

With such an open-ended question a range of answers is to be expected, and the highest mention at 26 per cent of the general sample is a laconic "Alright", is followed by 9.3 per cent who report "No contact". Overall the assessment is favourable, i.e. "Very good", "Good", "Alright", "Efficient", and "Sympathetic", together constituting 56 per cent of responses, with no significant inter-group differences.

But the pattern changes somewhat with Question 18 - "Do you find that inspectors act the same way to everyone?" Here only 24 per cent of the general sample gave an unqualified "Yes" to such a positively framed question, with marginal favourable qualifications amounting to some other 23 per cent of answers. The largest negative answers - 30 per cent averred some form of "favourites". Of the "favourites" charge, by far the most frequent mention at 47 per

cent was in Eastern (Milngavie following with 43 per cent).

From my own observations this assessment would relate on the one hand to the allocation of work, and on the other to a perception of the existence at New Street of a loose group of employees who have "lined up the best jobs for those whose face fits".

This led on to Question 19 - "Have you any desire to be an inspector yourself?" which generally evoked the response of 22.5 per cent "Yes", and 74.4 per cent "No".

"Yes" answers mainly focussed on the job characteristics such as hours and money (41 per cent) and answers which indicated individual status-seeking of some form, 24 per cent.

But it is noteworthy that half of the Glasgow sample indicated a desire for promotion, followed by 33 per cent of Fife crews. Most of the answers for the Glasgow crews also indicated some appraisal of the job in "better status" terms, which accords neatly with the generally held view that a bus driver's or conductor's job is "the last card in the pack". Looking ahead a bit to Question 23, about how people got promotion in the company, the Glasgow crews were quite exceptional in identifying "Being the right person for the job" (66 per cent) and "Seniority" (44 per cent) as being the chief characteristics for promotion. This is probably not altogether a comment on the rationalistic bureaucracy of municipal transport undertakings, but also a comment on an unstable work force, with little chance of informal power groups developing. "Ambition" played no

part at all, as far as they were concerned. The general tendency of the responses of those who did not desire promotion were on the familiar lines of fear of being cut off from former friends, coupled with a dislike of applying pressure or "ordering others about".

Question 23 "Would you say that people in this company get promotion because . . .", was intended to uncover any perceptions of "cliques and cabals". The total lack of such perceptions in Glasgow contrasts with the notions of other groups.

As might be expected, the other municipality came close to Glasgow (39 per cent as compared to 44 per cent) in endorsing seniority, though the A.A. at the other extreme endorsed a similar percentage for the impartiality of paternalism! (This was probably because the company is so small that everyone knew that the last man made an inspector was the most eligible on seniority grounds.)

On "knowing the right people", the existence of informal power groups in the decentralised S.B.G. depots is evidenced by an endorsing of 47 per cent for this category in Fife and Eastern depots.

But this is seen as needing to be backed up by "Ambition", mentioned by 26 per cent, 32 per cent respectively. The endorsing of "Ambition" by 44 per cent of Milngavie crews has to be related to their almost complete (94 per cent) rejection of the idea of being promoted themselves.

It was a main theme of Chapter 1 that certain managerial policies were inadequate, inefficient, or had deleterious repercussions for the crews. This is a recurring

theme in other sections, (e.g. the section describing the general survey characteristics of the crews discusses the finding that the crews liked the task they had to do, but disliked features of the organisation of the performance of the task.) I propose to deal now with how the survey crews perceived the management, bearing in mind that it is largely the crews who have to deal with any problems, and deal with the Public's response to the service provided by management. The focus is thus on day to day problems, rather than power of industrial enterprises.

Questions 10 and 11, on likes and dislikes, throw up an interesting contrast in that while 4 per cent thought the organisation looked after them, 22.7 per cent mentioned some form of organisational inadequacy as disliked, with the majority of mentions being in Glasgow and Eastern, both of which had one quarter of the sub-groups mentioning such a feature.

Looking for more positive assessments, I tried to overcome any personal bias (after all I had worked mainly in Glasgow and Eastern!) by framing a positive Question - number 12 - "Do you think that management succeeds in its job?" Despite this, the results were 27 per cent for "Yes", 55 per cent for "No", and 7.8 per cent for some qualification of "Yes". Of the groups only Edinburgh had a majority considering management to succeed, but their neighbours in Eastern had nobody prepared to approve management unqualifiedly, while 89.5 per cent endorsed No.

The range of complaints (followed up by Question 12)

was very wide indeed, from generalities like:

"It's all part of a general run-down in this country,"
to organisational policy such as:

"They should bring the fares down to bring people
back to the buses," and

"The services should be expanded, not contracted,"
to organisational particularities:

"They've far too many duplicates with nothing on them."

However, closer inspection revealed a set of related factors thematically united in the notion that the management were too far removed from the daily problems and conditions encountered by the crews. This had two implications, the first being that too much was left to the crews, the second being that organisational distance from the "shop floor" meant an unawareness of the proper policy decisions to make.

The actual categories (with percentages of population making that mention) follow. Socially and organisationally distant 30 per cent: services policy inadequate 26.4 per cent: lack of co-operation 14 per cent: lack of knowledge of the shop floor 14 per cent: detailed organisation defective 13.2 per cent, over-dependence on crews 9.3. per cent, un-concern 16.3 per cent and organisationally and technically inefficient 24.8 per cent.

The contradiction between management's domination of the labour process and their ability to carry out their objectives is clear from the crews' assessments and attitudes. Control over the work process is always

incomplete, but in the bus industry it would seem to be quite unusually so. But, paradoxically, though this allows crews greater control in some areas, it subjects them to greater strain and effort in others. Management has taken the design of the execution of the task unto itself, but this domination does not succeed in its ostensible aim.

An implication that needs stressing is the very real concern of the crews to make the system function better - and not just because they have to deal with so many of the dysfunctions: many of them have a very strong "service" orientation: they directly see the needs of the public they serve.

A further implication for the thesis in general is that it is evident (particularly from the massive Eastern negative) that responses are worked out in the situation, and are not a consequence of technology in Woodward's wide sense.

The answers to Question 12b - "If yes, what do you see as the job of management?", were much more straightforward. The two main themes were, firstly on the lines that management had a very difficult job to do, with the main problems outwith their control, and secondly that as a system it worked well. But only two respondents actually said that a good service was provided.

Questions 14 and 15 sought to follow up these perceptions of the organisation.

Question 14, "If you could, what one thing would you

most like to change?" obviously covered quite a wide range, but interestingly most of the large number of items were specific things that could very easily be changed within the existing structure. The effect of shift working on non-work was almost the only condition that could not be changed within the existing organisation, though it was the most heavily endorsed item at 12.4 per cent. It was very closely followed by "split-shifts" at 8.5 per cent. The "condition of buses" was felt a matter of concern to 10.9 per cent, but other items were much less a matter of agreement.

Given that all but eleven respondents wanted something changed, it seemed worth asking how they would go about it, hence Question 15 - "If you felt the situation could be changed in some way would you try to suggest it to the Company?", though of course this was also aimed at identifying the perceived power structure of the organisation, and channels of communication.

The most obvious thing to remark about the results is that 34 per cent of respondents obviously saw that the power of management lay in not being interested in the crews' suggestions. Even of the 64 per cent that did think they would try, many voiced the qualification that they did not think they would have much success. Given this, it is not surprising that most identified the Union as the most effective vehicle for suggestions (21 per cent). But even here 4 per cent pointed out the ineffectiveness of the Union. The only other significant

grouping was 11.6 per cent of the whole sample identifying the D.T.S. as being approachable - though this was influenced by 43 per cent of Kilmarnock nominating him.

Despite the general disenchantment with management and the many specific things which the crews felt could be improved at all levels, yet they still saw a large amount of common ground (shades of football teams! (Goldthorpe et al 1968)). When asked Question 21 - "Do you think management and men work together in this company?" 40 per cent said "Yes", but only 41 per cent said "No". 7 per cent hedged and said "Sometimes".

A look at the inter-group variations heightens the elements of co-operation, or "fulfilled expectations".

The A.A., languishing under the curse of paternalistic private ownership went as high as 81.3 per cent "Yes", 18.8 per cent "No".⁴

They were followed in the S.B.G. by Milngavie at 55.6 per cent "Yes" to which was close Kilmarnock's 53 per cent. But the variation within the "same" organisation of the S.B.G. showed Fife down to 23.5 per cent, and Eastern down to 5.6 per cent, in accord with the general attitude there.

Of the municipalities, Edinburgh had 47 per cent "Yes", while Glasgow was lower at 33 per cent.

In terms of the themes of Chapter One on the organisational structure and deficiencies of the bus industry, it is interesting to see what reasons the crews

give for the breakdown. (Question 22 - "Where do things break down?").

The first set of reasons (30 per cent of respondents) point out that the management is isolated socially and technically from the crews, and have thus no interest in communication or co-operation.

The second set of reasons, again with 30 per cent of respondents points to no knowledge or control of operating conditions, leading to their being administratively incompetent.

The third main response (12.5 per cent) is to the effect that the local level is competent, or even good, but that the general management of the enterprise is bad.

This of course ties in with responses (Question 13) that things run by inspectors and control staff are satisfactory, but that "management does not succeed in its job" (Question 12).

In short, crews are able to attribute specific reasons to account for the problems that they themselves meet. "Break downs" were attributed to management distance and lack of control of the problems crews encounter in operating conditions: this is a neat contrast with management's tendency to offer psychologistic explanations of "lack of the right type" for the vagaries of bus systems.

Perhaps the most interesting consideration of all this section on the attitudes of the crews to management

is that bus services are surprisingly good, taking into account the disaffection of the crews who operate them! Question 21 is a revelation of a deep interest in the job by crews.

But the general conclusion must be that the perceptions of the crews about inadequacies of their organisations are broadly in line with that of commentators like Hibbs (and exemplify how intelligence and involvement are repressed by organisational domination).

As a conclusion to these two chapters on Supervision I wish to draw attention briefly to what I think are the main points.

The distinction between the two chapters is that Road and Stance Inspectors have incomplete domination of the work force, with the resulting ambiguity allowing negotiation over the labour process, while the Depot supervisors have far more direct power to direct labour. However, in both cases the operations at the point of production are outwith the immediate control of management as a whole, they have evolved to meet the changing conditions that higher management itself has not coped with.

But despite the differential conditions for struggle for control, all supervisors act as agents of the domination of the organisation. And as is apparent from the survey replies, crews are perfectly well aware of this dominance, and can readily identify the structure of

dominance as being the cause of the problems they have to struggle to control in their work. Braverman (1974) is quite right, the separation of design of work from its execution increases the domination of the organisation, but in this case it also increases the struggle for control over the task, by failing to identify changing problems and taking action to reduce their effective intensification of work.

Yet there is a paradox here, for the crews perceive a relative lack of immediate supervision: and compared with most semi-skilled jobs this is true: the control system of the organisation has but primitive means of specifying how the task is to be carried out. However, this relative lack of means to check on work should not divert attention from the overall direction of work. One aspect of this overall control of the labour process which is associated with supervision, though not with any particular part is that of Rules. Besides all the implicit rules which could be discerned, there is a formal set of rules enshrined in a Rule Book, which like other rules books, defines its own rule-breaking. It is of course one-sided: the crews have no legitimate sanctions to counter management's negative sanctions such as suspension or dismissal. If the R.T.A. regulations are broken, the effects of prosecution on the individual driver are personally momentous, but organisationally trivial.

The Rule Book is a further mystification of the

control structure, for it seeks to define in specific and contradictory terms what are necessarily unspecific diffuse conditions - how do you throw a drunk off a bus without touching him, how do you complete a route in time without speeding, how do you maintain civility in the face of abuse, how do you refrain from making up losses from receipts when the organisation fines you for shortages etc. etc? In sum, the Rule Book mystifies the exploitation involved in breaking the rules to get done the job that management has defined.

So in sum, the structure of supervision in the industry answers Gorz's questions on Technical Intelligence and the Capitalist Division of Labour in the affirmative (Gorz 1972) - the supervisory function is required for ruling and controlling from above, it is designed to discipline the work force, and is based on social rather than technical division of labour.

Notes: Chapter Six

¹ The survey results on Question 23, "Would you say people in this company got promotion because . . . ?" were pretty evenly spread, with the highest percentage mention being given to "They are the right person for the job" at 36 per cent, but with "know the right people" at 27 per cent and "Seniority" at 26 per cent. In the smaller company of the Fife depots, however, 50 per cent mentioned "Knowing the right people", as was the case with Eastern. The more impersonal and "fairer" bureaucratic processes of Glasgow Corporation all seen here with an endorsement of 75 per cent for being the right person.

² This was particularly noticeable in Eastern, where to Question 21 - "Do you think that management and men work together in this company?" 89 per cent answered "No", compared to the sample average of almost 50/50 "Yes" and "No".

³ The information from the sample, in reply to Question 12 - "Do you think management succeeds in its job?" is that 27 per cent endorsed management with a "Yes", 52 per cent "No". But here Eastern was a categorical exception again with 90 per cent negative responses, interestingly opposed to Edinburgh city's majority assessment of success at 56

per cent which, is a result in accordance with other favourable assessments by Edinburgh Corporation crews.

Perhaps some of the authoritarian attitude is a hangover from former days with more emphasis on strict discipline. A feature of discipline of that nature is that it is almost infinitely extensible - e.g. a speck of dust will be called a "filthy dirty rifle" in Army training establishments. The true purpose (or latent function if you're that way inclined) is of course other than the ostensible one. Bus companies tried and would probably still like to use discipline of the military nature to ensure the "right" attitude. As yet they do not seem to have hit upon a way of instilling such an attitude, but the old framework still exists, with even some of the old operators of former modes (the bus industry being well known for long service - many busmen retiring circa 1970 had joined companies in the process of formation in the 1920s).

The arbitrary and "unmanaged" way in which control decides which services to cut when resources are low - and with regard to vehicles this is chronic (sic)-may reflect more general lack of policy decision in management in general (e.g. nine years after the Transport Act, there is still no policy decision on rural transport from the S.B.G.) Given this lack of direction, it is not surprising to find apathy at the level of services at ground level. Control are the ground level people who operate (or rather do not actualise) bus services. Their problems arise because of

shortage of buses, but there is no remedial management reaction - no explicated criteria for service inadequacies. The managerial point is that Control and Stance were established to carry out routine work, but this work is no longer routine - it involves basically management decisions, but there is no recognition of this in management terms.

⁴ This finding is just about the only one that accords with Ingham's (1970) findings.

CHAPTER SEVEN: Vehicle

The labour process as a theoretical idea draws attention to labour power, to the realisation that someone must do something to the materials of production to produce goods or services. Examining what actually has to be done in terms of effort, and what the actions mean to the worker have often been ignored in sociology, but writers such as Nichols and Armstrong (1976) and Haraszti (1977) have recently corrected this omission.

This chapter on the vehicle views the bus as material of production. But it views it not solely as "plant" but as plant subject to forces of production whose capitalist nature dominates the labour process. Therefore it looks not only at the effort involved in producing a bus service but at how this is intensified by the overriding tendency to produce surplus revenue. It also shows how the struggle to control exists at the point of production, and just as the machinist works out how to subvert the forces of production through his control of the task, (cf. Haraszti: *ibid*), so I show a similar process for bus drivers.

It is, I suggest, the intensity of this struggle that is a major factor in the basic contradiction related to the vehicle as material of production. For driving is a highly valued activity in our society, and is indeed valued as such by the bus drivers themselves. The work is outdoor, a characteristic generally valued by this section of the work force, while it can offer slightly above average

manual wages. Yet many companies have severe labour shortages and turnover rates of 50 per cent per annum, (as I write unemployment is over two million, yet the local bus company is still advertising vacancies). It is vital to understand the minutiae of daily struggle and effort at the point of production to understand this contradiction. I would also argue that much of the difference in turnover, and attitudes and work patterns are related to intensity of the labour process.¹

I do not intend to examine the nature of driving in industrial societies: as far as I know, no sociological studies exist of driving as a social phenomenon, though numerous psychological studies of the motor perceptual skills exist (reviewed in, for instance, Parry 1968). The sociological study of lorry drivers by Hollowell (1968) devotes two pages to consideration, at a secondary level, of the driver's perception of his activity, though the rest of the study is again directed at the way the organisation of work affects perceptions of it. Further consideration of the driver's job is at the esoteric level of the language and social activities that pertain among different types of drivers (ibid: Chapter VII), which is a rather different approach to the one taken here.

Before analysing the vehicle proper, it might be as well to emphasise the potentially highly valued activity that driving constitutes, by referring to some "job satisfaction" data that till recently were thought such an important part of the sociology of industry.

A study by Blackburn and Mann (1979) which touched in part upon job satisfaction used driving activity as a comparative indicator of the paucity of job satisfaction elements in the great majority of jobs, noting that driving to work typically contains much more interest and satisfaction than the work thus driven to.

Hollowell (1968) quotes an American study:

Actually it seems probable that more continuous attention from moment to moment is required of the motor vehicle driver, than of the operator in any other type of transportation, including the airplane. (McFarland et al 1955)

If Blauner's criteria of control relating to job satisfaction are used, then driving a bus can, and will be shown (implicitly) to involve a comparatively high degree of control over time, work place and physical movement, control over the social and technical environment, and control represented as freedom from supervision (Blauner 1964). But such studies only serve at most to show that one group of workers is more or less "alienated" than another. (This is what Hollowell 1968 shows with his two groups of lorry drivers.) And it has little to do with "satisfaction" or with, more importantly, the place of the worker in the organisation, or the struggle for control over work.

The general characteristics of driving a bus can be divided into two groups, the physical and the perceptual.

The physical characteristics of the machine are of immense importance, for the driver is engaged in constant

efforts to maintain his control over its inherent instability by largely mechanically unaided physical effort.

This physical effort is related to what is on any terms quite a large machine. Single deck vehicles may be up to forty feet long with five to eight litre diesel engines, while double deck vehicles may be up to 36 feet long, 14 feet 6 inches high, seat 96 passengers and have seven to twelve litre engines. Both are precisely 8 feet 2½ inches wide. These are maximum sizes. A variety of smaller permutations of size exist.

The size of the vehicle, with its related characteristics constitute major elements in the bus driver's job which serve to differentiate his skill from that of the car driver. There are problems in managing the highly unstable physical situation which is a moving bus, which are sources of both satisfaction and frustration.

Even a bus being driven for pleasure - for instance a vintage bus - poses constant control problems, but these are compounded by the pressures of the forces of production in bus organisation.

Firstly, driving a bus is hard physical work. Its size makes for exaggerated movements in town (one of the few favours ever done for drivers was the resistance till the mid 1960s to double-deck buses over 27 feet because of the difficulties of manoeuvring in traffic: London

Transport still sticks at 30 feet, the other organisations have gone for the greater capacity and capital use potential of larger vehicles).

Older buses are an ergonomic nightmare, since operating engineers and builders are concerned with least-cost solutions to design and maintenance. So if the wheel is close enough, the foot controls are too far away, if the seat is at the right height for physical control, visibility is reduced, and so on. Some idea of the physical effort involved can be gained from realising that the wheel rim pressure even on a modern bus is, when new, round about 75 lb, clutch pressure is about 70 lb, and the pressure required to keep the throttle down, 60 lb (Bus and Coach, October, 1969). And these are the manufacturer's published figures, not the botched job of a hurried maintenance engineer. I have frequently driven buses in which the clutch could only just be depressed to change gear. Indeed, the effort was so intense in one type of bus that it led to a condition known as "Bristolitis" since the pain in strained knee ligaments caused a double limp for up to an hour after a journey. This leads to efforts to circumvent the pain, such as single-clutching instead of double-declutching every change on crash gear-boxes, going round corners faster because the higher the speed, the easier the wheel effort, wedging the leg between the clutch and wheel to keep the clutch in while waiting, because selecting gears at rest is difficult.

Effort and physical exhaustion due to badly designed controls are not the only source of discomfort.

The engine bulkhead obtrudes into the cab, leaving just a thin steel plate between the engine and the driver. The noise is colossal, while the whole cab vibrates and rocks in time to the engine. The heat transmitted from the engine is a welcome addition to inadequate heating in the winter, but raises the temperature of the cab to a stifling degree in summer, the stifling effect being added to by fumes leaking through the joins in the metal.

The sliding window on the left lets in welcome draughts of air in summer but freezing gales whistle through in winter to add to that coming in through the gaiterless foot control slots. The front windscreen opens for more air in summer, but the rain streams in through perished rubber moulding, while a further supply drips from the overhead heating system tank in the roof.

As a final note to add to the cocophany of noise vibration, fumes, heat or freezing draughts, there is the insistent clang of the bell in its little cage - caged to frustrate attempts to diminish its painful intensity.

Even with more modern buses, with the engine at the rear, only the clutch pressure is missing, while driving strain is actually intensified since the timing of gears more accurately is necessitated, while the rearwards centre of gravity makes them highly unstable in braking conditions. It should be noted that a contradiction in the industry

exists in that the operating engineers bitterly resisted the introduction of rear-engined buses because of very high maintenance costs, but they were forced to buy them by the Ministry of Transport system of only giving grants for purchase for this type, to try to encourage the introduction of one man operation, a move which was itself resisted by the traffic side of bus operators. The heavy clutch pedal in a modern bus is missing, not to ease the driver's effort, but because the gear changing mechanism obviates its need: similarly completely automatic geared buses seek not to make life easier for the driver, but to take away his chance to make faster gear changes which damage the machinery, thus reducing his control over the task.

All of these driving tricks to overcome effort are of course against the driving training of the organisation, since the organisation is fundamentally setting off the driver's effort against the cost of easing his task: it is cheaper to hammer home the holding pin of a steering wheel than order a properly-fitting new one, for as long as the wheel can still turn, the driver can cope by more effort. And as regards effort, the bus companies have the ally of the "Machismo" image of bus driving: you can complain about the bad features of a bus, but never admit or allow them to slow down your journey time.

The skill in the physical side is matched by skill in synthesising the numerous and varied perceptual aspects

of the vehicle. At the psychological level vision and hearing are the factors most obvious, but there is also estimating the place of the bus in its potentially lethal environment, and of course the better these factors are synthesised, the more skill exercised. Again, any factor in this set which does not actually obviously endanger the bus is cost-cut - the wiper blade may hang, maddeningly splitting the view ahead, while feeble head-lamps barely pierce the gloom.

It can be seen that the driver is intimately involved with the machine, responding to the variations in road conditions transmitted to him through his senses.

The response to the machine's constraints on speed, manoeuvrability, acceleration, long timed gear changes, and long braking distances, is to adopt a strong rhythm of driving, co-ordinating to the utmost the movements needed for the fastest progress of the bus with the least amount of effort necessary. This rhythm of working also extends to steering and braking, since the driver is usually extremely familiar with every bend on the road, and the speed at which it can be taken, every pot-hole at bus stops, and how to avoid them (or use them to assist braking), what speed to go at so as to catch sequences of traffic lights, how many gear changes are necessary between stops, what speed is necessary in each section of a route to maintain the prescribed time-table timings. This latter requires an acute sense of timing, and the co-ordination

of the machine with its external circumstances to achieve. For the driver may be faced with some ten to twelve miles of varied route, an unknown number of stops, a bus with no speedometer, and will still have to arrive dead on time, without having stopped to wait to catch up on time.

This rhythmical co-ordination is thus necessary to avoid unnecessary effort, and keep to the timetable requirements. But the bus is not alone on the road. It is part of the general traffic system: the degree of skill necessary to achieve optimum rhythm is a source of satisfaction to drivers: the disruption of that rhythm is, correspondingly, a source of frustration.

Disruption of the bus's progress by other vehicles is encountered in two main forms, viz. the general traffic pattern, and the movement of individual vehicles. In both cases the driver must be involved in not just perceiving the movement of other vehicles, but of predicting what movements are likely, both in the normal sense of avoiding collisions, and for the purpose of exploiting under-use of the road space to his own advantage, or avoiding being baulked.

But the driver is also caught up in the more general social process of the traffic system. Again, as with driving as a physical perceptual activity, my description enters largely uncharted areas. Even to argue that traffic systems are primarily social systems enters on

contentious ground. The only valid approach I can take in these circumstances is again to give a "driver's view".

Bus drivers are concerned to perceive traffic patterns. This concern would not impinge so much if their vehicles were capable of instant response, or there were no need to expedite their progress in order to remain within the limits of the timetable. But the vehicles they drive take over a minute at full throttle to reach a maximum speed of about 40 m.p.h.,² while, for reasons gone into elsewhere, one of the principal concerns of the driver is not to run late. This leads to a felt need to optimise the progress of the bus. Of course, this need only impinges really in town traffic, since country roads generally have less traffic, and what traffic there is generally travels faster than a bus, so that a bus on a country route rarely finds itself trying to pass another vehicle, being much more likely to accumulate a "tail" itself. Town traffic is different.

Traffic patterns vary accordingly to the time of day, rush hour traffic allows little room for manoeuvre, since it tends to fill the available road space to maximum capacity. The bus finds itself delayed not only on radial routes by competing car traffic, but also by car traffic on cross-cutting peripheral journeys. Delays ensure, but this is due in the main to amount of traffic rather than poor use of road space. Better use tends to be made of road space due to tight traffic management

schemes geared towards rush-hour control, but also because commuter traffic is generally repeating familiar journeys with knowledge of the opportunities available for expediting journeys and the motivation of having fairly narrow time limits for getting to work. The bus driver's room for manoeuvre is accordingly somewhat more limited.

As mentioned above, the bus driver needs not only to identify the traffic pattern type he is enmeshed in and predict its likely consequences on his own progress, but needs also to identify and predict the movement of individual vehicles in front and to the side of him.

All driving includes such elements but the bus driver must see them with reference to the clock: all his actions have reference to the organisational constraints of the route and headway.

The accent is on prediction, because predicting the movement of other vehicles enables the effects of such movements to have minimal effect on the rhythm of driving. But prediction cannot take account of all the effects. The rhythm is frequently baulked by the movements of other road users.

Control over the bus's progress is a source of satisfaction at the skill involved. But the enmeshment with other traffic, the unpredictability of all the other traffic's movements with subsequent baulking of the bus driver's movements (or more serious effects) are definitely not sources of satisfaction, but of frustration.

The bus driver, in sum, is in a position which requires a high degree of co-ordination of physical effort and perceptual skill with regard to moving his own vehicle, to which is added having to co-ordinate the movement of his vehicle with others in conditions often fraught with danger to the vehicles or their occupants.

The skill with which the driver co-ordinates the vast number of inputs into his job is a source of esteem, but the process is also mentally and physically exhausting. The degree of exhaustion will depend on the point on a continuum running from an open dry road in good light to a wet night, greasy road with dense but fast-moving traffic.

A very sketchy indication of the vast number of situations and constantly varying inputs that the bus driver encounters has been given here: perhaps the single most important point to make is that this variety makes the task unpredictable from journey to journey, and even from second to second. Part of the driver's skill is to control that unpredictability, but no matter how good he is, he is still driving a potentially unstable machine in an unstable environment, and control takes effort.

Before examining the driver's responses to this situation, mention must be made of yet two more elements that the driver must take into account in his synthesis

of elements, namely the Passengers and the Conductor.

It is necessary initially to point out that Passengers and Conductor are dealt with here insofar as they directly affect the vehicle - passengers' relationship in general with the crews is dealt with separately, as is the conductor.

Firstly, passengers affect the weight of the bus, and thus the effort required - a full load doubles the mass of the whole vehicle, steering becomes heavier, braking distances increase, and more effort on the brake pedal is required, while acceleration is correspondingly even more laboured. A bus full of passengers cannot be swung round corners: a nice problem for the driver is how fast it can be moving before the passengers (or conductor) complain. The bus might stay on the road, but the passengers will be thrown about. Too rapid an approach to stops, and passengers will be reluctant to fight against the deceleration and will stay in their seats, or not descend the stairs till the bus finally stops, thus losing any time gained by a too rapid progress.

The driver relies on the conductor to expedite boarding and alighting (or which more later), but there is co-ordination here too in that the driver can watch the rear platform in his mirror and can let a busy

conductor know when the bus is ready to move by revving the engine, or moving off slightly ready for the signal to move. The driver may even be able to hurry along passengers making a leisurely boarding by moving off slightly.

As will be gone into when discussing "The Public", the aim of the passengers and of the crews are quite divergent. Certainly not all passengers are aware of the need to board and alight as fast as possible, and the crews have thus to try and control them.

The driver must also be aware of intention to board: this varies of course; in Glasgow if there is no hand signal, the bus does not stop; but the Borders driver has to know that the people sitting on the wall, who have looked at the approaching bus with no interest, and made no move, are in fact intending to get on it. Thus the driver, in addition to his other perceptual scannings, has to include the expression, gestures and stances (the "body language") of people standing at some distance from him. This, and the relation with the conductor giving starting and stopping signals are yet more variable inputs into the bus driver's work, plus the responsibility of being solely responsible for the safety of up to 90 people - felt very keenly by drivers.

With an experienced conductor, who understands fully that his main working concern is getting the bus moving again as quickly as possible after each stop, the driver can rely on the knowledge that if the start signal is not given as soon as the platform is clear, then there is a good reason (such as the conductor helping with luggage, or a late passenger). But not all conductors are able to appreciate this main aim - it is part of the job socialisation to have them appreciate it - with the result that the driver does not know whether the conductor has forgotten to give the signal, or whether there is some other reason for the delay. He therefore has to take the time to check the platform visually before moving off, and again just after having done so, to make sure it is safe to go on - yet another aspect of his perceptual activity.

The driver again has to rely on the conductor for timely stopping signals: too early and he might think it a late bell for the previous stop, or the passenger might get off at an intermediate traffic halt: too late, and the driver has to make a hurried re-adjustment of his co-ordination, and a new assessment of the road situation.

Because of the very great number of perceptual and physical demands made on the driver in moving his vehicle, the unstable nature of that machine, the unpredictable events that occur in the environment in which the machine operates, and the continual frustration of the co-ordinative movements made to overcome this situation, drivers look upon their acquired driving skill as a resource, firstly to overcome the

demands imposed by the machine and its traffic environment, and secondly, to overcome the various organisational demands.

The degree of skill with which the demands of the machine are met determines the skill with which and the extent to which the demands of the traffic environment are overcome, while these two together determine the success with which the organisational demands are met. This latter has been referred to when dealing with "The Route".

With regard to the former, the driver has to adopt an active attitude to driving. This involves a combination of a high level of co-ordination of the movements necessary to control the machine, and a high level of skill at moving the vehicle relative to others.

The first - co-ordination of movements can perhaps best be exemplified by contrasting it with the official rule book on starting procedure.

The rule book has the driver sitting at a stop with the gear in neutral and the handbrake on. On receiving the start signal he selects first gear, checks the off-side mirror, puts on the indicator if the road is clear, checks the near side mirror to check if the platform is clear, again checks the off-side mirror and if, and only if, the road is clear, releases the handbrake and moves off.

If a driver were to follow this procedure, he would be very late indeed on his journey. If the new driver does not realise that this way of driving by the rule book is inappropriate he will meet neither the Company's nor the crews' aims. He will have the error of his ways quickly

pointed out to him by his conductor or other crews. To give some idea, a new driver was 45 minutes late on a service journey of an hour, another rather better, was only 40 minutes late on a service time of 80 minutes (but he used a 15 minute break in between to catch up on time partly).

Drivers socialised into the job in the same situation do this: On coming to a halt at a bus stop, swing the wheels round so that the bus is angled with the platform in at the kerb, and the front of the bus slightly out in an "off" position (further out if there is an obstruction in the line, or even stopping in line with the obstruction and some feet out from the stop). As he comes to a halt, the driver will select second gear and keep his foot on the foot-brake, keeping the clutch in by jamming his knee under the steering wheel. Watching both mirrors in turn, he will anticipate by a few seconds the last passenger boarding, put on the indicator and observe the flow of traffic coming from behind. While he has decided which vehicle he can move off in front of, he will have received the start signal, and will move off angling into the line of traffic, with a swift glance in the near-side mirror to check for the safety of any late boarders. Depending on the behaviour of vehicles into whose path he is inexorably cutting, he will accelerate with greater or lesser speed, a "thumbs up" emerging from the signalling window as a conciliatory gesture, giving the impression that the vehicle behind has voluntarily ceded its place to the bus.

Driving in this way, it is possible at least to cut

down delays on the journey, though of course, it does not of itself guarantee keeping to time.

This nicety of judgement, involving a potentially dangerous situation, is an important element in being able to keep to time, and through its successful accomplishment, is an important element in the self-concept of being skilled that is shared by the drivers.

Another example of this skill is the often occurring ability, on say, a three lane highway, to be able to overtake a furniture van doing 45, with the bus doing 50, while another lorry approaches at some 50 m.p.h. It requires nerve as well as judgement to hold the vehicle steady while all three pass, at a meeting speed of 100 m.p.h., with only six to twelve inches between the vehicles, gauging the likely divergent effect of opposing slipstreams.

It also requires nerve, though tempered by experience, to pull out to pass knowing that the line of approaching cars will pull over to allow incursion on their part of the road.

This kind of behaviour, which may include speeding, a tendency to shoot amber traffic lights, to straddle half a road to force traffic to give way etc. obviously transgresses some of the rules of the Highway Code, and many of the rules of the bus companies.

Despite the experience of drivers, accidents happen, especially in dense urban traffic, where buses disrupt the

general traffic flows through moving at a different disjointed rhythm from other traffic.

I argue that bus drivers do stick to rules of driving but these rules are not the mechanistic written pronouncements of the Highway Code or the Company Rule Book; rather they are agreed patterns of driving behaviour, derived from a response to the situation the drivers find themselves in, and reinforced by job socialisation.

The patterns of bus driving are a creative active response to the complexity of the mechanics and ergonomics of moving the vehicle (for example co-ordinating movements to achieve instant readiness to go after a halt), and the environment in which the bus has to move (for example having little advantage in speed or acceleration, tactics of utilisation of road space, cutting in, etc., have to be employed).

The crews are not at the mercy of either the mechanics of the vehicle or the mechanistic written rules of traffic regulation: they adapt to those strictures, and create a new pattern of social (and physical) behaviour, in which (and because of which) they are intimately involved in what they do, but they are forced to do so by the forces of production.

A bus driver is not an Arthur Seaton (Sillitoe 1958), switched off as far as any meaningful relations with the machine go: the bus driver is fully conscious and with

his wits about him, and this is a major element in his evaluation of his job.

Whatever else might be summated from this chapter, the complex demands made on the driver are the most striking feature. A more complex job, with a large degree of control has been taken to be evidence of job satisfaction - notably by Blauner (1964). And certainly, from the survey, "driving itself" was the one single quality most valued mentioned by drivers. But though a positively valued quality, it is also one of the major sources of negative evaluations. And these negative evaluations have their real source, not so much in intrinsic qualities of the driving activity, (though these exist - Parry (1968) provides many examples) but in the constraints of the organisation of the activity. All this endeavour by the driver has reference to the aims of the organisation, through the tyranny of the headway, though this, for many crews is confounded with the apparent social needs of the population they serve: the job is, after all, seen as "socially involving".

The constraints, the compulsions imposed on the driver to use his control over his task to serve the aims of the organisation is evident. But one of the effects is to change some aspects of the activity normally positively evaluated, to being negatively valued; physical effort increases, information processing capacity becomes

strained in the race against the clock. In London, in the depression of the 1930s, much was made of the strain imposed on bus drivers through the onerous organisation of their work (Clegg 1950). Then they could not leave for better jobs: now they do.

Notes: Chapter Seven

¹ A recent work also examines how the organisation of work changes the perceived nature of an otherwise valued activity - Haraszti (1977) uses the valued "homers" production to point the contrast between work controlled by the worker and work controlled by the organisation - *ibid*: 138-146.

² Buses on stage carriage service are generally governed to between 37-45 m.p.h., although they are capable, ungoverned, of about 80 m.p.h. The rationalisation of management is that governing prevents damage through over-revving, though apparently this only applies to stage carriage, for the same drivers are allowed to drive ungoverned coaches at considerably higher speeds. The real reasons are of course related to control over fuel cost and, in terms of the labour process to controlling the pace of work, preventing the drivers from optimising the speed potential of the vehicle. Thus control over the work force is allowed precedence over the achievement of the aim of more timeous services through increased speed. The shortcomings in speed do of course intensify the labour process.

CHAPTER EIGHT: Conductor

The aim of this section is to outline in a descriptive way what the conductor does in his job, identify what social processes are involved, and to offer an analysis in sociological terms of these social processes; again with emphasis on the control of the task, and control by the organisation.

I think the best introduction to what is involved in the conductor's job can be conveyed by a sociographic account of recruitment and training and the initial period of work. In this way the reader can be introduced to the job in much the same way as any recruit to the industry. This induction is a formative influence in attitudes to the job, as well as instruction in the job requirements. It contains features typical of those found in similar situations - technical instruction, inculcation of the organisation's aims, as might be expected, but also informal norms adoption, work group formation, work rate determination, "hazing" etc. Some attention is necessary to these processes, since they are important influences in shaping the attitudes and behaviour of crews within the organisation. It is also of importance in that almost every one of the "platform staff" goes through this training, since drivers are not commonly recruited from "outside", but drawn from the conducting staff. (Indeed some companies, such as E.C.T., make conducting school training compulsory for all platform staff grades.)

There is, consequently, a common shared experience for crews relating to their common training experiences. One of the effects of this is to give recruits other recruits as a set of co-workers, a cohort, to relate to, not only during

their training, but also noticeably, for the rest of their careers. (Discussion of how people know each other throws this up frequently.)

As will become clearer, there is a very real sense in which crews "learn on the job", so that the following description of training in no way implies that training is complete in the week or so devoted to it.

The ensuing discussion is based on my general experience of being "trained" by no less than five different bus companies, as well as more general observation.

Given the diversity of people and reasons for choosing bus work involved (a discussion of my survey data on this subject is in Chapter 3), I will confine myself to the observation that the training period would seem to have the function of forming a commonality of attitudes to the job from the generality of the recruits' previous experience, a change from an "outsider" to accepted member of the work group, helping to form expressed feelings of solidarity and identification among crews, matched by a growing experience and appreciation of what is involved.

The recruit first encounters bus personnel in a way common to most recruitment to organisations, in the case of city corporations through the personnel officer or one of his subordinates, in the S.B.G., through the D.T.S., since the S.B.G. does not employ such refined organisational practices as having specialists in personnel. This recruitment takes place either at the Head Office or the local bus garage. The atmosphere is, I suppose, neither more nor less like the

generality of dowdy functionalism (in the aesthetic sense) found in other organisations, while the reception is, I suppose, neither more forbidding nor more welcoming than the reception given to recruits to any semi-skilled occupation.

It is only on being told to turn up at the "conducting school" that any particularity to the industry is conveyed.

Such schools (all five in my experience) are attached to working garages or bus stations. Thus the recruit gets his first insight into the "backstage" of the organisation, along with his first whiff of the inevitable accompanying diesel fumes.

He also makes the acquaintance of his fellow pupils. The general effect is of a first day at school, especially since it is normal to provide school-type desks, while the instructor, at least initially takes a rather authoritarian line. In this he is aided by being in inspector's uniform, the "class" still, at this stage, being in "civvies".

Basically, the training involves a discussion of the rules, ideals and instruction such as are to be found in the S.B.G. "Conditions of Service", with practice in filling out way bills, working the ticket machine, and working out fares and change.

It is at this point that the recruit begins to realise that the job is not simply a matter of "ca'in' the haundle".

It may be generally instructive and informative about the range of tasks and duties a conductor encounters to examine the various topics covered by the S.B.G. "Conditions of Service".

Depending on the imagination of the instructor, this will be more or less understandable to the trainees. For the trainees, much of the information only becomes meaningful when actually practised.

Instruction usually begins with some form of homily about civility, honesty, and especially, punctuality, all of which tends to be easily assented to by the assembled class.

The instruction moves on to the more concretely appreciable subject of the conductor's equipment: ticket machine, types of ticket, range of fares, booklet tickets, parcel stamps, way-bill and other equipment (with a warning not to be tempted to sell the leather cash bag to coalmen and such like who are apparently always willing to offer a good price).

The purpose and amount of "float" is discussed, as is the position and display of the conducting badge that they have applied to the local Traffic Office for.

The trainees are then taught of the other things they must carry with them - fare tables, time tables, duty boards and work schedules, Time and Mileage Cards, Rule Book, pencil, Parcel book, Lost Property Receipt book, Route Number book, Transfer Slips, Ticket Machine, Breakdown Form, and Whistle. The use and application of these items is also explained.

Instruction is then given in examination of the vehicle for fitness, lighting and ventilation of the vehicle, and setting the destination screen (including the portentous information that while the conductor is responsible for seeing that the screen is accurately set, it is the driver who

actually turns the handle!).

The lecture may end with instruction on what may and may not be carried on a bus, and the circumstances in which smoking, reading and sitting down are permitted.

About this point trainees probably get their hands on a ticket machine for the first time, thereby acting out several childhood fantasies, no doubt. They are inducted into the mysteries of the spring safety trip, how to set the various mechanisms to indicate type of ticket issued, price, stage number, date, cancellation, and how to record the number of tickets issued and the amount of cash indicated. Practice is given in setting and operating the machine, though I never myself had impressed upon me the particular necessity, realised later, of doing so quickly and accurately. Both type of machine in use and speed of operation are important to the conductor. (For instance, I can remember having to work on Midland's busy runs with an older type of machine that required insertion of cardboard tickets for each fare: this allowed a rate of working about one quarter as fast as the virtually instantaneous ticket-issuing machine used by G.C.T.) As yet the task seems unproblematical.

Some indication of the possible complexities of ticket issue and fare collection are given below.

Conductors are required to account for all passengers on board, either by issuing a ticket for fare paid, or by examining and cancelling where appropriate Passes, Seasons, Limited Journey and Return tickets. The latter two cases involve checking also the validity of the tickets, printed

by a different conductor, which involves knowing the correct information for the journey indicated, without the passenger giving the information.

An ominous note is sounded by the management's holding discretion about the action to be taken if conductors are found collecting fares from passengers leaving the bus.

The conductor is expected to print the correct ticket in the presence of the passenger (the virtual impossibility sometimes of doing this and controlling the other tasks can of course be used to good effect by conductors - but see later!).

The difficulty of keeping adequate supplies of change is raised by the requirement to give passengers their change before the end of the journey, tacked on to which is the notification that conductors are responsible for any counterfeit or foreign coins accepted.

Conductors are enjoined not to let passengers override, thus involving a thorough and exact knowledge of the fare stages. These fare stages can encompass up to about forty different points, while the number of different routes involved may be over twenty. (Many routes overlap, and thus have common stage points.) In addition, there is the requirement to know the names of the stops, crossings, pubs, and road ends intermediate to the fare stages.

The possibility (soon to be confirmed as certainty) of making a mistake is raised by the instructions for re-issuing a correct ticket and obtaining a witness's name and address for later crediting of the amount.

On the subject of "Passengers' Failure to Pay Fare", the S.B.G. regulations are worth quoting in full.

1. Passengers who appear Respectable (Company's emphasis)

In the event of a passenger who appears respectable presenting himself at or on the bus and stating that he is unable to pay the fare, the Conductor will in deciding his course of action, have regard to the following:

The type of passenger.

The time of day or night and whether or not it is the last journey.

The frequency of the service.

Whether or not the passenger is a regular traveller and has purchased a season, 12 journey or return ticket, which may be lost or left at home.

Whether undue hardship is likely to arise through refusal to carry.

He will then carry out the following procedure:

If, after carefully questioning the intending passenger, the Conductor feels that the passenger's statement is genuine and that the circumstances are such that a refusal to carry might react on the Company's prestige, he will ask the passenger for name and address, and having obtained same will issue the necessary ticket to cover the journey desired (provided the fare involved does not exceed 2s 6d (still listed 1976)). Should the fare exceed 2s 6d, he will issue a ticket to cover that part of the journey to the nearest Company office, where he will obtain instructions from the D.T.S. or Inspector with regard to the remainder of the

journey.

Conductors should endeavour to obtain from the passenger documentary proof as to the genuineness of names and addresses, but in no case where the Conductor has exercised reasonable care will he lose in the event of a false name and address being supplied. On completion of duty the Conductor will hand the name and address, along with completed explanation form claiming credit for the ticket issued, into his District Office.

In cases where the Conductor is not satisfied with the statement given, he will request the passenger to leave the bus, and will refer him to an Inspector or Company Office, or if neither of these is available, to a policeman. A policeman should be asked to remove from the bus any passenger who refuses to give name and address or refuses to leave the bus at the request of the Conductor.

2. Passengers who do not appear Respectable

If a passenger who does not appear respectable refuses to pay the fare, the Conductor should have such passenger removed from the bus, if necessary with assistance of police, but in so doing he should be particularly careful to act with the least possible inconvenience to other passengers and no matter what provocation may be given, a Conductor while on duty must not assault any person. In all cases where a passenger is removed from the bus the Conductor should get the names and addresses of witnesses and report the occurrence to his D.T.S."

(The Reader may care to glance at the sections on "The Public", to contrast these bland, unexpanded and enigmatic instructions, with the reliance on an apparently ever-handy all-empowered policeman (and the legal power of a policeman to remove a person from a bus is questionable since the passenger cannot be arrested for the offence - cf. "The Law of Inland Transport" by O. Kahn - Freund, 1958, p. 425) with the practical circumstances of a conductor on Glasgow's notorious 46 route, hustling through suburban waste-land just after closing time (when the police cunningly disappear ostensibly for their shift change-over), who has to gauge whether it is even worth asking anyone for a fare, and if so, who he can risk asking. Indeed such frequently occurring potentially violent circumstances, and what to do about them are nowhere mentioned.) (Vide also Appendix II).

Trainees are then introduced to the complexities of the fares for Children, Employees, Blind Persons, Go-carts and Dogs (e.g. in the latter case, to one quarter of the adult single fare, to the next penny a head - try working that one out quickly in your head while being thrown around a bus interior!)

Further instruction covers in quite bewildering confusion care and operation of ticket machines, ticket machine issue and checking, how and when to fill in a Waybill (the record of journeys made, the number of passengers, and receipts taken in), what to do with a mutilated ticket, how to deal with other Companies' tickets, machine breakdown procedure, cashing in of the day's takings, bell signals

(including the archaic instruction to signal the driver when the bus is being overtaken, and when it is safe to pull in again if the bus has overtaken another vehicle), instructions to prevent passengers entering or leaving the vehicle at stops for traffic lights, assisting passengers to board, time-keeping and recording of delays, stopping for passengers, bus defects, requirements not to signal other vehicles, breakdown instruction and recording, transferring of passengers to another conductor, duplicate operation, instruction not to congregate with other crews when standing spare, handling of lost property, parcel handling, parcel agency collection, conveyance of mails, passengers' luggage.

This is rounded off with attention being drawn to the "Extract from the Public Vehicles (Conduct of Drivers, Conductors and Passengers) Regulations", though the booklet itself does not consider the instruction finished before dealing in detail with what to do if an accident occurs. A curious, and yet typical omission is the complete lack of instruction to obey anyone: the powers of inspectors and regulators etc. remain unexplicated: likewise there are no clear instructions to follow set procedures when passengers breach "conduct" regulations.

I hope that the probably rather tedious enumeration of what the conductor must know and be competent in has at least given the lie to suppositions that the job is not a complex one: it is probably true to say that not much academic competence is required but the conductor has to remember and handle and co-ordinate a variety of considerations and tasks.

This variety is of course reflected in the crews' quoting "interest and variety" as one of the chief likes of the job. As will become apparent below, the principal requirements are the ability to optimise the speed of the bus, accurate handling of fares and cash, and remembering the fares and fare stages on routes. These are not necessarily (and in my experience are not) the things most emphasized in training school. Indeed, many of the rules, if adhered to, would prevent the efficient operation of the service at all, particularly those affecting control of passengers. It might perhaps rightly be surmised that the companies recognise the problematics of this area in that the next section of training involves sending the trainees out with experienced conductors. After this period - usually of about three days, the trainees return for a final test of their competence, and a final "pep talk" regarding civility, punctuality, service, consideration etc. One of my own training occasions, at E.C.T. this "pep talk" was reinforced by our inspector instructor introducing the Chief Inspector, who marched in, his pencil moustache twitching (and thus explaining the common inspectorial feature of pencil moustaches), sat down and said, "I'm here to talk about DISCIPLINE. You", he said, glaring at an inoffensive trainee sitting at the front, "Get your hair cut!" With regard to myself, he merely remarked that my sideburns were too long for E.C.T., though they might be good enough for G.C.T. Little did he know (or care) about my agonized shaving off of my beard, of which my sideburns and moustache were but a sad remnant! He could hardly

in the circumstances comment on my sporting a moustache). The rest of the "talk" continued with corresponding pleasantries about "Efficiency", "Courtesy" and "Timeliness" (the initial letters of which the more percipient of us had already noted, spelled E.C.T.) After that, we were on our own.

But before commenting on this aspect, I wish to look at the period that the trainees spend in training with a more experienced conductor, and follow this with a comment on the social processes of the training period.

The general effect of starting work actually on a bus is one of "culture shock". Being on the buses involves usually a fairly violent incursion into the trainee's pattern of living. Very few jobs involve starting as early as 4 o'clock in the morning. Many jobs involve shift work, but few such odd shifts, shifts that change from week to week. The discovery of having to be civil to a much wider range of people than the conductor may have yet been exposed to contributes to making the job problematical. Over and above this, there is a completely new set of work mates of proven proficiency but otherwise unknown quality to interact with. The status of the job may be unconsciously questioned, while the mechanics pose handling difficulties.

The solidarity of the trainees' class is of little help in the isolated conditions of the new team of driver, "regular" conductor and the trainee.

On the first outing with the regular, which will usually be in the quieter conditions of the early morning, the

trainee will usually just sit and observe, while, if he takes the task seriously, the regular will explain the length of the route, the commonest fares, and point out the identification marks (such as pubs, shops, parks) for the fare stages, as well as checking that the trainee has filled in the waybill and set the data on his ticket machine correctly.

About this time, it usually occurs to the trainee that not only does he not recognise the route that the bus is following, but that he is having difficulty maintaining his balance. This latter presents even greater difficulty when the trainee is sent off to take his first fare, since he not only has to keep his balance (as any passenger might) but has to avoid getting his equipment tangled up with the seats, extract his fare table and then print a ticket and give change. The whole process shows up a lack of physical co-ordination in strong contrast to the regular's practiced ease and economy of effort. About this time too, if he is unlucky, the trainee may begin to feel physically sick from the unexpected movement of the bus (regulars know the motion of the bus to the extent of matching their moves to the anticipated changing of gears by the driver).

Over all this, he will be involved in the baffling process of matching the information printed by his ticket machine to the passengers' needs. Quite apart from the generally occurring idiocies of "down the road", he will get requests for "The Star", or "the shops", places he has not heard of at all. Simultaneously the regular will be calling out the fare stages, which will seem to flash by

with bewildering rapidity, while the involvement with the mechanics of issuing tickets and change will prevent the identification of these points with any geographical feature.

In short, the whole process is physically and mentally traumatically exhausting.

The next "culture shock" occurs on the trainee's being introduced to what will be his fellow workmates in the break. Because of the (comparatively unusual in industrial organisations) large amounts of time "not working" that bus crews have, the interaction that takes place among "shop floor" employees is not determined solely by facilities and opportunity offered by machine disposition. In some ways the interaction may be said to compensate for the rather isolated normal working environment, for much of the talk revolves round bus experiences and personnel. This reworking of experiences, though seemingly a necessary part of bus work, necessarily excludes the trainee. But it does offer him insights into the actual operation of the job, and since much of the talk is about the iniquities of management with regard to inadequate running times, disgraceful old buses, injustices of shift allocation, eccentricities of passengers, critical comments on the personal and job characteristics of other crews, it offers an interesting and new perception on what the management has been intent on inculcating.

My own reaction has always been one of timidity. I have always walked into a crowded canteen with only the titular protection/introduction of the regular and his driver, to be confronted usually by a boisterous bedlam, a confusion

of groups and cross-talk: couples seriously talking, card games, tables occupied by a set of elderly conductresses interminably knitting fingerless gloves, the crash of cutlery, and the shouts of some ribald interaction between a conductress and a couple of younger crews. It is not a world that seems easy to participate in. I remember on one "first" occasion walking into a muster room where determined efforts were being made to strip one of the conductresses. It was an exceedingly funny interchange, though I was informed later that it was considered "a wee bit rough".

But it has its rules of conduct, and while the trainee is looked at inquisitively, he is left very much to the administration of the regular crew he is with, who will often point out various people as being of interest, or comment on the scene and job in general. There is no "hazing" per se, though practical jokes are often played: having a joke played on one may be a sign of acceptance. Anthropologically the "hazing" that marks the initiation to the job really takes place the first time the conductor manages a bus for himself, on his first shift after training, which is trauma enough to constitute an initiation by itself.

The first trip is invariably traumatic in that the conductor's normal tasks involve a facility with knowledge of fares, routes, passengers, and mechanical co-ordination which can only be acquired with experience. But there is only one way to get that experience!

In practice the new conductor will painfully learn that his real primary requirements in the job are not

connected with "efficiency, courtesy and timeliness", but with first keeping the bus moving with the least delay, second keeping his money right, third anything and everything else.

Problems start with finding the shift you're on, where the bus is likely to be, where and when the duty takes up, and who the driver is. If the shift involves a short route, then there is some hope of learning some of the fares, and through repetition the fare stages will begin to emerge as recognizable entities. I was not so lucky on my own first shift. The first section to a town some twelve miles away was not so bad, because it was through quiet countryside, and I could recognise some of the fare stages referred to. But the next section was to the nearest city - a distance of forty miles and over 80 fare stages, as I discovered when I eventually found the route in the massive fares book, spilling over several pages. The sectionalisation of fares over several pages, does of course make it more time consuming to look up fares. Fare stages over that length of route are horrific - a horror confounded by darkness and total unfamiliarity with the route, or the number of passengers who might be expected to go from one place to another.

The difficulty of finding where you are is confounded by passengers requesting unrecognisable intermediate stops which if pressed, they will identify by further unidentified other local features.

Even when the fare is clearly elicited, the conductor still has to contend with setting the machine, giving change

correctly, gauging the change requirements to be made to avoid carrying too much heavy small-change, keeping his balance, looking to the platform to see if anyone wants to get off (experienced conductors can judge when a stop is approaching and can cut down how often they have to look at the platform and when is the best point to signal the driver), remember to signal the bus off from a stop, not to signal when the bus has only stopped at a traffic light, remember to change the fare stage, learn that they have to reset the fare to make sure that the fare is single and not return, keep the money proffered by the passenger in the hand till the passenger has checked his change to make sure he cannot claim that, say, he handed over a half-crown but only had change from 2s.: learn, concomitantly that his change-giving is viewed with deep suspicion, that "shorts" are used as accusation of swindling, while "overs" are viewed as unexpected bonuses for the passenger (I never had anyone point out excess change though I frequently gave it away). The result is a slowly emerging control over the disparate and competing demands.

The primacy of keeping the bus moving with as little delay as possible, implying the stopping by the conductor of giving change or tearing off a ticket if necessary, will probably be imparted to the new conductor by the driver, as well as other advice on how to do the job. (Tips such as, if the passenger says he can't remember the fare, to say - "That's 1/7 isn't it," at which the passenger will suddenly recollect and say, "It was only 1/3 last time". You now know what the fare is!)

The importance of keeping the money right will emerge at the end of the shift, where the conductor makes up his totals on the waybill. New conductors invariably end up "short", a situation further complicated by the arithmetical problems posed at the end of a tiring day.

The transition from ordinary member of the public to fully-fledged conductor fits anthropological models of transition social processes very well.

The parallel is to see the instruction period as leading up to initiation into the group through the traumatic rite of passage of the first lone journey and through this into the group knowledge and perception of primary aims, danger runs, dishonest passengers and practices, how to deal with inspectors, what rules have to be broken and how to do it and the more diffuse social life that goes with being a member of the group.

Through this acceptance into the work group, solidarity is built up, common situations recognised and the formation of common attitudes to the job begun.

It is of importance to appreciate that there is a personal interaction and involvement of the individual with the work experience: the experience gained in conducting is a significant social one, and not something that can be compartmentalised as of no personal significance because it is merely "work". New attitudes to oneself and one's perceptions of society, as well as adoption of a new common "crew perception". Indeed, in a sense the "crews' perception"

provides a guide to conduct in a diverse and inconsistent environment. The degree of change does of course vary according to the previous social, personal and work experience of the individual: the experience will not be the same for the eighteen year old as for the 45 year old. One effect of this is to make for differences in style and performance of the work. Even at the level of churning out tickets there will be differences in style, but personality will also have a part to play, particularly in the more diffuse activities. E.G. conductors may see it as being in their own interest to be "civil and courteous", but these are subject to personal definition, especially given the isolated conditions of work. Thus, while there is no one common attitude to or perception of, work, so there is no one uniform style of performance (as might be found in mass production). This freedom for individual expression is welcomed by crews, and has its parallel in the variety of situations that occur for crews, which variety is held to be one of the main attractions of the job. Each new situation can be construed as requiring probably personal and individual reactions, and perhaps also the application of a learned group response.

The above notwithstanding, there are common response patterns just as there are common experiences.

These experiences are of course encountered over a period of time, and thus responses vary according to the experience of the conductor, both in his own personal experience, and in his experience of the common formulation and discussed reworking of group experiences in similar situations.

Typical common experiences encountered would generally include (and if the order is a little random, so also is the experience) - the discovery that there is really no requirement to work flat out to collect every fare, that it is in the conductor's own immediate interest to make the effort to control the number of passengers allowed on board, the confrontation with the demands of anonymous masses of passengers, the stink of a bus full of wet women, the virtually impenetrable smoky atmosphere on the top deck on early morning workers' buses, the clash of other people's expectations of bus behavioural standards with the conductor's own, the crushing weight of equipment and cash at the end of the day and the aching feet and legs, the comments from passengers on the ineptitude of "new starts" the shock that a split shift extends work over twelve hours (exclusive of travelling time), working out how to co-operate with different drivers, finding out about conventions such as the conductor always paying for the cups of tea, that a driver can "carry" or "hammer" a conductor; that other crews can help or hinder, that standards of honesty among both crews and passengers vary: that disciplinary proceedings are not concerned with justice and understanding of the conditions and circumstances: that the workmates both share and dispute values: that children can be uncontrollable, that a quite startling number of things can be found by an inspector to be wrong: the benefits of managing to break down; the resentment and abuse of the public for failures of the system outwith the conductor's control: that some of the crews find

the job tough and others seem to take it in their stride; that some drivers drive as if there was someone on their back-end, and others with no such consideration, the variety of places visited - unknown country roads, docks, housing estates, industrial streets: that uniform wearing imparts a fraternity with others, and establishes status: that there is dust from the road, oil from go-carts, green irradicable stains from money, fumes from the engine, scuffed and stood-on shoes, carbon from tickets to be contended with (and this in a "clean job"!): that the crews themselves differ in what makes for value and disvalue in the job, and that there are different and ambiguous standards of work performance; that the stomach can cope, though reluctantly, with a rapidly changing meal time and the inevitable beans and chips of the canteen; that some kind of restricted social life is possible, though some of that will best be spent with co-workers; that pressure of work varies both during the day and from shift to shift; that it is virtually impossible to work out how you are paid, though a check can and should always be kept on the number of hours worked; that Friday and Saturday nights in particular expose you to potential violence; but that nonetheless the public are involved in the job, just as the conductor is involved in the public.

As can be seen the process of job socialisation is a varied, disparate, in a sense unco-ordinated one, dependent on accumulated experiences and adaptation. In the remaining sections I attempt to analyse the basic processes involved.

In this endeavour I can only mention the likely effects

on the individual in terms of the disruption to sleep patterns, activity levels and bodily functions of the work: such effects exist, but by their nature, are not amenable to sociological research as formulated in this work. Thus I will try to confine myself to observable common experience: those observed by me, and reported by other crews as being involved in the task of conducting.

As can be seen from the preceeding section on job socialisation, the task of the conductor involves a variety of elements. But this should not cloud noting the basic function as being collecting fares: that is what he is employed to do, and that is what he spends much of his time doing (though in contrast to many other types of worker, by no means is he engaged in this all the time he is "working").

As in many jobs involving manual performance, the adoption of a rhythm of working helps. Much of the skill of the "good" conductor involves the achievement of a high degree of rythm. This involves precise accuracy and speed in changing the information that is printed on the ticket, quick selection of the most appropriate form of change (remembering that the conductor will also be gauging what change to try to disburse in terms of weight versus future requirements). Much of the skill of the experienced conductor depends on his speed at co-ordinating these functions. There is also a recollection of the fares and stages involved, since looking up this information is very time consuming: note also that this is somewhat of a taxing requirement that requires experience to acquire fully. These

movements must be fitted with the requirements to keep the bus moving as fast as possible, which requires precise timing of when to look up, when to break off one function in order to do another, to optimise the rate of doing both, (e.g. when to disrupt change-giving because that is also the optimum moment to ring the starting bell: when to change balance according to the motion of the bus to save the more tiring less co-ordinated moves - involving sensitivity to gear changing, or taking advantage of the bus going round a corner to get an impetus to climbing the stairs).

There is accordingly, a conflict between the rhythm of fares and change, and the requirement to keep the bus moving with no delay. To do one necessarily involves disruption of the other (quite apart from other disruptions such as requests for information). This assumes, of course, that the conductor is also using his skill in presenting himself so that passengers have their fare ready for him to collect.

The contradiction occurs because of what might be called the Time/Turnover dynamic. Recollect that as the bus moves along, the work load of the conductor is constantly changing. Depending on rate of the turnover and number of the passengers his work will require greater or lesser co-ordination and attention. There are many periods - such as evenings-when the conductor has little to do but admire the passing scene. But the essence of the problem discussed here is when the passenger numbers and turnover increase to a full bus load. Even here, it is the rate of turnover that is the critical factor. A full bus, with plenty of time to collect fares,

usually in conjunction with the majority of passengers having the same destination poses few problems, and is often welcomed by conductors. Turnover is the factor that presents most difficulty for the conductor, particularly high turnover with high density of passengers.

This problem in rhythm is solved most successfully by, paradoxically, Glasgow conductors who encounter such conditions most frequently. Here there is the adoption of a group norm, strongly supported, that the conductor works at a steady pace, which bears no relation to the number of passengers on board. Although the conductor by this practice misses many fares, he is able to achieve a very high rate of working due to the simple machines and standard fares, in contrast to S.B.G. routes, say.

But consider a busy S.B.G. journey. Even assuming the conductor has a high level of skill in the manual dexterity and mental gymnastics involved, he will still have his workspace disrupted by having to break off to control passenger boarding, while the relatively slow machines and diversity of destinations makes it more difficult to maintain machine and mental rhythm.

This circumstance introduces direct exploitation into the performance of the task, in that there is a conflict between management's aims of maximising money taken in, and the means whereby that aim is to be achieved. The conductor

cannot control the bus and maximise fare collection without disrupting one or other. It is significant that in the S.B.G. I encountered both an insistence by inspectors that every fare be taken when they boarded, and the lack of a group norm to justify working at a steady pace. Accordingly, S.B.G. conductors can be subjected to a very fast and disjointed pace of work. The pressure to work flat out, collecting every fare is very strong. But speed of work means mistakes - tickets wrongly printed, the wrong fare charged (because it is quicker to guess than to look it up), and most importantly, the wrong change given, resulting in shorts. It has to be pointed out that such circumstances are likely to occur once or twice in a shift, unlike the city situation where high passenger numbers and turnovers are the prevailing situation. But nonetheless, the conductor's control can be tenuous and often only maintained at considerable frustration and physical cost.

A further ambiguity can, I think, be derived from the conflict just discussed, and that is an ambiguity - a disparity of values - about the performance of the work.

The basic conflict between the crews' need to keep the bus from being late, and management's desire to get in every fare, is of course, very often resolved in the crews' favour, especially given the lack of supervision. Thus often the conductor is able to work at least at a pace which allows him to minimise his mistakes over his money (very important to him) and maximise his co-operation with the driver. This requires, of course, that the conductor gives the impression

that the crowd has only just boarded if an inspector gets on. Yet the surprising thing is just how effective and hard working conductors can be: many, through experience and expertise, can work at a quite astonishing pace. Many, despite the temptations, desist from "pochling", the subject I consider next.

Pochling is the common term in Scotland for a conductor handing in takings below what he has actually received, the difference staying in his pocket (pochle in Lallans). It is a very widespread, though by no means uniform custom, with a long tradition behind it. In fact Shillibeer had to dismiss his first two regular conductors for just this practice. Despite this salutary action, the practice accompanied the development of bus systems. In the early expansion virtually no company issued tickets and there was accordingly no accurate accounting system for numbers of passengers and fares paid. The volatile, easy entry market and supply of omnibuses and the preponderance of "pirates" encouraged this trend, it apparently being the custom for owners to expect a certain amount to be paid in rather than introduce additional expensive and elaborate checking procedures.

It was of course low profits and increasing general tendencies in accountancy which led to the calamitous introduction of a ticket system. The 1891 strike in London (cf. Chapter One) is an excellent example of how

accounting and other forms of revenue and cost control can attack the living standards of the working class, and the bitterness of the struggle against ticket introduction - after all, what L.G.O.C. was proposing was a cut in wages from c. £4 (with pochle) to £2 10s (with tickets).¹ In the event pochling did not disappear, and I now examine some (I do not know all the tricks myself) of the ways in which pochle is maintained, and thus control over part of the labour process retained.

The consideration of pochling will be treated under the two headings of How pochling is possible and what its Significance is within the organisation.²

How

The techniques of pochling involve two main categories:

- (a) techniques performed on passengers, and
- (b) techniques performed with passengers.

(a) Pochling by acting on the passengers can be accomplished in several ways. The simplest is simply to short-change, which has the merit of being outwith the ticket system and

therefore the organization's supervisory procedures. It does of course run the risk of provoking an altercation with passengers. Accordingly the conductor who wishes to pursue this activity needs to acquire over and above his normal discrimination about passengers, the ability to judge who is unlikely to notice the wrong-change, and who will also not make too much fuss about it if they do discover a "mistake". Common techniques when I was a conductor were to give change of 2s. when 2s6d had been offered, change of 10s instead of £1, confusing 6d with 1s and so on. The conductor's trick of keeping the money offered separate from the rest of the "bag money" until the passenger has accepted his change comes in useful if the passenger challenges his change.

The degree to which a conductor can carry off this practice is exemplified by a conductor of my acquaintance who was challenged by his driver to get the "tea money" on a journey on which the only passengers were three women who wanted 4d fares. The conductor triumphantly handed over 6d at the end of the journey.

The other practices involve the ticket system in some way. Again, the practice cannot be performed indiscriminately, since some people are more likely than others to either notice and/or complain. Possibly the easiest is to collect fares from passengers as they leave the bus, which has to be fairly busy of course, in order not to make it too obvious. This works simply on the basis that few passengers wait to collect a ticket. If they do, or if someone is watching, the conductor may print a ticket to satisfy them, but

it will show zero for the price, since the conductor can be virtually certain that no one will look closely at the ticket. Of course the successful pochler will always have some glib excuse ready should the ticket be questioned. This is a most successful practice since there are usually a number of occasions when the bus is busy enough for the conductor not to be able to complete all fare taking in a reasonable time. Of course, some active involvement of the conductor is necessary in that he has to be able to predict how many people are going to get off where, so that he can be on the platform during the rush to get off. Some of the passengers do of course take advantage of the rush and crowd on the platform to get off without paying.

The conductor can also manipulate the situation so as to maximise the possibility of this happening. For instance one conductor recounted to me that on a regular journey from a town centre to a suburb a 9d fare away, he used to tell the driver to go slowly, since the bus was packed and most people were going only the short distance of a 9d fare so that he could clear the top deck's fares (including the majority of longer distance fares). By the time he was downstairs, the lower deck passengers were crowding off, so he could just collect the proffered money, while ostensibly churning out tickets that were of course blank.

The advantage of this method is that it is virtually undetectable since it is an instantaneous transaction that cannot be observed by an inspector.

It is precisely the possibility of this situation

occurring that makes the arduous high capacity, high turn-over journeys so attractive to some conductors. (For instance the E.S. 16s from Glasgow to Edinburgh via the urban belt of Shettleston, Baillieston, Coatbridge, Airdrie, Plains, Caldercruix, Blackshiels, Armadale, Bathgate, Uphall, Broxburn and Newbridge, while posing arduous conditions in terms of the amount of people going short journeys was ideally suited to pochling both in terms of opportunity and amenability of the passengers. One informant told me he requested constant back shift on this route, which was avoided by others because of work load and the "rough" potential of the passengers, simply because he made £5 a trip from it (1970 prices).

A further point about pochling of this type is that it can happen unintentionally, since a mass of passengers who have not yet had their fares collected by a busy conductor, crowding on the platform, will press their fares (often, let it be said, less than they ought to have paid) to the conductor in such a way that the conductor is quite unable to work out how many of them should have paid what. Since "shorts" often occur, even the most honest of conductors is unlikely to try to account for the extra money there and then, though this option of making it up at the end of the day is always open to him. Even here, he may feel justified in holding the extra back because of acquired suspicion of the cashing-in system, that informs him at a later date that what he thought was the correct correspondence between cash and machine receipts was in fact "short". It will probably also

not take long for the fact to penetrate that "overs" are never returned to conductors. However, this is getting rather too close to the Why of pochling, and before dealing with this I want to deal with pochling performed with passengers.

(b) This practice is probably somewhat less common than the former, because of the greater risks of the more extended period in which passengers do not have tickets, but it tends to occur on the same kinds of routes as above, since the confused situation serves to disguise the conductor's activities and can serve to supplement pochling done under the former method.

The important point about this type of pochling is that it is possible through collusion of the passengers themselves. Indeed new conductors will probably find the practice being thrust upon them through the initiative of the passengers, and many only realise the possibilities of pochling through having it brought to their attention in this way. It should also be observed that the practice varies in different parts of the country. Some routes, indeed, cross over "pochling frontiers", and the opportunities will fluctuate accordingly. For instance the E.S. 16s already mentioned are a prolific pochling ground for most of the route, but say, the Western 14s from Ayr to Glasgow only encounter collusion from passengers when passing through Paisley. Paisley does in fact incorporate the notorious Ferguslie Park route which is alleged to be one of the busiest in Scotland but which runs

at a loss because of the extent of pochling.

There are two types of pochling of this type. The first is really an outright offer to the conductor. In this case the passenger may say "Never mind the ticket", or "Its no use gie'n it tae the Company, you may as well have it son". Or simply a silent pressing of the money into the conductor's hand, back of the hand uppermost (the signal!) or a wink accompanying the fare.

This latter signal, however, is more commonly associated with the second type, where the conductor "splits the difference", so that if the fare is 1 s.2d the conductor takes 7d. This applies even to the extent of change giving. In this case, if the passenger offered 2s. he would receive 1s 5d in return. Of course, no ticket is printed. It can easily be seen that some mental agility is required. A conductor on a regular route may have things so arranged that he simply goes round the bus collecting an agreed amount. A rare type of pochling is that of using a stolen machine which may be mentioned here. It occurs, but infrequently. And of course the conductor is also attending to his other duties, looking out for passengers who have underpaid, or who are trying to get away with not paying at all, and most importantly, looking out for an inspector. For this type of pochling exposes the conductor far more to being caught, simply because an inspector may get on anywhere at anytime (even using cars to get to unlikely spots), and the inspector is looking precisely for what are euphemistically called "missed fares".

To guard against this happening, the conductor may only accept offers of collusion in circumstances he judges to be safe, e.g. when the bus is so busy that it is quite reasonable that he should not have collected every fare. Thus a conductor can simply say to an inspector who has unexpectedly boarded, that "There are a few on top I haven't got yet". In this he knows he will have the co-operation of his passengers, who will blandly state that they just got on at the last stop. The conductor in this case will simply issue tickets to the people he is pochling with, but will charge them from the new, present, point to wherever they are going, and will also return extra change to compensate them.

Of course, the conductor relies on his own observation of the road ahead (and behind to see if one of the Company cars is following), and on the passengers letting him know, and his knowledge of where an inspector is likely to be, and importantly on his driver. Often the driver gets the first sight of an inspector, and will let his conductor know by braking suddenly, revving the engine, or flicking the interior lights. Of course, on most routes he will have received the signal for "An Inspector about" from buses coming the other way, and can thus warn his conductor in good time.

An explanation has to be added that the conductor, who may well insist on issuing tickets if he either judges it unsafe in the circumstances, or if he finds pochling a dishonest practice which he seeks to avoid, may nonetheless find

himself having to collude unwillingly with passengers. As is explained in the section on The Public, the conductor can find himself in a potentially hostile situation. Thus he may be unwillingly forced to pochle, rather than arouse antipathy ("Who the fuck dae ye think you are? Every other cunt on this route does it", being a typical expostulation by the outraged passenger). Certainly the "honest" conductor can often find himself in the position of having to "force" passengers to take a ticket.

Quite apart from active encouragement from passengers, there is the circumstance of having the money literally slung round one's neck for the whole of the working day, while the situation lends itself to manipulation largely free from supervisory checks.

Organisationally, the situation is engendered where an honest hard working and competent conductor can still find himself "short" at the end of his shift. To be a hundred per cent accurate is very rare. But this "short" is rarely seen to be the "fault" of the conductor, but of the circumstances in which he works. There is then the common rationalisation that to make up known shorts by pochling is quite legitimate, especially when deductions are made to cover shorts, and regularly being short can lead to dismissal.³

Significance

A historical note is apposite here, particularly to show that pochling is not a new social phenomenon, and certainly is not solely due to a mid-twentieth century degeneration of morals. Moore (1902: p. 54) writes,

As time passed, the behaviour of the conductors got worse. This was chiefly due to the indifference of the omnibus proprietors. If the conductors paid in a certain amount daily, they were quite satisfied with them, and by no means thankful to passengers who complained of their misbehaviour. The omnibus proprietor of the period (1860s) was a much lower class of man than George Shillibeer. In most cases he himself had been a driver or conductor, and on becoming an employer, his chief anxiety was to prevent his men growing rich at his expense. Knowing from experience what an omnibus could earn in various seasons and weather, he took every precaution possible to guard against his men retaining as large a portion of the earnings as he himself had pocketed when a conductor. The men who paid daily the sum he demanded were the conductors he preferred, and these usually were the passenger-swindling, bullying specimens, and thoroughly deserved the name - "cads".

A more sociological approach might care to look at not the ego's moral decisions, but say, Sutherland's "White Collar Crime" (Sutherland 1940) or similar work, which treats "theft" in terms of how people perceive

gains from their work and the opportunities within it for accession of goods or cash not specified in their contract. Such "industrial crime" includes such things as inflation of expense accounts, falsification of work and time sheets (cf. lorry drivers in particular: and it may as well be mentioned here that most bus crews also over-claim for work whenever they can), the traditional appropriation of fittings in shipyards, the use of stationery and telephones for private purposes by office workers etc., etc.

It would be out of place to do more than comment here that pochling, especially in its more moderate form, where it is not viewed as the *raison d'être* of doing the job, clearly fits into this established industrial pattern.

There is probably another comparison to industrial practices which seek to get round the rate-fixing of management which makes the job difficult to fulfill. This would apply particularly to the rationalisation of conductors which justify pochling by reference to working conditions which lead inevitably to "shorts", which they would otherwise have to make up from their own pockets.

The fact that there are different attitudes among crews to pochling is itself of significance, since it reflects both the scope for individual choice in the job, and is symptomatic of more general differences in attitudes.

There are conductors who endorse the management's paternalistic and utopian ideas of "public service". This can however have unfortunate results, as in the example of the conductress in the Borders who was a model in every way except that she thought it a shame that people had to pay for what was obviously an essential utility, and thus collected few fares on her regular route.

But in the main, pochling can be seen as a subversion of management's ideas of how the service should be run and indeed the ultimate management goal of valorisation, particularly in the case where collusion takes place between passengers and conductor, for here the organisational process goes quite out of the control of management, and the normal structure for fulfilling the organisation's goals of making money fail to operate. The bus industry in this respect offers a rather unusual and complete example of subversion of management's aim by the workers it employs to garner those gains. The very exploitation of conductors leads to their taking over part of the labour process.

It is, as far as I know, unusual to find clients of a service and the purveyors of it in collusion to defy the organisation's structure and aims. I was aware of an undercurrent of "class solidarity" in this situation, of identification of passenger and conductor as having interests in common against "the owners" (not many people are aware that the S.B.G. is nationalised: perhaps it would have made no difference.) There is a hint even of a revolt against industrial capitalism:

it is interesting to note that this collusion hardly exists at all in municipally owned systems - even when the same people use both services!

In addition there is the perception by the travelling public of the process. In the collusion process, it is clear that the organisation is being treated not as a service provided which ought to be paid for, but as a means for expressive activity. The passenger is explicitly giving the due to someone he identifies with in opposition to management interests (N.B. miners in particular are insistent on pochling): this is direct contradiction of the entrepreneurial profit-making rationale responsible for the provision of the service in the first place. This expressive attitude stands in distinction to "split the difference" collusion.

This expressive aspect of pochling also brings out the significant factor that the conductor no longer acts on the passengers, but with them: a social relation is set up in contradistinction to the automaton-like "payment for service" that might otherwise pertain. The relationship moves from secondary to primary. There are of course other occasions where the relationship moves from secondary to primary, which have already been discussed. Again, I argue here that much of the enjoyment and meaning derived from the job is dependent on the establishing of such primary relationships between conductor and passengers.

Of course this particular form of primary relationship has the fraught conditions of being regarded as morally wrong in some quarters, and more immediately is liable to

lead to dismissal if discovered, with no blame attaching to the passenger of course. The conductor's control over this part of the labour process is rewarding but tenuous.

Social Relations and Control

Richman (1969) briefly discussed the "dyadic relation of the duo of driver and conductor". However he offers no explanation for the existence or incidence of his "seven basic types". His approach seems to be simply descriptive, with a tendency towards psychologism. Since I wish to pursue a sociologically based study, I will continue to concentrate on the relation between action and the conditions of work.

My own observations are primarily to emphasize the dependence on each other to accomplish their tasks, and the affective and expressive components inherent in the relationship.

Enough discussion of both driver's and conductor's respective tasks has been given for it to be easily understood that working together well is extremely important to the performance of each job.

The driver depends on the conductor to expedite the progress of the bus by giving his full attention to hurrying along passengers and giving prompt signals.

The conductor depends on the driver to provide a smooth ride to cushion the conductor from both physical shocks and damage and verbal assaults from passengers complaining about the driving. And of course, the driver should also give

early warning of an inspector.

The dyad is also an affective and expressive one as should be clear from Richman's account. This is an important source of meaning to both, and is one of the factors which places the crew as a team in the wider social grouping of a garage. A "regular" team is treated by other crews very much as a unit, so that the sins of one are foisted also on the other: this is an interesting outcome of an organisational factor.

I want now to change focus from a rather detailed descriptive account, to a more general and analytical account of the conductor's job within the interior of the bus. If it needed any justification such justification would surely be provided by the singular features of a bus interior, presenting as it does, a curious density of society with an accompanying turnover of that society. (The analogies are fascinating, but largely spurious: a bus is not a microcosm of urban industrial society.)

The analytical argument I shall be presenting, stated briefly, is that the conductor is involved in a secondary relationship with an important section of his task - the public - that this secondary relationship contains features that threaten the power and ability of the conductor to perform his task as a whole, that the conductor seeks to maintain his power to control these interactions by a set of legitimacy actions designed to maintain the dominance of the conductor's definition of the situation; and that these legitimacy actions are themselves designed to maintain the

secondary nature of the relationship as a protection for the conductor's actions.

That the activity as a whole is of a secondary nature requires little explication. Transport systems form part of the infrastructure of twentieth century urbanised society. Bus transport is the successor to the innovatory breakthrough into mass transportation of the tramway (cf. McKay 1977). Bus trips still far outweigh any other type of journey. The sheer mass of commuters ensures an anonymity. The degree of randomness in the match between particular passengers - particularly crews, results in an inability to set up personal, primary relationships. Even those who are "regulars" are swamped by and subsumed into the mass. The interaction of paying the fare is a fleeting one, taking a few seconds only.

By far the preponderant service/client interaction is the terse, seconds long interaction of statement of fare, proffering money, and receiving change and ticket, with the casual, anonymous "Thank you" (or not, as local custom dictates): comparative situations occur with booking clerks, and cinema box offices: but on a bus there is no physical barrier such as a grille or counter.

Its fleetingness of the fare interaction puts it even beyond the anonymity of the interaction between cabbie and fare described by Fred Davis (Davis, 1966).

Indeed, so fleeting and anonymous is the interchange, that the surprising feature is that any form of "social" interchange could be said to take place at all. (And of course much of this thesis is in a sense devoted to demonstrating just what social processes do go on in such unlikely circumstances.) But even in such circumstance common perceptions of appropriate action exist: and informal social control dimensions are brought into being, of which pochling is, of course, an example. There are identifiable ideas/perceptions of ways of behaving in buses which are commonly held and acted upon, which are related to "bus behaviour" as a distinct social activity.

Examples are the division between men and women on early morning buses, the separation of the classes, the spreading out of passengers to fill spare seats before sitting next to someone, the tendency for passengers to sit on the near side, the division between those who perceive the needs of the conductor and have money ready, and journey clearly formulated, and those who see the conductor as dependent upon them, not to mention the perceptions and action of the conductor that are under discussion here.

As Parsons points out, in service/client relationships there are generally inhibitors on too crass a rendering of the service (Parsons 1951). But the conductor has on the face of it a very limited service to perform: he acts merely as the recipient of the cash exchange between the mass commuter and the anonymous bus company for a service which is transitory in more than one sense of that word.

Hughes (1958) points to the "skill in performance" as an important part of the service/client relationship. Yet for bus conductors, the skill involved is directed at the ability of the conductor to do his job, and is not apparent to the client. (One only has to think of the common attitude that all a conductor has to do is turn the handle of his machine.)

This lack of perception of any skill leads to a "moral undervaluing" of the service by the client, and it is "moral reputation" that Goffmann sees as of importance in forming a service/client relationship within a generally secondary relationship (Goffmann 1956). As regards the bus conductor he performs a job with low "moral reputation": (refer to the initial chapter to see the low valuation of transport services per se; they are almost totally a means to an end, cf. also survey responses to conductors' own estimation of how the public see the job). The conductor also has a low status and esteem as explained below, and a low self-estimation as regards his function.

These features noted depend, to a great extent on the communication between service and client. But the communication involved in the typical interaction between passenger and conductor would appear to be minimal.

Davis does not regard his cab drivers as being able to sustain the necessary communication to maintain social control by creating social interaction, and it would appear that bus crews have even less chance of doing so.

(One of the contrasts Davis introduces is with Hughes' waitresses, who have a regular core of regulars, who give meaning to the job.)

Davis notes particularly the fleeting contact with an aggregate of individuals as being archetypical of big city relationships. This results in cab drivers being regarded as "non persons", involved in weak patron-client relationships in which the imposition of sanctions is difficult, and propriety, deference and "face" are difficult to maintain.

If fleetingness of interaction and anonymity are to be used as the criteria giving rise to such a situation as Davis describes, then it could reasonably be expected that conductors would suffer the same situation, only more so. (Note the degree to which bus drivers are not "seen" - an interesting and amusing example of the lack of perception of what the bus driver does is provided by the way that many passengers will look to see if the road is clear at difficult road junctions: they become observably upset if the driver does not act in accordance with the way they are "driving" the bus.)

Why conductors do not suffer the same situation is explained below. But perhaps a cautionary note should be made about Davis's argument. Davis overlooks the fact that even given these characteristics, there is typical "cab behaviour". That this is so is implied in Davis's categorisation of various "types", who can be expected to act in certain ways.

This important point - that people have perceptions

of what appear to be even the most barren secondary relations: that there are social patterns of appropriate behaviour: that they act in different ways with those secondary relations - provides the clue to the way that conductors respond to their perceptions of these different behaviours.

It is hoped that this very brief discussion of the secondary nature of the relationship between conductor and passengers serves at least as a foil to the earlier accounts of both the complexity of the conductor's job, and in particular the myriad social involvements he is engaged in.

The repertoire of generalised activities of control of the conductor meets a variety of people (which the conductor reduces to types - such as "pochling" type, "trouble" type, "middle-class" type, etc.): the result is potentially unpredictable. It should be apparent from the control section that the conductor attempts to control this unpredictability by a series of definitions of the situation, particularly if his control seems threatened, as in potentially violent situations.

But here I want to focus on those social processes involving the conductor which derive from the secondary nature of the relationship, which still pertain despite the complexity of the task; and despite the meaning with which the conductor invests the job.

I want now to look at the more general Power relation involved in the conductor's task, in particular those aspects of power which are a result of the secondary nature of the interaction.

Since virtually all of them have been discussed in other contexts, their treatment will be cursory.

The conductor may usefully be seen as the locus, and in some respects the mediator of a set of conflicts. It is in terms of his response to this situation that he seeks to maintain his power - the power to safeguard his own position, that is, for his position is constantly under threat of disruption.

Probably the most general conflict is that between the social phenomenon of the need for transport and the economic function of paying for it. As Hibbs points out, the two are not necessarily related (Hibbs 1975).

Transport creates distance, and the means of bridging the distance, but it is not an end in itself. This creates a basic structural antipathy between the supplier of the service and the client. The conductor is the personification of the service. The passengers' resentment of paying for a service whose only "product" is a negative one, one valued merely as an end, is not infrequently transferred to the conductor.

This connects with a second area of conflict, that between the expectations by the public of the service provided, and the actual service which results from management policy. There can exist a large discrepancy between the two. Unfortunately for the conductor, he is usually the only visible "member" of the organisation available to the public, and as such is put into the position of mediating between a technically deficient system and the "legitimate expectation" of the public about the service.

The third area of conflict, and the one with probably the most immediacy is between the idea of passengers as "clients" of the service, and the ordering of the tasks which are of primacy to the conductor. This is of course a frequently occurring phenomenon of service occupations, but the conflict is particularly overt in bus work. This is partly because of the overwhelming organisational imperative to make its working co-ordinated and rational. The relationship of clients' needs to the service provided is thus tenuous, and the clients tend not to be aware of the organisational requirements (unlike say restaurants or airlines, where the superordination of organisational requirements is easily seen and legitimated by the clients). A further point is the non-existence of a "backstage" not visible to the client. The conductor may try to create a type of backstage by keeping the platform clear for all but himself, but this backstage is both visible, and necessarily invaded by the clients.

These conflicts threaten the power of the conductor to order the bus to his own requirements. But these conflicts as is obvious, do not normally pertain in an observable state on bus services. And the reason why they are covert conflicts (for the most part, they can, and do, erupt from time to time) is because the conductor defines the situation more powerfully than the passenger, and in this, each individual conductor is of course aided by the common conductor's definition of the situation which has had its effect on the experience of the passenger. Each conductor can draw on all the previous

successful definitions of the situation that have cumulatively had their effect in shaping the public's idea of "appropriate bus behaviour".

The conductor has tasks to perform which require him to have a powerful definition of the situation. N.B., the conductor's performance is powerful - consider the imperious actions and commands that are largely successful. Consider that the conductor has to initiate action with the passengers in ordering them to move up, or hurry along, or not to go up stairs, or move their luggage, or arbitrate over ventilation, keep dogs off seats, stop radios being played, "bundles" being carried, order passengers off, prevent others getting on - etc. etc. - all these myriad activities are part of a consistent set of actions designed to fulfil the conductor's goals or interests, to make the conductor's pattern of work and movement within the interior of the bus the dominant one.

As an example, consider simply how fares are paid. Note that the conductor has a basic problem here in that buses are unique in that there is no obligation to pay on entry, and no strict procedure to ensure that the passenger pays a fare. Even the legal position is that the passenger need only pay on demand (unlike railway trains where it is an offence to occupy a seat without having first paid - cf. O. Kahn Freund, 1954). Thus the responsibility is devolved upon the conductor of noting and remembering who got on where (as well as what they ought to pay), a further difficulty being added by the ability of a passenger to sit

anywhere, which may not suit the conductor's sectional progressive collection of fares, and the high turnover and density of passengers involved.

Given this difficulty (and personally speaking it is a difficulty), there is an evident need for a definition of the situation inside a bus so that passengers pay voluntarily (and if anyone thinks that it is "natural" that people always pay, they should try the top deck of a Glasgow 46 on a Saturday night), without the conductor's having to approach them specifically. The conductor can of course encourage this definition by an acquired ability to remember who got on where, and publicly "remind" any non-volunteer that they have not yet paid.

The conductor is thus put into the position of trying to legitimate his performance, in order to maintain his power to order and define the situation in his own terms. Of course he is put into the position of legitimising his performance because it is open to challenge, challenges which have the sources in the conflicts mentioned above.

I propose to look briefly at how the conductor tries to legitimate his definition of the situation, and thus his power to order his working life.

As might be expected, one of the conductor's chief aids is that through spending eight hours a day in the environment, he is more familiar with possible eventualities and can thus evolve standard replies to a great many situations which the passenger will be seeking to define usually with much less familiarity. He is also aware of the legal

backing given to his power; but aware also of the limitation of that power. Conductors can rarely rely on law enforcement in order to carry out their tasks, and for this reason their performance is rarely legitimised in this way. More immediately efficacious legitimators are used. Though of course they can frequently use the rules as a threat and legitimation of their action with great success: the insistence on rule-conformity is thus a prop in the conductor's definition of the situation, which only fails with those who scorn such legislation.

In terms of control of movement the conductor can exercise a number of sanctions, like ensuring that passengers get up in good time by not ringing the bell for the stop that the passengers want. Rather similar to drivers' ensuring that people at bus stops signal the bus in good time by simply running past unless they do so. It might be added with regard to such sanctions that they are of a typical secondary relations type, since the conductor is enforcing on an individual's action the generalised interference in the rhythm of the conductor's work: the effect of such a sanction on the individual passenger may be salutary, but it cannot be generalized to the mass of the public. (But the resentment in the individual passenger may well be vented on some other conductor.)

Much of the conductor's control over movement as over other interference with his job is directed to establishing a "presence", a persona of control which goes largely unquestioned. This presence is reinforced by the uniform

worn, constituting a kind of badge of officialdom as well as identity with a massive organisation. It is established by the conductor being the one person on the bus who manifests a different interest and role from the seventy odd others, established by the whole complex of actions, interaction, identification with the movement of the vehicle, loudness and tone of voice, and general partaker of the evolved notion and perception of the role of "conductor".

But although the presence so constituted may be a consistent and recognised one, that does not mean to say that it is entirely legitimated. There are constant challenges to it through conflict with the passengers' interests. The conductor does not achieve total control over his job even when his role is legitimated. It can only be legitimated in the general sense of a social role. It is open to challenge from any individual. People still challenge the conductor's role in refusing to pay fares, fare avoidance, jumping on and off at intermediate points, being slow to offer payment, ambiguous about stating destinations or other requirements, ignoring him, short-changing him, in short, quite often the passengers "win". Importantly also, the conductor's job is an open one: it is open to criticism and abuse from the public, and there is no backstage to retire to.

It is with regard to this latter that the conductor maintains legitimacy by adopting a joking relationship, a facility with repartee that serves to nullify the effect of the criticism, and thus diminishes the effect of what the

conductor sees as interference with his job. As outlined in "The Public", this joking relation is also used as a control device.

An example of the use of the nullifying use of repartee appears in the situation, and it is typical of the running derogatory commentary to which conductors are subjected, where the conductor refuses to allow a pensioner's fare concession some minutes before the concession period begins. He can get a passenger lean forward and say "I hope when you're an O.A.P., someone will do that to you!" Now the conductor has some option about what to do with regard to this interference with his work. His first option is to lose his temper which depends perhaps on what sort of day he has had till then, and depending on what sort of passenger he estimates he is dealing with, and tell them to "Fuck off and get off the fuckin' bus an' a'", and eject the passenger from the vehicle. This will probably have repercussions in complaints being made, though the conductor may well have taken the probability into account. The conductor may, however, choose to explain that if an inspector boards and finds he has issued a concession fare before the time, he will be suspended for a day, and that anyway the O.A.P. in question knows the situation perfectly well and is just "trying it on". This has the disadvantage of forcing the conductor to justify his action, in a way which may lead to further argument, and certainly distracts him from his other tasks. The third option is for the conductor to reply in repartee form, "Aye well, it'll be this job that makes me old before my

time", or some such similar phrase which quickly and effectively nullifies the passenger's interference by changing the context of the remark.

This repartee-making interaction with passengers into a nullifying joking relation - is typical of conductors, so much so that it is almost a culturally held expectation of the job.

The joking relationship, like all joking relationships is used to ward off a potential threat. It has the characteristic of appearing to be a primary relation, but serves the function of placing the relation onto a secondary level, and in the process, nullifying the threat by changing the context and content of the relation.

I hope I have demonstrated in this section that the conductor's performance of his job has reference to potential threats arising from the secondary relations inherent in the context in which his task takes place: that the conductor seeks to exercise power to maintain the dominance of his definition of the situation, and that this legitimation of his performance uses, among others, techniques that re-establish a secondary relation of a different nature - one which maintains the conductor's definition. The threats to the conductor are given further treatment in discussing "The Public".

Notes: Chapter Eight

¹ Information of wages and hours from McKay: "Tramways and Trolleys", 1976, p. 229. Of course the 16 hours a day involved perhaps only 12 or 13 hours effective work on service.

² In treating pochling, there is an obvious comparison with Ditton's examination of fiddling bread salesmen. I do not wish to engage in theoretical polemics here, so I will merely remark that I am not concerned, as Ditton is, with occupational socialisation and its typical concerns with "moral careers" etc.: on a pragmatic level, I must confess that I never saw any conductors in a "tense stage of identity-crisis" regarding pochling, nor were they visibly in a state of "existential limbo" (Ditton n.d.: 28). However, the organisational constraint is comparable, in that conductors are accountable for every penny, and their wages are stopped to make up any "shorts". Unlike Ditton's situation, management does not condone pochling, with regard to "defrauding" passengers or the concern.

³ The process of "becoming" a fiddler has been analysed fully by Ditton (op. cit.); a comparison could no doubt be made, but this would require a change of focus onto individual socialisation processes, incompatible with labour process analysis.

CHAPTER NINE: Public

It would be wrong to characterise the whole of the relations between bus crews and public as wholly anti-pathetical: there is a range from murder to "having it off" with a passenger on the back seat.

I will attempt to analyse this range of relationships by discussing the ways in which the Public impinges, or is seen to impinge, on the tasks of the crews. I will argue further that the relationship between crews and public is mainly of a secondary nature rather than primary and in dealing with this facet, will discuss the sub-topics of "The Bus as Street", "Control" and "Violence".

Again, the theme overall will be the reaction of crews to their situation, and the creative nature of their response.

Impinging by Public on Task

Were it the sole function of bus transport to get passengers to their destination, then possibly passengers would not impinge to the extent that they do. But the crucial factor is that the crews are instructed to fulfil this function within a certain time. As has, I think, been established, bus crews respond to the constraints of their situation, in part by adopting a rhythm of working to minimise delays in reaching the destination, and also to reduce the effort involved, a rhythm in the driver's case related to maximising the control over the machine (as well as a number of delay-avoiding procedures).

But bus crews are rarely in the position of achieving that "blanked off", automaton rhythm of the factoryworker:

there are too many factors that have to be responded to and one of the most important of these factors is the public. Simply put, passengers interrupt the pace and rhythm of working of the crews. This occurs even at the simplest level. For example, a passenger standing up late means that the conductor has to ring the bell later than normal, causing the driver to disrupt the rhythm that was going to take him past the approaching stop, and implement the stressful stopping procedures at a faster pace than the one he would normally use. In the conductor's case, he can normally expect that a group of people getting on at a stop will want the same fare - but he will get the occasional "odd" fare that will change his speed of working. There is, for the conductor, a rhythm about giving change. The proffering of say, a £1 note, which needs to be stowed separately from the rest of the cash, disrupts the flow of ticket-and-change giving.

There are, of course, occasions where the interests of the crews and passengers coincide. A good example is the early morning bus of workers who regularly get the bus, for which they make sure they are always on time, which they board as fast as possible to get in out of the cold and up

onto the top deck to have a "Woody", and who generally have the right money to aid the conductor at the start of his shift. It is ironic that this commendable complementarity of interests should take place at the time of day when other traffic is causing few delays to the driver's efforts.

This kind of cooperation raises its opposite, for it shows some understanding by passengers of the difficulties of the crew (and of course it is significant that early morning workers do not want to be late, since they usually directly lose money thereby). The opposite is an unwillingness to recognise the problems (and even existence - see under

secondary relation below) of the crews. This goes beyond the expected incomplete perception and partial understanding of the system which might reasonably be expected. There is as it were, an area of cultural interaction involved. This will be examined more fully below, but will be treated here because it underlies some of the disruption of the crews' way of working in that certain "cultural types" have a greater disruptive potential than others. For instance the conductor will find more difficulty with those of a different cultural background. He may find himself having to placate a middle class passenger whom he has asked to "shove up the bus there", where a working class passenger would raise no exception. He may find that asking some people to hurry only slows them up: the good conductor has to judge what is the most effective means of communication, as well as first determining what sort of person the passenger is - a high level of social discrimination. Different attitudes, and

indeed rhythm of working may have to be adopted in different areas and times of day. The early morning pace is unsuited to the requirements of elderly passengers at mid-morning: young folk going into town can tolerate rapid deceleration whereas older passengers will tend to sit tight till the bus stops if they find the pace discomforting. Of course, loads are rarely so homogeneous, so the expectation, or more accurately, perhaps, the desired behaviour patterns which the crews hold for passengers are subject to constant changes in pace and character.

In terms of the individual passenger, the crews are subject to just such unpredictability as mentioned above, and some examples are given later in terms of disruptive effect for driver and conductor respectively.

In terms of "passengers en masse", mention has already been made in "Route" characteristics of the effect of passengers. I will mention some again, in summary form.

A full bus goes slower, and requires a different driving approach, for instance the driver has to be ready to correct a swing outward on bends that is not present with a "light" bus. The driver has to adopt different perceptions about minimum braking distances, acceleration times, etc. And indeed the various loadings encountered during the day all have different characteristics that must be responded to. This is a source of variety of task for the driver, but a full bus is no one's idea of fun to drive. As discussed before, this has to be seen against the time constraint, for the fuller the bus, the more effort, both physical and percep-

tional, has to be made by the driver to keep up to time. There is certainly a rhythm to be used for driving a full bus, but it is a more exhausting one, and one which induces an even greater sense of "fighting the clock". Since the driver is trying to gain every possible second, he sees the interests of the passenger as subordinate to his own: the passenger running for the bus is ignored because of the small margin of time that the driver is working in: the driver does not, cannot, concern himself with the consideration of the individual passenger.

The effect of being late, in terms of progressive lateness has already been discussed: I merely mention its crucial significance - its relation to loading factors - a facet of the reified "mass passenger".

In a sense, even the areas run through on a particular route are relevant here, in that crew have "desired" expectations of an ideal route with just enough passengers to make the job interesting. Indeed, they may know that this route or this shift on the route is a very heavy one in workload and they are going to have to adopt a work pattern harder than the one they would like (and note that crews do not generally like "dead quiet" conditions, complaining of boredom when they encounter them - particularly conductors: driving is more valued by some just because of its constant interest and demands.)

For the conductor, passengers en masse also raise problems of impingement. The most noticeable is physical proximity. The conditions of modern mass urban transit require

the close packing together of individuals in a proximity they would rarely otherwise tolerate. The conductor has to worm his way through the density of folk crushing and being crushed, his movements constricted (try giving change without moving your elbows!). His speed of work goes up as he tries to go round everyone in time, the job of remembering who got on where becomes almost impossible, he is constantly being disrupted in his taking fares by having to watch the platform, ringing the bell when necessary, and even having to hurry from the middle of taking a fare on the top deck, squeeze past the passengers waiting to alight, so as to be able to restrict the numbers of those wishing to board, bell the bus away, and then get upstairs again to finish taking the fare - and stops may be only 200 yards apart, requiring repetition of this disruption - an exhausting process.

A look over the conductor's task as outlined in the section on the conductor will readily make clear the literal impinging of passengers on the conductor. In addition, sheer numbers increase the likelihood of his being "short", increase the weight of cash he has to carry, increase the number of mistakes to be made, and decrease the time he has for such activities. Over all this, he has the knowledge that the Company officially requires him to account for every passenger and every penny recorded.

Some projection of the conductor's feelings about the pressure of work, might, I think, reasonably be expected to be thrown on to passengers.

I look below at some of the likely disruptions of the

conductor's work.

The potential for disruption varies directly according to the Time given for the journey and the number of passengers carried. Obviously, on generously timed country routes, the disruptive effect of passengers is diminished, while at the same time the "service" aspects are enhanced. On city journeys, however, the situation pertaining is generally one of lack of time and high loading factors, and I will concentrate on this situation.

Much of the material on the "Conductor" is relevant here and should be read with that fuller description in mind, for I only re-cap and stress some points here relevant to disruption of the conductor's task, which has been shown to involve more than "ca'in' the handle".

The handling of the complexities of the job is exacerbated by the Time and Load factors, which themselves interact, in that sheer numbers of passengers have the effect of slowing down the bus by lengthening boarding times.

The conductor on any bus has (or should have) the prime consideration of keeping the bus moving. A large number of passengers make this task more difficult, as well as making the conductor's other tasks also more difficult. This is because the conductor must disrupt his tasks to control the loading of the bus, and to do so must push past a dense mass of close packed humanity (and 83 people in a space 11 ft. x 8 ft. x 25 ft is close-packed!). He has to control boarding for if a bus is full it implies that there are more people waiting to get on - more, probably, than the bus can hold. But

passengers will be intent on boarding, without regard to the capacity of the vehicle, while it is the conductor's duty to prevent overloading, for his own comfort and freedom to move, if nothing else (and if it is thought that "the public" will not try to board a fully laden bus, I recall that I once had over 100 people on a bus with a seating capacity of 75, because I got trapped on the top deck by an influx, and was unable to return to the platform. I was also stuck on the top deck until they all got off some stops later). Thus platform control involves physical contact and the use of personal authority to deny an evident and (literally) pressing social need. Remember that the conductor also has more fares to collect at such a time, and the disruption effect of sheer numbers is apparent. Note also that moving about a bus in motion is in itself very tiring (and I mean exhausting).

Perhaps an example of the extreme case may illustrate by contrast. In Glasgow, with front-loading buses, the driver controls the numbers entering, (though with help from the conductor if passengers seem reluctant to give up their attempt to board). This leaves the conductor free to move through the bus, which he does at a constant pace, irrespective of how many people there are, or how fast the turnover, simply because, no matter how hard he works, he could never hope to clear all the fares. Thus paradoxically the conductors subject to the heaviest loads have the greater opportunity to adopt a constant rhythm of working (this is only the case with front-loading buses - rear-loading buses

greatly increase the conductor's task.)

In short, the quite complex function of the conductor - information to passengers, defence of the way the driver is driving, sympathy with the iniquities of the service provided, change giving, fare recalling, social banter with regulars, knowledge of precisely where the bus is, fare-stage noting, observation for inspectors, the odd bit of pochling if that way inclined, (and the further complexities that adds) - are all exacerbated by heavy loading, and all have less time to be dealt with in if the bus is to be kept to time.

This would seem to be a heavy workload (and my own observation and experience confirm that it is perceived and reacted to as such): the end result is a stressful, physically demanding job: it is not surprising that these reactions, stemming in a way from overwork, influence the way that the crews perceive the public, a fuller exposition of which follows.

But before doing so, some slight mention must be made of the impinging of the public on the driver.

I need hardly reiterate the driver's concern with rhythm and control. Passengers disrupt that rhythm. The driver is dependent on the passengers to expedite his progress but there is little he can do to hurry along the painstaking movements of the elderly, he cannot

force the chap who hangs on the back posed in the running off position, who nonetheless hangs on till the bus is fully stopped. The driver may try to judge when he can move off, but he can never be sure. His perception of the actions of passengers always remains problematical and uncertain (he also has this difficulty with other traffic). He has to judge whether someone wants the bus by their demeanour and stance, since the odds are that they will signal (if at all) too late to avoid the driver running past the stop with all the time wasting involved, and the placating of angry passengers by a hassled conductor. He has to contend with the latent hostility and suspicion of the public (who has not just missed a bus, when they knew the driver saw them: who has not looked at a full bus ignoring a signal and knowing that there was surely room on board for one more?). He has to contend with the resentment of the public at having buses arrive in convoy.

From the driver's point of view passengers do not seem to realise that once a bus is committed in terms of traffic, the expectation of other road users means that it has to complete the commitment - a passenger who tries to board poses an emergency situation to the driver.

There is the conflict of interest between the passenger's social interaction at the bus stop and his giving a signal (rarely does a driver see a clear and unambiguous signal), and his leisurely boarding, and the driver's knowledge of his fight against the clock.

In sum, the crews are working under a set of constraints that in general are not perceived by the public. This results in a conflict of expectations of each other about what should be appropriate actions on the part of both public and crews.

This conflict is worked out within the general category of secondary relations.

Secondary Relations

A warning comment must be made here, I did not, for obvious reasons, carry out an investigation of how "The Public" perceives buses and bus crews. My comments must therefore, be necessarily brief, general, and probably biased in favour of the crews - my perceptions of the relation almost inevitably being coloured by my own experiences. However, there are some general points which seem to have validity and

also are useful in explaining how the crews react to the public.

The general point is that the relationship between crews and public is largely a Secondary one, with some of the various attendant processes associated with such secondary relationships. As important developments of this Secondary relationship I introduce as an explanatory heuristic concept the treating of the "bus as street", and relate this to Control-seeking measures by the crews and the influence of the perception and incidence of Violence.

Of course, in dealing with "the Public" in this way, I am necessarily doing what the crews do, reifying a diversity of people into a social object, and picking only on some of the salient features, though again, I am constructing an ideal type from my own and others' experiences.

The public's relation to the bus transport system has already been touched on in the opening chapter. Apart from the inadequacies of the service provided, with the consequent transfer of the resentment of the passengers onto the nearest available representatives of the Company - the crew - there is the peculiar ~~of the~~ general nature of transport services. As explained in the opening chapter, money spent on transport is not an end in itself: money is spent on spatial relocation, which is itself not generally an end, but yet another means to do other things. Thus one can conceive of the general frustration and resentment caused by dependence on transport services which provide something intangible, quite apart from the fraught conditions of use of those

services - ~~cf.~~ the rejection of public transport for the personalised car.

The Public do abuse crews for failures in the system. It is important to recall that the reaction of the crews to such abuse is totally outwith the control of management. The theme of this section is that much of this response generally, and not just to abuse, is mediated by the general nature of secondary relationships. Furthermore the general tenor of this secondary relationship is antipathetical on both sides.

Mention has already been made in the first chapter of the fraught and inadequate nature of bus services, while in the section previous to this one, the crew's perception of the public as a disruption has been examined, with further mention of the circumstances that obviously cause immediate resentment - the bus that does not stop, the convoys after long waits etc., in other words the disparity of goals between crews and passengers.

Just as a passenger reifies a conductor into the "organisation personified", so the conductor reifies the passenger into at one extreme, a potentially dangerous and certainly unpleasant disruption. Passengers rarely act as the conductor wishes them to - this would mean rigid conformity of behaviour on both sides: not only is this unlikely, but conductors would probably resent such an eventuality since it would make for boredom by cutting out the variety of his interaction with the diversity of passengers - for this reason, the conductor's response is not a uniform and unambig-

uous one; both secondary and primary relations exist and succeed one another.

This process is of course enabled by the very open-ness of the conductor's work - there is nowhere he can hide, only a barely tenable and constantly invaded "backstage". The immediacy of the experience is also often not explicable - the passenger experiences the jolting of the bus, but has no explanation of why the driver made that action: he experiences the wait for the bus, but the conductor has neither time nor inclination to repeat anything more than stock and stereotypical answers - "Don't blame me, we're on time, write to Head Office" - the classic secondary relation "put offs". The conductor refuses to become involved in discussion (unless boredom in the work prompts him) of an abusive nature, preferring mostly to "cock a deaf ear". His reluctance stems of course partly from pre-occupation with his other tasks, partly from repetition of the experience - once you have reacted personally once or twice you realise the futility of doing so, but also from sheer ennui - he will have heard the criticism before - if the bus is late, virtually every stop will have someone asking "Where have you been?" - while he will also know his own impotence to ameliorate the situation. (I think it should be clear by now that many of the circumstances are outside the crew's control, and that much of the struggle for control in this labour process stems from not just organisational domination, but organisational ineptitude.)

I wish to reiterate for emphasis that though the general relation is secondary, there is a tendency for the relationship to elide to primary, particularly in rural areas where the crews are conscious of being the only transport available, the dependence is very apparent, while the passengers are fewer, and the constraints of the situation much less demanding. (For instance in the largely rural area served by Fife, "Public" was mentioned by 10 per cent of respondents, as being a "disattraction" of the job, in contrast to Glasgow's 39 per cent.)

Mixed with this are the occasional primary interactions possible mainly outside the mass urban transit situation. The nod to the driver on the same route, the first name and life history swapping of the conductor with the "regular" passengers, the carrying of friends and relations for free etc.

I argue in the following sections that the conductor seeks to establish control over his working space. Given the secondary nature of this interaction with the public, it might be as well to look briefly at some of the general social interactions of a secondary nature that take place. A more detailed account of the "Control" argument will be given later.

It might be expected that the interaction will be mediated through the crews' taken-for-granted assumptions and their rationalisation of what they do, their perception of passengers and the impinging of passengers on their job. It might be expected also that the crews' definition of the situation will be the dominant one - they are more used to

the experience of bus travel and have a vested interest in the experience operating in their favour and a number of sanctions to deploy. These expectations are, of course, fulfilled: behaviour in omnibuses has been subject to conventions of "behaviour in public places" for rather a long time.

Perhaps the most interesting process from the sociological point of view is the rationalisation of actions about whose validity or appropriateness there is an ambiguity. For instance, the driver may feel it wrong to have to move off when there is someone running for the bus (Stan Freeburg's record notwithstanding), but he is also aware that, for other reasons already discussed, he cannot stop: the perception of "primary relation" need of the individual is changed to the "secondary relation" perception of the overall demands of the system that the bus keeps to time. Thus crews have such rationalisations as "There's always somebody running for the bus", "Stop for one and you stop for them all", "They'd want you to come up the path and knock on the door", "If you slow up for them, they stop too!" Very good rationalisations they are too, for they have just enough truth in them to lend authenticity.

To put it plainly, and re-emphasise the point of this section, the crews' actions are mediated by their perception of the public.

Further examples are the lumping of passengers with motorists as a secondary mass subjected to the overriding demands of the crews' constraints. Buses not pulled the

regulation 18 ins. from the kerb and parallel to the kerb but placed for optimal take off into traffic, or stopped several feet out because of parked cars at the stop - rationalised by the perception of the space being too small, justified by the fact that very often it is. The revving of the engine and the slight movement forward to encourage passengers to board rationalised with "They'd take for ever if you didn't do it". The classic "Nae haun, nae bus!" of Glasgow crews to justify shooting past passengers who are obviously wanting to get on: the "Aw yer too late wi' that signal Jimmy" in similar situations. Stops in Edinburgh used by E.S. and E.C.T., are one of the few places where clear and unambiguous signals are made because passengers know they cannot get on the E.S. buses otherwise: the manoeuvres of the E.S. drivers to keep another vehicle between themselves and the line of sight of the stop, or to be intent on judging the state of traffic showing in the mirror when approaching are rationalised with "Well they dinna gie ye oany time for pickin' up". Again a rationalisation with truth in it. But of course crews have to maintain consistency in such matters: thus they cannot encourage passengers to use the service by stopping when they do have time because of the danger of having passengers expect to get on at other times.

Of course, many of these actions have to be carefully considered, which makes the rationalisation ambiguous as well. For instance the driver may have to weigh up running past

the stop to "punish" a late signal as against the inconvenience of having to wait for the passenger to cover the extra distance. Here we have an interesting phenomenon, for although crews perceive passengers in secondary terms, they do not perceive them as an undifferentiated mass. Crews perceive a DIVERSITY of passengers, and they perceive the diversity because passengers impinge on the job according to their diverse characteristics and thereby invoke a response from a repertoire by the crews. This is, as might be expected largely effected through a labelling process - so there is no guarantee that the crews' response will be the most appropriate one. But perceptions of diversity and variety of responses certainly exist. And this does not just apply to the conductor, though it is probably of more importance to him, since he may be physically damaged if he does not perceive and respond appropriately.

The driver is also involved in this perception process. He has to judge whether the person he is about to run past looks capable of making a complaint to Head Office. He must perceive by looking at the make-up of a queue whether or not he has to pull right up to the stop: for example if it contains elderly people he has to bring the platform right up to the kerb to aid their boarding (and saving the conductor stopping his tasks to heave them aboard), though this is at the expense of the application of extra skill and effort. And note that this is done at quite a high speed, while the driver is also involved in controlling the vehicle in relation to others. It is not surprising that bus

drivers report "Variety" as one of the factors in the job.¹

The conductor is similarly, and indeed to a much greater extent, involved in perceptions and labelling processes. The notable diversity among passengers does not of course, make them less of "social objects", but does bring into play a highly discriminatory perception/labelling process. It is evident also that conductors do not always feel confident of having an appropriate repertoire of responses. Many of them feel intimidated by and uneasy working in middle class areas, (which of course implies perception of such a category of passengers). They see them as being more liable to complain, and in the threatening way of writing rather than personally to the conductor (which the conductor has learned to handle), or expecting a servile approach, and being unamenable to the jocularity or other essentially working class repertoire of the conductor. Of course many conductors are not uneasy about working in this way, but they still modify their behaviour, demeanour and voice if working with such a public.

Again, though this will be gone into in greater detail later, the conductor has to recognise potential hassles, and overcome them before they arise. He has to perceive whether he can say "take it or leave it" when a passenger questions the fare, or whether it will be quicker and quieter to actually show him the fare in the book: to judge whether the passenger with the luggage waiting to get off will need help or not; to judge who is trying to get off without paying when the bus is crowded, and whether to get the fare,

just for the triumph of cheating them of their intention, or whether an agreement can be quickly struck up between them as to apportionment of the fare. The conductor "on the game" or "at it" has to be able to judge who to pochle , and even those not so inclined have to be able to judge who they refuse and who they have to collude with. Thus, even though the relationship between conductor and passenger is a secondary one, it is a very rich textured relationship, involving a range of perceptions and responses. This is of course what the crews refer to when they assert "variety" as a feature of their work.

Over and above this is the essentially transient nature of the interaction. Each passenger stays only a limited time, and actual face-to-face contact with the conductor may take only seconds.

The fleetingness of the relationship leads to a very quick labelling of the passenger by the conductor. For instance a conductor can decide in under a second whether someone is going to take so long to unearth a fare that it would be better to collect a few other fares and then come back. Like many labelling procedures, this can be self-justifying: the passenger may give up the rummaging when the conductor walks off. Whether the conductor makes the "right" decision is not the question, for his action tends to result in a form of interaction which is consonant with his first decision.

Such perceptions as conductors have of the public - the "labelling" is endemic as might be expected in such an

intrinsically distancing type of secondary relationship - would not matter were it not for the peculiar nature of the public interaction within the cramped interior of a bus and the conductor's having to adopt a role which enjoins him to abstract money under difficult circumstances and also adopt a "policing" role in terms of "public order" and the maintenance of legally established regulation of conduct. And all this with no effective back-up from management. These circumstances lead to the conductor attempting to exert control and sometimes having the attempt challenged, occasionally violently, which feeds back into the crews' perception of the public.

The Bus as Street

It should be clearly stated that much of the work of bus crews is unhassled fulfillment of their contractual tasks of getting people from A to B. To help them in this there is the "normal" trust situation. The Public can be trusted to fulfill the expectations of the Company for most of the time, in accordance with the normal "conventions of behaviour in public places". But a look at the underlying processes involved in this particular area of social activity, points the way to problems which can have serious repercussions for the crews in terms of abuse and physical assault from the public: a result which helps shape the crews' perceptions of and reaction to, not only the "travelling public", but the whole job.

As I have noted, it is difficult to gauge how the public

view buses, since I was not investigating "behaviour in public places". But it does strike me as being useful to view the bus as being an extension of the street. It shares with the street, in being "for all", and is for many a necessary part of getting home. Many outlying urban housing schemes have no alternative means of being reached, and some like Drumchapel in Glasgow were built with guarantees made at the time about low cost transport services being provided.

Perhaps the argument becomes more persuasive if buses are compared with airlines. Airlines almost totally control and constrain the activities and movements of the passenger in various ways, quite apart from involving rather anomic relations among passengers. But buses accommodate parties from pubs, fights from round the corner, neighbours going to work, mothers "going their messages", whole classes of children etc. etc. The community continues many of its manifold and diverse activities on buses, but within very much more cramped, not to say condensed conditions.

As a street, the bus contains some of the many relationships which occur in streets, and is indeed for much of the population, as necessary for essential community interaction (which includes getting from place to place) as the provision of streets themselves.

But the Bus, while it may be used as a utility in this way, has the fraught characteristics of having to be paid for (theoretically so in the case of some late night Glasgow buses), behaviour within it is circumscribed by legislation governing conduct, and is of course subject to "technical"

deficiencies as regards timing, frequency, availability, accommodation and so on. In this sense a bus service is a utility: but the organisation of that service is a commercial enterprise, dedicated to valorisation.

There is thus a conflict between the "free" idea and the necessity of buses to the community, and these characteristics. (Streets also have by-laws and legislation governing conduct in them, but such conduct is rarely enforced, and when it is, is enforced by the police, and not by employees of what are essentially in law, private companies.)

And this conflict pinpoints the crews' position in the public's use of what is, after all, the crews' working environment.

For the "rules of conduct" are variably apprehended and acted within by the public. Conduct as "officially" (both Company and Parliamentary Regulations) regulated is much more circumscribed than street behaviour both theoretically and practically and thus much more easily broken. But the means of controlling Rule Breaking is not the normal one of the Police, but the actions of the bus crews, who are necessarily involved in the Rule Breaking by virtue of being there. It is worth noting in this respect that many breaches of street conduct rules go unenforced because the agent of enforcement, the policeman, is rarely on hand: this is not of course the case with bus crews, they can not physically overlook breaches of regulations. Over and above this, some of the rule-breaking activities of the public directly interfere with crews' job, quite apart from the assaults on crews that

occur. Further, the crews cannot easily avoid trouble by vacating the scene, as can the policeman who feels threatened nor can they easily summon help.

Before going on to discuss the crews' seeking to control the situation, I list some of the main areas of the public's rule-breaking, as described by Rose in his study of violence on London Transport, with the cautionary note that these are types of rule breaking incidents that actually led to assault. The figures refer to the percentage of assaults in that category (Rose 1976: 10).

	Survey %	Records %
Stealing from L.T.	3	4
Non payment of fares	19	24
Underpayment of fares	21	14
Drunk and disorderly behaviour	9	4
Rowdy behaviour	12	21
Passengers annoyed because of late buses	9	3
Passengers annoyed because of full buses	9	7
Difficulties with O.A.P.s	1	0
Any sort of traffic dispute	4	6
Others	7	9
No apparent reason	5	9

N = 96

N = 665

It is worth noting here the very small number of assaults "For no apparent reason", indicating that crews are rarely the victim of "blind violence" (and they happen to be the nearest target), but the assaults take place within the context of, and as a result of, the way the transport system functions.

By factor analysis Rose groups rule breaking as perceived by conductors as set out on p 321. There is, of course, a general relation between rule breaking and assault, especially in that Rose argues that assaults occur in part because of what the conductor does about the rule-breaking (crudely if he ignores it he lessens the chance of being assaulted). It can, I think, be successfully contended that this pattern of assault-related rule-breaking is similar to general rule-breaking that does not lead to assault. Of course, it is likely that the proportional distribution of such rule breaking will change, in that, say difficulties with O.A.P.s (generally not showing their concession-fare passes, or pretending they have one when they have not, or demanding assistance from the conductor rather than a nearby passenger) will be greater, since it can be assumed fairly safely that O.A.P.s are unlikely to have recourse to assault to settle their disputes. Similarly, rates of overriding will be higher, since the rate here is what caused assaults, and bears no proportionate relation to the actual rate. Again, traffic disputes occur by the second, but are statistically unlikely to lead to assaults.

These caveats in mind, it is still worth looking at how

of rule breaking by the public perceived by conductors.

	Never	5 x +/day	2-5/day	1-6 times/week	1 per week more 1/month	1/month	Less than 1/month
g from LT (Passengers)	8.0	0.2	0.4	1.6	1.2	0.8	15.3
ayment of fares	7.5	2.6	28.4	21.4	7.1	3.8	5.4
ment of fares	31.5	3.4	9.5	22.6	9.1	6.5	17.3
c disorderliness	25.6	-	0.4	20.4	17.9	9.9	25.6
ss - adults	51.4	-	2.2	13.7	9.1	7.5	15.7
ss - children	17.3	4.8	26.6	36.7	5.2	3.6	5.0
ses, passenger laints	10.7	14.3	27.4	30.8	8.5	2.2	5.4
ses, passenger laints	27.4	9.3	22.0	23.4	7.5	4.0	6.5
lties with OAPs	27.0	25.8	25.2	13.3	2.4	1.6	4.2
lties in Exit/ y	38.5	10.3	15.5	17.3	7.3	4.0	6.9
	81.9	1.8	4.0	5.2	1.4	1.4	3.4
stealing from LT	91.9	0.2	0.2	0.8	0.2	0.4	6.3
parking at bus s or in front uses	12.3	42.7	26.3	12.1	3.4	1.4	1.6
er traffic dispute	67.5	5.7	8.1	7.5	2.4	2.0	6.7
ifficulties	77.8	4.4	7.3	6.4	1.9	0.6	1.7

Figures are percentages

the conductors see these factors as being related, in related groups.

1. Difficulties because of deficiencies in system (e.g. passengers angry at delays).
2. Drunkenness and rowdiness.
3. Under and non-payment of fares.

The frequencies of how often these rules are broken, as perceived by conductors are given on p. 321. (Rose 1976: 18)

A further comment has to be made to the effect that while some of this behaviour is rule-breaking because it transgresses the 1930 Road Traffic Act, others of the behaviour have to be treated more as irritants to the crew (e.g. passengers complaining about the service). What is of interest is to note that the crews - at least in so far as can be derived from Rose's study, do not discriminate between the two kinds. This does of course accord with the remarks made above about the secondary nature of the relationship between crews and public and the resultant labelling of "the public" in general as an antipathetical entity.

These points may illustrate why the conductor seeks to control the passengers - firstly to make his "ordinary" task easier, secondly to decrease or avoid violence, of which he is generally the victim.²

At this point, the argument has to change focus from looking solely at "the bus as street" to include also the bus as transport system.

In condensed form, the conductor's position is as follows.

The deficiencies of the transport system provided, and the clash between the ideas of service and essential utility in the public's mind leads to rule-breaking (that is rule-breaking either of the R.T.A. regulations, common law, or the crew's way of working, as perceived by the crews) by the public. Crews encounter inescapably the public breaking the Rules of the Company. But the Companies do not define what the crews should do when they encounter rule-breaking. Crews then fall back on their own perceptions of the seriousness (or otherwise) of rule breaking (backed by discussion of such circumstances by workmates). But such perceptions are not necessarily related to the deficiencies of the transport system.

The result is a situation of anxiety for crews. A badly-judged reaction to rule breaking can lead to assault. No reaction to rule-breaking can lead to a break-down in the transport system. For example if crews are intimidated to the extent that they cannot collect fares or control the number of people on the bus, then the system has seriously broken down, at least from the management's stated expectation standpoint.

The next section, accordingly, looks at how the conductor seeks to control the interior of his bus, to overcome these contradictions in the labour process.³

Control

The previous section - The Bus as Street - has sought to show the diverse and manifold secondary relationships that exist within the confines of the crews' working space, and suggest some of the problems this situation poses for crews.

In this section on control it is suggested that the situation evokes a response from crews in a seeking to control the passengers in various ways.

From the crews' point of view, there are two aims in mind in seeking to exert control over passengers.

The first is to make their tasks easier. The second concerns being involved in rule-breaking by passengers and seeks to restrain passengers from rule breaking. That they are not always successful in this forms the subject of the next section, on Violence.

An important caveat has to be repeated here: the activity of observing just how conductors act within the bus is difficult, not only in the sense of observing enough subjects, but also of observing sufficient variety of events. (cf Schaffer's research specifically into violence/vandalism which involved two researchers on buses for six months, with no appreciable incidents recorded as happening when they were there). In consequence, the following discussion takes the form of an ideal type construction, based on my own observations and knowledge of the underlying processes, struggles, anxieties and resolutions as discussed by crews.

Briefly, in this section I argue that the crews inevitably take on a "police" function of maintenance of company

and public order (for example it is up to them to stop young ladies being pestered). But they are able to do this only within, and by virtue of their own created legitimacy, a legitimacy they maintain by various techniques of "presentation of self" similar to those observed by Goffman. The control has to be created and maintained partly to facilitate tasks but also for control of rule-breakers, and particularly that category of rule-breaking that moves into unruliness and violence. The conductor seeks to establish and maintain control at all times to give substance to his real need for control at times which pose threats either to his task's performance (collecting fares) or to his physical safety. The extent to which the latter impinges is partly external to the conductor, being dependent on the interaction of the particular transport system with the particular culture of the passengers (for example one does not have to establish just how violent a city Glasgow is, one only has to establish the "social fact" of belief in a violent culture/mythology/ideology/ethos).

But since this "control" constitutes a continuum, from total reliance on the supposed conventions of behaviour, to reference to the ultimate authority of legislation and police enforcement there is obviously variation in the form of "presentation of self" by conductors according to individual characteristics and different circumstances, and action from abandonment of the vehicle to physical coercion. My own observation conforms with Rose's in London that different conducting experience and different areas interacting with

the evolved garage group norms, play a large part in forming the conductor's behaviour. Hence different companies, garages and areas have different forms of behaviour and attitudes.

I propose now to look in more detail at the two types of control exercised.

The main feature of the conductor's behaviour is simply his self-presentation of being in command. In this he is given the aid of being allowed to collect money, with the massive, generally (but not absolutely) pertaining convention that money is paid in return for transportation. Considering the massive number of passengers carried per annum, the operation at this level is generally successful. But exceptions occur with sufficient frequency to highlight the underlying assumptions. And it is these irregularities which necessitate control, even were it not generally conventionally established that the conductor is "in control", both legislatively and in terms of public acknowledgement. For flouting by passengers of the rules does of course threaten even if it does not actually disrupt the conductor's control.

It is worth considering in this matter that it is the isolated, independent working conductor who is the sole maintainer of the convention that the public pays for its transport. If the conductor loses his control in this matter, the public simply does not pay (as in late night buses in Glasgow): the conductor has only the conventions and his own performance to fulfil this basic organisational requirement.

(As the conductor-training inspector in Glasgow Corporation remarked: "You have the most difficult job in the world - taking money from drunk Glaswegians".)

Apart from taking their money, the conductor establishes his presence in other ways and gives direct commands, to move up the bus, no, right up to the front! His presence in this way is made even more effective in that it is not usual for anyone else to call out at all in a bus, far less give peremptory commands to strangers. The conductor is also marked out by his uniform, which serves also to invest him with the generalised "authority" which uniforms are intended to convey. These two elements can combine to prevent people going where they intended - to physically bar them from entering, or going up stairs, etc. - the conductor is seen to be the one person on the bus controlling the whereabouts of others, while the reasons he does so are apparent, or become accepted as legitimate, even when the passenger himself cannot see the reason.

The conductor is also the one who initiates action. The passenger who tries to press his fare on the conductor when he is not choosing to collect fares at that moment is liable to be rebuffed, the conductor adopting the well-known attitude of most "public servants" to do so. This serves the double purpose of allowing the conductor to organise his work (for instance he may want to leave himself free to control a crowd at the next stop), while establishing his dominance over the passenger. To this end, the conductor may assume a commanding position in the bus facing the

passengers, and calling attention to himself by shouting "fares please". In sum, the conductor deploys a number of techniques to establish his dominance in his working environment. I feel that further examination of how this is done would take me out of the scope of this thesis. It would be as well to remark here, though, that this dominance is friable not only because the passengers have their own resources they can deploy, but also because of the rapid turnover of passengers - the time span for the interaction is extremely short, while the diversity of the people involved makes the interaction open to doubt and questioning about the appropriateness of the approach. The conductor has to very quickly identify the "type" of person he is involved with. The "wrong" remark may have unintended effects.

The main aim of this control - ordering events inside the bus to ease the complex actions of the conductor, whose overall aim is to keep the bus moving, is fairly easy to achieve. It is the "normal" unnoticed subservience of the public to the official with whom they are interacting.

But it does not always work. The "control" may be challenged in two ways: (1) by people trying to press their own interests - an irritant to the conductor, (2) by rule-breaking actions which the conductor has to deal with so as to avoid "trouble" - either verbal abuse, written complaints, or occasionally assault. And, it is what the conductor does in such circumstances that determines the outcome. Here there is complex interplay of the individual, the moral order of the work group, and the reaction of the passenger. The

mild remonstrance of the conductor on being offered a £5 note early in the morning (a control ploy: to make a public fuss reduces the likelihood of its happening) may meet with a shame-faced apology, a forceful rebuttal of the conductor's point of view, a written complaint, or if the conductor goes on about it, perhaps assault, a move into "rule-breaking". It is up to the conductor to recognise, to perceive, the type of person he is dealing with, and tailor his behaviour accordingly. He does not always succeed.

It is for such reasons that the conductor tries to build up an "unquestioned" stance. (He is also helped by his greater experience - he has probably evolved standard answers to standard complaints, which helps control the passenger in a way that takes little time.)

The other aim of the conductor in seeking control, is to use this position as a resource for bad situations. Ordinary control is used to establish control over rule-breaking. It is much more difficult for the passengers to abuse a conductor when the latter is obviously in full command of the situation. Heaving a drunk off with the minimum of fuss is easier if done with "official" overtones (though the efficacy of this in fact depends on the drunk's attitude to officialdom!). Disruption of "normal" control not only adds to the conductor's problems, but detracts from his overall control, which he hopes to use to control potentially violent situations. Loss of control in violent situations feeds back into "normal" control of course, and any diminution of this latter makes for a more difficult job.

(For instance the conductor has to establish that fares are taken when he is ready, and not the passenger, though there is no legal requirement for this.)

The important point to note is that the conductor seeks to control: he is not categorically able to maintain dominance. He is open to challenge at any time. The most he can do is try to perceive a challenge before it happens, thus giving him the chance to decide whether to meet or avoid confrontation. And here is a major difference in modes of control, which will be discussed more fully in the next section. For some conductors will seek to control by agreement and conciliation, while others take a more authoritarian line. These attitudes are probably derived from the interaction of particular personalities with the garage discussion of events and his own experiences - the more experienced conductors tend to take the more conciliatory approaches. (And the differences are great. I was told by a driver that he had worked the 16s - a notoriously bad route, for twelve years without incident but a change of conductor had produced two fights in one week.)

The conciliatory approach involves jokes, sympathy, agreement, or whatever: the end result is that the conductor maintains control by appearing to lose it. Make a joke if someone opens the emergency door: not threaten to throw them off. Agree, if someone says the driving is terrible. Sympathize if the passenger complains about delays.

This approach does encroach on control however, because it may have to involve overlooking rule-breaking. Even apart

from this, as said, control is tenuous. The conductor just does not know when someone is going to get on and say "I don't like your face".

There is also the point that the authoritarian approach does work as well. It certainly seems to escalate situations into assaults, but by no means have all authoritarian conductors been assaulted. (cf. Rose, 1976)

In sum, the conductor seeks to control, both to make his task easier, and deriving from this, to have his dominance as a resource in abusive or potentially violent situations. His control is tenuous, however, because of the unpredictability of the populace he encounters, the public's own capacity to challenge, and the extent of the rule-breaking the conductor encounters - and of course the extent of such behaviour is one of the main differences among my groups.

What the conductor does about rule-breaking is now enlarged upon.

Violence

In summary form, the argument of this section runs that the public's use of bus transport can involve, because of the public's perception of the system, an amount of rule-breaking: the conductor must react in some way to this rule-breaking: if he does so in an authoritarian way, his risk of being assaulted increases: if he does so in a conciliatory way he may be successful, though he might also have to overlook the extent of the rule-breaking, or make the conciliation at the cost of personal self-esteem; while if he

reacts to the rule-breaking by avoidance, then the part of the system which is supposedly in his charge has broken down, which leads in turn to resentment against management for putting him in such a situation.

Violence is present for busmen in the same sense as the dangers of the moving vehicle are there. The crews accept the dangers as being there, but can only wait for the event to happen, and prepare as best they can.⁴

Assault is, in terms of the number committed, rather rare, but the circumstances which might lead to assault are much more prevailing; which makes the possibility of assault a very real one. And it is very much what the crew do in such circumstances that determines whether assault takes place or not. (Not overlooking that conductors tend only to report those incidents in which they lost the confrontation: throwing drunks off, or successfully demanding fares from an avoider are virtually daily occurrences.) The possibility of violence is the main element, and not the statistical probability. The "social fact" of a culture of violence is more important than its "real" occurrence. There is probably an element of violence that occurs to bus crews "mindlessly" and bus crews are a convenient target, but it is probably very much smaller than violence (in which I include threatening behaviour as well as physical assault) which occurs because of the characteristics of the bus system, and it is of course this latter that is discussed here.

In this respect the bus crews are very vulnerable. In Glasgow, for instance, they not only run through areas which

have a city-wide reputation for violence, and which the ordinary cautious citizen would be wary on entering and would certainly be on the "look out for trouble", but they stop to uplift passengers in such areas, and after such passengers have spent the night drinking AND THEN ask for money from them! Yet the expectation of management is that this will not involve trouble. Or rather the management knows that this is a difficult thing to do but yet provides no effective support services. It is very much left to the isolated and vulnerable crew who are very much thrown onto their own personal resources. The scope for individual initiative is usually lacking in most industrial jobs: here it exists with a vengeance! In this respect also, very few jobs involve violence or the control of violence (if one excludes the police force, which is hardly in an "ordinary" position). There is no explicit supposition or recognition: certainly recruits are not warned of the possibility that bus services normally encounter at the least threatening behaviour, and yet they do: from the innumerable small conflicts to armed robbery⁵. The basic reasons for this remain unacknowledged by management, while even practical measures seem beyond them (cf Schaffer). Certainly the crews feel isolated from what they see as unfeeling and uncaring management, quite apart from an uncaring and unfeeling public, though there is probably more justifiable reason for public lack of action, given the secondary nature of the relationship. A recall of the Chapter on the structure and operation of the industry

in general will bring to mind the general lack of awareness or concern for what actually happens to the crews, though one does wonder if Glasgow Corporation ever asks meaningfully why its staff turnover is 50 per cent per annum.

The argument of this section rests mainly on the proposition that the main source of violence is the contradiction between the "bus as street" and the bus as a service to be paid for: between public utility and private ownership in a sense. A further consideration which exacerbates the situation is the diminution in utility and resentment and frustration built up in the public mind by the technical deficiencies of the system, especially given the general nature of transport being a means to other, unrelated ends: the generally fraught nature of bus transport is undoubtedly an underlying part of the public's response to the crews. One is less likely to comply with the expectation of the service if the service fails to meet the passengers' expectations. Added to that is the crews' conventionalised defence of their own role in the system, their labelling of passengers, their anxiety, and the disparate and diverse types of interaction involved.

The resultant of the interaction of these elements involves the clash of the public's perception of the bus system and what is provided. The conductor is caught in the middle as mediator. He is not always successful. Even his successes will be achieved perhaps at the cost of anxiety and the adoption of a conciliatory posture, which were it not for the support of the work group, would seriously damage his

self esteem. (This damage is one stated reason for the preference of conductors to become drivers - it gets them away from the public, though of course it is put in rather more direct terms - "jist tae get away fae the fuckin public".)

The lack of fit between expectation and perceptions means that the conductor has to control just what rules are enforced (or attempted to be enforced) in what circumstances. The type of activity that led to crews being a victim of assault (reported) are set out below. (Schaffer 1977: 2)

	Percentage
Fares	23.4
"Policing" (keeping public order)	17.3
Robbery	11.7
Driving behaviour	10.0
Fights between passengers	2.7
Other	3.3
Unknown	31.2

As with Rose (1976), Schaffer points out that these actual assaults are at one end of a "grey area" where the interaction has been resolved without recourse to violence. But these "grey areas" all involve rule-breaking in some form or other, which the conductor has to react to simply because he is on the spot.

I wish now to look more closely at the three main types of reaction to such situations by conductors.

There seem to be three different types of reaction to rule breaking, which have associated relations to the possi-

bility of assault. I class these three types of conductor reaction as (1) authoritarian (2) conciliatory (3) avoiding. These are not discrete categories and I suspect that conductors move through all three according to who is involved in what. Nonetheless I think they are valid as ideal types.

With regard to the public's reaction to the conductor's reaction, the "authoritarian" would seem to be an effective one for controlling a wide range of rule-breaking, but has the disadvantage of ultimately depending on physical coercion, and thus leads to a greater risk of being assaulted.

Note that Rose, in his 1976 study of violence on London Transport was not able to predict all who in his sample had been assaulted from his attitude survey, but was able to predict that those with an "authoritarian" attitude had been assaulted in the previous 18 months with an 80 per cent success rate.

Authoritarian reactions would include taking "command" steps, threats, physical action to deal with rule-breaking - being "hard" rather than trying to look it. Examples would be shouting at children to queue up in an orderly line, threatening "I'll get my driver tae ye" (the driver's dread), actually physically heaving off drunks, non-payers, "young hooligans making a racket", insisting on fare payment.

This attitude would seem to be based on viewing passengers as deliberate transgressors of rules (rather than people who make mistakes or "are just being natural") coupled with the idea that rules should be enforced, and that the conductor is the one to do it. Thus the "presentation of self"

is of someone assuming the persona of the enforcer of legislation and company practice, of putting the passenger in the wrong, and threatening penalties, including, in appropriate cases, the threat of personal physical enforcement by the conductor.

Note that crews are enjoined to enforce the rules but instructed not to touch passengers, since this is technically assault, and the Company could be sued. Conductors are instructed to contact control, an inspector, or a policeman, none of whom of course are liable to be on hand. Thus adopting this authoritarian attitude with its dependence ultimately on physical force, to enforce Company rules, actually comes into conflict with a Company ruling proscribing such action, even though the company expects the conductor to enforce the rules - clearly a vicious contradiction.

As an example, take the case of three pensioners who board a bus in Glasgow and seat themselves together. The gentleman with the two ladies makes a movement partially showing, partially obscuring a Concession Pass (entitling the holder to a flat fare of 2d (in 1967: fares at this time were 4d, 8d and 1s) and says "three twos, please". The conductor: "Could I see your wife's pass please?" "That's a bother", as wife rummages in her bag, while the conductor wonders about how many more are going to squeeze on, and if he will get round more than half of them before the obvious alighting point for most of them, just three minutes away. Wife eventually produces pass with disgruntled "There now, are you satisfied?" Now if the conductor takes an authori-

tarian attitude, he will say, as he is quite justified "You know the rule that passes must always be shown". Then to the other lady of the two "And could I see yours, please" Lady looks embarrassed, looks hopefully in bag, tension increases, until the gentleman friend bursts out with "She's no got one". At this point an extreme authoritarian conductor could halt the bus and go in search of a policeman. But this would be extreme. Many, still on authoritarian lines, would deliver an accusation loudly, about cheating, pointing out the low fare involved and the penalties attached to the conductor being found wanting in his duties to enforce regulations - in that precise Glaswegian word, "a sherriking". It is an effective enforcement of the rules and a warning to others on the bus. But by its public nature, it places the transgressor in an extremely embarrassing position, a position which, it can easily be seen, might prove to be so intolerable as to be resolvable only by physical assault or at least a belligerent posture being adopted. An "incident" of a violent nature occurs.

Of course pensioners, given their physical limitations are unlikely to physically assault conductors in a serious fashion: but they are inclined to adopt threatening behaviour. Who is involved affects the conductor's reaction in this way - if he cannot obviously bully them, he may have to adopt other reactions.

By conciliatory action I mean a reaction to a rule breaking situation which points out the rule-breaking to the passenger, but in a way that does not overtly or publicly

put the passenger in the wrong, or in an embarrassing position which might lead him to escalate the violence implicit in the confrontation.

A brief example might be the conductor approaching an over-rider with a remark such as "Ah know ye can go a long way for a shilling, but not this far!" Said in the appropriate way, this allows the passenger to "discover" he has made a mistake about the fare, or the place, and apologise without losing face.

This approach is of course in contrast to the authoritarian approach, which would probably involve the conductor saying (at best) "O.K., pal this is your stop".

It is significant that Rose (1976) found that it was conductors with quite long experience (i.e. over five years) who were least likely to be assaulted. No doubt some explanation of this lies in their being able to recognise potentially dangerous situations before they occur; but more weight, from my own observation, would be given to the unwillingness to engage themselves in an attitude that might conceivably escalate into violence or even abuse. They simply pretend not to hear abuse, or comments, or the threatening undertones that can presage a confrontation. They also are aware of avoidance techniques. They encourage people to conform rather than compel them. Murphy (1965) describes what he sees as a "good" conductor very much in these terms.

Sociologically, the conciliating approach is presented uncannily like that of the "joking relationship" and for the

same structural reasons.

In this case the incompatible elements are the rules governing behaviour in and about public service vehicles and the public's own perception of their "right" to maintain their own standards and types of behaviour in the bus. The conductor is placed as mediator between these two elements. His practical response is to encompass the rule-enforcement with "joking" pleasantries. The conductor of a bus has, after all, a reputation for repartee. For example, if he suspects the passenger of being about to override because of the low fare asked for, he may enquire what the person is going to do at that stop since the shipyard is closed on Sundays.

Nor is this presentation confined to rule-enforcement - it tends to be carried into other relations merging with a more general attitude. So that if a passenger asks "Next stop please", they are quite likely to get the reply "Not on Thursdays, sorry."

Similarly a conductor trying to hurry along tardy boarding may choose "Come oan there, its a timetable we run to, no a calendar", rather than take a more peremptory line.

However, though many conductors adopt such a presentation of self, it is not discrete from the other reactions, since of course it is a presentation that interacts with the presentation of the passengers. It is difficult to keep up a conciliatory front with someone who insists on not paying a higher fare than the one they paid on a previous bus with

a different conductor. There comes a point in such an interaction when there is a straight confrontation which can only be solved in a confrontation way. This is of course a source of irritation and dissatisfaction for a conductor who genuinely finds a conciliatory attitude makes for an easier and pleasanter job for both him and the passengers (and crews are aware of such an approach and discuss its merits as against the other approaches, and the different circumstances which fit each approach).

As an example, consider the 'cheating Pensioners' case referred to in the previous section. On the discovery that the two with passes had deliberately been trying to convince the conductor that all three held passes and that thus the conductor was wasting his time and causing bother to poor old folk who ought not to have their word doubted and have to go to the inconvenience of actually producing the passes and isn't it typical of petty officialdom, - the conductor not unnaturally, and even though he remonstrated mildly, pointed out that he has to check because he otherwise runs the risk of being penalised by suspension - a risk he would rather not take because only somebody else's 6d is involved - he was brought up short by an angry "Ach but keep it quiet and get on with it then". Now this would seem a rather provocative remark from the passenger in the circumstances. But it is precisely the hallmark of the conciliatory conductor for him to stop, issue the right ticket, collect the money, and go on with his other affairs without going on about the matter, even though to do so might give him personal satis-

faction at having a legitimate excuse to berate one of the irritating class of 'the public.'

One further aspect of the conciliatory approach is worth mentioning. Often rule-breaking - like not offering to pay the fare - is backed up by a presentation of self by the miscreant of being prepared to back up the position by violence. Here the conductor must judge for himself whether he can think of a pleasantry that will allow him to cajole the fare (or the proper fare in the case of over-riders) or whether the threat implicit is likely to be carried out even if he establishes a joking relationship. In the latter case his only real course is avoidance, which is dealt with next.⁶

All conductors practice avoidance from time to time, if only through sheer ennui at having the same abuse, threats and insults made at them. But nonetheless it does constitute a distinct type of reaction, though again whether it is invoked depends on the circumstances. Perhaps it is more of a reaction to circumstances than the other two. As a general attitude it would tend to be associated with a general lack of concern about whether or not rules were broken, though such concern is difficult to maintain because of the advantages that control of passengers confers upon how the conductor accomplishes his tasks, and also considerably increases the risks of being penalised by the supervisory system. (Possibly in times of staff shortages, such unconcern is more predominant because of the lack of replacement staff. In my own experience, staff believe that management

has "purges" to enforce the "proper" conduct of the conductor in times of staff availability.)

As an example, in the Cheating Pensioners case, an avoiding conductor might not have bothered asking to see all three passes, and this would seem to have been the idea in the pensioners' minds.

The more general occurrence is simply when the conductor is either intimidated directly, or more commonly recognizes a situation of potential intimidation, usually associated with non-payment of fares, or where the pursual of one aim interferes with another: the time taken to check the three passes in the example resulted in the conductor missing other fares. This is a pretty obvious piece of rule-breaking, and also one which the conductor has most difficulty in overlooking. (It is much easier to close one's eyes to over-riding, or smoking on the lower deck, or playing musical instruments, or singing and stamping, etc.)

The only choice available to the conductor is confrontation or avoidance. Given the small sums of (other people's) money involved, many conductors avoid contact with such passengers, passing them by without apparently noticing them. This is of course a matter for the perception of the conductor: many more people would no doubt be not likely to pay, but fear they would come off worst in a confrontation with the conductor.

Similarly, should trouble break out on the bus, the driver and conductor of a Glasgow bus are very likely not to try to pacify or control a fight among the passengers, but

simply get off the bus and wait till one side wins. Of course conductors may change tactics if help is at hand. If someone has flatly refused to pay a fare and the police are at hand then use will be made of them. (cf. Appendix 2.)

In this chapter I have sought to analyse in detail relations between the employees of organisations devoted to raising public revenue and the public which provides that revenue. This labour process is marked by an unusual devolution of control onto platform staff, who, while generally dominated by the forces of production involved, are forced into evolving their own far-reaching measures of control - not just over the task, but over wide social relations - aimed ultimately at maintaining the valorisation process. As in other capitalist labour processes, the skills involved in coping with the material aspects of valorisation, and controlling the social relations - the market, as it were, are valued by the crews, but in contradictory fashion are not valued, indeed generally unperceived, both by those they are worked on - the public and by those whose interests are served - the management. These skills, though valued, have to be seen as evolved to deal with unstable unpredictable events which demand control. Sometimes the skills fail and control is lost, for the struggle for control has to be constantly maintained and is problematic at any given moment.

The general exploitation in the labour process takes on a particular form in that crews have to apply a valorisation process to what is regarded as a public utility, while the forces and materials of production are weakly structured, necessitating a personal effort and involvement from the crews, quite unsupported by the organisation. Crews are put into a contradictory position of having to maintain valorisation, and public behaviour, which though backed by legislation has no concrete and present means of enforcement: attempts to enforce the general aims of the organisation may result in a most particular violence.

Notes: Chapter Nine

¹ Mention has to be made here of an action which to me still remains inexplicable, and that is that bus drivers (including me) get extremely annoyed if they are signalled to stop by a rolled umbrella, and will do their best to make life as difficult as possible for the transgressor, by seeking out the puddle that invariably forms at bus stops, creeping past the stop to make the passenger walk, or anything else that strikes them as appropriate.

² Schaffer (1977) found that although assaults per passenger were low - one per 121,354 passengers - anxiety about violence by crews was high. What she did not observe was that per annum, five per cent of the staff of Glasgow bus crews were assaulted, which, assuming a constant work force, non-repeats etc., would be ten per cent of staff in two years, or fifty per cent in ten years. This perhaps indicates that the crews have a quite rational expectation of violence occurring.

³ Vandalism should be mentioned as another feature of urban bus systems, which may perhaps be related to the "bus as street" idea. In this respect, buses seem to be associated with "them", if the extent and type of vandalism is taken into account. Schaffer (1977) also points out that much of so-called "vandalism" is better attributed to wear and tear, or the use of inappropriate furnishings and finishes.

But at least in Glasgow, "vandalism" takes a character substantially different from the creative talents of the

graffitti writer; and the character would seem to be one which views the bus as a legitimate target for outright aggression. It is difficult to put forward another character on the 669 incidents involving broken windows between July 1975 to July 1976 in Glasgow. This takes place almost wholly from outside the vehicle, usually involving stoning the bus.

Other forms of "vandalism" fit much better with common patterns of street usage, Schaffer recording

Ink	152 incidents
Seat damage	250 incidents
Broken glass and fittings	151 incidents

⁴ As an example, I remember driving for about three miles in a state of high tension, ready to be assaulted at any moment. It was an empty late evening bus, travelling on a very quiet stretch of country road. The only passenger had just got on and had lurched to the rear of the bottom deck. He was about 6 ft 5 ins., built to match and had a glazed, lowering expression. I kept an eye on him in the rear view mirror while I talked to the conductor. After three miles the man got up, stamped down the gangway and lowered ahead. Sweat broke out all over me, and I got ready for an emergency stop. But all he said was, "Is this the caravan site?" in a very mild tone. We stopped and he got off.

As we moved off my conductor said, "Jesus, I thought we'd had it there, I was just ready for him to leap."

Both of us had been expecting an attack for all the time the man had been on board. I may scare easily, but my conductor had just left the Special Air Service to go on the buses, and he was scared.

This kind of incident is indicative of the strain to which bus crews are exposed, even though "nothing" happened.

⁵ Schaffer (1977: 4) reports for the period October 1976 to July 1977, on Glasgow's buses, 21 incidents of robbery, with weapons (such as axes, iron bars) being used eight times.

⁶ The joking relationship is, in a sense, the introduction of an apparently primary element into a secondary relationship. It can be used to stave off violence. For instance, one of my co-workers was quietly sitting at the rear of his bus at a remote terminus when four drunk and very large "heavies" got on. The last one turned round as he went up the stairs "Ah doan't like thon conductor's fuckin' face".

Realising he was trapped, the conductor set up a joking front,

"Ah hope youse is all in good voice because there's compulsory singing on the top deck of this bus."

It was the best he could do in the desperate circumstances: it proved successful, he was offered a can of beer, had a forced laugh with the group, and needless to say, collected no fares.

CHAPTER TEN: Union

⁷ That crews are very much thrown onto their personal resources, without the support or control of the organisation can have its compensations.

On one occasion a battered, blood soaked youth with ripped shirt ran round a corner and just managed to jump onto the last bus to High Possil (an isolated and desolate housing estate of the type that Glasgow does so well). Pushing through the fairly busy lower deck, he collapsed on a side seat, sprawling over it and most of the passage, and promptly (to my relief) fell asleep. Adopting a categorical avoidance technique, I carefully stepped over him when I went to collect what fares were being offered.

He was still asleep, and even more intimidating in his isolation when we arrived at the emptiness of the terminus.

With a great deal of trepidation I shook him awake, saying:

"O.K., this is your stop, pal, the end of the line".

He woke up and to my relief stumbled docilely to the door, shook his head, and said,

"Is this Castlemilk?"

"High Possil my friend", I said as I gave him a hard shove onto the road and belled the driver away into a racing start.

Castlemilk is twelve miles to the south.

I was not able within the bounds of this study, to make the especial study of Union activity among busmen that the intrinsic interest of the subject merits, so the discussion is limited. The survey results reveal little that has not been noted before (Goldthorpe et al 1968 place their results within a general review: their results bear great similarities to mine and to Beynon and Blackburn's (1972)). The main bulk of this section aims at going beyond the survey responses to the analysis I make of the processes in which the Union is involved with the organisation itself. The analysis offered of Union processes themselves ~~is~~ very limited, since none of my periods of observation coincided with industrial dispute activity. However, the analysis that I do offer does, I think, offer some interesting comments on the rather peculiar involvement of the Union with management, though I recognise that only a beginning is made on this subject. From time to time I will refer to "general union policy". My source is a two-hour interview with the Scottish national bus officer of the T.G.W.U.

The first consideration is the survey results.

As a general point, the respondents did not attach overriding primacy to trade unions in overall employment terms, only five of them giving "strong and active union" as being an important thing about a job (Question 7).

But a direct question - Question 24: "Have you been to a Union meeting in the last year?" elicited "Yes" from as many as 64 per cent. However this extraordinary figure (the general level of attendance is circa 3 per cent to 15 per

cent of Roberts(1956)quoted in Goldthorpe et al(1968: 99) is explained by the strike in the S.B.G. in the year before the survey was carried out: figures were much lower in Glasgow and Edinburgh which did not strike. My own observation of Union meetings at New Street were of low attendance, (meetings are held twice to cover "both sides of the sheet") and discussion, usually fairly strident, about allocation of work, faulty vehicles and other small scale issues on the margin of management's control.

Questions 24 (a) and 25 attempted to elicit how the respondents saw union activity, and how they saw their union representatives.

Of those who took an unqualified positive attitude (40 per cent of the sample) the general areas given were:

Trade Union as a political movement	10 per cent
General interest in process	30 per cent
Bargaining agent	17 per cent
Felt need to participate in own organisation	10 per cent
Directly involved as official	21 per cent
Resolution of specific issues	5.7 per cent

These overall attitudes fell broadly into the category of perceiving the Union as a locus of power for resolving disputes, and monitoring what was happening in the organisation, which affected crews directly.

Those (24 per cent of the whole sample) who took a "qualified positive" attitude to the Union fell broadly into

two categories, the first expressing a rather instrumental attitude, the second expressing the view that while they supported the idea of the Union, they were dissatisfied with its performance. The results were (percentages are of this section of respondents)

Attend major or specific issues only	61 per cent
Disaffected with policy or process	19 per cent
Union only expresses sectional interests	10 per cent
Generally poor Union	10 per cent

Of the negative assessments of the Union (30 per cent of the sample) by far the largest group - 28 per cent - simply said they were not interested, followed by 18 per cent who professed other commitments. But most of the remainder - some 28 per cent in total of this group - voiced some view that they did not care for particular policies, or (mostly) did not like the conduct of the meetings or had some other specific disaffection with the operation of the branch.

This leads to consideration of Question 25: "Why would you say people get involved in union affairs?" This question evoked a broader assessment of the Union, and the responses fell into two main categories: the first seven values are assessments of Union officers, the last four are statements which interpreted the question as being about the respondent's own involvement in the union.

	percentage of sample (rounded)
A combination of welfare and personal gain	11
Concern for welfare of crews	8
Personal gain	8
Personal qualities of officers	7
General statement of approval of the Union	3
Disparagement of the Union	7
Statements about the interest of the work	12
Statements about the need for a collectivist approach to work	12
Need for bargaining mediators	14
Personally involved	3
Non-involved	4
Don't know	8

Overall then, there is a perception of the Union as a provider of necessary services. The lack of expressed collectivistic or solidaristic attitudes is in line with general findings (cf. Chapter 5 of Goldthorpe et al (1968) for particular references, Chapter 6 of Fox (1974) for a general assessment of the place of Trade Unions in the institutionalised framework of industrial relations).

This general approval of Union activities, though with reservation, is echoed by reported voting in General Elections. Without repeating the detailed responses, the majority sentiment is pro-Labour, 63.6 per cent of the sample voting Labour, and of those 75 per cent made a general statement of

working class identity as the motive.

But since those who claimed some active involvement in politics is only 9.3. per cent, it makes more sense for the purposes of this section to move to Question 49, which asked for attitudes to strikes.

- | | |
|--|---------------|
| 1. The respondent would not voluntarily strike | 21.7 per cent |
| 2. The respondent would strike with Union support | 33.3 per cent |
| 3. The respondent would strike without Union support | 24.0 per cent |
| 4. The respondent would support a general strike | 17.1 per cent |
| (No answer 3.9 per cent) | |

Obviously the proper analysis of these results belongs to general political attitudes and "images of society" approaches, which are outwith the scope of this study (for example it would require fairly large scale explanation of why it is that the more settled workers in "traditional" working class areas, (Fife and Kilmarnock) who expressed strong solidarity with co-workers and general working class identity, were least willing to strike, while the more socially mobile crews at Milngavie saw the Unions as not being powerful enough, and were much more in favour of strike action. A valid explanation of these features would require too extensive a treatment for present purposes.

What can, in general, be gathered is an ambivalent attitude to their Union on the part of the crews, and I propose to proffer a partial analysis of this ambivalence by looking at the processes that the Union is involved in at the industrial relations level, rather than in trying to

induce explanations from the responses given in the survey.

The most obvious question that can be asked of Union activity is to enquire what part the Union plays in forming or controlling the working conditions of the crews. From an outsider's point of view, it might be expected that the T.G.W.U., with unchallenged activity in the bus industry, would be closely involved in ameliorating conditions at least in order to diminish the wastage rate. From the inside, I have commented in detail on exactly what pleasantness and unpleasantness crews can expect. Yet the T.G.W.U. takes no steps on such matters. Indeed the Scottish branch office has asked its members not to fight poorly maintained or deficient vehicles, because this cuts the profitability of the companies. They seem unaware of the contradiction that it is the country areas, most threatened by redundancy through closure of "unprofitable" routes, that have the better maintained vehicles, and not the largely profitable urban areas: it is of course also the urban areas which have the staff recruitment difficulties! No steps are taken nationally to deal with poor management, shift structures, assaults on crews, differences in earnings, unbalanced work loads, split shifts, timing schedules etc. etc. - all the struggles that the crews are daily involved in. The lack of co-ordination means that Kilmarlock depot of the S.B.G. can negotiate to do away with split shifts, while the New Street depot of the same company carries about fifty per cent of its shifts split: conditions of production are unchallenged.

At a more general level the T.G.W.U. sees itself as having presided over a slip in the desirability of "a job on the buses" from second highest before the War to very near the bottom of its job preference scale. It has presided over a series of unofficial strikes, where it has seemed more to dispute with its own members than with the employers, it sees itself as having been ineffective in keeping up wages (even here it is wrong, busmen have done relatively better than the average in this respect in the period 1948-1965 (Devons et al 1968).)

Whether this emphasis solely on wage bargaining is due to confounding of two bureaucracies caught up in a process of identity (my informant even said "we" when he meant the S.B.G.: he also hinted that he was consulted when a director concerned with Union activities was appointed) or not, it does point to a serious difference between general union policy, the role of the Shop Stewards at each depot, and the struggle at the point of production by the crews.¹

One of the first consequences of this division is that conditions vary from one part of the country to another, because of a lack of coherent policy and action by the Union, or indeed interest and co-ordination at National level regarding conditions. Thus even within the same type of organisation of City Transport, conditions seen as sources of strain by crews will have been solved in one place but not in another (the fare collection method and timing of one man buses is a prime example, or even rates of pay for O.M.O. work: many of the perceived problems have been solved in

Edinburgh, but not in Glasgow, or indeed from one part to another of the same organisation (e.g. condition of vehicles within the S.B.G.)).

Now of course, these differences exist primarily because of different management decisions but conditions are seen to be better in some parts of the country because of local union activity.

But the main consequence relates to the partial conflict between the formal, national policy and negotiation function, and the local struggle for control.

The conflict derives from the wish of the crews to use the Union to ameliorate the local problems they encounter, and the lack of an organisational framework connecting local wishes with an effective means of carrying them out. A local shop steward may be able to carry through some actions, but he will very quickly be baulked by general management decisions. Note here that the local D.T.S. has very limited managerial functions so that many decisions on small but important details are enforced by fiat from traffic manager or general manager level. Not surprisingly, general managers are not keen to negotiate with shop stewards. Yet the one person who can and does - the D.T.S. - is not free to make managerial changes. Thus attempts to carry out improvements in local working conditions are baulked through lack of concerted Union action; local Union action being met with statements of general management policy.

For example, local concern over the provision of "Pay as you Enter" illuminated signs can be fobbed off with

arguments about the cost of provision, or local requests about local difficult timings remain piecemeal and ineffectual instead of being incorporated into national policy on "reasonable" timings according to stated criteria of traffic and passenger densities.

In this way, not only the reasonable "mitigation of unpleasantness" (cf. Clarke and Clements 1978: 225, referring to Goodrich's work) that the crews ostensibly seek, is stifled, but in terms of general class struggle, the Union's policy cuts off the possibility of connecting struggle for control at the point of production to a challenge to the whole capitalist rationality behind the organisation.

Not surprisingly, there exists a deep sense of frustration and resentment relating to this conflict, though not perhaps always clearly attributed to this lack of continuity in Union organisation. But the resentment and frustration is directed at local and national Union activity: in feelings of the uselessness of local participation, and resentment of Regional officials. Both sets are seen as "being in management's pockets".

The frustration is even more easily directed against the Union in general since the main interest of the job - the pay - is not only not a concern of the local shop stewards, not even of the Regional officers, but of a national negotiating committee. So great is the resentment at this arrangement, that Glasgow busmen succeeded in pulling out of the

National Committee, against the advice of full-time officials, while withdrawal from the National negotiating machinery was one of the main demands of the 1969 S.B.G. strike.

It is against such a background that statements that "They're only in it for themselves" have to be seen.

Associated with this is the feeling that "The Union is in the pockets of management. They're all in it together".

And indeed there is a certain amount of truth in this. For some degree of consensus is necessary in order to negotiate at all. But it is a far cry from the ordinary busman's resentment at a hard nine hours graft in a twelve and a half hour split shift and the pay he gets for it, to the National Joint Council for the Omnibus Industry negotiating table. It is hardly surprising that the connections between the two are not often perceived by crews, while those who do see the connection may very well condemn as inadequate the efforts made on their behalf. (Especially since the Union officials themselves involved admit they were worsted in negotiation in the late 50s and 60s, the period that saw the collapse of the "traditional" busman's world.)

Certainly this is one area where it might be in the Union's own interests to improve communication with their own members. For at present the only channels are the infrequent garage Union meetings. As an illustration, in the 1969 strike, many of the crews were initially unaware that pay negotiations were due, and a strike over a local dispute blew up into a full-scale unofficial strike over pay involving virtually the whole of the S.B.G., with the members being

condemned by their own Union officials for interfering with wage negotiations.

The really significant feature of the 1969 strike is that a dispute over local working conditions became incorporated in pay negotiations, to the very great discomfiture of the national union negotiators. The T.G.W.U. found itself dealing with a shop-steward-led movement effectively breaking up the accommodations between management and union. This effort to supercede the union bureaucratic control did gain a major concession - the Monday to Friday week (though this is a doubtful gain in retrospect, since it necessitates week-end working in an industry run on overtime, while ~~suiting~~ management's policy of cutting unremunerative week-end services), something which did materially affect conditions of work and enhanced overtime payments. This challenge to Union control, this carrying through of action over working conditions to the national negotiations, is a significant marker, and the willingness to strike probably accounted for the advantageous settlements on conversion to one-man operation (though again this is two-edged, since it creates redundancies). However, this occasional break-through should not disguise the situation that local Union activity is generally related to the welfare of members negotiating on members' behalf in disciplinary actions, and discussing the allocation of work and overtime, an area long won for Union control - indeed G.C.T. will not dispense overtime working to non-Union members. Even what action there is has to struggle against a national Union policy that sees no conflict of interest in asking members not to try to improve conditions of work in case this threatens the financial standing of the employers, seemingly unaware that this implies direct

subsidy of their employers by the work force.

Discussion of the allocation of work - which usually only involves a limited number of members is the most commonly reported topic of discussion at Union meetings. Since it generally only involves a few workers, who are concerned (usually) about what they feel to be an unfair allocation of overtime, meetings tend to be heatedly acrimonious and not of interest to the majority of members. A word of explanation is necessary. In the country areas like, say, the Fife depots in my groups, overtime is limited, but to avoid favouritism by the inspectors, the allocation is supervised by the Union. In New Street, overtime is plentiful, but again the allocation of "senior" work such as London journeys, and of recognizably light shifts, are in the supervision of the Union. On the one hand struggle at work is nullified by failure of the "formal" politics of the Trade Union to deal with the realities of the bus crews' job, while the accommodation at inter-organisational level is matched, on the other hand, by a local accommodation, and even collusion, through the emergence of depot power groups based on Union activity.

It would be surprising if such a power group did not exist. After all Unions do have a weight even at local level, and they also have Shop Stewards and "Committee Men" who engage in discussion with the D.T.S., and control allocation of duties, overtime, local pay arrangements, welfare benefits etc. Certainly in New Street, the "Union men" are seen to be, if not powerful in the sense of directly influencing the other crews' position or tasks, then they are seen to be associated with other power groups in the garage, and partake of that intangible power. The Union men are seen to be on equal conversational terms with the Control room. Even the Regulators curb their sourness

when speaking to them. The Union men can persuade or dissuade the D.T.s in disciplinary cases: they are involved with the powerful schedules department in allocating work. The Union, or rather being active in the Union, is seen as a way of promotion. (This is openly admitted by the national bus officer, and is seen as "natural".) Active shop stewards are seen by the crews to be "bought off" by being offered Control jobs. And certainly in New Street there is the evidence that the Chief Schedules Clerk, a man almost universally hated for his intolerant unwillingness and inflexibility about small requests for re-arrangement of duties or working partners, is himself a former shop steward. Some of the depot drivers and other schedules clerks have been active union members. Whether Union activity is "factually" a good way to other posts cannot be established here: but the feeling of many crews that this is the case is a very real one.

Similarly one could expect a certain amount of internal "power" manoeuvring.

Certainly Schaffer (in a private communication) in her discussions on changes in the detailed working of Glasgow Corporation to combat vandalism and assaults with Union representatives and management, found that the Union had been inefficacious in pressing for changes, and that Schaffer's suggestions were seen as a threat to Union autonomy, in a way that she felt could only be related to a feeling of insecurity by Union officials concerned with internal attacks on their own positions. Schaffer cites one

case of a curfew in one area being called, not because of any particularly bad incident, but because one Shop Steward wished to counter an attack on his authority by showing he was powerful enough to be able to call a curfew. Schaffer reports an insistence generally on the power to call a curfew (which she argues is counter-productive) rather than adoption of measures to combat specific types of vandalism, assaults and fare-dodging: i.e. subversion of revolt against the labour process.

One other feature of bus organizations which would not only help internal union structure, but would also account for some of the lack of interest in the Union, is that many of the recruits to the industry are young, with young families and other commitments, who do not stay long enough in the industry to find out what the issues are and what Union processes exist. To them, a Union meeting is an ill managed squabble among "senior" crews about issues which do not touch the interests of the newcomer.

But there is one activity of the Union which recruits do learn about - the right to have a "Union man" in attendance at Disciplinary hearings. Most crews find themselves "on the mat" at some time, but whether or not they have the Union man there depends on their own assessment of how serious the matter is and whether special pleading will be necessary. In this respect the bus industry would seem to be unique. Many industries involve tasks hedged about with petty restrictions and penalties for omissions or commissions by workers. But as far as I know the bus industry is unique in having what amounts to a formal trial system which has an

unnamed prosecutor, a judge and executor in the form of an authority figure who is also responsible for hiring and firing personnel.

A note will be sent to the "offender". This note, in New Street is called a "Come and see me" and requests the person concerned to attend on the D.T.S. This will be in the person's own time. Even worse, in Glasgow, the locus for the appointment, with the Chief Divisional Inspector, is in the centre of town, though of course the garages are all on the periphery. Though the offender is required to be in uniform - and the full uniform at that, since it is of course a further offence to be "incorrectly dressed", he is unpaid for this time even if found to be "innocent".

He will only be informed of what the "charge" is when he is actually interviewed (and since no particular time is stated, he may have to go several times before he finds the D.T.S. available).

This charge is quite likely to be anonymous in that the form is "A passenger has complained . . ." Here the person has to try to recall past incidents, and then give an account of whether he, say, used abusive language, as was alleged, or why he did, or how best to deny the incident altogether. To be fair, recently there has been a change in that it is no longer automatically the case that "the customer is right", as was the case till the mid-60s. But no matter what actually happened, even if the person's response was justified, he is unlikely to escape the "punishment" of a homily on public-crew relations.

As is apparent from the accounts of drivers' and crews'

tasks, the possibility of making a mistake or infringing a rule is very likely indeed. It is only the difficulties of maintaining constant supervision which prevent constant attendance on the D.T.S. Mention has, of course, been made of the necessity of some rule-breaking in order to make the system work at all. There is also the curious feature of the busmans' work that he is very often unaware of having made a mistake (and thereby committed an offence!) until and unless a boarding inspector notes the wrongly priced ticket, wrong fare stage, a ticket reading outwards instead of inwards etc. etc.

Many of these mistakes, which might be considered trivial, are however dealt with by the same disciplinary process as the more serious charges of deliberately defrauding the Company. Of course from the supervisory point of view it may be impossible to distinguish between a mistakenly and a deliberately missed fare. The presumption is, as one might expect in such an oddly constituted "trial", one of guilt. In this respect, also, the inspectors' account of a breach is accepted as being the "truth", with the person charged put in the position of being able to advance pleas in mitigation, since there is often no way of establishing "what really happened".

It is maybe as much a recognition of this curious feature as much as a shortage of staff, that results in a statement on the lines of "don't do it again" as the final judgement on the person. But such a finding of "guilty" is recorded, and is no doubt used to build up a picture of the

desirability of continuing to employ the person.

Because of the relative inability to do much about the myriad of what are, despite the use of the full authority of the D.T.S., somewhat petty and trivial breaches of what is only Company policy, rather than criminal acts (even where the 1930 Road Traffic Act has allegedly been breached, this is still seen as an internal Company matter) few crews seek to have the Shop Steward with them in such an interview, though the right to have him there is recognised.

But the Shop Steward can be involved, usually where the outcome involves suspension or even on occasion, dismissal. As an aside it may be noted that Union men are not over-keen to establish interest in "junior" crews, perhaps because they are more likely to (a) make mistakes (b) have to be shown either to be honest, or intelligent enough to get away with fraud or rule-breaking - both of which claim the time and effort of the Shop Steward.

But where the Shop Steward is involved, the whole process becomes even more strange. For the situation is not only one of "trial" with presumption of guilt and prosecutor judge and executioner bound up in an authority figure who is also effectively a person's employer, but the Union is involved in what is quasi-judicial management function. And note the very real nature of the "sentence" if it involves suspension. Bus workers are no longer fined for mistakes but suspension involves loss of pay, while a person may find himself doubly penalised by a "warning suspension" if he hands in too many "shorts". Not only does the Union

necessarily compromise itself by being involved in mitigating arguments, which necessarily endorses the "justice" of the disciplinary procedure, but it endorses the "guilty" finding since it would be an ill-thought action for an employee vehemently to pursue his case - rather as some minor offences in the broader field of justice are best plead guilty to, because the sentence is much lighter.

One can also speculate that some form of "ground rules" for deciding both whether an employee will be of long-term value, and what form of "sentence" should be used, are worked out between Shop Steward and D.T.S. This does of course involve both D.T.S. and Shop Steward deciding whether the person is "the right sort" for bus work. This is of course a moral judgement dependent on a curious agreement between the D.T.S. and Shop Steward, who are formally in a position of contention.

Part of the explanation for this, which is perhaps also the explanation for the incorporation of some of the union activists into management is the agreement about "the right sort". For it is a feature of the industry that despite the inadequacies, and the efforts to overcome these inadequacies, and the horrors perpetrated on the public, there is a strongly prevailing idea of "service" - an idea shared by both management and men, though neither actually fully endorse the detailed application of the idea. Thus, while the "ideal type" is held to be desirable, no real attempt is made to overcome the organisational barriers to its achievement.

Indeed the Shop Steward, by being involved in disciplinary proceedings, mainly in a mitigating role, establishes the ignoring of the underlying exploitative nature of the process, discussed in Chapter One and illustrated in subsequent chapters.

The theme of the "right sort" of worker appears in the policy of over-manning at New Street, which has the effect of making the union tardy in contacting "New Starts" to enrol them in the Union.

For as already mentioned, the Union does not wish to engage itself with staff who may be found to be "unsuitable", short-term employees. (This of course is a partially self-reinforcing action by the Union, since it enhances the isolation of the new recruit and makes the common problems and difficulties individual ones.)

But this is enhanced at New Street by the practice of taking on extra staff to cope with the busier summer months. While some of the staff taken on are students, non-students are also taken on from May. But this results in over-manning in the less busy months from October. Fortunately for the management, "industrial misdemeanours" are so frequent, and especially among newcomers, that dismissal easily takes the place of redundancy. This period also allows dismissing those employees who in some way are not considered suitable. (One example was a conductor who had run foul of the Control and Schedules Department. He was dismissed for sleeping in. He took his case to an Industrial Tribunal, and was reinstated on the grounds that his record was no worse than many others not dismissed. However, he was always very careful

to be absolutely correct - a great strain - e.g. he was the only conductor who formally kept the driver to time.) But not all of the new starts are dismissed: some judged "suitable" are kept on. And since the "Union Man" will be potentially involved in dismissal cases, his perception of the employee, as well as the D.T.S.'s (and also the Schedules Clerk, who may have alerted the D.T.S. by reviewing the record, which the Schedules Clerk has in his care) is crucial in determining whether the employee is retained or not. Thus the Union is not over-anxious to enroll new starts: its main concern is the maintenance of the conditions that come the way of the core of long-term staff. For the achievement of this aim, it participates in the complicity to regulate seasonal fluctuations through dismissal, effectively through "disciplinary proceedings".

As a final comment, Huw Beynon's thesis can be noted (Beynon 1973). Beynon sees the union activity of car workers as an outcome of the conditions of work.

But Union activity of the kind Beynon found is apparently missing in the bus industry. Despite the conditions I have described, virtually no union activity is directed at amelioration of the conditions. It is outwith the scope of this thesis to provide an answer - I was not concerned with Unions per se.

But the explanation may lie in the following factors. The most obvious one is that bus crews work in isolation. Unlike the assembly line, an intolerable work-pace is not an

immediately shared common experience, but an individual problem. It is also a problem that may be an outcome of random factors operating infrequently. But probably most importantly, some of the intolerable conditions can be overcome. To do so involves breaking the rules as has been described, but this is possible because of the limited supervision. There is a tacit understanding that some of the rule breaking is in a sense legitimate, and it is the mitigating arguments of the Shop Steward which make the system workable. But mitigating arguments are necessarily a form of persuasion. A direct conflict of interests is thus avoided. The result is that the local representative of management - the D.T.S. is in a situation of negotiation about the moral worth of personnel. Other issues, such as conditions of work are outside such meetings since they are defined as "general economic matters" not within the sphere of action of the D.T.S.

But these general issues are also outwith the scope of any one garage Shop Steward. There is no co-ordination between garages at Shop Steward level, no means of expressing the resentment of the crews of the conditions they meet.

In sum, no opposition is seen between the interests of management and that of the Union members, or rather Union officials at national level, except for how much the industry can "afford" to pay: there is no locus for discussion of actual conditions of work, while the local activity of the Union branch involves the creation of a *modus vivendi* between the crews' representative and immediate management.

The themes of Union oligarchic structure and failure to represent workers at anything other than wage negotiation are fairly well rehearsed and need no more than passing reference (cf. Clarke and Clements 1978 for an extensive review).

Clarke and Clements (ibid: 16) sum up the situation as regards the T.G.W.U. pungently:

Therefore the conventional role of trade unionism may be accepted as merely a protective function exercised within the constraints of capitalist domination of the employment contract: collective negotiation may secure better terms for the sale of labour power - but it does not begin to question the acceptability of wage slavery.

This acceptance brings them into conflict with the interests of their own members.

As I noted, for busmen the alternative of basing a wide class struggle on the issues of control of production was rejected by Morrison and Bevin, who engaged in political machination to this end: their rationale that technology is neutral, and can be controlled in the public interest is given the lie in this thesis, for management and worker rationales of the organisation of the labour process are fundamentally opposed: for the worker the labour process involves a struggle denied by Union accommodations and the hegemony of the economic system: for managers control of the labour process is an expression of power.

The position of the T.G.W.U. is clearly shown not only by its unwillingness to recognise, far less act on the real political struggles of its members at the point of production,

but its failure to involve itself in issues which have the kind of general "welfare" aims that would prove acceptable - e.g. integrated transport systems, in which bus services could be rationally planned to be complementary to other transport systems, instead of in market-place competition with them, or advocating bus transport as a social service, with other means of funding and low fares for the mainly working class users. In these respects the present T.G.W.U. has regressed from the position of the municipalities in the nineteen hundreds.

Note: Chapter Ten

¹ This "monolith shall speak unto monolith" is of course not peculiar to the bus industry, but in this case it is relevant to point to the struggle (noted in Chapter One) in the 1930s between Ernest Bevin and the syndicalist rank-and-file movement in London Transport, based partly on the busmen's fears that issues like control at the point of production would be lost - and how right they were. In this case rank-and-file members were expelled from the T.G.W.U.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: On the Road

Capitalism always seeks to extend its control over labour power. For the period 1930-1975 this tendency was put in abeyance in the bus industry, given the success of the structure of domination set up circa 1930. Of the general domination, I wish to note particularly the devastatingly simple organisational constraint of having to be at a specified place at a particular time. This is the principle means of immediate control of the use of the crews' labour power. Much of the crews' energy is spent in overcoming fluctuations in the work process to meet this overriding aim - maintaining the headway - and it is clear that intensification of labour use had reached a "state of the art" perfection round about 1940, i.e. the timings of 1940 were as labour-intensive as possible. And no doubt the achievement of this degree of domination was helped by the large reserve of labour and the relatively high status and pay of bus workers.

But it is evident that intensification of the labour process effectively took place in the period 1950 - to date, predating the intensification of one-man operation and attendant changes of the mid 1970s, and to which this latter intensification is in a sense, a response. Simply, congestion in towns increased, while a moribund management, for reasons outlined in Chapter One, failed to respond, effectively leaving crews to struggle against increasing difficult working conditions. A vicious decline was set up in which the increasing exploitation of labour led to resignations (and dismissals because it became necessary to break more rules more often to maintain

the headway - an organisational principle whose importance the crews recognised, even if it appears to have been overlooked by management), which led to recruitment of less experienced staff less able to cope with the increasingly intense work, and less able to defend pay and status, which latter decline led to a loss of attractiveness of the job, which led to higher turnover, lack of staff and disruption of the resources necessary to maintain the organisation. Falling revenue caused by the same use of cars as was disrupting services increased the difficulties of response to deal with the changed organisational environment. These effects have been well expressed by Bendixson (1974):

So much for the heady atmosphere of theory.
Down in the real world one finds windswept bus shelters, bronchial passengers and a decline in the use of buses in the last twenty years that has been nothing less than phenomenal. Between 1951 and 1971 the number of people carried by buses in Britain dropped by half, a black record approached by few industries . . .

. . . In the 1960s it was common for busmen to attribute the predicament of their industry to the change from a six- to a five-day week, which not only lost them the fares of their Saturday commuters but also made it more difficult for them to recruit drivers. The conquest of the cinema by television and the availability of a growing fleet of private cars were advanced as contributing causes of decline.

(This is confirmed by my own research in that these reasons are adduced in the Glasgow Corporation Transport Report for 1966. In line with Bendixson's arguments, other reasons were not mentioned.)

. . . All these changes did no doubt cause people to travel less by bus but there were other equally

powerful forces at work. The miasma of congestion was destroying the regularity and dependability of services. Passengers found themselves waiting longer at stops and taking longer to get to their destinations once they were aboard. Faced with such frustrations they first cursed the conductor, lowering staff morale, and secondly vowed never to ride in a blasted bus again if they could possibly help it . . . Profitability was expected (of the bus companies) even when their passengers started deserting them. Fifteen years of skimping and scraping ensued, as the companies tried to pay all or most of their running costs out of dwindling or at least slow-rising incomes. Maintenance depots got grottier, staff canteens got grimier and the buses themselves got older and creakier.

(Bendixson: 74)

Brutally, the response of management seems to have been putting their heads in the sand, leaving low paid, and inexperienced crews in a struggle against the realities of more intensive work and defective organisation, to compound the general struggle against domination. It says much for the crews' resilience that they have been able still to subvert and recreate the labour process.

As might be expected it is the cities which have the worst conditions. (The density of service means also that wheel-time is much higher, so that meal breaks can be brought down to the legal minimum of twenty minutes.) There is clearly a connection between the intensity of work in Glasgow and the common assessment that bus work is "the last card in the pack", which stands in contrast with the much greater degree of self respect of rural-based crews (and incidently shows that the "same" technology has different effects, related not to different attitudes to work as Blackburn and Beynon (1972) illustrate, but to the forces of production which dictate the intensity of

effort involved; which illustrates the inadequacy of thought in Appendix I).

But the distinction in exploitation of labour is not simply a Company versus City organisation one. I propose to illustrate the sort of conflicts set up among crews and give some kind of flavour of what bus work is like by relating at length one work experience. Bear in mind that similar experience will be heppening all over the country: this account is illustrative of the reality of present day bus work.

The shift started at 6.40, not a bad time for an "early broker". Out to Livingston and back, then off till the 12.10 Leven, followed by "Assist the 1605 Hawick", involving duplicating out to Newton Grange and back. Claim for Middleton, sign off 17.40, with a bit of luck and discouragement of intending passengers, in the garage for 17.10, with the extra time, just make up the eight hours for the shift (the schedules office would make up the eight hours, of course, but you'd miss the penalty payment for spread-over without the extra claim). There wasn't much of note about the Leven or the Hawick duplicate, but the 06.55 201 to Livingston was interesting.

Leaving on an outward journey to a satellite town involves little trouble. There's time for a more leisurely search for the bus in the diesel smoke of the garage. Of course, since this is simply one duplicate run for a commuter load of passengers, it's one of the old double deckers. This means a rather more uncomfortable journey for us, but its tolerable when only one of the journeys is busy.

Expectations of a quiet time are confirmed in the bus station, while Willy (my conductor) strolls off for a Sun, the solitary passenger boards. There is little point in leaving dead on time, because there is little chance of being held up by passengers or other traffic, so Willy and I have a chat, leaning against the warmth of the radiator.

It so happens that Willy is living at his mistress's in Livingston and is in the ironic position of having to leave the house at 5.30 to hitch a lift the seventeen miles to the depot to sign on at 6.35. He plans to jump off before the terminus,

for he has just enough time to walk home, have a cup of tea and walk up to the terminus in the lay-over time. I pointedly remark that he'd better not jump off before I know where I'm going, for I have never been on this particular new route, and Livingston is a notoriously difficult place to find a bus route in. So Willy gives me a fair idea of the way to go, promising not to jump off till I'm pointed the right way. Our conversation is interrupted by the arrival of the Whitburn bus. He is due away five minutes ahead of us, but obviously suffers from the delays caused by not having the same conductor every day, and is now caught behind us in the stance. Its a bit inconvenient to leave exactly on time on this journey, but here there is no option but to go in order to free the bus behind.

So this first morning, we leave on time. The preferred pattern is to leave several minutes late, and then travel at full speed, this making for a more absorbing journey by calling for the fuller attention given to driving flat out. "Flat out", it should be realised, is in the case of the bus we have this morning, 38 m.p.h. Driving flat out (as is explained elsewhere) is not a case of high speed, but of the optimum speed in stopping and starting and cornering, which calls for high concentration and co-ordination.

Having left on time, though, I can give some attention to the pleasures of the early morning, and indulge in a relaxing ride in the country. Instead of catching up on time, I can play the game of regulating the speed so as to arrive at the timing points exactly on time (i.e. travelling for four or five

miles in exactly the time allotted). We pick up a couple more passengers on the way out before we pass the last timing point. It's worth speeding up here, since there should be no more passengers, and running a bit early will allow Willy more time at home.

We successfully negotiate the intricacies of Livingston's road lay-out. Willy has politically decided to stay on, having observed a couple of inspectors standing at a bus stop near his jumping-off point, so I have the benefit of his humorously concocted signs when I look over my shoulder into the saloon of the bus. It's just as well he stays on, because the road to the Fire Station terminus is a round-about one, and more direct routes would have presented themselves.

During the journey, Willy has arranged that the one passenger who travels all the way should do duty on the bell if necessary for the rest of the week, after Willy gets off, and should ward off any sleepy morning passengers who try to get on under the impression that the bus is going on as far as Bathgate, and not stopping short at the Fire Station.

The terminus is a little haven of quiet after the constant threshing of the bus engine. Time for a chat and quick scan of the Sun. Willy, of course, has had time for a thorough perusal (in blatant disregard of company rules) on the outgoing journey.

We're due off at 07.53, so at 7.50 I'm standing on the platform having a last sniff of fresh air, when Willy says:-

"There he's away through now."

"Who?"

"The 7.55. He comes from Bathgate and is due down the road two minutes behind us. He'll no be very pleased to be ahead of us."

Having an idea of myself being a driver willing to co-operate, until events bring me to other conclusions, I realise that I'd better get a move on, if the other crew and ourselves are going to co-ordinate.

The ideal way of acting is for the two buses to do "stop for stop" - to go in tandem, picking up passengers at alternate stops - particularly if there is going to be heavy passenger loading, as there is on this journey. Since the pattern of working for the week is established on Mondays, I have to get a move on to catch up on the other bus, so as not to appear a "crawler". As it is we leave exactly at the official time - 7.53.

As we entered the long sweep down-hill through the houses, I saw that he had already cleared the first stop, and he was coming into sight leaving the second, and we passed as he pulled into the crowded third. He was pretty full, so I wasn't surprised when he didn't catch up for the busy fourth and fifth stops. By the time the sixth and seventh stops were cleared, I was pretty sure that he was "hanging back", for each stop had taken at least a minute to clear, and he should have had time to catch up, since of course, he has had no passengers to uplift. I can only conclude that he's feeling resentful that we weren't down through the scheme first, even if it is his own fault for running five minutes early.

At this point in the route there is a gap in the housing

where the road runs under the main dual carriageways through Livingston, before running again for a short distance through a housing area. Here there are only two or three passengers, so it seems likely that a bus on a route that joins ours here has already gone through.

By the time we approach Mid Calder the bus behind has caught up, and we go stop for stop into Edinburgh, though the other bus goes ahead. The Bathgate bus clears most of Sighthill - the section within the city boundary, which I'm quite pleased about, since Willy hates "scratchers" (the term for passengers within the city boundary).

It being a journey due in the Bus Station at 8.50, there is a considerable amount of traffic congestion, so we end up almost ten minutes late at the Bus Station. This is quite normal for this time of day, and since we finish with this journey, we submit a "Traffic Delay of ten minutes" on the time card for the shift. This helps bring the shift up to eight hours.

The week progressed this way:-

The next day we again left the Livingston terminus at 7.53. It soon became clear that the Bathgate bus was going to let us do all the work. This wasn't too bad, since the worst day for the conductor is Monday with its Weekly Tickets, and Willy likes to be busy anyway. So I just took it nice and easy downhill, noting the "crawling" of the bus behind pretending to be stopping behind to set down passengers.

After we'd cleared most of the "skulls", the Bathgate driver decided there wasn't much point in hanging back, and

overtook, pressing ahead all the way to Edinburgh. Since we were six or seven minutes early at the city boundary, he was getting on for ten to fifteen minutes early. This of course suited us since Sighthill was being cleared of most of its scratchers.

Now it should be understood that from the Bathgate crew's point of view, they had to arrive at the Bus Station in time. For they were on a straight through shift, and had their break of 25 minutes before continuing on the Edinburgh to Glasgow run which is rather heavy in terms of length of driving - it usually turns out as five hours without a significant break. Of course they realised they would be held up by traffic congestion, so tried to overcome this by running early. Being late was not important to us, since we got paid an extra ten minutes traffic delay time.

The pattern continued for that week. I resented being so blatantly "pushed" down the road, but was willing to trade that off against being able to get down the city roads relatively unscathed. I should note that this resentment was based on a feeling of flouted justice, not on feeling that I had to work too hard. For it so happened that the busy section of the route was for once generously timed, so there was the rare circumstance of having high passenger loadings without fighting the clock. In addition, the high passenger loadings were only for two miles. After that most of the passengers had already been lifted by buses timed five minutes ahead of us where the routes joined. (This was, of course, a further reason for not hurrying too much on the first stage

of the journey: that, and giving Willy time to organize the taking of fares.)

Thus by the end of the week, the pattern had been established. We left on time, went leisurely through the estate until the Bathgate bus overtook with a touching presentation of expending every effort to catch up, while we followed him in at a sedate pace, avoiding most of the scratchers.

The same shift came round in its four week course.

Willy and I agreed, after he had returned from his morning cup of tea, that it was only fair to do all we could to help the Bathgate crew out. Neither of us envied them the shift, but we both resented the exploitation of being pushed down the road. We'd also discussed the pattern with one of the inspectors, because we felt that the job would be easier given close co-operation. We'd got a certain amount of sympathy, plus the information that while the inspectors weren't worried about the duplicate's running early (for a duplicate is what we were in effect), they wouldn't tolerate the service bus running ten minutes early.

With this in mind, Willy and I decided to give the other crew a chance. This was further backed up by Willy deciding that it might even be a good idea to get a "swinger" - a full load, and thus avoid having to stop at all on the way into Edinburgh.

So we left a couple of minutes early and belted down the road. We managed to get a full load by mistake, by getting in front of the 27, which was actually late. Being late on a Monday morning is a common occurrence, given the combination

of having a conductor under more than normal pressure, and not knowing the passenger or traffic loadings ahead, and thus not being able to regulate timing accordingly. For instance the 27 in question is due in at 08.40, and leaves again at 08.47 on another local journey. To get in and out in time means right up to time all the way and about ten minutes early at the city boundary.

Having a full load eased some of the pressure of wondering what the other bus was doing.

We repeated the process on Tuesday, again "clearing the road" but this time slotting neatly some three or four minutes behind the 27 (there's a limit to philanthropism).

It was on the Wednesday that it happened: We left at the right time, and at the junction cut in front of the Bathgate bus, which I recognised as one of the old beat up buses, instead of the more modern (and faster) bus they normally had. Taking things easy, again the response of the other crew was to hang back, overtaking only at the last stop.

O.K., I thought, I've got my load, you can get yours now.

We followed down. There was no need to go flat out till nearer the city, and then we'd still hit the timing point about six or seven minutes early - a useful margin for unexpected contingencies, but not so early as to cause comment or "booking" by an inspector.

He was waiting for us at Mid Calder, the Bathgate driver. Waving us down. Apoplectic.

Pull in behind, slide back the window as he stands in

front of the bus (a foolish position, I think to myself, I wouldn't do that).

"What d'ye mean?"

"Let's see your duty board!"

By this time Willy has come round to the front, ready to join in anything, but, as etiquette demands, leaving the negotiation to the driver.

"No, I'll let you know anything you need to know. What's your complaint?"

"What time are you due here?"

"Eight minutes past. And I'm exactly on time. You're due here at ten minutes past."

"What bus are you?"

"The 7.53 from the Fire Station, two minutes in front of you. And we've cleared the road for you every day this week. But I'm not running ten minutes early to suit you."

"Well Jesus Christ, we've got tae get our breakfast, and there's no chance with the old shit heap. 37 fucking miles an hour! All the way tae fucking Glasgow 'n' back."

There's no chance to explain that if he helps us, we'll help him, for he sees the way things are going, and stomps off swearing that he'll see the Inspectors in the Square and find out what we're up to. He's just got time to hear the answer that he has already been discussed, and that we hope he will see the Inspectors.

Some sort of compromise is worked out by going in more or less together that day. (It would mean certain, bad trouble with this guy not to go stop for stop with him.)

Even here he doesn't seem to realise that there are few passengers to pick up, and anyway, to go too far in advance of time means overtaking the 27 in front, or even the 35 in front of that one.

The rest of the week is an uneasy truce. He now makes a token effort at taking a couple of stops, and under Willy's urging, I speed up the extra bit necessary to fit in with the Bathgate bus's efforts to be fifteen minutes early at the boundary. (Willy was a comparative newcomer to the job.)

Much discussion ensued between Willy and myself and other crews concerning the idiocy of the other driver, and how he was making things difficult for himself, and how we hoped he'd asked an Inspector why the 7.53 from Livingston Fire Station wasn't running ten minutes early at Mid Calder.

The next time we did the shift, it was a different driver.

It is clear that the constraints imposed by organisational structure are perceived differentially and lead to differential expectations of behaviour. Action based on such perceptions leads to working patterns not envisaged or controlled by the organisation.

Given that technical requirements dictated by the organisation are modified by the actor's perception of them, so much

more subject to the perception process are the social expectations involved in the job.

These expectations of social behaviour (i.e. behaviour of other actors in the situation) need more extensive treatment than can be given here - for present purposes they include factors such as age, experience in the job, whether from the same garage or not, the dyadic relation between driver and conductor, ones own skill in utilising resources to control the situation in one's own favour, task/occupational expectations (for example the expectation that crews will run early), perception of risks involved in not fulfilling organisational requirements etc.

(Perhaps "The buses" is an abnormal job in that it provides opportunity for a wider range than normal of general social characteristics to be brought into play.)

It should also be realised that these constraints are perceived relatively. Different crews will perceive and react to constraints or technological requirements in different ways, and at different times.

For example, time in my own case in this incident was relatively less of a constraint than for the other crew. I could run to time all the way knowing that I'd be ten minutes late, but knowing also that I'd be paid for that ten minutes, and that it was a necessary addition to my working day - further, that other crews on the same shift claimed the same timing, and it's important to keep up such similarities of claims. Even if I had not had another bus on the same route I would still have reckoned that the extra effort required in

running early was not justified.

One of the crucial factors involved in this situation was the conflict of unattainable organisational requirements and what were perceived as "reasonable" social expectations.

The Bathgate crew knew that the time allocated, though sufficient for the task from Livingston (or Bathgate, their starting point) was insufficient from the City Boundary inwards due to the traffic congestion. Further, their only meal break in what they felt was an arduous shift was of some twenty minutes, from 8.50 to 9.18. To lose ten or more minutes of this meal break had uncomfortable consequences, and hence this desire to at least get in on time. But getting in on time involved passing the Boundary timing point at least some ten minutes early, well outside the margin that might be allowed by an inspector.

A further factor is that although the Bathgate crew are very much aware of their problems, they have no way of communicating this state of affairs to other workers they might encounter on the road.

Communication among bus crews is by action, not words (unless this is an opportunity for verbal consultation about co-operation or otherwise). Such action is of course open to misinterpretation.

From the Bathgate crew's point of view, they had the pleasure of having a bus timed to go through Livingston two minutes in front of them (although it transpired that they were not aware of when exactly my bus was timed). Given this,

they evolved the strategy, not of sharing the load, but of "tailing" the bus in front. They had a reasonable expectation that my bus would wish to complete the journey as quickly as they did themselves. They failed to read correctly the communication effected by my bus's going slowly through Livingston. As already outlined, there was little point in my going flat out - I would be doing more of the work of the bus behind, would run the danger of catching up on the bus in front, and also run the risk of being "booked" for running early.

At this point, I hope it can be seen that there was a conflict of expectations taking place within a response involving manipulation of the organisational parameters. The conflict was a dual one. It was engendered by the Bathgate crew's having an organisational requirement that was physically not possible, which was in conflict with their expectation of a reasonable break from work. Their reaction met my expectation of an evenly spread co-operative approach to work, my own strategy to the journey I had to make.

Thus there came into existence a pattern of social action not envisaged by the organisation. Elements of this process lead to a conflict, which was not resolved.

Workers are involved in technology, but bring attitudes and other social paraphernalia with them. Some of these affect expectations of, and response to, and patterns within work - the workers respond to the work situation and evolve a new social pattern.

Crews act on the social environment, they are not simply dominated by the capitalist labour process.

It is evident that the crews react to the constraints put on them by the domination of the forces of production by using their control over the materials of production: the bus needs controlled, certainly, but it can also be used to manipulate the headway system in order to decrease the intensity of effort, effectively making the struggle for control of the crews into a different social system than the one envisaged by the bureaucratic structures of the employers. But this struggle for control is, as I shall show, contradictory in its nature.

However, while control over the task is relatively open, the organisational constraints are still massive, though themselves often random, fluctuating and unpredictable in nature.

The bus, qua material of production is of immense importance. Here, the inherent interest in our society in driving (with its opportunities for social and personal expression) are contradicted by the conditions in which the machine is used, which imposes often severe effort on the driver, while being a fairly physically unpleasant and taxing working environment for the conductor. However, these aspects are not inherently deleterious for the crews: it is the forces of production, the domination of the labour process by the rationality of the organisation which make them so,

e.g. it is the speed of operation which makes the vehicle an imposition, while conductors are only there at all as an (capitalist) efficient way of collecting revenue - other ways of running the transport infrastructure are easily conceptualisable, while conductors, even within capitalist rationality, can be done away with in relatively simple material ways.

Overcoming the constraints of the vehicle and task are important elements in the crews' self-estimation, but this self respect is based fundamentally on exploitation of their labour power.

The organisation of a route forms a second constraint on the crew. The headway system of buses coming at stated intervals is not only an organisationally convenient device which often fails to meet the reality of fluctuating loads, but is based on route timings which are aimed at maximising the exploitation of labour power through high speed. Inspectors are employed to check this operation, while dismissal ensues for those not up to the work. A particular exploitation is added here in that the organisation specifies a way of carrying out the task, supported by sanctions, which if adhered to, would preclude accomplishment of the task.

I have already discussed the fluctuations which a route can provide, and these obviously affect the effort needed to maintain the headway. As will become apparent, in extreme conditions (as occur very often in, say, Glasgow) it is not the stated time that matters, but the actual relative gap between vehicles.

Variations in this relative gap directly affect the work load of the crews, and therefore explain the necessity for crews to maintain control over the place of their vehicle.

For variations on the route have a tendency to destroy the headway. For example on a ten minute service, a one minute delay at a mere intersection, constitutes a need to catch up one-tenth of the total time of the headway, while at the same time, a following bus may go through successive sets, thus speeding up its progress - let us say even by a modest tenth (i.e. one minute) also. The gap between the two vehicles has now been reduced by one-fifth. If a constant number of passengers arriving in constant numbers is assumed (a rational assumption: ten minutes is a frequent service) the following bus has a reduction in its load of one-fifth. This enables it to go faster, since it is subject to a lessening of passenger delay factors of one-fifth, while the first bus is doing one tenth more work, this tending to slow it even further. The effect of this can be even more striking - the more frequent the headway, the greater the effect of such patterns.

There is also added to this the characteristic of urban areas having sudden increases in density of traffic at particular parts of a route. This causes "bunching", similar to that at the end of motorways, in which vehicles have their speed cut from 70 m.p.h. to 30 m.p.h. The effect on buses encountering different densities is the same; except that the "bunching" effect destroys the organisation's aim of a

regular headway. Note that this bunching effect is not under the control of any driver, it is an external environmental characteristic which the organisation does not control, though it assumes it is controllable by the driver: if the first bus is held up then subsequent buses come up behind it. The bunching pertains through the area of traffic density, the bunch is subject to similar constraints since there are no factors operating to spread the bunch. Even past the dense part, the bunching, once established, will still persist, since there are no effective factors to spread it out to the original headway gaps: in addition the dense traffic will have disrupted efforts to conform with the running time for at least some of the bunch: so much so that buses down the "tail" will start overtaking buses scheduled in front of them, in order to regain lost time, thus destroying the organisation's basic organisational principle of headway even further.

As will be explained, this possibility of bunching can be used by drivers among themselves deliberately, but it is enough to note here the unintended basic process.

Bunching does of course only occur where at least one driver has been so constrained by the extra-organisational feature of traffic density that he has lost control over the actual time/running time match. In these circumstances an important part of the driver's task is outwith his control. Needless to say, each driver seeks to avoid this lack of control. To emphasize the obvious: where vehicles are

bunched, the first bus does most of the work of carrying passengers, creating extra strenuous efforts by the drivers to catch up, and greatly increasing the number of passengers that the conductor has to deal with.

It might also be noted that many of the urban route timings were taken over from trams, which had the advantages of reserved track, and also a great lack of traffic lights at intersections. As an example, the timings for bus journeys along Glasgow's Argyle Street are the same as in 1902, but actual achieved times are 3 m.p.h. in 1968, as opposed to 9 m.p.h. in 1902! And of course, the buses on this route have the given average expected speed of about 12 m.p.h. (Source G.C.T. Report, 1968).

From the point of view of the driver as the person who by his actions effects the organisation's aims the disruption to the fundamental organisational principle of the headway, lies outwith his control over his task: it is an extra-organisational impinging by the environment, but one which the organisation utterly fails to take into account. The organisation has ways of dealing with the most extreme effects, by turning buses short of their terminuses, but no way of dealing with the fundamental difficulty of attempting to apply average speed requirements to fluctuating conditions. Or rather, it has a way: it has the option of increasing

running times to meet the known most delaying journey. But companies do not exercise this option, because they have apparently cheaper and more easily controlled ways of running close to their stated schedules, and that is to use the efforts of the drivers to overcome the delaying effect of traffic (and other delays). As Lamden put it, "Tight running times put the crews on their mettle." As a personal comment, "mettle" is not a word I would ever have thought to use to describe the aching shoulders, numbed leg muscles, and sick headache caused by flat out driving to maintain a 12 m.p.h. average speed. The real reasons for this panglossic phrase are that (a) increasing running time is expensive, because more buses and crews have to be used to provide the same level of service, and (b) Managements generally have the fear of being unable to control their drivers in stopping them from running early. For this reason the running times tend to be related (in so far as they are worked out at all) to the quietest conditions. So that the difficulty of achieving the running times is used as a performance control in a situation that does not easily permit the more normal industrial supervision of work. This of course increases the disruption in busy times. This difficulty of maintaining running times is thus deliberately built into the driver's job: control over his task is threatened by the very organisation whose aims he is required to effect. To add irony and contradiction even further: the ability of a driver to keep up to these rather arbitrarily imposed standards is highly regarded by the crews themselves: the work group

socially sustains the achievement of management's aims, though of course they focus on the ability to win against the odds - even though this ability may be the negative one of not being late - i.e. the efforts to keep up to time can be so great as to call into being judgements of value of a man's ability to overcome the negative quality of doing what management requires and only just being in control of the task.

The opposite is also the case: drivers never mention the difficulties in case it affects their rather "machismo" image. One fairly new driver's statement that he never got to the terminus of a notoriously hard route on time was greeted by a rather embarrassed silence: his remark was not taken up as a topic of conversation even though many of the other drivers shared his "failing". But the resentment of "timing" does form a topic of talk and they do discuss individual incidents that they had to overcome to avoid being late.

In this context the contrast with "company driving" has to be seen. The driver must, just to keep to time, evolve a way of driving which is fast, yet safe, and which thus clashes with the company directions, which concentrate only on "Safety". Yet, of course, the management refuses to acknowledge that their style of "safe" driving is incompatible with maintaining timetables.

It should now be becoming apparent that there is a peculiar feature of bus work, as it affects individual crews.

There are a number of randomly operating and fluctuating factors that together constitute "the work" to be done. But these factors, either singly or together, can act so as to overcome the driver's running to time, and thus his control over his task. But the more the driver loses control over running time (the headway), the more he tends to do so.

If for any reason a bus is late, then obviously more people have had time to accumulate at any one stop. But the more people that there are, the longer the loading time becomes, and the longer the loading time, the later the bus gets . . . and so on in progressive fashion. If a bus becomes late, it does of course not only do its own work, but starts to do the work of the bus behind it - particularly if the route has a high frequency service. Since this is so, it continues to get progressively later, with the consequence that on a busy and tightly scheduled route, the bus behind starts to catch up (while the bus in front moves relatively further ahead, then increasing the numbers of intending passengers). Whether or not the bus behind will pass is an outcome of a number of factors taken up later.

But the consequences for the crew must also be taken into account. The driver is, in this sort of situation, doing more than his "share" of work. Being late, he may try to catch up, but he can only do this by extra effort. In any case, he is unlikely to be able to rest at the terminus, and of course, if he does not, neither does the conductor,

with consequences for the crew relationship, since the driver, by default, is "causing" the conductor to be on his feet - trying to keep his balance on a swaying, jolting, accelerating and decelerating platform for up to four and half hours without respite. Conductors resent the sort of driver who puts them in a position where they have no opportunity to rest, and at the same time probably have a very much larger number of passengers to contend with, which of itself requires more effort. For instance in one case I observed of a new driver, who had not yet adopted the "real" style of driving, and in consequence took 85 minutes for a 30 minute journey, the conductor came off after the first journey, and refused to complete the shift, preferring to declare himself "sick". This conductor's action quickly became known in the work group, with attendant unfavourable impressions being held of the driver.

Given this kind of possibility that his lack of control over running time has personally disastrous effects in increase of work - and it is the kind of eventuality that clearly impinges on each driver - it might reasonably be expected that drivers seek to maintain control over Time to the greatest possible extent.

For the bus driver, being ahead of time is not seen as primarily an inconvenience to the public, but a way of decreasing the workload, while he is also aware of the accelerating feedback process of being behind time. He is also necessarily aware that if the bus in front is ahead of

its time, then he will also be in the position of accelerating loss of control over his work. But he is not in a position to know with certainly whether or not the bus in front is ahead of time or not. He may even be not able to ascertain whether or not the bus scheduled to be in front has in fact passed, and has not broken down or is otherwise "missing".

The bus driver is thus in a position where he cannot know what is causing fluctuation in his work, or the whereabouts or actions of units in a system, the actions of which cannot be ascertained, yet which affect him immediately. But he does know that fluctuation if sufficiently in the direction of increasing his workload, will be progressive in effect.

In this situation of isolation and lack of knowledge of the whereabouts and actions of the other units of the system of which he is part, the driver seeks to minimise the effect of the worst possible eventuality (a bus missing is far worse in effect, than one "merely" ahead of its time), by running as far ahead of his own scheduled time as he dare - "dare" because of the existence of a supervisory system which exists to enforce the frequency.

Now there is a conflict of interests here, apart from that between organisation and work force, and that is the conflict between the interests of the Public in having a bus service which runs to time, and the interests of the crews in not having to do more than their "share" of the work.

This conflict leads onto discussion of the last set of constraints, pre-existing attitudes (pre-existing in the sense of being brought to bear on the job).

It is something of a problem to designate this set as "constraints". For I refer not to a feature "properly" belonging to the organisation, but to sets of mental images which are derived from extra- and intra-organisational areas.

As mental images, they lack the concreteness of such elements as the vehicle, or the running board, or even such wider factors such as "the public". But paradoxically, their lack of concreteness only serves to emphasize their importance in shaping action. It is the images of the job that the men hold that they react to, more than any physical entity.

But as mental images, they are subject to greater variation than the other elements, drawing as they do on the whole spectrum of any one individual's experiences.

Given this diversity, I feel it would be clearer simply to indicate the general areas of generation of attitudes. These areas can be identified as, in a general sense, the "moral order" of the busman's job, that is, the set of perceptions, symbols, expectations, forms of acting etc. which constitute a background referent: which makes "busmen" distinguishable from other industrial groups.

It seems sensible to point to the existence of work group norms as a constituent part of moral order. This is of course a wide area, encompassing everything from what

height to wear a conductor's bag, to general attitudes to management. The relevant norms here deal with expectations of "reasonable" amount or effort of work, and obligation to self, and, to one's workmates, and to the provision of the public service. As will be demonstrated a certain amount of ambiguity pervades these norms, not least because of the possibility of conflict of interest among these areas of obligation.

The ambiguity potential is lessened by job acculturation. But given the isolation of the busman's work, this is a process which takes a long time and the degree of freedom of action makes the process an open-ended one. It is therefore difficult to put any categorical value on any norm. Even just as a consequence of time, it might be expected, as indeed is the case, that there is a difference in normative expectations between a driver of twenty years' experience hanging on till his retirement, and a driver of one year's experience who regards his involvement in the job as very short term.

This serves to distinguish bus work from many other occupations. It makes no difference to a machine-minding occupation what experience the operative has. But bus driving is a service occupation, in which, as has been shown, the operative has comparatively large scope for all sorts of actions, some of which materially affect the type of work produced.

Combined with this set of more or less ambiguously

conceptualised work group norms and expectations is the individual's own attitudes, which can be presumed to be the outcome of his experience so far. It should be clear by now that scope for individual action within the constraints of the job do exist: the individual attitudes have some formative play here. Thus pre-existing attitudes consist of the work group norms, with an element of individual experience.

An example: in Eastern Scottish, there is an established norm that buses in country routes of low service frequency run strictly to time. Many drivers take pride in doing so. But one driver on the Biggar service - a two-hour service, with no alternative means of public transport, took, for his own individual reasons, to running up to thirty minutes early. This was deemed to be quite inexplicable, inexcusable, and the decision by management to sack the driver was approved by the staff.

The Struggle Against Constraints

This section should go some way to elucidating why the undoubted satisfactions that exist in the busman's task can be largely negated, so that busmen "vote with their feet" in a quite dramatic way. I will also demonstrate that the factors concerned are on a continuum: that they are dynamic in nature, and that their effect thus varies. It may also perhaps serve to emphasize the relative nature of the judgments of an industrial workforce, and thus criticise the

sometimes deterministic nature of some studies of industrial workers which treat the work-force as a constant unreflective mass, at the mercy of some kind of "totting-up" of "satisfactions" or "dissatisfactions", or successfully dominated, usually not taking account of dynamic processes as is done here.

In particular, this section emphasizes and demonstrates that workers respond to their situation and not only in terms of perceiving their situation as "satisfactory", or "unsatisfactory". They not only perceive the work situation: they act on such perceptions, even to change the nature of the work itself. Workers are involved in their work situation in a creative way. Indeed I shall argue that at one end of a continuum of interaction, the creative response of the workers actually forms a distinguishable different organisation than that which formally exists: that more is involved than the frequently occurring subversion of management's aims, or different means of achieving management aims (such as Roy, 1955).

But I shall also argue that even such creative responses which might be thought to add to the meaning and attraction of the job are not wholly positively perceived: that they are themselves a source of frustration and resentment. Not all creativity is benign! Indeed probably the most important point to grasp in this section is that the workers are responding in a creative way, sometimes re-creating the actual process of the organisation, performing the work in a

different and uncontrolled way from that which the organisation seeks to enforce. But this creativity is not always a course of unmitigated satisfaction. Indeed at one extreme the reaction of crews is one of resentment at being forced into such action for it is seen as only existing by means of exploiting co-workers and the public and this, not due to faults in either of those groups, but in management's control of the system, and ultimately the busmen themselves. To this is added resentment that even this creativity, evolved ostensibly to meet the crews' needs, at base serves only the management's needs: through the actions of the workers in this way, the organisation succeeds in using the workers to maintain a service which management no longer controls in accordance with its stated aims, and legislated function. The situation is one of deepest irony: the workers, by evolving their own responses to the situation supposedly desired by management but unachievable except in ways not approved by management, actually succeed in providing some form of organisation, which would not otherwise exist because of the inadequacy of management policies. The losers in this process are of course the workers themselves; their efforts at control succeed, but are turned in on themselves and ultimately serve the aim of management. I turn now to the reality of the road system.

A simple example will show the circumstances in which drivers seek to control the relative position of their

vehicle, and I will then examine how this is done in the case of Glasgow, which is the most extreme case in my study. The emphasis is on how the drivers seek to control the system, but can only do so through adjusting the position of their vehicle relative to others. This has the concomitant that decrease of effort for one unit of the system means an increase for the other units. This has important consequences for attitudes to the job. Glasgow is an extreme case in part because the density of the headways make the effects of position control more perceptible.

The following description is of a situation that occurs all over the country, largely outwith the cognisance of the passenger, even though they are actually transported within it. It is an example deliberately chosen for its simplicity since it involves the minimum of two buses. It is also a good example of the "game" aspect of control over the system. For crews can practice position control in preparation for its "serious" application, for when the sweat and pain and effort, the extreme tension of driving to the limits of physical and mental capacity, become intolerable, and the only way to decrease the effort is to find a "tail", and "push it up the road". Because crews know they may be driving to the limits of their capacity, they tend to make sure that they are not disadvantaged at any time. Thus even when there is little chance of effort which affects the crews' comfort, they will still, of themselves, insist on the correct relativity of position. For, of course, no one driver has freedom to alter the position of his vehicle:

other drivers will simultaneously be trying to alter their position, and trying to prevent others from "tailing" them.¹

But I want now to describe a situation in G.C.T., where extra effort does exist: and the "extra" is in addition to an effort which the drivers already see as excessive in conditions that management openly admits are "terrible".

The first response to these working conditions is the bus driver's equivalent of the "working up the line" of assembly workers, and has the same reason: to gain a little respite from constant attention to work. Running early near terminuses is the rule, in order to stretch the lay-over time. It is also easier to do because normally the vehicle will be stopping to set down passengers, and thus is not held up by boarding as well.

But running early has its place in other parts of the system. And note that in Glasgow, the case under discussion, a driver cannot be booked if he is under two minutes early. This is important (and also explains why buses in Glasgow generally run at least two minutes early). For by varying his speed slightly, the driver can avoid some loads altogether. For instance, the very heavy load of an erupting bingo hall can be avoided if its time of disgorgement is known, and can thus be avoided by slipping by just before. Other potential loads - schools, factories, offices, have their times known to the drivers through experience of trying to cope with them. Thus a driver, knowing of a load ahead, can speed up to pass it before it accumulates, or if possible, hang back to let

some other bus on the route lift the load. Even if he knows he cannot avoid the load, he will still try to speed up on the preceding section, so as to compensate for the extra boarding time involved.

All of this depends on the experience of the driver: of the potential hazard, and his experience of just how much extra effort he can avoid and whether the risk of running early is worth it. But in Glasgow, this experience is piecemeal and lends itself to variations through the week because shifts are on a constant cycle, it taking three years to work through all the shifts in a large garage. Thus the driver's experience is limited to the week in which he is working, which makes the effects of fluctuation relatively greater. This will relate to the knowledge of the drivers of how long it actually takes to cover the route (as distinct from the Company's time). Where time is tight (and obviously this varies by time of day), the unexpected disgorgement of some school or factory can wipe out any rest time. The effect this has on the driver has already been described, but I despair of conveying through words the horrific experience of being stretched to full capacity both mentally and physically. The constant pressure to keep the system moving - any slackening of pace only makes it more difficult, the effort is constantly to get those few extra minutes in hand so as to guarantee some kind of break - the break from the peculiar vibrating cramp caused by keeping the left foot on the clutch, the break from the icy draught that still manages

to blast the back of the neck despite the Daily Record jammed in the crack in the window, the relief from the blast of air up the accelerator pedal trouser leg: or the relief from the summer heat of a cab in the 80s caused by the sun and the fume-laden heat from the engine - watch that you do not burn yourself when changing gear on the thin metal plate that separates the cab from the engine - the roar of which is now only noticeable when at last it stops, and hands no longer slip sweating off the wheel.

Physically and mentally, breaks are important. But they also have a moral significance over and above their physical necessity. The break is seen as ^a/right: it provides a symbol of being outwith the control of the organisation, away from the constraints and pressures, time out from the whole set of strictures that impel subordinate action.

This time off assumes even greater significance for busmen, for once set in motion, they cannot leave their machine, even in cases of dire physical necessity.²

Breaks serve as a symbol and actuality of respite from the tyranny of the headway. Not to get the break is not just to miss a cup of tea: it means the system has beaten you. Thus breaks are still worked for even when physical relief is not the main aim.

From the organisation's point of view, breaks are not only time paid for but not used, but the speeding up (or less frequently hanging back) affects the actual timing of the bus. The intent of the crews subverts the organisation's aim in

this respect. At the least it can be established that crews do not wholeheartedly sacrifice their own interests to the impersonal fiat of urban mass transport.

The driver is very much aware of how much harder he has to work if he loses his relative position in the headway. Any minutes gained in one "easier" section are kept in hand to deal with any of the many unpredictable fluctuations in the elements of the system in which he operates - though of course there is no guarantee that even these minutes in hand will be enough. Thus the not pulling into bus stops, the high degree of co-ordination with conductor for bell signals, the revving of the engine to encourage passengers to board quickly, even moving off very slightly before loading is complete, the quick crashed gear changes: all the myriad of skills and tactics needed to clip the vital second off each delay.

It is probably worth noting again here that efforts to make up time, besides involving the driver in conflict with other motorists who are unlikely to be concerned with the busman's problem, also involves the bus driver in breaking the speed limits, among other legislative rules of the 1974 R.T.A. The bus driver is put deterministically by the organisation in the position of potential conflict with the Law. Of course, the Company is not willing to admit any such requirement, even though it is a direct outcome of its own domination, and the requirements given to operatives. But the drivers find themselves speeding so often in what

appears to be their own interests, that this feature is an ambiguous one from the crews' perspective.

In short, the driver's skill in manoeuvring in the traffic system, is a crucial factor in mitigating the constraint of Time.

The exercise of this skill can be seen as a source of positive satisfaction in the busman's job. But its exercise exists not for the "simple" job of manoeuvring the bus, and even in this respect the driver is doing the equivalent of driving from Edinburgh to London every day! It is turned to overcoming the constraint of Time as embroidered on a typed paper pasted to a Running Board. In this it is attenuated to the point of breaking (and sometimes it does break). It is no longer a joy of exercise of physical and perceptual motor skills, but a debasement of such reactions to an abstract aim - to the organisation's dictate of Time and exploitation to the full of its labour power.

This is of course the difference between city and rural bus driving. Time is not such a constraint in the country because there is so much of it: it also happens that the service frequency is so stretched that it is meaningless to talk of headway: each bus is clearly on its own. But in the city the bus is acted on more by extra organisational elements, while simultaneously Time becomes more of a constraint. The more frequent the service, the greater is the constraint.

But there is another feature of the frequent service

constraint: the interactive nature of a frequent headway service: so that the action of one unit in the "flow" affects the following units.

It needs little explication to establish that frequency of headway is one of the chief distinguishing organisational characteristics among the groups I surveyed. But, because of the capacity of a frequent headway for interaction among the units, the headway is also the organisational feature that serves to differentiate attitudes to the job.

In essence the drivers can also seek to exercise control of the position of the vehicle (always relative to the consideration that its position is supposedly governed by Time), through using the fluctuation and pattern of the headway itself. But they can only do so in a way that is potentially and actually divisive of the work group and disruptive of the service as a whole.

But only in a headway system in which the action of one vehicle can affect the work load of another can this take place. Obviously the potential is greater in a frequent headway service. Thus the organisation itself provides the means for its own disruption. What happens is that a major constraint of the organisation becomes the chief tool manipulated against the organisation's apparent aims, the constraint of Time in the system is turned round and used against the system.

Time, instead of being the major constraint of the system becomes the very tool which drivers use to ease the

work load imposed by the system.

But they can only do so by transferring the load onto some other crew, or by subjecting the public to an even more fraught experience because of the collapse of the Time control. "More fraught" because the driver's action in this respect can only be realised because of the already pertaining great fluctuation in Time arising from intra and extra organisational factors which, as I have shown, are not taken into account when designating the Time controls in the form of the Running Board.

The organisational consideration of most importance is that buses in cities share the same streets and serve the same population for much of their routes. Often it makes little difference to the intending passenger which bus he gets, and he may have a choice of several different route numbers. But if a mass of passengers awaits, then which bus they get on is of vital interest to the crew. They also know that passengers tend to get on only the first bus to come along, and not others immediately behind it. In Glasgow particularly with its very high density, tenement-lined main roads, there are many overlappings of Routes for quite considerable sections.

Buses may run quite considerably off schedule for quite legitimate reasons. This common feature of the system can be used as a manipulative device, directed against the same route, or an overlapping one. For a driver can use the unpredictability of the time of a bus, deriving from these

system fluctuations, to ensure that the "road is cleared" by a bus running at the same time on the same section of road, using the "unpredictability" to justify his position behind the other vehicle. But of course, the other driver may do the same, so that something in the nature of a War Game is carried out.

A driver may "hang back" to let another bus, on a different but overlapping route, through in front when actually he may be scheduled to enter a section first. To do this he must not only look up its timing in the timetable, but also work out the likely time it will take from the last timing point to where the routes join. This is problematical given that the other bus is operating in a fluctuating system of its own. There is also the organisational feature of overlapping routes, that the times of the buses are not worked out among the routes, but only with reference to the intra-route timings. Thus in any one fifteen minutes on a particular section served by say two routes, each running on a fifteen minute headway, the buses are not so timed as to divide the fifteen minutes into seven and a half minute intervals, but may well be timed within two minutes of each other. The organisation rarely seems to concern itself with this feature, apparently being content with establishing only the regular headway for each Route Number, ignoring the service frequency as it appears to the passenger.

In consequence, even though there may be two buses in fifteen minutes, this still can mean that there is a fifteen

minutes' worth accumulation of passengers.

Indeed, this feature of the organisation is the one most heavily criticised by the crews, for it means both that they encounter a load twice as heavy as it might be, while the "load" has had an uncomfortable fifteen minutes in the rain, in which to think its usual dark thoughts about the inadequacy of the service.

Whatever the organisational reasons (or lapses) which result in this close-timed situation, the effects are apparent.

For obviously the whole fifteen minutes' load, which might be split between two buses, in fact can, and usually does fit on the first one. Thus the potential for easing the load, particularly for the conductor, is a strong one. The temptation to make the other crew do the work is equally strong.

If a driver wishes to take account of this confusion by hanging back he must regulate his speed over the preceding section. Thus the driver's skill in overcoming traffic interference to give him this control over his position is an important factor.

He must also take into account the consideration that it is likely that the other driver is doing the same as he is. At least, even if he does not wish to vary his own position, he must take into account that some other driver may be intent on varying his position, which will have the consequence of increasing the first crew's work load.

Thus the organisation is subject in its realisation to the intention of its operatives. The service which actually exists is then different from the organisation's design, as a direct result of the crew's reacting to the constraints upon them.

But the intent is subject to ambiguity and uncertainty for, from any one driver's point of view, the behaviour of other drivers is unpredictable.³

To be "tailed" can be merely annoying, but it can also push crews over the limit of the ability to cope with the volume of work. And it should be recalled that the whole nexus of potential stress exists: particular combinations of the multiplicity of tension and strains can turn a trivial incident into a furious altercation. For the driver who, in addition to the normal hard work of the job, has narrowly missed killing someone, had a few heart-stopping traffic encounters, had to push kids off the platform even to leave the terminus, been subject to abuse by some passengers, and had to get up at 3.30 in order to get into all this, to find himself in addition "tailed", can push him into an explosive situation. Altercations of an extremely hostile nature, even given the normal Glaswegian somewhat aggressive mode of expressing himself, are commonly observed in Glasgow, one driver furiously shouting at another, who is probably replying in equally abusive terms. Inter-staff fights reported on G.C.T.'s claim sheets are five per cent of the total number of assaults (Schaffer 1977: 4) and probably much more

frequent.

It is not possible for drivers generally to look upon "tailing" with equanimity. It is a game, but a deadly serious one. And it is a game that all the crews are bound up in. For it takes only one bus in a system to "tail" to force other crews to shift their position, to avoid being landed with an inordinate amount of work: this shifting position is then perceived by other crews, and so on.⁴

As might perhaps be expected, drivers have certain tactics they can adopt in response to being tailed, or indeed as a response to the fluctuation in the system which effectively lead them to be tailed, whether or not the "pushing" crew has intended it.

Perhaps the most obvious one is to attempt to speed up, to catch up on the bus in front. On a four minute service like the Glasgow 61, there are obviously more chances to do this.⁵

Another technique is to go deliberately slowly, in order to slow up the "tail" to such an extent that his potential gain in easing of effort by tailing is negated by the extra effort he will have to make to catch up on his time when the routes diverge.

Going slowly obviously depends on what assessment each driver has of his potential to catch up on time at some other point on the route. It also may depend on whether he thinks he will get a "turn" (short of his destination) or not (see below).

Going slow may also be accompanied by a repertoire of

impression management devices to try to get rid of the tail.⁶

Tailing is also influenced by whether the buses involved are on the same route or not.⁷

The responses of the drivers to deal with the unpredictable elements of the system feed back into the unpredictability of the system as it appears to any one driver, and this increases the driver's desire to exercise control over the job to the limit. It is difficult for a driver to know whether his heavy passenger loading is due to deliberate manipulations on the part of other drivers, is due to some "uncontrolled" factor such as breakdown or accident, or is actually the expected passenger loading at that time. This does of course make for frustration and resentment, as well as a control-seeking response (and the easiest control - Time, is organisationally denied).

Another possible tactic, which can be used deliberately but is probably used more often genuinely, is to request a "turn" from a timekeeper inspector - i.e. to cut either that journey or the next one short at an intermediate destination thus allowing it to catch up on the next journey on the timetable. This has an indirect result on other drivers on the route who now find that a gap has appeared in the service with consequent difficulties for them.

However, it should be noted that the timekeepers by their position can tell how much any part of the system is being subject to delays, and are also under pressure organisationally, to limit the number of uncompleted

journeys. Thus getting a turn is not a tactic that can be tried consistently, though it is a good occasional gambit.

Analysis

The threats to the capacity of the driver to do the job come basically from the application of an organisational system based on a myth of vehicles running at fixed intervals and speeds over uniform conditions picking up a fixed and limited passenger load, free of fluctuations in such matters, and with no account taken of other factors that might interfere with this organisational flow.

These fluctuations join with the organisation's design and equipment to constrain the driver. I have shown how drivers respond to these constraints: they subvert, and recreate their environment in dealing with the constraints. And, paradoxically, the more the drivers are constrained, the more creative is their response. I have already made the comment that such creativity need not be of a benevolent kind. By ordinary "common sense" evaluation I cannot see that driving a bus in Glasgow could be considered a pleasant job: I have gone some way to indicating why.

I have discussed how the extreme case among my groups is the one whose organisational system is most subject to disruption, and how the crews respond to this disruption, by subverting the planned pattern of work.

Now it is not unusual for studies in industrial sociology

to comment on the subversion of the management's aims. Many studies of the piece-rate system (e.g. Roy 1955, Haraszti 1977) have pointed out that management expects some subversion, particularly of the way the machines are used in order to achieve production goals. And indeed Haraszti's "A Worker in a Worker's State" (1977) argues that management takes this subversion into account when setting the norms.

Undoubtedly there is an element of this within bus organisations. But I argue that Glasgow's subversion is actually a re-creation of part of the organisation.

Many aspects of how the job is done are outwith management's control. But its main organisational feature, which must always be to have a bus maintain its running times is not within the organisation's control either.

First of all, even slight casual observation of the system shows wide discrepancies between official and actual times.

But even in so far as times are observed, they are likely to be because of the control function of the interaction of the crews themselves, and not a function of the supervisory aspects of the organisation. In other words what actually happens is different from what the organisation intends, and is achieved by different means from that which it provides to its operatives and supervisors.

And the main way that the crews create this new technology, is by manipulation of the organisation's main constraint - that of Time.

Subversion of time is thus the driver's main weapon against the system, by varying time he shifts his relative position and thus his load. Though note that his ability to do so is circumscribed because of outside factors such as traffic congestion. But even here, the aim can be to position yourself in a "bunch" (though not first of course) and to justify this new position by the traffic conditions and the organisation's intention to have the buses in the right order. They are in the right order all right, but the headway system has been destroyed.

But the driver is not totally free to manoeuvre. As discussed, he is in an interactive situation with other drivers. It is this interaction which is the main controller of the extent of re-creation of the technology in terms of time. The drivers, as a whole, as has been illustrated, control the extent to which any one driver can exploit the available tactics. Thus it is the crews' control which organises the work, (even as a coping device, subversion of Time, and all the tactics that enable control of Time, do not guarantee success: and of course this subversion, even though necessary, is expressly forbidden by management and subject to disciplinary proceedings).

This controlling effect of the interaction between any one particular driver and other drivers is effected by the tactical combination that I have discussed - the adoption of certain tactics are constrained in this way, in addition to the existing organisational constraints.

I have also given examples of miscuing in the system of interactive control, with the kind of conflict that is used as sanctions on drivers to maintain position.

Naturally the system of control is not as tidy or well ordered as the official one, and neither is the organisation so well suited to its ostensible purpose. But it is a reaction to a situation that imposes enormous constraints and fluctuations in efforts. It might not be the best system, but unlike the organisation's paper plan, it works.

But this system is achieved at great cost, on top of what the organisation itself sees as demanding working conditions.

And I argue now that the contradiction in the crews' struggle for control is that this control to a major extent serves not the interests of the crews, but the interests of management.

I argue that the contradiction of the busmen's situation is that this "creation", through created adaptation to constraints is condoned by management, who know that in no other way could they provide an organisation at all: that the action of the driver is "acceptable" as a controller of organisation in a situation which is otherwise quite out of the control of management. As an illustration there is no way that buses could run to time according to management directive: this is of course not an uncommon feature of

organisation - work to rules depend on this - the supposed capitalist rationality is patently irrational.

To overcome the irrationality there is exploitation of the work force. For the drivers' attempting to overcome problems posed by management inadequacies can only succeed by exposing themselves to work practices which carry the disciplinary penalties of suspension or dismissal, and in conditions of pressure of work that require great effort and skill and if successful can only be so at the expense of workmates and the public.

Thus even the coping tool of time subversion, the apparent use of the organisation's greatest constraint against the organisation, by getting the system working in some fashion actually serves management's goals.

Thus individual workers are deluded when they think that by tailing or bunching or employing the other tactics, that they have "won" against the system: all they have done is exploit temporarily their co-workers, and the public, whose spatial relocation is what all the activity is about.

But there is I believe, a further double-think involved. For, as I have shown, "tailing" is seen as reprehensible by both management and men. Many of the men resent having to act in this way. Like management they take a psychologistic interpretation, positing the existence of "cowboys".

"It's cowboys that ruin this job, you know". Thus they see themselves as having to respond reluctantly to the actions of cowboys in self defence.

It is seen as an individual phenomenon. I argue that it is a collective, and largely unwilling consequence of the structure and process of the organisation: it is a systemic phenomenon: the individualistic interpretation is used by both management and men to obscure the real issues of class exploitation stemming from the organisation.

It is perhaps worth pointing out that I myself took for granted the individualistic interpretation. It was only in the course of analysing the structural features of the organisation and relating them to my observations of what actually happens that I began to realize that the existence of the "cowboy" might be yet another instance of the way in which issues of struggle for control over production are mystified, and "folk devils" adduced (c.f. Cohen 1972).

But I hasten to point out that though both employers and employees have an idea of a cowboy, they have so for different reasons.

It is worth looking at these two notions. Firstly, management, or rather individual managers tend to make general negative value assessments of the crews they employ on clear class lines. The negative aspects vary, from not bothering about the matter, to statements like, "we cannot recruit the right sort of men", to the openly voiced opinion that the crews are "animals" to use the well-known Scottish term.

The General Manager of Midland, was openly scathing about the ability of his crews to firstly understand the

questions I wanted to ask in my questionnaire, and secondly that they would feel inclined to give any answer. The general assessment he conveyed was that the crews were "rough" uncultured boors. In fact I found them considerate, helpful and intelligent. This managerial assessment fits in with the status position of the crews in the organisation, and the supervisory and managerial processes that maintain it (cf. Nichols and Beynon, 1977).

The importance of this moral evaluation for present purposes is that the organisation can hold that "breaches of discipline" are because of the innate evil intent of individuals, rather than looking at the causes, for the "breaches" in the structure and operation of the organisation.

As far as the crews are concerned, again, the term "cowboy" is a pejorative tense couched as a moral assessment of individuals. It is the "cowboys" who "disrupt the system, don't help out, just use the job, don't care about the service to the public, etc., etc."

It will come as no surprise that I argue that the "cowboys" are not a phenomenon of low class evilly-intended individuals, but are a consequence of the operation of the whole system.

This is the major difference between Cowboys and "Folk Devils". They have the similarity of not existing, and serving as a scapegoat for other group processes - in this case the failure of management to organise the bus services to cope with its environment - with the common feature being

regarded in terms of the morals of individuals, rather than the outcome of social processes.

But the difference is that "Folk Devils" usually constitute a group different from the group that is applying the label. The contradiction for bus crews is that it is the crews themselves that constitute and perpetuate the myth of the cowboy.

Perhaps I should explain that, as an employee I accepted the fact of "cowboys" for some time, and only came to doubt the existence when I realised that I had never been on with one as a driver, and of course I wasn't one, although I had "seen" plenty: they are easily recognised by the practice of pushing you along the road.

I set out my explanation below. Perhaps the reader may care to keep in mind the Livingston example already described, which is not a Glasgow example, but it has the "Glasgow characteristic" of having only a two minute gap between the two buses.

. . . Firstly, it has to be admitted that individual breaches of discipline do exist. There are drivers who consistently run early when the situation does not warrant it (and note this) as the other crews judge. This is not unexpected, given an organisation which allows such a great measure of independence to employees working in isolation and free from supervision. Perhaps the surprising thing is how much conformity there is to the organisation's goals, and how much the temptation of knowing how much work can be avoided,

or putting your foot down in a powerful coach, are in fact ignored. Breaches of the organisation's aims to this extent are rather rare.

But minor changes to the organisation's goals are frequent. I have just been describing them, so I will not elaborate on them here.

In brief, opportunities to adjust position do exist, and on a frequent service, relatively minor changes have quite a large effect, with the force thrust onto individual isolated workers.

The point is that these generally minor movements are generally taken up, they are not the indulgencies of "cowboys".

Cowboys are generalised from the tailing and bunching which result from fluctuation in the process; they are a result of structural factors not in the control of the organisation. There is deliberate positioning of vehicles, but this is of relatively small effect given the much more common tailing that results from the organisation. The bunching commonly seen is more likely to be the result of poor traffic management than deliberate efforts by drivers, though once a bunch is established, the following drivers see no reason to pass the first vehicle. But to the driver of the first bus, desperately toiling along, the others are quite categorically "cowboys".

The result is that variation in the position of buses (and thus of work load) is more due to fluctuation from "outside" the organisation, or to organisational structure. But

it appears to be the action of individuals.

And indeed, it is not wholly unaffected by the action of individuals. For the scope of the cowboys to act freely is in fact limited by sanctions from the other crews. Too extreme "cowboy" action results in positive ripostes from crews. But I think I have demonstrated well enough that such tailing is due to the structure of the headway. On a four minute service, a two minute coincidence of traffic lights can result in a tail, without any intent. The tail would only be doing exactly what the other bus was trying to do - go as fast as possible to avoid getting behind.

This lack of evil intent is well illustrated by my Livingston example, where each driver thought the other a cowboy.

From my point of view, the other driver was expecting me to do all the work: from the other driver's point of view, my hanging back was keeping him from getting in on time to have a needed break in the course of an arduous shift.

Perhaps the reader is better able to judge than myself whether or not the two positions were equally just.

It is noteworthy that this whole scenario was played out exactly to the stated timetable. We both had good reason to maintain our positions, but I was using the organisation's system to discourage being tailed.

This illustrates how the accusation of "cowboy" can arise, simply through the class of quite legitimate values and expectations.

It is in this sense that the crews themselves constitute cowboys, and perpetuate the system.

As a last point, it can be remarked that all this business of tailing, bunching, accusation and counter accusation, which I hope I have demonstrated, is of vital interest to the crews, is quite outwith the interest of the organisation. For all the organisation is concerned with is the number of miles completed, and passengers carried and revenue collected. How this is done, whether some crews work harder than others to achieve management aims appears to be of no interest, even though the situation can be one where for large parts of the day there is little correspondence between the actual service and that advertised. As long as the public is moved, management does not concern itself too much with how: and after all, the crews are being paid to do the job. To make explicit the contradiction the crews are put in the position of responding creatively to the constraints, but this only serves finally, management's aim, the cost being borne by crews and public.

Notes: Chapter Eleven

¹ The Gifford-Edinburgh bus does not have much to do on its evening runs. The shift does two "Giffords" in its latter part, and not a lot happens on either of them. Between the two journeys, there is a 45 minute break in the Edinburgh Bus Station.

For this reason I was quietly driving into Tranent, taking time to admire the barley ripening, and the sun going down over the Fife hills, and thinking that bus driving does have some very nice aspects. There was no point, as far as I was concerned, in running the slightest bit early at this point: indeed I was having to devote some attention to running slowly enough to arrive in Tranent at the scheduled time of 20.01. The run into the city would be quiet enough to easily allow getting in five minutes early, while there was a long break to look forward to.

About a half-mile from Tranent, I observed across the fields on the main road that I joined at Tranent, the roof of one of our buses going along. When I got to Tranent there was no sign of it, so I waited a couple of minutes for "Time", and then set off. On arriving in Edinburgh I was accosted in a half-joking, half-threatening fashion by another driver.

"Where were you then? You're the Gifford aren't you? Well, I'll see you tomorrow night!" With that he walked off leaving me and my conductor wondering what on earth he

was talking about.

The next evening, at the same time, and the same place, again I observed the green roof of a bus on the main road. But this time it was stopped. By the time I had loaded the few passengers at Tranent, and was prepared to go, the other bus had come up behind. And behind it stayed - I was steadily "pushed" all the way to the city. This did not particularly worry me, since there was very little effort involved in picking up the few folk wanting a bus at that time. Nonetheless, it is annoying to be "pushed" so blatantly.

Consultation of the timetables during our break led us to working out that this other bus was actually a Haddington bus, but it was not due through Tranent till five minutes after we were. The first night, it had been running seven minutes early - presumably because the crew did not have a break at the end of the journey and wanted to manage a cup of tea by arriving early.

Annoyed at being pushed, simply because we had, through running to time, been behind a bus we should have been in front of, when this was caused by the other bus running seven minutes early, I resolved to work out a little ploy which would discomfort the other driver and discourage him from pushing.

I knew that the other bus timed his arrival at Tranent by waiting for our roof to appear across the intervening fields. So, quite simply, I ran fast over the section from

the last timing point to Tranent, arriving three minutes early, since it is a quiet section. This was enough to be out of sight of the other bus as it approached. Loading up, off we set round the corner, where I could trundle along a mere couple of minutes early.

We were enjoying our well-earned cup of tea when the other driver appeared - five minutes after his due time. He looked startled, and then laughed as he came over.

"Ah thought ye'se would hang back, so I waited on ye."

"Aye, but we always run to time you see. I knew you'd think we'd hang back, so I went through dead on time."

"Well, you certainly got me."

Having explained that the first night we had not realised his journey existed at that time, and that there was no reason for us to do anything but run to time, amicable relations were restored. For the rest of the week, the other bus was behind, but we were not pushed up the road for we were running in a few minutes early, so that the other crew could have their short break but still follow us in.

The interesting thing about this example is that it was done to establish the "rights" of the situation. It was not concerned with any extra effort, but with controlling the potential of the situation.

² As an illustration of what this means, let me give the example of the driver who mistook the state of his bowels.

We were bowling along, out of the city in the early

afternoon. Suddenly, for no reason that I, on the "back end" could tell, the driver decelerated. There was a long slowing pause, then the driver changed down to third and took away again. He also then turned round and mouthed something at me, but I could not lip-read what he was saying.

It so happened that the route passed the garage, and not unusually, the bus stopped. But unusually the driver came round and said,

"Ah'm sending out another driver for ye."

"Why, what's up?"

He paused, looked embarrassed, and then laughed.

"Well, ye see where we slowed up back there?"

I nodded.

"Well, Ah went tae fart, but Ah went and shat masel' instead. So AH'll have tae away hame and get changed."

He had of course, had no option but to stick to his post (as it were) for about three miles.

³ For example, if driver A is approaching an overlap section, which he knows (because he has checked in the timetable) driver B, on a conjoining route is due to enter second, and A wishes to tail B, then A does not know whether B will hang back to ensure that A goes through first, go through on time, or whether B is in fact in some game of his own, and has gone through early, thus causing even greater problems for A if he has hung back, through the greater accumulation of passengers, and the fact that he is now late. A may also be aware that

there is a third bus joining some time ahead, and it would not do to be too far behind it. No matter what A does, he is in a problematical situation until he actually sees what the other bus has done. Even then, he cannot be sure that the bus has that particular position by intent, or by some chance fluctuation in the various unpredictable elements. It is these elements that are used to create the impression that a bus is justifiably in that position, for the "game" involves "impression management" to quite a degree because a bus can quite justifiably be behind time, the driver can pretend to be behind time. He may even make attempts to pass, which unfortunately have to be aborted because of on-coming traffic: this kind of bluffing is easier because of the general doubt that may exist as to what the proper order in a section should be. The type of out-guessing is exemplified by my example at Tranent. The difference between that example and what happens in cities, in particular Glasgow, is the degree of effort involved.

⁴ In Glasgow in particular, the situation is complicated by the fact of the rotating shift pattern, in which a crew does the same shift only every two or even three years, which prevents the establishing of compromises or modes vivendi. Every Monday morning has to be worked out anew, so that the "proper" order may not be established till Wednesday, or even at all, if one or other of the drivers has been particularly skillful in his bluffing. (It is possible to go through a

week on an unfamiliar shift without realising that the bus behind should be in front.)

⁵ In the 52, 53 and 54 example in G.C.T., the 54 at fifteen minutes past the hour will do most of the work for the subsequent 53 at sixteen minutes past, and even some of the work of the 52 at twenty minutes past. But it is itself only five minutes behind the preceeding 52. Against the possibility of catching up on it, the driver must weigh the effort it will cost him to speed up. If other delaying factors are slight, then he must weigh up the risk of being caught. In the case of the 52, 53 and 54, they must be on time at Paisley Road Toll because there is a time-keeper stationed there, but there is no time check after that till the centre of town (some two miles). This allows some latitude of action. But to complicate matters (but it is a complicated life on the buses!), the driver has to calculate his likely work load, since it may be comparatively light, and thus not worth the effort to change position. (This latter is usually the case with these particular buses: this sequence of buses is often cited by Possilpark Garage crews, who operate half the service, as being a glaring example of Corporation inefficiency, since the first bus of a 52, 53, 54 sequence rarely carries a full load, while the two behind it carry very little indeed.

⁶ For instance the first driver may signal his willingness to be overtaken, conveying the impression that he believes the following bus to be there through mismanagement, and that he is willing to be passed so as to avoid unpleasant misunderstandings. He may also simply stop and wait - particularly when he is being tailed by a bus he reckons should be in front. He may amplify his stop (and this can also be used as a subterfuge to get into a position to tail yourself), by consulting an Inspector, or conceiving an urgent necessity to visit a public toilet.

⁷ There are two organisational structural features here. First, because each garage only does a limited number of routes, the regular timings of these routes become known to the crews. Secondly, "tailing" drivers can be identified and confronted for an explanation of their behaviour in the garage face-to-face interaction. Also, you are likely to encounter the same driver on the road again, but with the potential to turn the tables. There is, however, a stronger influence in the prescriptive norm of "helping your mates out". A bus on one route which catches up with the one in front is expected to help the front bus by doing stop-for-stop with it, particularly if it is from the same garage. This has the practical effect of splitting the load, and also keeps the second bus from getting late. This is a norm that exists as an ideal, but crews complain bitterly that it does not happen enough.

One of the reasons for it not happening enough is that bus routes in Glasgow generally go right across the city, and are serviced by two garages at opposite ends of the system (unlike Edinburgh with its two major garages, Glasgow has fourteen). Consequently, alternate buses on the route come from the two different garages, making it impossible to make the garage work group a force for control, as it can be where crews from the same garage are involved.

Indeed the work group norm can operate so that drivers have to be careful not to tail accidentally a bus from their own garage.

CHAPTER TWELVE: Conclusions

The first draft of this thesis sought in its loose way, and amid its other concerns, to point to some inadequacies in contemporary industrial sociology theory, particularly urging instead consideration of the links between work experiences at the point of production and the wider industrial and social structure. The present draft, has, of course, sought to systematise this into linking the labour processes of bus work to the specifically capitalist nature of the industry. The necessity for this kind of work in industrial sociology seemed to be becoming increasingly apparent in the literature, and it would be apposite, and is in a sense, expected in a thesis, to offer a "review of the literature". As it happens, Salaman (1978) has written an excellent article competently reviewing the tendencies towards this thinking, and urging it as the only valid kind of "sociology of organisational structure".

I intend to use Salaman's article to show how far my own work accords with what Salaman is urging is the necessary approach to organisational sociology, and to comment on some of the particular features of my analysis: this is important since Salaman's view is that "there exists relatively little work of a truly sociological nature" (ibid: 519) in the sociology of organisations. It is especially important since I have to establish that this thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge, and can thus be distinguished from other commentators on bus drivers and conductors (see my remarks on Van Beinum pp. 501-514).

Any analysis which seeks, as mine does, to make use of the concepts of the labour process, must necessarily make use of associated concepts such as materials and forces of production, and concentrate, as I have done, on the contradictions, paradoxes, inconsistencies and irrationalities of this particular capitalist labour process. This makes concern about the meaning of "organisation" or "technology" somewhat redundant, but it is clear that Salaman's article is relevant in that he is reviewing how other writers who would in some sense place themselves in the area of industrial sociology, are tending towards the same kind of analysis (see especially Beynon 1973, Nichols and Beynon 1977, and Nichols and Armstrong 1976, and Nichols 1980).

The emphasis in analysing the labour process must be about the exercise of power, and consequently about resistance and struggle thereby created.

Salaman rather misses this point but it is still worth going through his argument, to show that my work can be firmly related to recent other publications, which together make a radical break with previous industrial sociology.

Salaman (ibid: 519) sees a sociological approach to organisations as addressing the relationship between particular work and control designs and the nature of society. Rather than taking "efficiency", "rationality" and "hierarchy" etc. as unquestioned, he urges their critical consideration, particularly with regard to sectional advantages. And the nature of the ideologies which bolster inequalities

should be a focus, arguing that all of these remain unquestioned in conventional organisation analysis.

Before going on to follow Salaman's demonstration, I should make clear that it has obviously been the intention of this thesis to be "sociological" in Salaman's sense. My thesis has sought to show in particular that the design of work is explicitly related to efforts to control the work force in the interests of valorisation, and that the organisations are inherently capitalist, (and thus integrated with the whole of capitalist society), that the "efficiency" and "rationality" are spurious (and that the labour process is undertaken almost entirely by the crews, the rest of the organisation being concerned with their control), while I have sought to show that the notions of "service" and "professionalism" used by the immediate managers of the concerns are not only spurious, but fallacious even in their own terms, and serve mainly to legitimise their stability and their control.

Salaman's main point is the acceptance by writers on organisations of two major features - efficiency and rationality - when they should be asking how these ideas fit with the values of the managers of the enterprises or capitalism in general:

Writers who hold such views ignore the political, sectional, nature of apparently neutral procedures and technology. Like Mannheim's functionary they transform problems of politics into problems of administration,

(ibid: 520)

This is a particularly apt quotation, for it hits exactly the

way that, for example, the struggles of tramway workers of the late nineteenth century were incorporated (literally) by municipalisation: the struggle at the point of production was inconsistent with the ideologies of public ownership, indeed further rendered more difficult by the very effectiveness of the municipal administration of the time compared with overt capitalist organisations, while the idea of service was taken over directly as "surplus from the operations" to be paid to the common good. The form, the use of the materials of production, were taken over unchanged from the capitalist organisation. In the case of public ownership, the sectional advantage, which Salaman urges as a topic for investigation, is peculiarly difficult to be certain about. To take the case of Glasgow's municipalisation, on the one hand, there was undoubtedly benefit to the work force and to the citizenry and to the coffers of the city. But this benefit was not one-sided. It precluded action by the men to better conditions at the point of production, while the social benefits seem strangely consistent with the arguments over reduction of hours during the First World War (cf. Rose 1975: 72 ff.) because it increased production: cheap tram fares meant rested workers and a larger labour pool for any one firm. In other words, better working conditions for tram workers, and better transport conditions for the labour force at large, also ironically meant that the wheels of capitalist production ran more quickly and efficiently. In so far as public transport is concerned the conclusion to be drawn seems to be, yes, the struggle for control leads to an

amelioration, but that this impetus must be maintained because the innovation itself recreates new conditions. One sectional interest that is clearly served, however, is that of the professional manager, whose position as agent of power is clearly defended by the implicit politics of "neutral administration in the interests of efficiency". Sometimes, however, the class nature does break through overtly, as when ~~the~~ the then manager of Midland, described some of his crews as "animals". Or when ~~the~~ the then Personnel officer of G.C.T. said, quasi-admiringly, that he "didn't know how the crews managed to cope in the conditions". He did not attempt to find out of course, nor did he cease firing crews who had run foul of his supervisory system in trying to "cope". One political situation that does exist quite openly is that of the subsidies for the national bus concerns, and here of course the "service" ideology is contradicted by the reluctance of bus management to discuss problems with the local elected authority who are providing the cash to keep routes running.

To return to Salaman (ibid 521 ff.), he advocates the necessary consideration of a number of points in any "genuinely sociological approach to organisations". First is:

a concern to isolate and describe the main features of organisational structure and the design of work and control and the principles, philosophies, interests and purposes that lie behind them.

My own view is that this necessitates analysis of concrete historical processes, tracing how particular organisational forms were developed to meet various contingencies. It is clear that the principles, purposes etc. of the controllers of the bus industry have been valorisation, though this interest has been challenged by labour both within the industry and in the form of public ownership, so that the capitalist rationality is now disguised in the forms of "service" and "efficiency".

Secondly,

to relate the structure of organisations to the society within which they occur, paying particular attention to the ways in which values prevalent in that society are reflected in organisations. . .

Of course it is evident that if the production of goods and services in a society is dominated by capital, then so will any particular industry be. However, it is still necessary to trace through the prevalence of the values, the kind of legitimacy produced, and the particular contradictions that ensue. It is especially interesting in the bus industry, to see how the inconsistencies of public ownership are maintained against its capitalist form, and of course to trace through what conditions are created for the work force at the point of production by the acceptance of "efficiency" and "rationality". Indeed it is the very notion of efficiency that has served to increase exploitation at various times (e.g. the intensification of the labour process through increasing route speeds, the devising of shifts so that a driver spends his maximum legal four hours 50 minutes at the

wheel without a break, the prolongation of use of obsolescent vehicles etc. etc.).

Thirdly,

. . . to analyse the role of ideas and values including sociological theories of organisation in buttressing and legitimising (or disguising) the nature, function and origins of organisational structure.

Though this is a valid point, I do feel it too akin to the previous one to merit separate comment here, except that I show how H. Van Beinum's work on Dublin bus crews does fall into this reprehensible type of "sociological" theory.

Salaman's (p. 522) identification of "the design of work and the structure of control" as the major elements of organisational structure, though quite correct, has to be taken further. What he really means is "the labour process", and once that concept is employed in analysis, as I have done, then the demystifying of organisation structure becomes possible. If the organisation is a capitalist one, then the "purpose" of the "organisational structure" is clear - valorisation - and the focus must be on the specifically capitalist work process, its contradictions, innovations, legitimising ideology etc. Further, it becomes necessary to argue that the labour process is not just about "organisational structure", but about capitalism as a whole: that the domination of capital in work is made possible by the domination of capital in general. Salaman shies clear of this point - e.g. some paragraphs later he singles out Perrow for remarking "that organisations reflect and reveal societal

resources and interest": what Salaman misses is that organisations are societal resources and interest, not merely reflections of them. Salaman is in great danger of cutting off "organisation studies" from his realisation of the wider issues involved.

However, he proceeds to competently dismiss systems approaches, Talcott Parsons and other "scientific" theories. His discussion of "efficiency" as an unquestioned end-goal in organisational analysis, though correctly condemned as a managerial issue, and as too easily leading to sterile comparisons, completely ignores the underlying use of the idea as a way of intensifying labour power, and thus the idea that "efficiency" must remain a central issue, though revealed as a device to increase exploitation.

He correctly condemns the loose use of "the environment" instead of identifying the particular interests, values, class loyalties, ideologies, market developments etc. (and of course this is what I have tried to do in Chapter One). But I cannot agree with his notion (p. 525) that this should lead to analyses in terms of power and authority, for it must logically follow that it is the pattern of domination and the struggle against it that concern the sociologist. This is a better context for Salaman's quoting Benson's writing that the internal organisational structure and process must be explained in extra organisational terms.

However, though I have said that Salaman has reviewed the field competently, I disagree that the end point must be

organisational structure, for this is only a concern because of the way sociology grew: perhaps Salaman is reluctant to wipe off theoretical notions of "structure" that once figured so prominently in sociology.

But once the position is established that work experience at the point of production is the central focus in industrial sociology and that this is what Marx called the labour process, and that this consists of the materials and forces of production - the "plant" and the division of labour about it - then notions such as "organisational structure" become redundant: also emphasising the interests of capital in running the organisation, makes the contradictions more evident, and makes "structure" appear much more impermanent, since the domination of capital must constantly be revolutionised.

Nonetheless, Salaman still makes some useful points in his consideration of Weber's and Marx's writings on organisations.

Salaman sees (p. 527 ff.) Weber's main contribution as establishing that organisations were influenced by prevailing societal priorities, values, and in particular that the bureaucratic form was influenced by capitalist rationality and its drive for control through formal administration. Two points of interest in my own account of the history of the bus industry show aspects of this, firstly the administrative bureaucracy set up on the take-over of London buses by large scale international capital in 1861; and setting the pattern for later general public ownership, Morrison's failure

on the take-over of London Buses in 1932 to realise that capitalist rationality was, (as Weber demonstrated) not the same thing as "efficiency" but the means to the end of valorisation, and that unless the values of the organisation changed, then even publicly owned transport must inevitably seek increasing intensification of labour.

Salaman is of course right in identifying Marx as "(supplying) the ingredients for a critical sociology of organisation" (ibid: 529).

Marx's major interest in bureaucracies was as instruments of class oppression: the main problem is of course the nature of bureaucracies in socialism. I do not wish to pursue this problem, except to point out that if nationalisation of assets is considered a form of socialism, then my thesis shows that it does not do away with labour exploitation. And if a form of socialism retains the system of capitalist exploitation of labour, then it is difficult to see how it can be maintained to be socialism: however, this problem lies somewhat outside my present interest. In sum:

. . . traditional bureaucratic forms are seen as inherently opposed to socialist priorities and as intrinsically oriented towards capitalist interests and values. (ibid: 530)

Likewise, the alternative form of organisation, based on members' interests are not of direct concern.

However, Marx's approach to bureaucracy is pertinent, for he makes the point that bureaucratic activity, which is presented as above politics, as neutral expert administration,

is essentially and irredeemably political, and furthermore uses this presentation of neutrality to mystify its interests and sectional priorities. I did go to some lengths in Chapter One to demonstrate that this is the case for the administrators of publicly owned bus organisations.

Salaman next emphasises Marx's analysis of the relation among such factors as degree of control, hierarchy, co-ordination and the nature of the task. I have already discussed these - the labour process, in Chapter One, so I will only briefly paraphrase Salaman's version here as a resumé.

The first element of capitalism which directly affects the division of labour and the structure of employing organisations is that labour power is purchased by an employer to achieve profit, and this establishes the form of the employment relationship. However, this labour power is a potential, it requires direction and control to exploit it to the full, thus bringing management, the agency of control, into existence.

The second element is the inherent conflict between the seller of labour power and the buyer, who wishes to maximise his use of it.

The operation of these two elements, results in the specifically capitalist design of work processes. And this means that the search for efficiency, since it can only be done through further control and exploitation of labour power, is inherently sectional, since it is aimed at surplus value

for the controlling agents.

The interdependence of efficiency and control have implications, firstly for the division of labour. In the capitalist labour process, the impulsion is always towards breaking down the human control over production. As Marx (and of course, recently, Braverman) showed this leads to the cheapening of labour through deskilling, fragmenting tasks, while at the same time the conceptual processes involved are hived off. The bus industry offers interesting light on this issue, for the task, that is using two men to move the vehicle from here to there, collecting revenue directly, has till recently, been extraordinarily resistant to deskilling. The ordering of the work was taken out of the crews' hands as soon as the early entrepreneurs combined to control routes, and consolidated, in London, by 1860, but little has changed in the task since then, and it is this freedom from direct control that allows the interest and variety in the job, and forms the particular forms of struggle for control. Indeed the control structure - the extensive rule book and disciplinary procedures are there because of the actual irrationality of trying to control the crews' working environment. All that has of course changed with recent technological and organisational innovation. Deskilling has gone so far as to almost eradicate conducting, a job which has existed since 1829. Intensification of labour has produced such horrendous strain for one-man drivers that entirely new concepts of fare structures and collection machines have been introduced.

Crude charges are made in cities, while the moribund technological environment of the country services ~~is~~ being changed by ticket machines which hold, calculate and display the complex fare structure. The way is being paved further to the cheapening of labour through automatic, power-assisted buses, while the power to control position through radios and position locators, is obviously imminent. A probably temporary paradox exists however, for pay for one-man operator drivers has improved greatly, while the changes in fare collection have made the job more interesting in some localities. The increase in wages is of course likely to be eroded in time especially given the tendencies towards deskilling.

The second implication that Marx drew out is that of the use of machines. While it is undoubtedly generally important to see the machine as being a means to take control out of the hands of the work force, I would like to add the comment that machines are not the only way to exploit markets and labour: the efficiency of the tramways over horse buses depended simply on laying the rails, enabling increases in speed, though simultaneously making the crews subject to the tyranny of position on the line.

It is possible that the emphasis in writing on the capitalist labour process on machinofacture has unwittingly obscured the fact that capitalist accumulation does not proceed only by using machines in production, to increase exploitation and/or replacement of labour power.

This leads directly to the third implication, that the use of machinery facilitates control of the work force, since the design of the work has already been usurped by the owner, the worker being reduced to attendant on a machine he had no hand in designing - a feature which evidently applies to transportation machines, though as I have described, the control by management is problematic.

Overall, then capitalist management is clearly not merely a way of co-ordinating work activity, but has its particular forms because it is aimed at valorisation: the power of the manager comes from this impulsion, and not from his supposed neutral technical functions. In any event, these innovations exemplify the central point about Marxist analysis of the labour process: that technological innovations are not neutral - they are part and parcel of the forces of production. Or, put another way, the forces of production in the Marxist sense include both technology and the patterning of the division of labour around it; a dialectic relation typically denied by the sociology of organisation.

Salaman then proceeds (ibid 536 ff.) to comment on the significance of Weber's and Marx's work for his "new" sociology of organisation. I am not concerned with this concept, though I hope I could claim that this thesis is what Salaman's recommendations would look like, so I will merely select some pertinent points which provide comment on my own work.

In his attempt to draw together Marx's and Weber's relevance for the sociology of organisations, Salaman (ibid 537 ff) emphasises both Marx's and Weber's conclusion that the structure of organisation stems from the purposes of those who control, and that any search for "efficiency" will be in accord with those purposes, and not any neutral search for the best "technical" answer. Their emphasis on capitalist organisations as structures of control and domination, surrounded by ideological activity serving to mask its political nature are evidenced in the bus industry, which has formed into P.T.E.s and vast holding companies (S.B.G., G.G.P.T.E., N.B.C., L.T. etc.) when it has been established that there are negative returns to scale in the industry. The drive for expansion has gone on obviously to secure control: the political nature of the activity has run counter to the idea of public service.

As is evident from Chapter One, I have adopted Marx's ideas on the labour process as the theoretical base: Weber's ideas on domination cannot be dismissed out of hand, yet are not quite applicable to this thesis, for it is evident from the takeover of London buses in 1860, that the bureaucratic form was applied immediately that large scale capital formed the basis of the organisation: it was not the case that "modern society" (in this case) conceived suddenly the need for a bureaucratic form of control (cf. Salaman ibid: 539) and evolved it as the most efficient way of running bus services.

Salaman sees (ibid 539) the common themes of control and legitimation, and their embeddedness in the nature of the host society, and not the result of efficiency or technology, as themes lately pursued by a number of writers in sociology. Again, it would be tedious to rehearse his argument, but he does draw attention to a number of relevant points.

One common theme is that of how efficiency, administration and technology are used to deal with problems of control - problems, that is, for senior organisational members - which enables analyses to extend beyond the organisation's own definitions of itself. Fox (1974) for instance has developed notions of trust and discretion, which are variously applied throughout organisations, and which serve class interests.

This reinforcement of Marx's ideas on the design and execution of work is an interesting one for the bus industry, since it shows the class nature very well. For it is true to say that the design of the work - the working out of routes, market demand, ordering and servicing of materials of production and so on are quite out of the control of the crews, they still retain a quite extraordinary degree of discretion in the execution of the task (and the central paradox of bus work - that the social relations, the interest and variety are cancelled by the relation of production imposed to try and control at a remove-should be familiar by now). However, this discretion is denied by management's

supervisory structure and their whole assumption about the nature of their work force, and as I have shown played out in many petty humiliations.

This division of labour, with its consequent vaunting of some skills and degradation of others has been put most forcibly by Braverman (1974). His themes of the imperative of capital accumulation, tendential degradation of labour, and the location of specific aspects of such transformation and degradation within the totality of developments in capitalist production needs no repetition here, but I would like to make some comment.

Firstly, Braverman makes the point (ibid: 83) that the capitalist division of labour designs work such that it

. . . polarises those whose time is infinitely valuable and those whose time is worth almost nothing. This might even be called the general law of the capitalist division of labour.

The bus industry provides particularly good examples of an extension of this idea - that these valuable positions necessarily become personal expressions of class interests by the incumbents, who cling to them with a tenacity enhanced no doubt by public ownership - e.g. while doing my research I met a general manager whose own company had been bought out early in the '30s, while one of the municipal managers saw his responsibility career from one of the most highly regarded undertakings to one of the lowest over his thirty-year term: no one suggested he be replaced, though dismissals of the crews were running at about one third of the establishment per annum. A point well known in other areas but worth

noting here is that managers with long service in the S.B.G. retired with pensions: crews who had managed to survive that long retired with none, until compulsorily introduced in the 1970s.

Secondly, Braverman's thesis on the success of capital in degrading labour needs comment. On the one hand it is obvious that in the bus industry the nature of the task has defied efforts at deskilling till very recently. Indeed, the substantive chapters of this thesis emphasize that many of the problems that the industry has encountered have been devolved in ways contradictory to any supposed capitalist rationality, so that crews have had to bring to bear more skills of both a physical and a perceptual nature and not less. On the other hand, though the movement did not really get under way fully till the date of this thesis, there is a definite movement to cheapen labour in ways other than domination of wage negotiation and the less defensible sectors of the labour market - i.e. the intensification of labour power has moved into changing the materials of production as well, and the moves are clearly aimed at greater use of labour and capital and also greater control (cf. pp. 469-470).

The third and most important point is that it is the central theme of this thesis that workers react, recreate, struggle for control over production, over both the task and as a collectivity. I have described the struggle at the point of production, while in Chapter One I traced changes

in the market position of bus workers as a consequence of collective action. As Elger has shown at some length, Braverman tends to give the impression that capital has only to seek to be dominant for it to be. Not so. Elger (1979: 60 ff.) criticises Braverman for:

the inadequacy of his objectivist conceptualisation of the working class, which fails to address the manner in which class struggle is integral to the course of development of the capitalist labour process. The second (criticism) focusses on the implication, in the structure and discourse of Labor and Monopoly Capital, that analyses of both the obstacles confronting the accumulation process and their resolution in the reorganisation of the labour process can be divorced from analysis of broader forms of political domination and struggle.

It was awareness of these pertinent criticisms that led me to trace the processes of capital accumulation and the associated class struggle, placed I hope, with just enough clarity in the relevant historical location. I must confess, the earlier periods can be identified more clearly than those more recent, but even today, I have described how the low profit, indeed losses, of monopolistic bus organisations led to technological innovation, which "coincided" with a renewed collective action, much of it outside "official union policy" which secured overall, a built-in 25 per cent increase in wages at the introduction of the innovations. So the cyclical nature of capital and the struggle against it are still very present in the 1970s. The political structure of the 1970s has been one of encouragement of the shop-steward movement by at least the relevant T.G.W.U. (though it usually deplores the inevitable locally-based

struggles that result) and an improvement in wages and to a slight extent hours, against a background of income policies and legislation aimed at "controlling" precisely the kind of collective action that has been successful in improving wages and conditions in an industry that was suffering from a thirty year slide in its standards of pay and status, and conditions of work.

In short, as Schwarz remarks Braverman's approach fails to recognise "the working class as an active and problematical presence within the mechanism of accumulation". (Elger 1979: 60)

It is also a point that Salaman fails to recognise fully, since he is, I think, rather more concerned with building up "organisational sociology" than with examining political and economic domination. Yet he does draw attention to those who are concerned with such issues, e.g. Beynon (1973), Nichols and Armstrong (1976). While he quite properly criticises those writers who concern themselves with viewing organisations' characteristics as the result of technology, Salaman still seems to cling to the idea that "technology" exists as an artefact, ("Secondly such relationships as do exist between technology and organisational structure may be correlational as much as causal." (Salaman 1978: 545)) when he would be well advised to accept Nichols' and Beynon's turning of the basic Marxist point ". . . technology, which properly understood is the organisation of people's labour" (Nichols and Beynon 1977: 69) thus doing away with much

tedious discussion of a non existent problem.

This view of technology is even stranger in the light of his review of Benson's (1977) dialectical analysis, which emphasises the processual aspect of organisational structure, a point also made by Elger (1975), who emphasised the emergent nature of organisational structure in terms of conflict, negotiation, domination, resistance and acquiescence - terms whose use in this thesis need no emphasis. Benson uses three Marxist ideas which are implicit and exemplified in my work: totality, which requires a focus on the whole organisation, and its constituent inter-connections, contradiction, which refers to the inevitable strains and conflicts contained in, though they may be masked by organisational stability, and praxis, which refers to the potential within organisational members actively to reconstruct their organisational experiences and the structure of the organisation of which they are members.

* * * * *

It is appropriate to end my use of Salaman's review on a Marxist note for I wish to return to the Marxist view of the labour process with which I began, to provide a theoretical basis for the substantive material in the thesis.

As Nichols (1980: 272) emphasises, Braverman is chiefly responsible for re-uniting the study of capitalism and the labour process, despite reservations about his self-imposed limitations. However, Nichols is also right to point to the

need for some historical specificity and for the need to realise the uneven development of capital accumulation due to inconsistencies, failure to completely control the labour process, and of course the struggle of the proletariat against capital domination.

In this concluding section I wish to briefly review how my work fits such aims and pick out some particular features of the labour process in the bus industry.

The material on the history of the industry sought to show how the needs of capital have led to the present form; how hierarchy was virtually non-existent till the introduction of vast capital and the change from absolute to relative surplus value, how monopoly control led to low profit, severe exploitation even for a time when exploitation of labour was carried out ruthlessly, and eventually to technological innovation. Even at this time, however, the workers retained a great deal of control. Most importantly they received high though "illegal" wages through their direct control of revenue collection. The direct swap of wages for hours as a result of the 1891 London strike shows quite dramatically the effect of the workers' control. The striving for innovation in the materials of production to counteract low and variable rates of profit in the area of public transport cannot be divorced from the new electrical equipment companies' desire to exploit the potentialities of mass public transit through electrification of tramways. But the success of this particular process of capital accumulation was limited to the suppliers of

equipment, for the interests of capital immediately met the interests of socialism, at least in its municipal guise, which effectively limited or "socialised" tramway company profits and prepared the way for public ownership and improved the conditions of work for tramway workers.

The search for capital accumulation through innovation in what transformed the horse to the motor bus similarly ~~was~~ met with an improvement in conditions. Similarly the push for public control of transport existed quite openly and was finally resolved in nationalisation or municipalisation of most of public transport. There is no doubt of the connection between the labour process, the various capitalist accumulation changes and the general political-economic processes interacting with each stage.

However, public ownership of bus organisations does raise problems which are of interest in discussing the capitalist labour process. Since the publication of Haraszti's "A Worker in a Workers' State" in 1977 evidence has existed that state ownership of the means of production may still mean intensification of labour at the point of production. However, as far as I am aware this issue has been unexplored explicitly for state ownership of the means of production in a capitalist (i.e. the so-called "mixed economy") state. I have therefore grounds for claiming that this study of the labour processes of the bus industry can extend the range of studies of the labour process, as exemplified by Nichols (1980).

The contradictions I have described stem of course from the taking over of existing capitalist organisations, and running the organisations firmly in the mold of the capitalist rationality of domination of the work force and control of the labour process. Herbert Morrison was quite simply wrong. Even a meritocracy cannot run a "humane" organisation if the processes set up to extract surplus value remain unchallenged and unchanged. The imperatives to intensify labour power may be put in abeyance for a while, but the exigencies of capital flow apply equally to the form of financial holding of publicly owned transport organisation, and thus the increasing exploitation is inevitable. The alternative possibilities were of course indicated eloquently by Mr Clay (cf. pp. 45 - 46). In the bus industry the particular form of domination and exploitation has been shown to be mystified by management's self-perception of itself as engaged in providing a "service" through "professionalism" (crudely, don't question what we do for we are experts). That services have patently deteriorated while the expertise of managers has been shown to be inept even in their own terms, though important, should not be allowed to obscure the processes whereby this particular mystification has been used to intensify labour power. If services can only be maintained by intensification of the labour process (refusing to reduce scheduled speeds because of congestion, perpetuation of long hours, etc.) then the "professionalism" of the managers is well placed to operate the means of compulsion through the

organisations' procedures, and to inhibit, though not prevent, either external "political interference" or internal questioning of its structuring of the work process. In this last it is of course helped by a Trade Union policy that steadfastly refuses to concern itself with anything other than pay and conditions, and leaves the struggle over toil by the work force broadly unsupported. As I have described struggles over pay and conditions have achieved major advances at various stages, helped or hindered by the general elements of class struggle at the time.

However, the Union's general policy of "leaving it to the managers to manage" does not prevent the struggle for control of the labour process. The crews' struggle for control is helped by one of the contradictions of the organisation of the labour process in the industry. As Braverman puts it, (1974: 100):

Workers who are controlled only by general orders and discipline are not adequately controlled because they retain their grip on the actual processes of labour . . . (and) they will thwart efforts to realise to the full the potential in their labour power. To change this situation control over the labour process must pass into the hands of management, not only in a formal sense but by the control and dictation of each step of the process, including its mode of performance".

This quotation aptly sums up the basic contradiction of the bus industry and points to the inevitability of conflict. For while the organisation seeks to control the crews, it is the crews who retain control over a great deal of the task. As should be evident by now, it is at present impossible for

management to break down the very complex skills involved in bus work into discrete simple actions over which it could extend control. From this stems the basic irrationality of the structure of control in bus work: controls such as high or even just standard route timings which can at times put great stress on the crews without achieving their aim of regularity: even attempts to organise the labour process on principles of regularity when the task conditions fluctuate greatly: intermittent checks on fare collections which impose only the most general check on the generation of revenue: petty humiliations in a haphazard and ineffective discipline scheme which contradicts the basic position of having to trust crews, and which effectively negates the reliance on their commitment to do the job when free of any supervision, etc., etc.

However, though control over the labour process is problematic for management, there is no doubt of the tendency of management to increase exploitation. This tendency, it has been shown, has led, and still does lead, to a creative response by busmen - a struggle - sometimes successful, sometimes not, sometimes at the point of production, at other times through a wider collective struggle, and sometimes in the context of a more general class struggle.

Certainly bus crews are exploited, for they do not own the buses: but they are clocking up not just miles, but experience . . .

APPENDIX I: Thesis A

Denzin (1970, Preface) has an apposite quotation from Homans which fits the overall intention of this appendix rather well.

The most important advice I can give the contemporary sociologist has nothing to do with the validity of my arguments. It is this: you do not have to believe anything about theory and methodology that is told to you pretentiously or sanctimoniously by other sociologists - including myself. So much guff has gotten mixed up with the truth that, if you cannot tell which is which you had better reject it all. It will only get in the way. No one will go far wrong theoretically who remains in close touch with and seeks to understand a body of concrete phenomena.

(Homans, G.C. 'Handbook of Modern Sociology pp 957-976.)

This quotation is appropriate for it encapsulates a major difficulty I had with my research. I started with a theoretical paradigm which I was forced to largely abandon in favour of analysis of the data that I actually had. The general effect has been to move from a research design which would have been fundamentally taxonomic in nature to one which, though perhaps less ambitious, does I believe have the virtue of making sociological analyses and perceptions which have something pertinent to say about the 'concrete phenomenon' which form the subject.

This shift in theoretical endeavour means that this section which deals with the original theoretical concern, has really the nature of a methodological addendum to the rest of the study. Rather than seeking to justify the original thesis (called Thesis A for convenience here), I will be seeking to explain its intent, how this intent was

carried out, and thus why I have the particular methodological framework that I have. I will offer some criticism of this original format, which criticism has led up to the formulation of a rather different thesis.

As I have already said in Chapter 1 this study was basically of an occupation. My starting point was the observed discrepancy between the common professed aims of bus organisations and the actual service provided. On the basis of my own experience, I was interested in analysing the social processes involved in producing this actual service.

But although this study has the form of an occupational study, which tries to show, as its main sociological contribution, that workers respond to the organisation in which they find themselves, and that this response can have the effect of changing the actual form of the organisation, I have to explain that this latter thesis was not what I set out originally to show.

Although I retained at the back of my mind that much of this thesis would include material which would normally constitute an "occupational study", I set out originally with a much more ambitious aim, namely to use my material to explicate some of the main problems in what was then a rather contentious debate commonly designated as "Technological Implications vs Orientations". That I have not in fact done so, or rather have made if anything a contribution to only

a part of that rather large area of academic discussion, is perhaps best attributed to original adoption of the rather dangerous practice common in research of looking for some convenient theoretical peg on which to neatly order one's dangerously unwieldy and ill-formed data and ideas. Certainly the ideas in this thesis are derived from a rather introspective consideration of experience, combined with a willingness to have ideas emerge from the material, rather than fitting the material to a pre-existing paradigm.

Since I have now abandoned all but one part of this original approach, it might well be asked why I consider it here.

It is included simply because the methodology with regard to what groups of busmen were analysed, and how the important element of the questionnaire survey was constructed, depend to a large extent on the original design. As it happens, the methods adopted have conveniently lent themselves to the type of analysis that has emerged, but I will return to this point after having discussed the original proposition.

I can really only start by offering a mea culpa or auto critique as it has become known, because of what ought to have been the evident dangers of trying to fit my "concrete phenomena" to what is basically a taxonomy for research. But yet there were attractions in doing so, and perhaps the original intention was not so culpable after all.

What was perhaps more regrettable was my too heavy a dependance on other people's ideas.

The main source, or inspiration, of the original

intention was a University of Edinburgh Faculty of Social Sciences Seminar Paper delivered by Frank Bechhofer in May 1970, entitled "The Relationship between Technology and Shop Floor Behaviour: A Less Heated Look at a Controversy", subsequently published in Edge and Wolfe (eds.), 1973, pp 121-142. It is out of place to offer a critique of Bechhofer's ideas here, since the intention is only to explain the course of the methodology of the thesis.

I was eager to follow up the direction of research suggested by Bechhofer because it seemed to offer a way of combining the "Action Perspective" advocated by such as Silverman (1970) with the "Systems" approach, with its derivative, the "Technological implications" adherents, whose main protagonist was Joan Woodward.

The Action approach seemed a suitable one to take since it was evident that much of the job of the busman was conducted in ways which fitted into classical symbolic interactionist perspective and could only make sense in an Action-perspective. The "Technological Implications" approach also seemed relevant because it seemed equally evident that Busmen are subject to massive constraints in their working environment from the form of the technology in which they are involved.

I was dealing with a conflict between the principles of a highly bureaucratic and rigid type of organisation, which yet operationalised its main activity in highly discretionary unsupervised situations requiring non-prescribed action. The resultant system seemed to be viewed in

pathological terms by management (in that they saw their employees as intransigent, low quality poorly disciplined workers) and by the workers, who saw their working conditions as made much more difficult by a short-sighted, unconcerned and unknowledgeable management. That there had to be a link between the organisational theories and the social situation of the actors seemed evident, but what it might be was not.

I believed that Bechhofer's paper provided me with both a way to handle these two conflicting areas, and also a way of contributing to more general research concern.

I will give a brief resume of the parts of Bechhofer's paper that seemed important to me, indicate how I applied these ideas to my own research, and then give the comparative hypotheses I entertained about my study. Note that I am not attempting to review the whole of Bechhofer's paper, or treat it at all comprehensively: this account is a historical one of my actions, not Bechhofer's ideas.

Bechhofer's main aim is to suggest a paradigm for research that accommodates the two schools of thought on the question of the extent to which shop floor attitudes and behaviour are determined by technological factors. His discussion of specific problem areas in the latter part of the paper was not taken into account specifically in my original research formulation. Dealing with the controversy between Woodward and the Affluent Worker authors (J. Woodward, in New Society, 25th July 1968, Goldthorpe and Lockwood et al 11th August 1968, J. Woodward (ed.) 1970 'Industrial Organization: Behaviour and Technology') Bechhofer identifies

the question at issue as the extent to which shop floor attitudes and behaviour are affected by technological factors. He sees the 'technological implications' approach as being a creditable sociological one, explaining a number of characteristics of industrial organisation and variation in the nature, extent and effectiveness of managerial control. But Bechhofer doubts the application of the approach to 'shop floor' behaviour, commenting that it was not found helpful in "The Affluent Worker: Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour" (which he subsequently refers to as IAB) though he does say that much of the contention was based on false assessments of what the authors of IAB had actually said.

Seeing the argument between IAB and Woodward as being really located at the meta-theoretical level, Bechhofer argues the crux of the matter lies in the sort of assumptions about the nature of human action that the sociologist is going to make. He goes on to argue the relevance of the 'Action perspective', and that explanation of behaviour in the industrial setting must take the orientation of the Actor into account. He sees this stance as being reconcilable with a modified version of the technological implications approach, "if, and only if, workers' definitions of the work situation could be shown to depend largely on the technology or, to take a wide definition (which would include management structure), on in-plant factors." He goes on to argue that it is clear that the proponents of the technological implications do not accept that the meaning

that workers attribute to the work situation should be the starting point, and that this contrasts with the essential analysis of orientation in the explanation of shop floor behaviour in the Action perspective. Bechhofer does however concede that the relative importance of what he calls in-plant and out-plant factors is a matter for empirical investigation in each particular case.

In general what he sees as crucial is the need to clarify the way in which the worker's orientation to his work and the technology interact. And this acted as the impetus to my own research.

It was the schemata which Bechhofer develops to deal with this issue that attracted me and seemed to give me a way of handling the subject I had chosen.

Bechhofer identifies four ideal type comparative research situations concerned with the extent to which technology and work orientations determine industrial attitudes and behaviour.

Type 1 Technology the same: Orientations of workers
different

Type 2 Technology the same: Orientation of workers
the same

Type 3 Technology different: Orientation of workers
different

Type 4 Technology different: Orientations of workers
the same

This typology is seen as the basis to research in the whole field, requiring empirical research in these four boxes with both orientation to work and technology treated as variables

and the studies replicable at various levels.

It was to filling all four boxes that I turned my endeavours, blithely ignoring Bechhofer's warning that, "Immediately it is clear that we do not at present have either a sharp enough conceptual grasp of orientation or sufficiently refined measures of technology, or enough detailed studies aimed at this particular set of problems . . ." (p 128). Before describing what I thought might be the application of the paradigm to my chosen area of research, it might conveniently be parenthesised here that if the present resultant study has any relevance to this main area of research, it is in supplying a "detailed empirical study".

Applying the paradigm:

Type 1 (Technology the same, orientations different)

In this case, I thought it feasible to treat the S.B.G. companies as having the same technology, while differing orientations could be explained by variations in the "community" factors in which each garage was based. I also thought it possible to treat the two city organisations as constant, with a similar attribution of orientation variability. As Bechhofer pointed out, it is a case in which little work has been done, (ibid p 128)". . . and to the best of my knowledge none actually aimed at the problem under consideration". The aim of the research in this Type 1 was to show that, say, differences between Eastern Scottish and Fife crews was due, not to organisational factors, but to the employees being drawn from a predominantly middle class city, with a large number of "respectable working-class" in "decent" housing

areas, probably associated with 'instrumental' orientations on the one hand, as opposed to a small, highly integrated local mining community, with strong "solidaristic" ties, on the other.

Type 2 (Technology the same, orientations same)

This is rather an important case for the eventual form of this thesis. For as Bechhofer points out, there appears to be no comparison possible. But he does make the point that this format is effectively one of replications, and that "such comparisons . . . may alert us to important factors at present being ignored". It is in fact in this area that my own eventual thesis can make some contribution. For what I show in the body of the analysis, and argue further in the Conclusion, is that the available research does not seem to take into account orientations formed within the work place, or that such orientation (combined with other, out-plant factors) may affect the processes of the organisation.

In the original methodology I thought that this particular cell might show up differences among the S.B.G. depots, and might also lend itself to a comparison of the privately owned A.A. as opposed to the state-owned S.B.G. Kilmarnock depot which might be argued to have a similar technology and pool of labour. I thought such an apparent non-comparison might throw up some unapparent factors. It did!

Type 3. (Technology different, orientations different)

Because of the poor specification of the variables involved, Bechhofer sees this cell as offering few opportunities

for research. Yet I thought that I might be able to make a contribution by comparing such technologically different (or so I conceived it at the time) organisations as the A.A. and Glasgow Corporation, with what appeared to be their different pools of labour, and seeing what similarities emerged.

Type 4. (Technology different, orientations the same)

It is worth quoting Bechhofer in full here.

"Type 4 is the research situation that has given rise to the present controversy. The force of the argument in I.A.B. comes from comparison of workers who have the same orientation in different technological environments. It should be noted that there are two prongs to the argument: the first that the attitudes and behaviours are broadly similar over many aspects of industrial life, the second that some of the differences observed run contrary to what would be predicted on the technological implications approach.

". . . it can be seen that in empirical terms the debate centres on studies falling in only one part of the paradigm outlined; it uses concepts that are insufficiently precisely specified and are inadequately measured; and it concerns a model whose dependent variables are so all-embracing that it is surprising anything useful can be said at all!"

(ibid p 130)

Oh yes indeed! But nothing loath, I blundered on.

But there did appear at the time to be good research

opportunities in this situation, and indeed there still would be, though for a rather different type of study than the one produced here. For my material in this cell allowed comparison of the "same" pool of labour in different organisational situations. Thus I could compare the Milngavie depot of the S.B.G. with the Knightswood depot of Glasgow Corporation, which both draw on the same housing areas for labour, as do Eastern Scottish and Edinburgh Corporation. The major problem in doing so was of course that there might be a degree of self-selection involved, but this could be argued to be another virtue of the situation, since there was the chance of studying individuals who had moved from one organisation to the other, and finding out why.

The intention of my research was thus to fill the cells of the paradigm suggested by Bechhofer, thus achieving a very great range of comparative research situations.

The full extent of the comparisons involved is indicated in the diagram over the page.

Orientations

	Same	Different
Same	<div> <div> Kilmarnock ↑ X Milngavie X Fife ↓ Edinburgh </div> } <div> Glasgow Corp) ↕ Edinburgh Corp) Kilmarnock ↕ A.A. </div> </div>	<div> Kilmarnock Milngavie Edinburgh Fife </div> <div> ↔ </div> <div> Edinburgh Glasgow </div>
chnology		
fferent	<div> Milngavie ↔ Glasgow Corp Edinburgh ↔ Edinburgh Corp Kilmarnock ↔ A.A. </div>	<div> Glasgow ↙ ↘ Kilmarnock ↔ Fife ↙ ↘ A.A. </div>

The diagram indicates the possible sets of comparisons.
Arrows connect the possible pairs.

This was a useful form to adopt, given that the technology and Orientations involved were no better defined than any that had then emerged from the literature. By analysing the material from an "Action Perspective" it was hoped that some valid conceptualisations would emerge. (It is hoped that this last aim has been achieved, though not through just quite the comparative format outlined.)

What questions and problems I hoped to be answered by adopting this framework are not of concern here, though some of the themes are returned to in the Conclusions. I have included the original format in order to explain what might appear to be a rather arbitrary selection of groups, and rather an unwieldy number of groups, at that. It would of course have been better to confine myself to fewer groups to simplify comparison, but by taking seven, I was able to fill all the 'ideal' research situations.

I must now attend to the task of pointing out why I did not eventually use this paradigm, at least in a formal sense, and indeed, largely abandoned it, as an explicit guide to analysing the busman's world from the perspective of the busman.

The first reason for the abandonment of Thesis A was a difficulty with the "Technology" element. It was not that I was unable to specify this element - if anything I have done so too minutely - but that I could not, within the model, justify arguing that differences in Technology existed to a great enough extent and certainly not in terms of Woodward's typology. Differences among the organisations existed, as

between the S.B.G. and City organisations, but these related, as far as I could see, mainly to the administration affairs, and I could see little effect of the differences on the crews, and none at all on the tasks performed. In addition perusal of the Survey data very quickly showed that differences between the S.B.G. depots and Glasgow and Edinburgh Corporation Depots were as great as those between the two types of organisation.

A second, and related difficulty, was that the Technology, though apparently the same in all seven groups, was perceived differently, and responded to differently by the actors involved in the situation, but in ways which were not attributable to community-derived (or out-plant) factors, i.e. orientations were related to 'in-plant' factors. This was not, I judged, compatible with the paradigm, in that there were organisational factors operating which were not subsumable in the typologies so far erected. In short, what was seen to be responded to by the crews was not derivable a priori from the model.

The second difficulty was with the status of 'Orientations' as an operational variable. As is evident from I.A.B., the orientations are pitched at a rather high level of generality, while the validity of some of them, such as 'solidaristic' was derived from the material and was not set out initially to be tested. Thus it is questionable that it was the adoption of an instrumental orientation that prompted the 'Affluent workers'. There is no basis for not saying that instrumentalism is a general orientation to work, while

'solidarity' has, say, never existed outwith specific areas of action, or specific trades. Certainly there is nothing in I.A.B. to deny the idea that these workers had already developed an instrumental orientation in previous work experiences.

A further related difficulty attached itself to this problem. Although I was fairly certain of my ability to analyse in-plant orientations to work, I was doubtful of my capacity to relate these to out-plant factors. For much of my insight into inplant factors was attributable to my participant observation involvement, which would be impossible to carry out into the wider community in which individual crews were located. The only means of doing so would be by survey techniques. But to do so with any hope of rigour would require interviewing over two thousand people (remembering that they would have to be assigned to their seven groups), a proceeding that was obviously outwith the scope of a graduate research program. Nonetheless, some "orientation" questions were included in the survey, though I was too doubtful of the validity in statistical terms to use them to any degree, given that I would be unable to relate them to specific referents through participant observation. What I do have on orientations however, is a fair amount of useful material which relates to in-plant factors, and which has been referred to where appropriate.

This is not to deny the possibility of such a study. A study of busmen's integration of work and leisure, and/or more general "images of society" would be interesting, but the material I have on such subjects does not show tendencies

to differences among the groups to have much reliability placed on them, while there is a lack of other worker groups who might act as comparisons.

The third difficulty, and probably the most serious, is in misjudging the scale of research envisaged in Bechhofer's paradigm. Bechhofer is really suggesting a taxonomic framework for the organisation of the whole of the research in the area of the influence of technological factors on the attitudes and behaviour of workers.

It is not a model of causal explanation, and it was, accordingly, inappropriate, I think, to endeavour to treat it as such, to try to "test" the operation of the "technology" and "orientations" variables in the way I set out to do. Following on from this was the gradual realisation that an occupational study, or the analysis of a "slice of social reality", which was the essential first step, was a rather different endeavour from a general essay trying to integrate some elements of organisational theory based on "systems" thinking with an "Action" approach really focussed on the area of "images of society". There was also a growing suspicion in my mind that the original "contention", and its examination belonged rather in the "Sociology of the Sociologists of Work" rather than in the realm of practical utility in empirical research. (This is a point made by Cox 1975.)

It hardly needs added that this application of an inappropriate - certainly inappropriate in scale - research model is in no way attributable to Bechhofer.

A fourth difficulty to emerge which contributed to the abandonment of Thesis A was that treating the occupation of the Busman solely in terms of the (rather loosely specified) variables of Technology and Control, did not allow me to get to grips with other processes that I thought were present. Certainly I found that analysis of my survey data, while it had a lot to say about the stated attitudes of the crews I interviewed, simply did not "uncover" what I felt were important issues, even in terms of "technology" and "orientation".

Once analysis was under way, other themes such as 'constraint', 'response', 'control', 'expectation', 'ambiguity', 'negotiation', 'power' and even 'presentation of self' began to emerge as the dominant issues.

These were themes that seemed to relate to in-plant factors - they were orientations developed within, i.e. in response to, the task and the organisation. I could not see how such a focus on "in-plant orientation" could fit into the original model.

I would not care to argue that such themes are necessarily incompatible with Bechhofer's scenario, but they were difficult to fit into a consideration of technology and orientation as originally formulated for the research project.

In summary, these four difficulties (there were others of a personal nature, which are not relevant to this discussion), led to abandonment of 'Thesis A'. I would not have made this commentary on this fairly common dialogue between thought and research were it not necessary to explain (a) why

I have the groups of busmen I do, (b) why my questionnaire took the form it did.

As it happens, both (a) and (b) are still very present in the study because the comparative nature of the groups involved is useful, and one of the interesting features that emerged was that, though in Woodward's term there is only one Technology, yet there are significant differences in perception and response to that Technology among my groups, and because much of the data of the survey is still useful in giving an idea of how busmen see their job, and what 'orientations' they develop within it.

Examination of both my own observations and analyses, and analysis of the survey data led to the adoption of a second thesis, which has guided the writing of this study.

This second thesis is that crews respond and react to their work situation, not just in attitudes, but also in behaviour: they push back, subvert, and recreate their own work situation as far as they can. Despite the massive constraints and control on the task, crews do act on the technology to change its effect and its form. Indeed I ~~have~~ shown (in the Chapter on Interaction) that it is where the task is hardest and the control system most constraining, that the greatest opportunities exist for recreating the Technology of management.

This is an important departure from such studies as I.A.B. which do not consider that the attitudes and behaviour found have developed within and in response to in-plant factors, but that attitudes to work are 'prior orientations'

On the other hand, Woodward's system approach would also seem to be a long way from recognising that workers themselves can re-create the technology.

With this as the thesis, the analysis of what is a rather complex task - that of the crews - is pursued. Concentration is on how the crews react to structural constraints - successfully, and unsuccessfully, and, of course, WHY.

I feel I should also point out that the study eventually produced is not formed solely from the giving up of an original idea. I felt even originally that a paradigmatic approach did not touch closely enough important issues. I believe that the issues I touch on here, those of constraint, response and control in particular, treated very much in an exploratory way as they are, yet serve to move the study from being solely a descriptive one. I hope to ^{have} shown that the themes I have used in analysing the busman's situation are related to the organisation at the institutional level. Giddens in particular (1973) "Class Structure of Advanced Industrial Societies" p 15) notes the importance of moving from the 'Action' level (and in my case at times, the symbolic interactionist level) to the institutional level. It is for this purpose that a rather more extended critique of the organisation than is commonly found in examining "workers", is included.

But over and above the particular interest of bus companies, there is at least a little exploratory comment on "the condition of man" in the 20th century under a well

established bureaucratic/industrial system that represents for all its public ownership, a capitalist mode of organisation.

This appendix is now curiously placed, since it was originally introduced to explain a shift in emphasis to a "social action" approach to my empirical material. Thus even more strongly do I have to support Cox's (1975) suggestion that this "orientations vs. technology" controversy belongs more properly to a sociology of knowledge concerning the development of British industrial sociology, rather than to any findings.


However, it may be worth commenting here that there is a further contradiction in Bechhofer's paper in that he still assumes that "technology" can be identified a priori by the sociologist, when logically, it would have to be the actor's perception of technology that should be taken.

Naturally interpreting material through the theory of the labour process so changes my work as to make this material irrelevant except in its methodological interest. Once the perspective "technology is the organisation of people's labour" is accepted, the focus must necessarily be on why that organisation, rather than "meanings".

APPENDIX II: Glasgow Herald

PERSPECTIVE

Violence and vandalism on Glasgow buses have stretched to the limit the patience of crews. They want more protection. According to a psychologist's survey the busmen are disillusioned with warning klaxons and radios. How serious is the problem? JAMES McKILLOP reports the astonishing scenes he experienced on one city route.



The 46 to Castlemilk arrives at the Mill Hotel . . . and the crowd surges on to an already packed bus.

A night of mob rule on the 46 bus

THE Castlemilk cowboys rule — every Thursday, Friday, and Saturday night. They hijack the upper and lower decks on Glasgow bus route 46 after a night on the town.

As the pubs closed on Friday, I joined the drunken horde that stormed the Castlemilk bus outside the Mill Hotel, Rutherglen, and can testify that the scenes were straight out of the Wild West.

The conductor was intimidated to the extent that he dare not ask for a fare. If he had said a word out of turn he would obviously have been in trouble as passengers poured on — dangerously overcrowding the bus.

All sympathy goes to the crews who have to

man city buses on notorious trouble-spot routes and one can easily understand why they are disillusioned about the effectiveness of radio and warning klaxons in drivers' cabs.

When I got off the 46 bus on Castlemilk on Friday I was told I had witnessed a "quiet night." There had been no violence, so it had been a victory for common sense.

A victory? The mob rules on this bus. The moment we got on at the Mill Hotel it was made perfectly clear to the bus conductor that he was not there to collect fares.

As far as the passengers were concerned he was there on sufferance and as long as he did not make trouble he would not be

harmed. Wisely, the conductor stood beside the driver throughout the journey.

The only way he could contain the horde was to warn them that the "Gestapo" — plain clothed and uniformed bus inspectors — were following.

For me the evening began in the Mill Hotel which has won a wicked reputation among bus crews.

The trouble is that the powers that be have decreed Castlemilk should not have a pub of its own. And this is an area with a population the size of Perth's.

The result is that every drinking night there is an exodus from Castlemilk — an exodus that has to

return when the pubs close.

The Mill Hotel is one of the first watering spots outside Castlemilk.

I visited each of the three bars and there was no question of disorder in any, although it could be said that a large percentage of the clientele had had more than a few too many.

Drunks

Waiting for a bus outside the Mill Hotel is an experience. Drunks run across the road endangering life, limb, and carry out. Those who had not found the 15-minute drinking up time sufficient, brought their unfinished pints with them.

One man who attempted to get rid of his empty pint by throwing it over a fence, caught the middle stump and the bus queue was suddenly dodging broken glass.

When the bus came there was an almighty rush. It didn't matter. The crew, already intimidated by the crowd were not going to prevent anybody getting on an already overcrowded bus.

There was no question of taking fares. Upstairs a party was in full swing with the Flower of Scotland the favourite choice.

One passenger looked surprised when I asked if this was the normal behaviour.

"Where do you come from then? It's always like this"

"Don't you ever pay your fare then?" I asked.

"Never."

A Glasgow Herald car following the bus had to swerve as a glass was thrown from the upper deck. But inside they were

still in happy mood, continuing the party until they reached home.

Later I insisted on paying a fare.

"Why should you be different from the rest?" was the response from an exasperated conductor, who was afraid to do anything as provocative as be seen to collect a fare. Who would blame him?

When I continued to insist he gave me a ticket — for only 10p.

I spoke later to the uniformed inspectors who were in a follow-up vehicle. "You have had a quiet night tonight," they told me.

"Of course we have got to take that back yet." And they pointed to the back of a bus seat that had been thrown out a window.

But it is true that I did witness a quiet night.

Between 10 p.m. and 11.30 p.m. buses from the Mill Hotel are notorious. I was told by both union and management officials.

Crews have had to deal with seats set on fire, windows being smashed, assaults, and seats being fouled by passengers. Beer cans filled with urine are left on board.

If an emergency door is opened — and that is not unusual — the driver is left with a problem. Should he investigate? If he does, he runs the danger of his cash being stolen. If he doesn't he is left with the possibility that there could be a serious incident.

How does the crew cope?

"How would you cope?" I was asked. "The bus company employ ordinary human beings as conductors and drivers — not supermen."

GLASGOW HERALD

4th October, 1977

APPENDIX III: Questionnaire

DATE TIME

COMPANY GARAGE

DRV CDR CDRS

WORK HISTORY

1.How long have you been working here.

vrs. mth.

2.What sort of situation were you in, that made you take up this job
in the first place.

3.Have you ever left this job, and then come back

yes no

4.What job did you go to

5.And why did you come back.

6.What are the main jobs you've had since you left school.

TYPE OF WORK	EMPLOYER	LOCATION	DATE
--------------	----------	----------	------

**2.

7. Here are some of the things often thought important about a job.

Which one would you look for first in a job

1 2

Interest and variety_____	_____*	_____
Good workmates_____	_____2	_____
Not too much supervision_____	_____3	_____
Strong and active union_____	_____4	_____
Worthwhile job_____	_____5	_____
Job where you have to use your own judgement_____	_____6	_____
Chance to better yourself_____	_____7	_____
Security_____	_____8	_____
A good wage_____	_____9	_____
Respectable job_____	_____10	_____

D.K.
N.A.

and what would you choose next

8. As far as these two things are concerned how would you rate this job.

Very good All right Pretty poor Very bad D.K. N.A.

9 How about things more on the bad side of work

Which of these is most important to you

1 2

Long hours_____	_____1	_____
Boring job_____	_____2	_____
People look down on you_____	_____3	_____
Cant use your own judgement_____	_____4	_____
Too much supervision_____	_____5	_____
No future_____	_____6	_____
Job itself unpleasant_____	_____7	_____
Insecurity_____	_____8	_____

D.K.
N.A.

And what would you choose next

10. Is there anything you particularly like about being a driver/conductor.

11. And what do you dislike most.

*3.

12. Do you think that management succeeds in its job

yes no

12a If no, why is

12b If yes, what do you see as the job of management

13. How about things run by the inspectors and control room staff.

14. If you could, what one thing about the job
would you most like to change.

15. If you felt the system could be improved in some way,
would you try to suggest it to the company.

yes no

15a If yes, who would you approach

15b If no, Is that because : (1) You feel it would be useless
(2) You dont think anything could be improved

*4

16. How would you describe how people got on with each other here

17. And as for yourself:

Do you keep yourself to yourself	1
Have a few good friends	2
Try to be fairly friendly with everyone	3
Get on well with everyone	4

18. Do you find that inspectors act the same way to everyone.

19. Have you any desire to be an inspector yourself yes no

19a. Why/ why not

20. Which workers get a better deal for themselves,
those in this company or in
Why is that

21. Do you think that management and men work together
in this company yes no

22. Where do things break down

23. Would you say that people in this company got promotion because
They've got it through seniority
They know the right people
They're ambitious
They're the right person for the job

24 Have you been to a Union meeting in the last year

yes, no

24a If no, Is that because you dont think it worth bothering: why
If yes, Most people dont, why do you

25. Why would you say people get involved in union affairs

26. Do you think your job is a good one to have

VG G N B VB

27. What do people in general think of it

28. Is there any job youre thinking of changing to just now

yes no

28a If yes, Why is that

28b If no, Would it be difficult for you to find another job

yes no

Why

29. What would you say was a fair basic wage for your forty hour week.

£

30. Imagine you could divide the population of Britain into two groups, there's lots of ways you could do it, but out of these ones here, which are the most important for you
- 1 Town 2. hands 3 employers 4. rich 5. right 6. honest 7 educated
8. work 9. them.

RESIDENCE

31. Have you always lived in the area you're in now

yes no

31a Where lived

31b. Why moved

32. What sort of area do you live in now

33. Do you like where you live, or would you prefer to move

(a) (If likes area) Why is that

(b) (If would like to move) Where would you like to live

34. Do you have any relatives in the same area

yes no

34a If yes, How often do you see them

35. Do you see anyone from this garage socially, outside work

yes, no

36. Apart from people at work, are there any friends you see a lot of.

37. And what sort of jobs do they have

38. What sort of leisure time activities do you go in for, mainly

*7

39. Are there any clubs or organizations you belong to.

40. M. S. D. W.

CHILDREN

ages

no.

41. (Of children who have left)

What do they do

42 Do you expect them to improve their position.

yes no

43.(Of children at school)

Do you know what **** wants to be? Is that the kind of job you hope
he/. she will settle down in

yes no

If no, what sort of job is hoped for.

44. In the universities and colleges there are fewer people from
a working class background, why do you think that is

POLITICS

45.Do you think it made much difference that the Conservatives won the
last election.

yes no

a In what ways does it make a difference

b Why do you feel it wont make a difference

*8

46. Do you always vote the same way at General Elections

yes no

46a Previous votes

47. You seem pretty attached to ***** Can you tell me why that is

48. Are you involved in politics at all

yes no

Position

49 . About Strikes, which of these statements comes nearest to you
own attitude.

1 2 3 4
D.K. N.A.

Here are some statements that are sometimes made. Could you
tell me whether on the whole you would agree or disagree with
each of them

50. It is sometimes said that in general the state interferes too much
in the lives of individuals in this country- would you agree or disagree

agree
disagree
D.K.
N.A.

51.that the trade unions have too much power in the country

agree
disagree
D.K.
N.A.

52.....that big business men have too much power in the country

agree
disagree
D.K.
N.A.

53.that there is one law for the rich and one for the poor

agree
disagree
D.K.
N.A.

54. Talking about different kinds of jobs, could you put these occupations
in order of what you think is their standing in the community.

- 1 chartered accountant
- 2 building site labourer
- 3 factory worker
- 4 policeman
- 5 bank clerk
- 6 school teacher

54a And where would you put your own occupation among these

55. As things stand just now, what do you think offers the best chance for a worker to improve his situation - Get out of the working class or fight to improve wages and conditions where he is.

fight stay

EXPENDITURE

56. Could you tell me your average weekly earnings; that is including overtime, but before deductions.

£
-17
17-20
21-24
25-28
28-31
32-35
36-39
40+

57. Taking the whole of the money coming into the house, about how much a week would that be.

£

58. And lastly, What would you say you needed to earn to live in reasonable comfort.

£

COMMENT

Questions involving the respondent choosing one of a set of fixed options, were presented to him on cards. The format has been reproduced in the questionnaire for most questions.

For those that are not, the full form was:

Question 30

1. Town dwellers/City dwellers.
2. Those who work with their hands/Those who do not.
3. Employers/Employees.
4. Rich/Poor.
5. Right wing/Left wing.
6. Honest/Dishonest.
7. Educated/Uneducated.
8. Working class/Middle class.
9. "Them"/Us.

Question 49

1. I would not voluntarily go on strike.
2. I would strike with Union support.
3. I would strike without Union support.
4. I would come out on a General Strike.

APPENDIX IV: Print out of Survey Variables
and Values

RUN NAME BUSMAN TRIAL NINE
FILE NAME BUS STUDY ONE
SUBFILE LIST EDINCORP, FIFE, GLWCORP, MLNG, A.A., KIL, EASTERN
E OF CASES 18, 19, 18, 19, 18, 19
VARIABLE LIST VAR001 TO VAR223
INPUT MEDIUM CARD
INPUT FORMAT FIXED (F3.0,F1.0,F2.0,F1.0,3F2.0,19F1.0,3F2.0,23F1.0/
6X,5F1.0,2F2.0,F1.0,3F2.0,F1.0,F2.0,F1.0,2F2.0,F1.0,F2.0/
6X,2F2.0,F1.0,F2.0,7F1.0,2F2.0,F1.0,F2.0,F1.0,4F1.0,2F2.0,
11F1.0,F2.0,5F1.0,2F2.0,17F1.0,6X,2F1.0,5F2.0,F1.0,5F2.0,5F1.0,
F2.0,3F1.0,2F2.0,20F1.0,3F2.0,F1.0)

IGNORING INDEFINITE REPETITION, THE INPUT FORMAT PROVIDES FOR 223 VARIABLES. 223 WILL BE READ.
IT PROVIDES FOR 4 RECORDS (ICARDS) PER CASE. A MAXIMUM OF 79 ICOLUMNS ARE USED ON A RECORD.

MISSING VALUES VAR006,VAR007,VAR027,VAR028,VAR104,VAR105,VAR107 TO VAR109,
VAR111,VAR113 TO VAR116,VAR120 TO VAR129,VAR131,VAR133,VAR138,
VAR139,VAR151,VAR157,VAR158,VAR178 TO VAR182,VAR184 TO VAR188,
VAR194,VAR198,VAR199,VAR219 TO VAR222(98,99) /VAR008 TO VAR026,
VAR030 TO VAR103,VAR110,VAR112,VAR119,VAR130,VAR132,VAR150,
VAR152,VAR153,VAR156,VAR159 TO VAR177,VAR183,VAR191 TO VAR193,
VAR195 TO VAR197,VAR200 TO VAR219(8,9) /
VAR001,SERIAL NUMBER/VAR002,CARD NUMBER/VAR003,GARAGE NUMBER/
VAR004,STATUS/VAR005,AGE/VAR006,LENGTH OF SERVICE/
VAR007,PREVIOUS SITUATION/VAR008,LEFT JOB/
VAR009,JOB ALTERNATIVE/VAR010,JOB REJOIN/
VAR011,OCCUPATIONS HELD/VAR012,EVER HELD OCCUP TWO/VAR015,EVER HELD
OCCUPTHREE/VAR016,EVER HELD OCCUPFOUR/VAR017,EVER HELD OCCUPFIVE/
VAR018,EVER HELD OCCUP SIX/VAR019,EVER HELD OCCUP SEVEN/VAR020,IN
SERVICES/VAR022,IN SERVICE INDUSTRY/VAR023,IN MANUFACTURING INDUS
TRY/VAR024,IN PRIMARY INDUSTRY/VAR025,UNEMPLOYED/VAR026,EDUCATION
AT FIFTEEN/VAR027,LOCATION/VAR028,FIRST JOB AFFECT/VAR029,SECOND
JOB AFFECT/VAR030,RATING OF JOB IN AFFECT TERMS/VAR031,FIRST JOB D
ISAFECT/VAR032,SECOND JOB DISAFECT/VAR033,TRAVEL/VAR034,PROFFES
SIONAL SKILL/VAR035,BEST JOB AVAILABLE/VAR036,TREATED PROPERLY B
Y ORGZTN/VAR037,LIMITED SUPERVISION/VAR038,ACTIVE JOB/VAR039,
REGULAR MONEY/VAR040,SOCIALLY INVOLVING JOB/VAR041,GET USED TO JO
B/VAR042,JUST A JOB/VAR043,SHIFT WORK/VAR044,TOURING WORK/VAR045,
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE JOB/VAR046,RESPECTABLE/VAR047,DRIVING ITSELF
/VAR048,VARIETY/VAR049,UNSPECIFIED AFFECTIVITY/VAR050,NOTHING/
VAR051,OTHER/VAR052,MAIN TREND OF LIKES/VAR053,PHYSICALLY TIRING/
VAR054,MENTALLY TYRING/VAR055,DRIVING CONDITIONS/VAR056,,PUBLIC/
VAR057,ORGZTNL INADEQUACIES/VAR058,UNSETTLED CONDITIONS/VAR060,
EFFECT ON NON WORK LIFE/VAR061,SUPERVISION/VAR062,UNSOLIDARISTIC
WORK FORCE/VAR063,WORK MATES/VAR064,WAGES/VAR065,UNION/VAR066,CON
DITION OF BUSES/VAR067,LIFE CHANCES/VAR068,STIGMA/VAR069,MANG/
VAR070,OMO/VAR071,BOREDOM/VAR072,NOTHING/VAR073,OTHER/VAR074,
DISLIKES MAIN TREND/VAR075,MANAGEMENT SUCCESS/
VAR076,MILITARISTIC DISCIPLINE/VAR077,ORGZTNLY DISTANT/VAR078,SOC
IALLY DISTANT/VAR079,UNION NOT STRONG ENOUGH/VAR080,SERVICES POLI
CY INADEQUATE/VAR081,LACK OF COOPERATION/VAR082,PERSONNEL POLICI
ES/VAR083,ARCHAISM/VAR084,LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF SHOP FLOOR/

VAR087,OMO/VAR088,SHORTSIGHTEDNESS/VAR089,UN-CONCERN/VAR090,ORG A
ND TECH INEFFICIENT/VAR091,LACK OF COMMUNICATION/VAR092,NON SPEIF
IC/VAR093,OTHER/VAR094,DONT KNOW/VAR095,NON-CRITICAL OF HANG/
VAR096,NON INTERFERENCE WITH JOB/VAR097,BEST IN CIRCUMSTANCES/
VAR098,PROVIDE GOOD SERVICE/VAR099,GOOD LOCAL ORGZN/VAR100,CONTR
OLLED TRANSPORT SYSTEM/VAR101,NON-SPECIFIC/VAR102,OTHER/VAR103,DK
/VAR104,ASSESS CONTROL/VAR105,JOB CONTENT CHANGE/VAR106,SUGGESTS/
VAR107,YES SUGGESTS-TO WHOM/VAR108,NO SUGGESTS-WHY/VAR109,PEER
RELATIONS/VAR110,SELF-PEERS RATING/VAR111,INSPECTORS ASSESSMENT/
VAR112,SELF-DESIRE INSPECTORSHIP/VAR113,INSPECTOR-DESIRE/
VAR114,NO DESIRE INSPECTOR/VAR115,COMPANY PREFERENCE/
VAR116,OWN COMPANY/VAR117,QUALIFICATION/VAR118,OTHER COMPANY/
VAR119,ASSESS CO-OP/
VAR120,BREAK-DOWN BETWEEN MEN AND MANAGEMENT/VAR121,SENIORITY/
VAR122,KNOW RIGHT PEOPLE/VAR123,AMBITION/VAR124,RIGHT PERSON/
VAR125,OTHER/VAR126,DONT KNOW/VAR127,UNION ATTENDANCE/
VAR128,POSITIVE ATTITUDE/VAR129,NEGATIVE ATTITUDE/VAR130,
QUALIFIED POSITIVE/VAR131,ASSESSMENT OF UNION/VAR132,JOB ASSESS/
VAR133,GENERAL ESTIMATE OF JOB/VAR134,JOB CHANGE/VAR135,
YES JOB CHANGE/VAR136,JOB CHANGE DIFFICULT/VAR137,
JOB CHANGE NOT DIFFICULT/VAR138,BASIC WAGE/VAR139,BASIC WAGE OMO/
VAR140,MISSING/VAR141,TOWN/VAR142,HANDS/VAR143,EMPLOYEES/
VAR144,RICH/VAR145,RIGHT/VAR146,HONEST/VAR147,EDUCATED/
VAR148,WORK/VAR149,THEM/VAR150,AREA OF ORIGIN SAME/
VAR151,PRESENT RESIDENCE/VAR152,LIKES AREA/VAR153,WISHES TO MOVE/
VAR154,RELATIVES IN AREA/VAR156,FREQUENCY O VISIT/VAR157,
CRENS INTERACTION/VAR158,FRIENDS INTERACTION/VAR159,SPECTATOR
SPORTS MC/VAR160,SPECTATOR SPORTS MC/VAR161,INDIV SPORTMC/VAR162,
INDIV SPORT MC/VAR163,TEAM SPORT MC/VAR164,TEAM SPORT MC/
VAR165,DIFFUSE ACTIVITY MC/VAR166,DIFFUSE ACTIVITY MC/VAR167,
SPECIFIC FACILITY MC/VAR168,SPECIFIC FACILITY MC/VAR169,
GARAGE ACTIVITY/VAR170,GARAGE ACTIVITY/VAR171,FAMILY-HOME CENTRED
/VAR172,FAMILY-HOME CENTRED/VAR173,SOCIALIZING MC/VAR174,SOCIALIZ
ING MC/VAR175,NOTHING/VAR176,MARITAL STATUS/VAR178,NUMBER OF MALE
CHILDREN/VAR179,1ST MALE OCCUP/VAR179,SECOND MALE OCCUP/VAR180,
THIRD MALE OCCUP/VAR181,FOURTH MALE OCCUP/VAR182,
FIFTH MALE OCCUP/VAR183,NUMBER OF FEMALES/VAR184,
1ST FEMALE OCCUP/VAR185,SECOND FEMALE OCCUP/VAR186,
THIRD FEMALE OCCUP/VAR187,FOURTH FEMALE OCCUP/VAR188,
FIFTH FEMALE OCCUP/VAR189,IMPROVEMENTS IN CHILDRENS POSITION/
VAR190,SCHOOL CHILDRENS DESIRES/VAR191,MALES ASPIRATIONS/
VAR192,FEMALES ASPIRATION/VAR193,ELECTION DIFFERENCES/
VAR194,DOES MAKE ADIFFERENCE/VAR195,MAKES NO DIFFERENCE/
VAR196,POLITICAL VOTING/VAR197,PREVIOUS VOTES/VAR198,
ATTACHMENT TO LABOUR PARTY/VAR199,
ATTACHMENT TO CONSERVATIVE PARTY/VAR200,INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS/
VAR201,ATTITUDE TO STRIKES/VAR202,THE STATE/VAR203,UNIONS/
VAR204,BIG BUSINESS/VAR205,LAW/VAR206,CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT/
VAR207,BUILDING LABOURER/VAR208,FACTORY WORKER/VAR209,POLICEMAN/
VAR210,BANK CLERK/VAR211,SCHOOL TEACHER/VAR212,
CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT/VAR213,BUILDING LABOURER/VAR214,
FACTORY WORKER/VAR215,POLICEMAN/VAR216,BANK CLERK/VAR217,
SCHOOL TEACHER/VAR218,BUS CREW/VAR219,WORKER SITUATION/
VAR220,WEEKLY EARNINGS/VAR221,TOTAL HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS/

VALUE LABELS

VAR222,COMFORT LEVEL/VAR223,COMMENT/
VAR003 (01) EDIN CORP (02) FIFE (03) GLW CORP (04) MILNGAVIE
(05) A.A. (06)KILMARNOCK (07) EASTERN/
VAR004 (1) DRIVER (2) DRIVER OMO (3) DRIVERS (4) DRIVERS OMO
(5) CONDUCTOR (6) CONDUCTRESS (9) N.A./
VAR007 (01) TRADE CONDITIONS (02) GENERAL CONDITIONS (03) STOPGAP
(04) PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE (05) PERSONAL CONTACT (06)
DOMESTIC REASONS (07) MONEY (08) PREVIOUS JOB DISADVANTAGES
(09) INTRINSIC ATTRactions (10) REDUNDANT-UNEMPLOYED (11)
DRIVING EXPERIENCE (12) FORMAL AVENUES (13) OTHER (98) DK (99)NA/
VAR008 (1) YES (2) NO / VAR009 (0) LOWER PROF. (1) SHALL
EMPLOYERS (2) SUPERVISORY (3) SELF EMPLOYED (4) SKILLED MANUAL
WORKERS (5) RELATIVELY SKILLED MANUAL (6) SEMI-SKILLED MANUAL
(7) UNSKILLED MANUAL/
VAR027 (01) NORTH (02) NORTH-EAST (03) TAYSIDE (04) SOUTH-EAST
(05) SOUTH WEST (06) CENTRAL-A (07) CENTRAL-B (08) CENTRAL-C
(09) CENTRAL-D (99) NA/
VAR028 (01) INTEREST AND VARIETY (02) GOOD WORKMATES
(03) NOT TOO MUCH SUPERVISION (04) STRONGAND ACTIVE UNION
(05) MORTHWHILE JOB (06) USE OWN JUDGEMENT (07) CHANCE TO
BETTER SELF (08) SECURITY (09) GOOD WAGE (10) RESPECTABLE JOB
(98) DK (99) NA / VAR030 (1) VERY GOOD (2) ALL RIGHT (3) PRETTY
POOR (4) VERY BAD (8) DK (9) NA
VAR031 (1) LONG HOURS (2) BORING JOB (3) CANT USE OWN
JUDGEMENT (4) TOO MUCH SUPERVISION (5) NO FUTURE (6) JOB ITSELF
UNPLEASANT (7) INSECURITY (8) DK (9) NA/
VAR032 (1) LONG HOURS (2) BORING JOB (3) CANT USE OWN JUDGEMENT
(4) TOO MUCH SUPERVISION (5) NO FUTURE (6) JOB ITSELF
UNPLESANT (7) INSECURITY (8) DK (9) NA /
VAR052 (1) ECONOMIC SECURITY (2) ECONOMIC WAGES (3) NON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY (4) NON-ECON SCL PEER RELATNS (5) NON-ECON SCL ORG RELTN
(6) NON-ECON XTRA-ORG RELTN (7) NOT CLASSIFIABLE (9) NA /
VAR074 (1) ECONOMIC SECURITY (2) ECONOMIC WAGES (3) NON-ECON
ACTIVITY (4) NON-ECON PEER RELATNS (5) NON-ECON SCL ORG RELATNS
(6) NON ECON XTRA ORG RELTN (7) NOT CLASSIFIABLE (9) NA /
VAR075 (1) YES (2) NO (3) YES QUALFD (8) DK (9) NA/
VAR104 (01) VERY GOOD (02) GOOD (03) ALRIGHT (04) BAD (05)
EFFICIENT (06) INEFFICIENT (07) SYMPATHETIC OF DIFFICULTIES
(08) TOO DISTANT FROM SHOP FLOOR (09) OUT OF DATE ATTITUDES
(10) FAVOURITISM (11) CAN DEAL WITH MEN
(12) UNNECESSARY (13) ARE LOCUS OF OPERATION (14) TOO MUCH
POWER (15) TOO LITTLE POWER (16) NO CONTACT (17) TOO MUCH
SUPERVISION (18) OTHER (98) DK (99) NA /
VAR105 (01) NOTHING (02) OMO-UNEMPLOYMENT (03) OMO-PUNLIC
(04) SHIFTS NONWORK (05) SPLIT SHIFTS (06) CONTRL & MANG INTRST
(07) FACILITIES (08) UNIFORM (09) SPARE WORKING
(10) NON CO-OP, MANG & WRKRS (11) CLOSED SHOP (12) MONEY
(13) LOCAL TASKS (14) STRCTRROAD SYSTEM

(17) CONDITN OF BUSES (18) BTR RLINS -PUBLIC
 (19) ANTIGATED STROCTR (20) GEN MANG DEFECTS
 (21) CONDINS SERVICE (22) DISTRBTN TYPE WORK
 (23) AUTHORTRN SUPERVSN (24) BETTER UNION (25) OTHER
 (98) DK (99) NA/
 VARI07 (01) UNION (02) UNION-INEFFECTL
 (03) UNION-OWN ATTITUDS (04) INSPCTRS IN DEPOT
 (05) CHIEF INSPECTOR (06) DTS-GARAGE BOSS (07) DTS WITH UNION
 (08) TRAFFIC MANAGER (09) GENERAL MANAGER (10) HEAD OFFICE
 (11) APPROP DEPT. (12) MANG CUT OFF
 (13) MANG NOT INTERESTED (14) USE PERSONAL CONTACTS
 (15) NEED COLLECTV ACTN (16) OTHER (98) DK (99) NA /
 VARI08 (01) FELT USELESS (02) NOTHING IMPROVED
 (03) RE UNION ATTITUDE (04) NOT TAKEN UP
 (05) SHY (06) MANG OMNISCIENCE (07) WOULDNT HAVE NERVE
 (08) CAUSE CONFUSION (09) FEAR REPRISAL (10) MANG TOO DISTANT
 (11) SUGGESTS BOX (12) MANG NO ACTION (13) NO INVOLVEMENT
 (14) LACK COMMUNICATION (15) MANAG, RESPONSIBILITY
 (16) MANG DISINTEREST (17) MANG SHIRKS (18) WHERE START?
 (98) DK (99) NA
 VARI09 (01) AMBIVALENT-TASK (02) AMBIVALENT-O-T (03) AMBIVALENT-
 SENIORITY (04) AMBIVALENT -TYPE (05) CO-OP-TASK (06) CO-OP-ORGZTN
 (07) VERY GOOD (08) GOOD (09) GOOD QUALIFIED (10) NEUTRAL
 (11) BAD (12) UNSPECIFIC POSITIVE (13) UNSPECIFIC NEGATIVE
 (14) INTGRN DUE WORK (15) DISHRMNY -DIFF TASK
 (16) DISHRMNY DUE TNRVR (17) DISHRMNY DUE AGE
 (18) OTHER (98) DK (99) NA /
 VARI10 (1) SELF TO SELF (2) A FEW FRIENDS (3) FRIEND WITH ALL
 (4) WELL WITH ALL (8) DK (9) NA /
 VARI11 (01) YES (02) FAVORITS-TASK (03) FAVORITS-WORK
 (04) FAVORITS UNAMP (05) FAVOURITES (06) GOOD (07) FAIR
 (08) PRETTY DECENT (09) SOME GOOD SOME BAD (10) BAD
 (11) ACT IN GOOD FAITH (12) NOT MUCH CONTACT (13) BAD BC MANG
 (14) NOT CONSISTENT (15) OK IF JOB PROPER (16) SNOBBISH
 (17) SOCIALBLE (18) UNDERSTANDING (19) TWO FACED (20) VINDICTIVE
 (21) SAME ON PROMOTION (22) HUMAN BEINGS (23) OTHER
 (98) DK (99) NA /
 VARI13 (01) INDIV STATUS SEEK (02) JOB STATUS (03) JOB HOURS
 (04) JOB MONEY (05) JOB SECURITY (06) JOB SMARTNESS (07) PERSONAL
 ITY SUITS (08) SELF ESTEEM (09) JOB CHARACTERISTICS (10) OTHER
 (98) DK (99) NA /
 VARI14 (01) ISOLATION (02) JOB-SCL CONDITNS (03) ANTI SUPERVSN
 (04) GENL ANTIPTATHY (05) A-PHYSICAL (06) A-BOREDOM (02) A-PRESSUR
 (06) NO GTRR BENEFITS (09) PREFER PRESENT JON (10) IDENTITY WITH
 MANG (11) DISLOYALTY TO FRIENDS (12) TOO MUCH RESPONSBLTY
 (13) NOT CAPABLE (14) TOO MUCH ROUTINE (15) OTHER
 (98) DK (99) NA /
 VARI15 (1) THIS FIRM (2) THIS FIRM QUALFD (3) OTHER FIRM
 (4) OTHER FIRM QUALFD (5) NO DISCRIMINATN (8) DK (9) NA /
 VARI16 (01) AFFECT SCL INTERACTN (02) AFFECT MANG (03) OWN LOCALE
 (04) EASE OF TASK (05) VARIETY (06) INTEREST (07) DISCIPLINE
 (08) GOOD ORGZTN (09) HOURS-WHEN (10) HOURS WHEN (11) WAGES
 (12) SUPERANNUATION (13) SECURITY (14) FACILITIES (15) UNSPEC-GEN
 (16) UNION (17) UNSPECIFIED (18) OTHER (23) AFFECT - WORK

(98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR117 (01) AFFECT SCL INTRACTN (02) AFFECT MANG (03) OWN LOCALE
 (04) EASE OF TASK (05) VARIETY (06) INTEREST (07) DISCIPLINE
 (08) GOOD ORGZTN (09) HOURS-WHEN (10) HOURS WHEN (11) WAGES
 (12) SUPERANNUATION (13) SECURITY (14) FACILITIES (15) UNSPEC-GEN
 (16) UNION (17) UNSPECIFIED (18) OTHER (19) NONE GET GD DEAL
 (20) SAME (21) HARDER WORK (22) SETTLD IN OWN JOB
 (23) AFFECT TO WORK (24) DK (99) NA /
 VAR118 (01) AFFECT SCL INTRACTN (02) AFFECT MANG (03) OWN LOCALIT
 Y (04) EASE OF TASK (05) VARIETY (06) INTEREST (07) DISCIPLINE
 (08) GOOD ORGZTN (09) HOURS-WHEN (10) HOURS WHEN (11) WAGES
 (12) SUPERANNUATION (13) SECURITY (14) FACILITIES (15) UNSPEC-GEN
 (16) UNION (17) UNSPECIFIED (18) OTHER (23) AFFECT - WORK
 (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR119 (1) YES (2) NO (3) SOMETIMES (4) NEUTRAL (8) DK (9) NA /
 VAR120 (01) TOO POWERFUL (02) ISOLATED SCLLY (03) ISOLATED TECNCL
 (04) NO INTEREST IN CO-OP (05) LACK OF COMMUNCTN
 (06) NO CNTRL OPRTG CDTNS (07) NO KNOWLDG OPRTG CDTNS
 (08) ADMING MANG INCOMP (09) LOCAL GOOD, GEN BAD
 (10) DIFFS BC DIFF POSTNS (11) MANG & UNIONS IDENTITY
 (12) MANG & UNION DISPUTES (13) WEAK UNION (14) UNSPECIFIED
 (15) GENERAL (16) OTHER (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR128 (01) TU AS POLC MOVMT (02) GEN INTRST IN PRCS
 (03) BARGAINING AGENT (04) PARTICPTN IN OWN ORG (05) RESLTN ISSUES
 (06) DIRECTLY INVOLVED (07) OTHER (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR129 (01) DISAFFECT POLICY (02) DISAFFECT STRUCT (03)
 DISAFFECT PROCESS (04) INEFFECTUAL (05) ANTI- UNION
 (06) SECTNL INTRSTS (07) PERSONL FAILURE (08) NO CONFIDENCE IN LEADE
 RS (09) NOT INTERESTED (10) OTHR COMMITMTNS (11) GENERAL
 (12) OTHER (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR130 (1) MAJOR ISSUES ONLY (2) SPECIFIC ISSUES ONLY
 (3) DISAFFECT POLICY (4) DISAFFECT STRUCT (5) DISAFFECT PROCESS
 (6) SECTNL INTRSTS (7) GEN POOR UNION (8) DK (9) NA /
 VAR131 (01) WELFARE-PERSNL GAIN (02) WELFARE OF CREWS
 (03) PERSONAL GAIN (04) PERSONAL QUALS (05) APPROVE UNION
 (06) DISPARAGE UNION (07) INTEREST IN WORK (08) COLLECTIVISTIC
 (09) BARGAINING-MEDIATOR (10) INVOLVED (11) NON-INVOLVED
 (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR132 (1) VERY GOOD (2) GOOD (3) NEUTRAL (4) BAD (5) VERY BAD
 (8) DK (9) NA /
 VAR133 (01) VRY DEROG (02) MLD DEROG (03) NEUTRL (04) MLD ESTEEM
 (05) BAD REPUTN SCLLY (06) BAD REPUTN BC SYSTEM (07) LAST RESORT
 (08) NO JOB MKT BC SHIFTS (09) NO JOB MKT BC PUBLIC
 (10) IGNORANCE CNDTNS (11) AVERAGE JOB (12) PUBLIC SYMPATHY
 (13) GOOD JOB (14) NOT JOB-WAY LIFE (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR135 (1) SEMI-SKILLED JOB (2) SKILLED JOB (3) TRADE
 (4) BETTER PROSPECTS (5) EMIGRATION (6) DOMESTIC REASONS
 (7) OTHER (8) DK (9) NA /
 VAR136 (1) AGE (2) UNSKILLED (3) DEARTH TRADE-SKILL
 (4) GEN UNEMPLOYMT (5) DISTRICT UNEMPLOYMT (6) NOTHG COMP
 (7) OTHER (8) DK (9) NA /
 VAR137 (1) NEVER UNEMPLD (2) DRIVING SKILL (4) SKILLED WORKER
 (5) JOBS AVAILABLE (6) SPECIFIC SKILL (8) DK (9) NA /
 VAR150 (1) VES (2) SAME TOWN AREA (3) WEST CENTRAL

- 500 -

(4) EAST CENTRAL (5) SCOTLAND - OTHER (6) OTHER-UK (7) EUROPE
 (8) COMMONWEALTH (9) NA /
 VAR151 (01) SMALL TOWN INDUST (02) SMALL TOWN MINE (03) SMALL TOW
 N AGRIC (04) HIGH AMENITY COUNCIL (05) MIXED COUNCIL
 (06) POOR COUNCIL (07) POOR TENEMENT (08) CENTRAL CITY
 (09) ESTABLISHED WC AREA (10) LOWER MC (11) MIDDLE-MIDDLE
 (12) CONURB UNSPECIFIED (13) MED TOWN COUNCIL (14) MED TOWN-WC
 (15) RURAL (16) OWN HOUSE (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR152 (00) AFFECT TIES (1) PROXIM WORK (2) CENTRAL SITUATN
 (3) HI ENVIRON AMENITY (4) HI SCL AMENITY (5) OLD INTENSE AMENITY
 (9) NA /
 VAR153 (00) TO AFFECT AREA (1) TO HIER ENVIRON (2) TO BETTER AREA
 (3) TO COUNTRY (4) TO TOWN CENTRE (5) TO BETTER HOUSING
 (6) FROM COUNCIL SLUM (7) FROM OLD SLUM (8) OTHER (9) NA /
 VAR156 (1) SEVEN X WK (2) THREE X WK (3) ONE-TWO X WK
 (4) ONCE MONTH (5) SOMETIMES (6) RARELY (7) NEVER (9) NA /
 VAR157 (01) ONE PERSON (02) TWO OR THREE (03) A FEW (04) MANY
 (05) MOSTLY CREWS (06) CASUAL (07) REGULAR DRINKING
 (08) REGULAR CLUBS (09) SOME FUNCTIONS (10) ANTI-CREWS (11) NO
 (12) YES UNSPECIFIED (99) NA /
 VAR158 (01) YES (02) A LOT (03) NEIGHBOURS (04) SOME
 (05) TWO OR THREE (06) OWN FAMILY (07) CALUAL (08) MOST IN JOB
 (09) NO TIME BC JOB (10) NONE (99) NA /
 VAR176 (1) MARRIED (2) SINGLE (3) DIVORCED (4) WIDOWED (9) NA /
 VAR194 (00) CONS BETTER ECON (01) LAB BETTER ECON (02) ANTI-PLAN
 (03) PRO-PLANG (04) ANTI-SCL WELFARE (05) PRO SCL WELFARE
 (06) LAB FOR WC (07) OTHER PRO-LAB (08) OTHER PRO -CONS
 (09) ANTI BOTH PARTIES (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR195 (00) BOTH PARTIES SAME (1) NO DIFF TO ECO (2) GEN SCEPTIC
 (3) POLITICS INEFFECTUAL (4) OTHER (8) DK (9) NA /
 VAR196 (1) YES (2) NO (3) NO VOTE (4) VACILLATES (5) CHANGED (8)
 DK (9) NA /
 VAR197 (00) LABOUR (1) LIBERAL (2) CONSERVATIVE (3) COMMUNIST
 (4) SNP (5) OTHER (6) UNABLE (7) ABSTAIN (8) DK (9) NA /
 VAR198 (01) GEN WC IDENTITY (02) POS SCL-MEF POLICIES
 (03) TRADITION (04) LAB BETTER ECON (05) POS PLANG & NATLZTN
 (06) POS LAB MEN (07) LAB GIVEN CHANCE (08) REALLY LIBERAL
 (09) OTHER PRO LABA-CONS (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR199 (01) CONS BETTER ECON (02) POS CON MEN (03) GEN POS CONS
 (04) TRADITION (05) ANTI PLANG, NATLZTN (06) STICH TO CONS
 (07) POS CONS EGOISM (09) REALLY LIBERAL (10) OTHER PRO CON, A-LAB
 (98) DK (99) NA /
 VAR201 (1) NO STRIKE (2) STRIKE WITH UNION
 (3) STRIKE WITHOUT UNION (4) ALL OUT STRIKE (9) NA /
 VAR219 (1) FIGHT (2) GO (8) DK (9) NA /

PROCESS 98FILESALL
 CODEBOOK
 STATISTICS
 OPTIONS
 READ INPUT DATA
 1,4
 VAR162 TO VAR223

APPENDIX V: Bibliographical Note

There are many sources on the nature of the busman's task: any busman will be able to inform the enquirer of the main features. But the purpose of this bibliographical note is to review the available published material on busmen. Autobiographical accounts which competently describe the job are Courtenay (1957), Jones (1968), Murphy (1965) - this being a very perceptive and critical account by an active trade unionist - an anonymous article in Terkel (1972) and Wason (1958).

More academic accounts noted are Makins (1972), which despite its similar title is actually a study of the operation of two local union branches, with very little reference to busmen, Beetham (1970), which examines differences in local government policies on race through examination of the right of Sikhs to wear turbans in two municipal enterprises, Van Beinum (1970), and Brooks (1975), these latter two presenting material sufficiently similar to my own to warrant closer review to establish that my own work is both more encompassing, at a deeper level of analysis, and has a radically different conceptual framework.

The fundamental fault of Van Beinum's work on "The Morale of the Dublin Busmen" is disclosed on p. 1 where he traces the origins of the study in

a long period of difficult and troublesome relationships between the busmen and the management, which culminated in a strike in May 1963. In an effort to find a way to deal with this problem . . .

Thus the study is clearly directed at being a piece of management consultancy with massive institutional support, with the busmen being assumed to be "the problem", rather than the equally rational possibility, even within a consultancy framework, of it being management which is the "problem". This bias clearly vitiates Van Beinum's claim to be conducting a "scientific" study. It also means that the whole interpretation can be couched in a psychological framework of the busmen's attitudinal responses to unquestioned organisational constraints, rather than in a sociological stance, which would try to identify the social processes leading to the expressions of statements (the status of Van Beinum's reported "attitudes" is highly questionable in psychological terms) by the busmen.

However, though I have stated that Van Beinum's study is biased in management's interests, and is a-sociological, I must still devote some attention to it, since it does cover some of the same ground as my own work, though as I shall argue, less validly.

For clarity, I propose to examine Van Beinum's work in three ways. Firstly, in his own terms, to see what

internal contradictions he meets. Secondly, an examination of the validity of his conceptual framework. Thirdly, a contrast with my own work, both in terms of content and concepts.

With regards to the first concern, it can be clearly said that Van Beinum and his team do an excellent job of eliciting statements from busmen about significant (and insignificant) aspects of their employment. However, though the major areas of work (such as Supervisors, Work Group, etc.) are differentiated, the status of the "attitudes" responses is problematic. For few of the statements are attitudes in any meaningful psychological sense: they are, quite simply, statements about work. (E.g. "Accelerators stick", or "The conductor is required to assist in manoeuvres such as backing or in signalling cars behind as necessary" (p. 38).) Further, and in line with his psychological assumptions, Van Beinum fails to distinguish the significance of various statements, so that responses which indicate what I would argue are vital organisational issues such as time schedules and pace of work, are treated exactly the same as statements of relative triviality such as disliking the quality of the uniforms supplied. This is of course because Van Beinum is not concerned with understanding the social processes involved in either producing a bus service or even in producing the attitudes reported. Thus, although the attitudes are treated as fact, in that they are statements made by the busmen, it is clear from the Foreword that

treating the busmen's involvement in work as a set of (merely) attitudes, allows management to dismiss them as an inadequate conception of reality, and certainly to deny them as legitimate statements about the labour process (e.g. designating all statements about the labour process as attitudes, whether they are fact "automatic or preselected (gears) are more difficult in order to get a smooth change with no jump", or feelings - "some shifts are very tiring", allows such genuine common statements about reality to be designated as individual and hence inconsequential attitudes: in an organisation in which each individual worker is used as interchangeable labour power, the response is bound to be "effort can overcome the difficulties of gear-changing", and "if you can't take the pace, get out").

Paradoxically, Van Beinum misses an important point about attitudes. Since he fails to divide his responses by the obvious social factors of age, sex, and length of service or percentages giving a particular response, he misses the point that there are differences of attitude. There are crews who stay in the job for some significant length of time. Given his concerns, it is puzzling that Van Beinum does not seek to differentiate the adaptations to the work that such long service workers must necessarily make. His lack of interest in relevant social factors such as, simply, pay, means that it is difficult to dismiss the notion that the reported low morale was due to external factors such as a high demand for labour making the job

relatively less attractive. Similarly, the lack of comparative data makes it difficult to assess just how "low" the morale is compared with other groups of workers or other bus workers - Van Beinum is content to accept management's and the union's statements about the work force, and thus cannot validly assess the state of "morale" at all.

Even within his framework, there is a strange reluctance to go deeper than taking statements at face value, e.g. "the busmen see themselves as the least considered employees of the company" - well, are they, or why do they think so?

Overall, the methodology is straight reportage of responses to questions which the author thinks of note, rather than analysis of either the social processes involved, or even of the wider meanings of the response. It is this feature which gives rise to what I hope is a superficial similarity with my own work: naturally if busmen are asked for their perceptions of their work, they will tend to mention the same things - Murphy, Brooks, Van Beinum and myself all broadly report the same things for they are what busmen themselves see. It was the inadequacy of this methodology as a means of analysis and explanation that led me largely to abandon my survey data. In Van Beinum's case, the social complexity is reduced to psychologism, so that "social" becomes trivialised to the point where (p. 42) "new" buses, which allow driver and conductor to talk, are seen as a significant alteration to the organisation.

But it is in the "Work Organisation as a Socio-Technical System" (pp. 60-65) that the contradictions in Van Beinum's work are most evident. Here he continues his reduction of class exploitation to the lack of fulfillment of social "needs" that he posits on p. 20, in which "stress" and "pressure of work" are related to the feelings of the individual, and not to the degree of exploitation of the industry. But the very "needs" (derived from the Tavistock work of Trist and, in particular, Emery : cf. p. 62-63), pose an unobserved paradox for Van Beinum. For bus work comes very close to meeting the prescriptions for "fulfilling" work, such as he prescribes (overlooking the dubious psychological basis of the schemata for the moment). Indeed an earlier paper of mine endeavoured to show just how busmen did meet most of these "needs" in their work, and that "the differences in alienation" between two groups of bus workers was related to the differences in opportunities to have their "needs" met in work. Since Blackburn and Mann, (1979) place driving to work as more skill-demanding (and in socio-technical terms, need-fulfilling) than most of the jobs they studied, it follows that busmen's low morale cannot be due to lack of these needs being fulfilled. It is significant, and of course terribly damaging to Van Beinum's work, that he makes no attempt to see how far busmen have their "needs met" according to the criteria he adduces. Instead, he leaves these socio-technical desiderata unexamined, and makes three points which, since they are his conclusions for

this section, need specific criticism. He writes,

Morale will be improved and attitudes towards the work situation will become more positive if:

- we raise the level of participation of a conductor or driver in the work situation by increasing their area of decision-making in, and control over, their jobs.
- we reduce the role of the time schedule as a criterion for work performance; and
- we create conditions in the work situation which will allow the conductor and the driver to relate themselves to each other and to a number of crews in such a way that it is meaningful both socially and psychologically. This will require the formation of work groups in which stable and mutually supportive relationships can be developed.

The first recommendation is inadequate because, as I show, it is not lack of decision-making that busmen suffer from, but a surfeit of decisions to be carried out often in highly stressful situations.

The second recommendation is really saying that Dublin busmen have to work too hard in an irrelevant organisational framework. Had Van Beinum not been being paid by the controllers of the organisation, he might have been able to say this plainly.

The third recommendation is an excellent example of how much management consultancy seeks, through the use of mystificatory "social science", to disguise the exploitation involved in labour processes. Here "group psychology" is to be used to overcome the degree of exploitation that Van Beinum has himself identified - e.g. on p. 29, "The existing route and schedule system, therefore, directly determine the stress level intrinsic to the conductor's task."

In brief, his recommendations contradict the reality which the busmen have made clear to him.

My second concern is to examine the validity of socio-technical systems thinking as a conceptual framework.

Whatever the merits of socio-technical writing in general, I think this study shows the failings mentioned by both Rose (1975) and Silverman (1970).

Firstly, technology is treated as an objective factor in the work organisation, rather than the means of domination of labour in the production of surplus value. Thus labour has to fit into the supposed requirements of this spuriously "concrete" factor. Van Beinum writes (ibid: 64):

"Machines cannot be flexible and a technical system cannot have feelings of responsibility". This view is of course unacceptable: the whole point about machines is their flexibility, while the technical system is a result of human action, and equally modifiable. Van Beinum's position serves to disguise the structure of domination, and makes it difficult to adopt a framework other than one which views workers solely reacting at the psychological level to immutable work situations. Changes in the organisation can only be directed at improving the "social" environment as compensation for the degree of exploitation.

Secondly, the concern is very much with pragmatic applications consonant with the dominant ideology, rather than any sociological analysis.

Thirdly, and relatedly, there is the assumption that the "problems" of the organisation are those of the paymasters - the controllers of the organisation. This is indeed the prevailing assumption in this study.

Fourthly, as Rose points out (ibid: 217), there is a tendency to patronise as well as manipulate the workers. Two small points are illustrative of this. (a) On p. 17 Van Beinum writes, "There is considerable disagreement and uncertainty among the busmen as to who their boss really is." What Van Beinum overlooks is the massive general domination by the whole supervisory organisation: there is no ambiguity about this at all. (b) There is one exclamation mark in the whole book, (also on p. 17) where the report that there are too many managers, and that positions have been made for them is simply dismissed through this exclamatory device, without any attempt elsewhere to investigate whether the busmen were right or not. The way is clear for the organisation to adopt the idea that attitudes can be modified by "talking through problems" so that psychological orientation becomes consonant with the organisation. This is indeed what Van Beinum suggests in his conclusions.

A last point, made by Silverman (1970: 118), is that socio-technical studies have a commitment to abstracted empiricism in preference to grand theory. I think it not unjust to argue that Van Beinum's empiricism does not even qualify as abstracted, while his model of general social relations, while very evident, is implicit.

This leads me on to my third section, the contrast with my own work in terms of content and concepts.

In terms of content, a comment on the empirical data of Van Beinum's work is in order. I did not use his empirical data in the course of this study because I felt: (a) it added nothing to the survey data I had, and on the points of common observation it would be tedious to comment "This is confirmed by Van Beinum (and Brooks, and, autobiographically, by Murphy and Courtenay)", and I did not find that Van Beinum made any serious observation that I had overlooked, (b) as regards survey data my own was more sophisticated, covering more ground and exposing more values (cf. computer print-out of variables and values), but for reasons already adduced, I found that a survey method did not uncover social processes, but rather served to obscure them, while (c) I feel that Van Beinum's data ~~are~~ reported in such a way as to be amenable to fitting into the psychologic framework of socio-technical systems, while I was concerned with explanation, making use, I feel, of qualitatively different empirical observations.

This brings me on to my next point, that Van Beinum's work is not concerned with the analysis and explanation of social processes, but with the application of psychological support at work. Thus the statements of the Dublin bus crews are problematic only in this framework: I take much more to be problematic at a deeper level of analysis, seeking in the main to link specific work experience

with the institutional structure of the industry, and the main features of industry in general, with constant emphasis on explanation, and not merely reporting.

At the conceptual level, analysis and explanation are used with explicit reference to a specific model of capitalist domination of the forces of production, as opposed to Van Beinum's empirical material used explicitly to argue for compensation for "the fact that the technical system is dominating and is being optimised at the expense and neglect of the social system" (ibid: 65) by suggesting that conditions "will allow the conductor and the driver to relate themselves to each other and to a number of crews in such a way that it is meaningful both socially and psychologically" (ibid: 65), within an implicit model which both accepts management's domination of the labour process, and assumes a universal consensus model of society.

Curiously this consensus model of society becomes almost explicit precisely within virtually the only piece of true analysis of social relations in the whole work, where Van Beinum discusses Trade Unions. He explains members' "apathetic" attitudes by pointing out that decisions cannot be taken at shop-floor level because both shop-stewards and local management are rendered powerless by their respective organisations, which apathy leads to further centralisation. However accurate this might be, his further comments are not simply fallacious, but assumes a consensus model of industrial relations, with an explicit recommendation

that shop-stewards be used to further control members. Van Beinum arrives at the conclusion paradoxically. For on pp. 79 ff. he argues that mid twentieth century industrial man has become "privatized" in a world which no longer has the "nineteenth century dichotomy of working class and middle class" (ibid: 79), and thus is apathetic towards trade unions, which should now take on the additional role of seeing that the worker's individual and psychological needs are met. (cf. ibid, particularly p. 82). Quite apart from the ecological fallacy involved, Van Beinum seems unaware of the contradiction that he was commissioned to carry out his study because the "privatized" and "apathetic" of C.I.E. had been taking militant collective and disruptive action.

The distinction between my work and Van Beinum's is clear in these pages. I have been at pains to disclose the conflicts and contradictions inherent in the production of bus services: Van Beinum not only adopts an implicit consensual model of society, but also argues that exploitation (which he designates as deficient psychological need-fulfillment) ought to be resolved by co-operation at the shop floor level because: "They deal with a matter which is, or more accurately, should be mainly of a non-conflict nature." (ibid: 83). He can adopt this peculiar viewpoint because he does not question either the "situational determinants", or that production systems are problematically about "the optimisation of the human resources, the social

system". (ibid: 83).

I believe that my own work has made clear that production at the shop floor level is necessarily a conflictual and contradictory one, for it is structured by particular interests of domination in a way that exploits the workers and inevitably forces them to struggle for control. As a last comment on Van Beinum, let me remark that it would appear that C.I.E. management and the I.T.G.W.U. seem to have recognised that Van Beinum's psychological mysticism bears no relation to reality: by the time of publication, seven years after the initial study, Van Beinum has to report that the only changes are better uniforms and the introduction of a pension scheme.

Having examined Van Beinum's work in some detail, my treatment of Brooks (1975) will be much briefer. Although he explicitly says that he adopts a "socio-technical" and "technological implications" approach in his study of degrees of absorption or pluralism of immigrant groups in London Transport, Brooks avoids all the attendant pitfalls by limiting his discussion of "theory" to one page, and making no use at all subsequently of such ideas.

To summarise in a way that does not do too much damage to a competent study in the area of race, Brooks describes the busman's job very much as Van Beinum does (Brooks indexes Van Beinum in his bibliography but makes no reference in the text) - a good straightforward though brief description, but with tables of answers to such

questions as "what brought you into the job?" analysed not in terms of work experience, but in differences due to race. Brooks does not examine the busmen's labour process in any explanatory way (apart from noting that the conflict inherent in the job is exacerbated by race factors): he totally accepts management's rhetoric about the organisation of work, and he, curiously for what is at times a sophisticated study, confuses "sociability" with "sociological" (e.g. "The social situation of crews operating front-entrance vehicles is probably very different. . ." (ibid: 50).) The similarity with my work lies in the necessary description of the busmen's job: the difference lies in the analysis of the material. I believe the difference to be significant.

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